Blog10/LEARNING_SELF-CONTROLS_NAGEEB_ALIThis_article_examines_how_a

LEARNING SELF-CONTROL∗

S. NAGEEB ALI

This article examines how a decision maker who is only partially aware of his temptations learns about them over time. In facing temptations, individuals use their experience to forecast future self-control problems and choose the appropriate level of commitment. I demonstrate that rational learning can be perpetually partial and need not result in full sophistication. The main result of this article characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for learning to converge to full sophistication. I apply this result to a consumption-savings environment in which a decision maker is tempted by present bias and establish a learning-theoretic justification for assuming sophistication in this setting. JEL Codes: D03, D83.

“An individual who finds himself continuously repudiating his past plans may learn to distrust his future behavior, and may do something about it.”

— Strotz (1955)

I. INTRODUCTION

Questions of temptation and self-control are at the forefront of psychology and economics. When studying self-control, a mod- eler must decide just how much individuals can be assumed to know about their temptations because different assumptions of self-awareness translate intodifferent behavioral predictions. The assumption most commonly made, referred to as sophistication, is that the decision maker perfectly anticipates future self-control problems. Yet sophistication is often seen as an inaccurate model of a decision maker’s awareness, especially when the decision maker may lack experience. An alternative assumption is that of naivete, whereby a decision maker anticipates having perfect self- control in the future. Bridging the gap between these two extreme

∗This article is a revised version of Chapter 3 of my dissertation. I am grateful to my advisers, Susan Athey and Doug Bernheim, for their support and encour- agement and to Drew Fudenberg and Paul Niehaus for numerous suggestions that greatly improved the article. I thank Ricardo Alonso, Manuel Amador, Dan Ben- jamin, Aislinn Bohren, Juan Carrillo, Chris Chambers, Vince Crawford, Stefano DellaVigna, Ben Ho, Shachar Kariv, Navin Kartik, Botond Köszegi, Troy Kravitz, Jon Levin, Charles Lin, Ulrike Malmendier, Andres Santos, Josh Schwartzstein, Shamim Sinnar, Joel Sobel, Joel Watson, Tom Wiseman, the editor (Robert Barro), and three referees for helpful comments. I acknowledge financial support from the UCSD Academic Senate, the UCSD Hellman Fund, the Stanford Institute for Eco- nomic Policy Research, and the Institute for Humane Studies.

c© The Author(s) 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals. [email protected]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2011) 126, 857–893. doi:10.1093/qje/qjr014.

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assumptions, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) propose a framework of partial naivete in which a decision maker with(β,δ) preferences assigns probability 1 to a particular level of present bias (β̂) less than his true present bias (β̂ > β).

With few exceptions, most models of imperfect self-control make one of the above assumptions. That derived behavior is sen- sitive to the specification of beliefs has been widely recognized, including by those that first modeled self-control (Strotz 1955; Pollak 1968). Nevertheless, the practice has been to treat a decision maker’s belief about his self-control as exogenous and model choice given that exogenous belief. While this practice makes analysis tractable, it raises two conceptual issues. First, in models of partial sophistication, a decision maker’s beliefs may be incompatible with what is observed over time, and so ancillary assumptions are necessary for analysis.1 Second, given the many different awareness assumptions that could be made, it has been difficult to assess which assumption is appropriate for a particular environment and why. Fudenberg (2006), in his recent discussion of behavioral economics, voices this concern:

I think that behavioral economics would be well served by concerted

attempts to provide learning-theoretic (or any other) foundations for its equi-

librium concepts. At the least, this process might provide a better under-

standing of when the currently used concepts apply.

This article proposes a simple framework to address these concerns. In this approach, beliefs and choices are derived en- dogenously and jointly evolve based on the decision maker’s ex- perience. Endogenizing beliefs in this way allows one to pose and answer the question of whether and when sophistication closely approximates the decision maker’s self-awareness once he has had many opportunities to learn. Although one may be tempted to conclude that Bayesian learning should always engender sophisti- cation, I demonstrate that tradeoffs between commitment and flex- ibility inherent in self-control environments may actually impede learning. The main result of this article is to offer a necessary and

1. For example, a partially naive decision maker might see behavior that con- tradicts his view of the world in each and every period. The literature typically addresses this issue by assuming that his beliefs are not revised, which implicitly assumes that he receives no feedback about payoffs or the past history.

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sufficient condition—across self-control environments—under which learning is not impeded and inexorably leads to sophisti- cation; this condition can be checked in applications to assess the appropriateness of assuming sophistication.

As the main application of this approach, I analyze a standard consumption-savings environment in which a decision maker is tempted by immediate consumption and purchases illiquid assets to commit toward future consumption. This setting has been the focus of many papers in the quasi-hyperbolic literature (e.g., Laibson 1997; Barro 1999), almost all of which assume sophisti- cation. I demonstrate that this canonical setting satisfies the con- dition for adequate learning: thus, a decision maker who learns about his tendency to overconsume from his past choices even- tually chooses commitment as if he could perfectly forecast his temptation tooverconsume. This result therefore offers a learning- theoretic foundation for sophistication in consumption and savings decisions.

The general framework that I develop builds on the Planner– Doer approach to self-control: decisions are made by a single long-run Planner with dynamically consistent preferences and a myopic Doer. Prior research using such models, particularly Fudenberg and Levine (2006), has demonstrated that such models offer analytically simple and tractable frameworks to understand self-control in a variety of settings,2 and this article illustrates how this approach is useful for studying questions of self- awareness. The Planner represents the forward-looking rational individual who chooses how much to commit by investing in illiq- uid assets, signing contracts, making promises that are costly to betray, and so on. In contrast, the Doer represents the instinc- tive response of the individual who makes the daily choices and is presented with stimuli, situations, and commitments; the Doer is best thought of as a short-run player or behavioral type. The Planner is uncertain about the extent to which the Doer resists temptation and uses the Doer’s behavior to learn over time.

To fix ideas, I describe the example studied in Section II: sup- pose that an individual faces a consumption choice between fish

2. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) were the first to propose a dual-self approach to imperfect self-control. The recent literature also includes Benabou and Pycia (2002), Benhabib and Bisin (2005), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), Brocas and Carrillo (2008), Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), Dekel and Lipman (2010), and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2007).

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and steak in each period. In the beginning of the period, the Plan- ner makes a reservation at either a restaurant that serves only fish or one that serves both fish and steak. The payoff from eating fish is constant over time and across the two restaurants, but that from eating steak depends on an i.i.d. taste shock that is realized after the Planner selects the menu. Eating fish is ex ante optimal given its long-term health benefits, but there are contingencies in which steak may be preferred. As in Kreps (1979), the Plan- ner strictly prefers the flexibility associated with the larger menu were self-control not an issue; however, once at the restaurant, the Doer chooses what to eat (if there is a choice to make). The Doer’s preferences are partially aligned with that of the Planner, and partially reflect a temptation to eat steak in contingencies in which the Planner prefers fish. The Planner is uncertain about the strength of this temptation and would benefit from knowing it because that helps him plan. Were the Planner to know that in the restaurant, temptation is resisted, he may strictly prefer the larger menu for the sake of flexibility. In contrast, if he believes that the Doer would too easily succumb to the temptation to eat steak, the Planner may find it ex ante optimal to select the smaller menu, which offers commitment value.

Learning about one’s self-control involves costly experimenta- tion (and, in this case, a two-armed bandit): the Planner observes the Doer’s self-control only when the Planner chooses the larger menu and exposes himself to temptation. Accordingly, once the Planner becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the Doer’s type, he chooses the smaller menu because the value of flexibility and learning no longer outweigh the expected cost of the Doer suc- cumbing to temptation. Notably, the Planner may make this deci- sion with positive probability even when the Doer is a “good type” who resists temptation. Despite the infinite possibilities to learn, the Planner may decide it not worthwhile to do so and therefore make forever inferior commitment choices.

The direction of the skewness in these beliefs merits discus- sion. The Planner cannot perpetually overestimate the Doer’s self- control and undercommit relative to how he would choose in the full information benchmark. To see why, notice that any belief that rationalizes flexibility will allow the Planner to continue to passively learn and therefore update his beliefs. Thus, if the Doer is unable to resist temptation, the Planner almost-surely learns this over time, and eventually he makes the same commitment choice that he would in the full information benchmark.

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On the other hand, the Planner may perpetually underesti- mate the Doer’s self-control even if he began with an overopti- mistic prior: once the Planner has observed the Doer choose steak too often, flexibility appears costly, and so a Planner will choose to actively learn as long as the future value of learning outweighs its cost. If the Planner is not perfectly patient, he is willing to under- take a finite number of trials, after which he might commit to the singleton menu and never revise his belief thereafter. Thus, par- tial awareness and learning can endogenously lead to perpetual overregulation, whereby individuals choose rigid commitments or lifestyles that they would not were they more self-aware. This pos- sibility resonates with the perspective that obsessions, compul- sions, and rigidity emerge from erroneous beliefs that one lacks control otherwise (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1994).3

A feature of the setting described above is that the Planner chooses between full flexibility or full commitment but has no abil- ity to partially commit. In contrast, many settings feature par- tial commitments that retain some flexibility for the decision maker while offering a measure of commitment. For example, in a savings environment, an individual can purchase illiquid assets to ensure some minimal savings without relinquishing flexibil- ity altogether. Contractual mechanisms, such as recent innova- tions like stickK.com,4 can penalize certain choices and provide incentives to counteract temptation while retaining some flexi- bility. Social mechanisms—through promises, shame, and peer groups—also provide partial commitment insofar as they change the benefits and costs of particular actions but are not completely binding. Apart from external commitments, a decision maker may also rely on internal commitments, such as costly self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001; Fudenberg and Levine 2006), which influ- ence the choice from a menu without relinquishing flexibility al- together. To capture possibilities for partial commitment, I allow the Planner to affect the Doer’s choice through menus and nudges that restrict and influence the Doer’s choice. The framework here demonstrates that these partial commitments play an important role in the decision maker’s long-run behavior and beliefs.

3. A complementary channel for overregulation is explored by Benabou and Tirole (2004), who study a self-signaling mechanism in which temptation is miti- gated by the adverse reputation effect it induces in future incarnations.

4. StickK.com is designed to “help people achieve their goals and objec- tives by enabling them to form Commitment Contracts.” (http://www.stickk. com/about.php).

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The main result of this article identifies when partial com- mitments induce efficient learning regardless of the Planner’s pa- tience. I identify a condition, full commitment distinguishability (FCD), that is sufficient for learning to engender sophistication and may also be necessary. FCD is a condition on how fully in- formed Planners behave and relates to the richness of the set of partial commitments. The necessity and sufficiency of FCD offers a simple criterion to understand whether learning leads to sophis- tication in applications: instead of solving a more intricate model in which the Planner is uncertain and updates beliefs over time, a modeler needs to solve only the full information model in which the Planner knows the Doer’s type and check whether that sat- isfies FCD. Using this characterization, I study two applications that have been examined in prior work assuming sophistication: consumption-savings with illiquid assets and a costly self-control environment. Within these settings, I illustrate how to check the validity of FCD and derive its implications for learning.

The results herein underscore the insights that emerge from deriving the decision maker’s perception of his temptations from his environment. In contrast to prior research that divorces a decision maker’s self-awareness from the fundamentals of the set- ting, whether incorrect beliefs persist is determined endogenously within this framework. Based on these results, one may expect that in those settings in which an individual has access to a wide range of partial commitments, he may know more about his temp- tations than in settings in which partial commitments are inef- fectual or lacking.5 From a normative perspective, the role that partial commitments play in learning has new implications for the design of commitment and suggests when interventions enhance learning. Endogenizing beliefs also makes it possible to connect a decision maker’s perceptions of his temptation to other aspects of his preference; for example, in Section III.D., I highlight how patience fosters learning and sophistication.

Some readers may be troubled by the disappearance of overoptimism at the limits of Bayesian learning. Although I use the approach developed here to study asymptotic behavior, the framework is sufficiently flexible and tractable to model a

5. Just as the nature and severity of an individual’s temptations varies across decision problems, it is likely that his perception and awareness of his temptations also differs across these settings. Thus someone could be sophisticated about his tendency to procrastinate and yet still have erroneous beliefs about the extent to which he may become addicted to particular substances.

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decision maker’s initial response, and these initial responses may reflect initial optimism. Indeed, there are numerous reasons to be- lieve that decision makers may begin with optimistic priors and learn slowly,6 and so findings in the field are consistent with the short-run behavior predicted by this theory. Moreover, when a decision maker makes choices in an environment in which he has had little prior experience, he has to simultaneously learn about how tempted he is by different choices in that setting and the pay- offs of different actions. I show by example that such multidimen- sional learning can be impeded by challenges of identification that slow down the rate of learning. Thus, there are natural reasons to expect decision makers to appear to undercommit in the short run as they simultaneously learn about self-control and the benefits and costs of actions.

Section II presents a simple example of the impediment to learning introduced by imperfect self-control. Section III studies a general framework with partial commitments, in which experi- mentation takes a rich form. That section contains the main results of this article and describes the implications of patience, of- fers some suggestions on how a modeler might make partial inferences about a decision maker’s awareness, and describes the connection of the results here with the steady-state solution concept of self-confirming equilibrium. Section IV applies the framework to savings behavior and costly self-control. Section V discusses the results of this article in light of the related literature and illustrates the identification challenged induced by multidimensional learning. The proofs for all results are collected in an Online Appendix.

II. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

I begin with a simple example to illustrate the mechanism for incomplete learning in the most transparent way. Consider an infinitely-lived individual who chooses between undertaking an activity (at = 1) or not (at = −1) in period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Under- taking the activity in period t generates a deterministic reward b ∈

( 1 2 , 1 )

but involves a stochastic cost st uniformly drawn from

6. Optimism could emanate from a number of different sources, if a positive belief about one’s attributes has some intrinsic value (Brunnermeier and Parker 2005; Kőszegi 2006) or induces motivation (Carrillo and Mariotti 2000; Benabou and Tirole 2002; Compte and Postlewaite 2004).

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[0, 1]. This activity can represent, for example, the choice to con- sume fish from the example described in the introduction or to exercise, in which case b captures the discounted long-run gain from the activity.

The decision in each period is made through the conjunction of two systems, the Planner and the Doer, who act sequentially in each period. The Planner is a long-run agent with an exponential discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and in period t, he obtains a payoff of (b − st) if at = 1 and 0 otherwise. In the first subperiod of each period t, the Planner chooses a menu prior to the realization of st, after which the Doer selects an alternative from the menu. The Planner chooses between full commitment to undertaking the ac- tivity by selecting the singleton menu{1}; full commitment to not undertaking the activity by selecting the singleton menu {−1}; and flexibility by selecting the menu {−1, 1}, thereby permitting the Doer tochoose either action. When the Planner chooses tocom- mit to an action, that action is undertaken regardless of the Doer’s type or the realized cost.

The Doer in each period is not a strategic actor but can be thought of as a behavioral type or short-run player. Nature se- lects the type, θ, of the Doer from

{ θ, θ̄ }

where 0 ≤ θ < θ̄ ≤ 1, and this type persists through time. When the Planner is flexi- ble, the Doer of type θ observes st and chooses at = 1 if and only if θb exceeds st. Thus, the Doer is tempted toward inactivity and undertakes the activity in fewer contingencies than the Planner would wish to do so. This temptation might emerge from a mani- festation of a present bias when costs and rewards are temporally separated. The perspective here is that the Doer’s being myopic (representing the individual’s instincts) does not account for how his actions influence the Planner’s future commitment choices.

The Planner faces a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility: while he would like to exploit the Doer’s informational advantage, flexibility allows temptations to guide that choice. Since the payoff from flexibility depends on the Doer’s suscepti- bility to temptation, it is valuable for the Planner to try to learn about θ to optimally choose commitment in the future. I assume that the Planner would prefer to commit to undertaking the ac- tivity if he were perfectly confident that θ = θ and would prefer to remain flexible if he were confident that θ = θ̄.7

7. The relevant condition is b ∈ (

1 2 −θ

, 1 2 −θ̄

) ; when this does not hold, the

Planner’s optimal commitment choice is independent of his belief about the Doer’s type.

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He begins with a prior μ0 ≡ Pr ( θ = θ̄

) that ascribes positive

probability to both types. For simplicity, suppose that all that he observes over time is behavior and not past realizations of costs (I consider more general informational structures in Section III). Because full commitments override the Doer, the Planner learns about θ only when he chooses to be flexible. I use ht to summarize the relevant history for the Planner when acting at time t and μt to denote the Planner’s posterior belief that the Doer’s type is θ̄. Given a prior belief μ, the Planner updates his beliefs to μ+ and μ− when he is flexible and observes the Doer choose at = 1 and at =−1 respectively. The dynamic decision problem of the Planner is described by the value function

V (μ) = max

 



b − E [s] + δV(μ) , ∑ θ∈{θ,θ̄}Pr

μ (θ)

( θb(b − E [s|s ≤ θb] + δV (μ+))

+(1 −θb)δV (μ−)

)  

 ,

where the first term is the value of committing to undertake the action and the second term is the value of flexibility. The Planner never commits to a =−1 since on expectation this is dominated by committing to a = 1. Standard arguments ensure that the value function exists and is unique, continuous, and nondecreasing inμ, and thus the optimal decision takes the form of a simple threshold rule.

PROPOSITION 1. There exists μ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all μ < μ∗, the Planner’s optimal choice is to commit to the activity and for μ≥μ∗, the Planner’s optimal choice is flexibility.

When the Planner is more optimistic about the Doer’s abil- ity to resist temptation or values the option to learn, he is more willing to remain flexible. Because of the option-value associated with flexibility and learning, a forward-looking Planner is will- ing to choose flexibility even if he expects that committing yields greater short-run payoffs. For less optimistic beliefs, whenμ<μ∗, the benefits of flexibility and learning do not offset the expected costs of temptation, and therefore the Planner chooses to commit. Because the choice of commitment shuts down the channel for learning, once he chooses to commit in one period, he finds it opti- mal to commit in every subsequent period. Because the choice to commit is endogenous, eventual beliefs are endogenous and there- fore evolve differently for each type of the Doer (assuming that the prior μ0 exceeds μ

∗).

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Consider the case in which the Doer is of typeθ. The Planner’s beliefs will fluctuate as long as he remains flexible and his beliefs remain bounded away from putting probability 1 on θ̄. The Mar- tingale Convergence Theorem ensures that the Planner’s beliefs eventually settle but do not converge to the completely incorrect belief ofμ = 1. Therefore, the Planner eventually commits, making the same choice that he would in the full information benchmark; initial partial awareness does not forge any long-lasting differ- ences from the standard benchmark.

Now suppose that the Doer is of type θ̄. The Martingale Convergence Theorem again implies eventual convergence of the Planner’s beliefs, which obtains in two distinct ways: either the Planner’s beliefs converge to the truth (μt → 1) or the Planner’s belief μt falls below μ

∗, leading him to commit. Both events oc- cur with positive probability. Recall that in the full information environment, a Planner who knew that his self-control problem corresponds to θ̄ would never choose to commit. Relative to this benchmark, partial awareness and learning introduce a possibil- ity for long-run inefficiency and overcommitment. The preceding ideas are summarized below.

THEOREM 1. For any typeθ ∈ { θ, θ̄ }

, a Planner eventually chooses to commit with strictly positive probability.

1. If the Doer is of type θ, then almost-surely, the Planner eventually chooses to commit.

2. If the Doer is of type θ̄, then the Planner either chooses to commit or he learns the Doer’s type. Both events occur with strictly positive probability if μ0 ≥μ

∗.

This result illustrates how beliefs that induce excessive flex- ibility eventually dissipate: if the Doer is of type θ, any belief of the Planner that rationalizes flexibility is refined over time as the Planner infers the Doer’s type from its choices. Almost-surely, this information leads the Planner to conclude that the Doer’s type does not warrant flexibility, and therefore the Planner eventually chooses to commit.8

What is the source of the friction that leads to perpetual over- commitment? The principal challenge that the Planner faces is that when he optimally chooses to commit (believing that he faces a Doer of typeθ), his commitment choice leaves no opportunity for

8. While such optimism disappears eventually, it might emerge in the short run, especially if individuals begin with priors that overestimate self-control.

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him to retain flexibility in case the Doer proves to be type θ̄. Thus the Planner faces an experimentation challenge that traps learn- ing with positive probability. Augmenting this environment with partial commitments offer an escape from this experimentation trap.

Consider the inclusion of a simple bond commitment contract. For simplicity, suppose that the individual has risk-neutral and additive preferences and consider a one-period bond contract in which the Planner pays a lump-sum amount L and a prize x is returned to the decision maker if the Doer chooses a = 1. There are various ways to model how such a contract affects the Doer; for simplicity, suppose that a Doer of type θ chooses a = 1 if θb + x exceeds the cost s. In this case, a fully informed Planner, regard- less of the Doer’s type, implements the first-best by setting x to equal (1 −θ)b and paying a prior lump-sum amount of (1 −θ)b2. This bond contract leads to zero expected transfers and induces the Doer of type θ to choose a = 1 whenever the Planner would like to do so.

Not only does such a bond contract attain first-best, but it also helps a partially aware Planner learn efficiently. Regardless of the Planner’ beliefs, it is now never optimal to restrict the Doer’s choice set to a singleton: even when the Planner becomes quite confident that the Doer’s type isθ, he is better off, even in the short run, by partially committing through a bond contract. Over time, as the Planner uses bond contracts repeatedly, he can observe the Doer’s behavior and therefore continue learning; almost-surely, his beliefs converge to the truth.

The possibility for partial commitments to dynamically im- prove learning has implications for commitment design. Recent years have seen the advent and study of commitment contracts that incentivize good behavior and mitigate self-control problems. The following section analyzes generally when partial commit- ments facilitate sophistication.

III. WHEN IS LEARNING ADEQUATE?

The framework builds on the above example in several ways. The action-space can be binary or a continuum. The commitment technology can be one of two types: first, as in the prior section, the Planner can set incentives to nudge the Doer to take a par- ticular action, and second, he can choose menus that restrict the

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Doer’s choice. Both commitment technologies capture the essence of partial commitment, albeit in different forms, and the gener- ality of this framework is useful in applying these results to dis- tinct but commonly studied applications. The Doer’s type is also drawn from a continuum. Finally, the Planner observes signals about past taste shocks.

As before, time is discrete and unbounded, with choices be- ing made in period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The Doer makes choices from a fixed, time- and history-invariant action set A: this is assumed to be a compact subset of <. In each period, a state s is real- ized that determines the Planner’s preferences for that period: s is drawn from S ≡ [s, s̄] and is distributed i.i.d. with measure ν that has cumulative distribution function F (∙) and a continuous and strictly positive density f . The Planner’s state-dependent prefer- ences over actions, u( a, s), are bounded, strictly quasi-concave in a for each state s, and jointly continuous and satisfy the strict single-crossing condition in(a, s). Accordingly, for each state s, the Planner has a most preferred action aP(s) which is nondecreasing in s. Let â denote the action that the Planner would choose if the Planner had to prescribe a single action for every contingency; for simplicity, I assume that â is unique, and I denote by π̂ the ex- pected payoff of this action.9

The Planner cannot directly choose actions but can choose commitment. The Planner has two forms of commitment: menus and nudges. A menu, M, is a nonempty closed subset of A, which restricts the Doer’s choice of action. Let F be the collection of all nonempty closed subsets of A; this is the collection of all feasible menus. The Planner may or may not have access to all feasible menus: the set of menus from which the Planner can make a choice isM, a closed subset ofF that contains full flexibility (M = A) and the optimal full commitment (M = {â}).10 In addition to restrict- ing choices through menus, the Planner can nudge the Doer into taking particular actions through incentives: the Planner can sign commitment contracts, make promises to peers that are costly to betray, or exert self-control. A nudge, η, directly affects the Doer’s choices between actions in a state-dependent manner that is spec- ified below. The set of nudges is N , a closed subset of [0, 1], which

9. In other words, â is the unique solution to maxa∈A ∫

S u(a, s)dν, and π̂ is the associated expected payoff.

10. Distance is defined by the Hausdorff metric. By Theorem 3.85 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), F is compact, and M, being a closed subset of a compact set, inherits compactness.

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includes the case of no nudge (η = 0). I let C = M×N denote the full set of commitments available and c = (M,η) denote a generic element.

As before, the Doer is a myopic agent who does not account for how his actions affect the Planner’s choices. The Doer’s behavior is governed by its type θ drawn fromΘ =

[ θ, θ̄ ] . The Doer observes

the state s and nudge η and chooses the action from the menu M that maximizes the payoff function W (a, s,θ,η); when indifferent between two actions, the Doer chooses the action that the Plan- ner prefers. The function W is continuous and satisfies the strict single-crossing property in (a, s), (a,θ), and (a,η), and for each (s,θ,η), W is strictly quasi-concave in a. The action selected by the Doer facing a commitment c is denoted by aD(s,θ, c).

These assumptions ensure that the Doer’s preferred action is nondecreasing in the state s for a fixed type θ and nudge η. Thus, both the Doer and Planner prefer higher actions in higher states. For a fixed state, the Doer’s preferred action is nondecreasing in its typeθ and in the nudgeη chosen by the Planner. I assume that in the absence of all commitment, the Doer prefers to choose a lower action than the Planner.

ASSUMPTION 1. The Doer is tempted to undertake lower actions than the Planner: u(a, s) dominates W(a, s,θ, 0) by the single- crossing property for every type θ of the Doer.11

Assumption 1 implies that the Planner knows the direction of temptation but is uncertain about its strength, which varies with the type of the Doer. Such an assumption is consistent with most applications of this model, for example, in which temptation is driven by some form of present bias, or by identification of a tempting object. A special case of this framework, also consistent with most applications, accords the highest type, θ̄, with the Plan- ner’s preferences over actions, and thus no temptation.

I denote a full information environment—in which the Plan- ner knows the Doer’s type—byΓ = (S,ν, A, u, W,Θ; C), a constella- tion of parameters that satisfy the above conditions. The Planner begins with a prior μ0; throughout the article, I restrict attention to priors μ0 with a continuous and strictly positive density on Θ.

After each period t, the Planner observes at and obtains some information about st. The setting of Section II considered an ex- treme case in which the Planner learns nothing about the state;

11. In other words, for every type θ, state s, and pair of actions a and a′ > a, W(a′, s,θ, 0)− W( a, s,θ, 0)≥(>) 0 implies u( a′, s)−u(a, s)≥ (>) 0.

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one could equally consider the other extreme in which the Planner observes the state perfectly. Spanning these two extremes is an imperfect attribution environment in which the Planner observes the state with noise. Generally, suppose that the Planner obtains a signal σt( at, st) that comes from the space S and is distributed according to F̃(σ|s, a).

For t > 0, ht denotes the relevant history for the Planner in period t, which comprises past commitments, actions, and signals. The Planner’s posterior belief about the Doer’s type conditional on history ht is denoted by μt.

I analyze two special cases of this model relevant for the ap- plications herein.

MODEL 1—Actions are chosen from a binary set A = {−1, 1} in which the ex ante optimal choice, â, is 1. The Planner’s payoff satisfies u(−1, s) =0 for all s, and u(1, s) = U(s), where U is smooth, strictly increasing in s, and satisfies U(s)< 0 < U(̄s). The Planner can choose from all possible menus—M = {{−1, 1} ,{−1} ,{1}}— and can choose nudges from N .

MODEL 2—Actions are chosen from a continuum A = [a, ā], and the Planner’s and Doer’s state-contingent payoffs satisfy the assumptions of the general model and are smooth. The Planner does not have access to nudges(N = {0}) but has access to a closed set of menus, M. For convenience, suppose that a = aD( s,θ, A, 0) and ā = aP( s̄). Two special cases of interest are those in which M is the set of all feasible interval menus, which I refer to as Model 2a, and in whichM comprises all feasible menus including nonintervals, which I refer to as Model 2b.12

Model 1 generalizes the example in Section II to a contin- uum of types.13 In the binary choice environment, menus without nudges offer the Planner a choice between commitment to a sin- gleton menu or full flexibility. Nudges introduce partial commit- ment by allowing the Planner to influence how the Doer chooses actions in each state. Apart from its usefulness in understanding

12. Specifically, Model 2a corresponds toM = FI = {[α,β]: α,β ∈ A andβ ≥ α}, and Model 2b corresponds toM = F.

13. Section II, restricted to two types, corresponds to S = [−1, 0], u(−1, s) = 0 for all s, and u(1, s) = b + s, where b ∈

( 1 2 , 1 ) . The Doer’s payoff is W(a, s,θ,η) =

1{a = 1} (θb + η + s) and thus the ideal action a ∗ D(s,θ,η) takes on a value of 1 if

0 ≤ θb + η + s and −1 otherwise. In the absence of the bond contract, the set of nudges is N = {0}, but with the bond contract, the set of nudges is expanded to N ′ = [0,(1 −θ)b].

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the impact of incentive-based commitment mechanisms, this model provides insight into how a decision maker learns to exert internal self-control and willpower, as studied in Section IV.B.

Model 2 offers a continuous action space in which the Planner commits by restricting the Doer’s choices and has no other way to influence the Doer. This framework is particularly applicable to study savings environments, as I demonstrate in Section IV.A., in which the Planner can purchase illiquid assets to commit the Doer to some minimal savings but still retain some flexibility for the Doer to save more than that minimum.

Since the applications of interest in the literature satisfy either Model 1 or Model 2, I characterize learning only for these two special cases. In both cases, the Planner faces an exercise of optimal experimentation similar to but richer than a standard multiarmed bandit. Naturally, my work builds on insights derived from the experimentation literature, particularly Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Aghion et al. (1991).

III.A. Adequate versus Partial Learning

The central issue analyzed is whether the Planner eventu- ally attains the same payoffs that he would in the full informa- tion benchmark in which the Doer’s type is known. Answering this question sheds light on when an assumption of sophistication can be justified through long-run learning.

The full information payoff is defined as follows: for each type θ, when the Planner selects commitment c, his expected staticpay- off is π(θ, c) =

∫ S u( aD[s,θ, c], s) dν. Given a Doer of type θ, denote

the Planner’s full information payoff by π∗(θ) = maxc∈Cπ(θ, c), and let C∗(θ) denote the set of commitments that attain this pay- off. This payoff corresponds to the Planner’s optimal balance be- tween flexibility and commitment when the Planner knows the Doer’s type; its existence is guaranteed by continuity and com- pactness assumptions.

When the Planner is uncertain about θ and has beliefs μ, he optimizes with respect to his beliefs. Denote the payoff in a single period from a commitment choice c by m(μ, c) =

∫ Θ π(θ, c)dμ; how-

ever, when the Planner is even slightly patient, he also values learning. Given a commitment choice c and prior μ, the Planner may revise his beliefs when observing the Doer’s chosen action and the realized signal; Q(μ, c) denotes the probability distribu- tion over posteriors induced by (μ, c), and P(Θ) denotes the set of

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Borel probability measures onΘ. The Planner solves the Bellman Equation,

V(μ; δ) =max c∈C

{

(1 − δ)m(μ, c) +δ ∫

P(Θ) V(μ̃; δ) dQ(μ, c)

}

The Planner’s beliefs, commitment choices, and therefore, value function evolve stochastically; the object of interest is their long-run distribution conditional on the true θ. We can partition the set of types based on whether learning is necessarily efficient, yielding the full information payoffs in the longrun.

DEFINITION 1. Learning is adequate for a type θ if the Planner’s payoffs eventually converges to the full information bench- mark with probability 1,

Pr ( lim

t→∞ V[μt; δ] = π

∗[θ]|θ )

= 1,

and otherwise, learning is partial for typeθ. Learning is glob- ally adequate for a prior μ0 and discount factor δ if the set of types for which learning is partial has μ0-measure 0, and otherwise, learning is inadequate for that prior and discount factor.

Adequate learning is weaker than complete learning insofar as the eventual belief need not identify the type, but the Planner nevertheless obtains the same payoffs as in the full information benchmark. Globally adequate learning requires more than the mere existence of strategies that ensure learning; indeed, it must be that at least one such strategy is optimal for the Planner.

III.B. Full Commitment Distinguishability

The possibility for globally adequate learning relies critically on the commitment set, and one can assess if it is conducive to learning by examining how a fully informed Planner behaves. Be- fore deriving the precise condition, I offer a heuristic explana- tion of its connection to globally adequate learning. Whenever the Planner remains partially flexible so that the Doer can choose dif- ferent actions in different states, the Planner eventually learns the Doer’s type from the empirical frequency of its action choices. It is only when the Planner chooses to constrain the Doer to a sin- gle action in all states that learning is possibly impeded. Since it might be optimal to fully commit some types of the Doer to choose â, the Planner can perpetually distinguish these types from others

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if there is a way to fully commit those types while retaining flex- ibility for others. The presence of such expedient commitment is formalized as the property of full commitment distinguishability.

Formally, let Ĉ(θ) ={c ∈C: aD( s,θ, c) = â for almost all s} de- note the set of commitments that induce a Doer of type θ to choose the action â with probability 1; for each type, this set is nonempty because C includes the singleton menu {â}. The set of types for which a fully informed Planner finds it optimal to fully commit to the action â—and relinquish flexibility altogether—is denoted by Θ̂ = {θ ∈Θ: π∗(θ) = π̂}.

DEFINITION 2. An environment Γ satisfies full commitment dis- tinguishability (FCD) if for almost every θ̂ in Θ̂ and every θ not in Θ̂, Ĉ(θ̂)* Ĉ(θ).

Under FCD, the Planner can carefully select commitment so as to fully commit almost every “bad type” in Θ̂ while retaining partial flexibility for some “good type” outside Θ̂. A sufficient but unnecessary condition for FCD is that a fully informed Planner never chooses full commitment, as in Section II when the bond commitment contract was introduced. An environment fails FCD if the only commitments that fully commit a strictly positive mea- sure of types inΘ̂ also fully commit some types not inΘ̂. Since the Planner’s preference for commitment is determined by how the Doer maps taste shocks into actions, the particular representation of the Doer’s preferences does not affect whether an environment satisfies FCD.

To clarify what is being assumed in FCD, I detail when the condition holds in each of these two models below. These details are not entirely necessary to understand the connections drawn between FCD and globally adequate learning, and so some read- ers may wish to skip to Section III.C.

When Does FCD Hold? Consider the binary action environ- ment of Model 1: because W satisfies the single-crossing condition in(a,θ), any commitment that induces the Doer of typeθ toalways select a = 1 also induces all higher types to choose that higher ac- tion in every state. Thus, FCD can be satisfied only if whenever a type θ is in Θ̂, all higher types are also in Θ̂.

OBSERVATION 1. In Model 1, an environment Γ satisfies FCD if and only if for almost all θ in Θ̂, all higher types θ′ are also in Θ̂.

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The following examples highlight aspects of FCD in Model 1: let the Planner’s payoff from a = 1 in period t be b + st in which b = 34 and st is drawn uniformly from S = [−1, 0], and recall that the Planner’s payoff from a = 0 is normalized to 0. The Doer’s type is drawn from Θ =

[ 0, 12

] , and the Doer chooses a = 1 if and only if

θb + s + η is positive. The Planner selects nudges η from N , and depending on N , FCD is satisfied or violated. In each of these ex- amples, the Planner has access to all possible menus but does at least as well by choosing the menu {−1, 1} and using the nudges specified below.

EXAMPLE 1 (FCD with no commitment). SupposeN ⊇ [

3 8 ,

3 4

] : then

a fully informed Planner sets η∗(θ) = (1 −θ)b to align every type’s preference perfectly with the Planner. SinceΘ̂ =∅, FCD is trivially satisfied.

EXAMPLE 2 (FCD with commitment). Suppose that N = {0} ∪[ 3 4 , 1 ] : then a fully informed Planner uses a nudge of 34 for

each type. Such a commitment choice offers flexibility to all types below 13 and fully commits all higher types. Thus, Θ̂ =[

1 3 ,

1 2

] and satisfies FCD.

EXAMPLE 3 (FCD not preserved under expansion). Suppose that the nudge

{ 3 16

} is added to N above: then a fully informed

Planner uses a nudge of 316 for types in (

5 12 ,

1 2

) , thereby offer-

ing flexibility to those types, and a nudge of 34 for any other type. FCD is violated because Θ̂ =

[ 1 3 ,

5 12

] .

Examples 2 and 3 highlight a distinction between FCD and standard notions of richness: FCD in Model 1 is not necessarily preserved when N is expanded.

In Model 2, it is difficult to offer a simple criterion for FCD generally. One can simplify having to check every potential pair of types θ̂ inΘ̂ andθ not inΘ̂: FCD holds if and only if it is possible to fully commit the type with the least self-control (θ) while retain- ing flexibility for any type not in Θ̂. FCD simplifies further in the special cases of Models 2a−b in which M comprises all feasible interval menus or all feasible menus respectively. In these cases, a Planner has no reason to fully commit a Doer that would freely pick actions higher than â in some states: by Assumption 1, the Doer chooses actions higher than â only in those states that the Planner prefers higher actions to â. Thus a Planner is better off by offering the menu [â, ā] rather than committing the Doer to choos- ing â in every state. So the set of types for which full commitment

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is optimal is a subset of those that choose actions less than â in every contingency. In this context, FCD is satisfied if and only if these two sets of types are identical.

PROPOSITION 2. An environmentΓ satisfies FCD in Model 2 if and only if Θ̂ has zero measure or for every θ not in Θ̂, it is the case that Ĉ(θ) * Ĉ(θ). In Models 2a−b, FCD is satisfied if and only if the set of types for which full commitment is optimal, Θ̂, coincides with the set of all types whose preferred action is below â in every state.

III.C. Main Results

I describe the connection between FCD and globally adequate learning: FCD is sufficient for globally adequate learning and might also be necessary in particular cases. When FCD is sat- isfied, these results offer Bayesian learning foundations for so- phistication. Simultaneously, the results indicate that individuals might not be fully sophisticated in environments in which FCD fails and that interventions may help even experienced individu- als develop a better understanding of their temptations.

I begin by demonstrating sufficiency.

THEOREM 2. If an environment Γ satisfies FCD, then for all pri- ors μ0 and discount factors δ, learning is globally adequate in Models 1 and 2.

When FCD is satisfied, even a slightly patient Planner even- tually chooses commitment as if he were fully sophisticated about his imperfect self-control. Moreover, under FCD, globally adequate learning may obtain even if the Planner is not sufficiently forward- looking to actively learn and experiment: a passive learner who myopically best-responds to his beliefs eventually behaves as if he perfectly understood his temptation. As such, the introduction of partial commitments that induce FCD can have strong impli- cations for individuals regardless of their patience or prior.

The essence of the argument is that if FCD is satisfied, learn- ing has no short-term costs but offers short-term and long-term benefits; in other words, the commitment structure facilitates cheap experimentation. Under FCD, the Planner can select com- mitments that fully commit those types in Θ̂—for which full com- mitment is optimal—while retaining partial flexibility to some types not in Θ̂. By choosing commitment in this way, the Plan- ner can learn about the Doer based on the empirical frequency of

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his choices. Should the Doer choose different actions over time, that frequency identifies his type. On the other hand, if the Doer chooses the same action in every period, the Planner learns that the Doer’s type is one that has no flexibility at that commitment choice. Based on this updated belief, the Planner can change his commitment choice so as to still guarantee that types in Θ̂ fully commit while offering partial flexibility to types not in Θ̂ that re- main in the support of his posterior. By iterating this procedure, the Planner eventually makes choices that converge to those in the full information benchmark.

Notice that such an argument applies independently of the accuracy with which the Planner observes past states. The signal σt(at, st) could be a noisy signal of the state st or uninformative al- together, and globally adequate learning is nevertheless ensured. Insofar as there are substantive reasons to consider noisy attri- bution structure (prior work has focused on such cases),14 it is noteworthy that such noise does not prevent long-run learning in the presence of FCD, although it likely interferes with the speed of learning.

In the absence of FCD, challenges of costly experimentation emerge. When the cost of experimentation outweighs the bene- fits of learning, the Planner may choose to sacrifice learning for the sake of short-term payoffs if he is not perfectly patient. Since sets of menus can assume many different forms in Model 2, it is challenging to demonstrate the necessity of FCD generally. Ac- cordingly, I demonstrate the necessity of FCD in the special cases of Model 2a−b, in which M comprises all feasible interval menus or all feasible menus respectively.

THEOREM 3. Suppose that an environment Γ fails FCD. Then for every discount factor δ < 1, learning is inadequate for some open set of priors in Models 1 and 2a−b.

14. Noisy attribution has featured in, for example, Benabou and Tirole (2004), where the assumption is that a decision maker learns about his self-control using a “revealed preference” approach. One reason to study noise in attribution is that if past circumstances and taste shocks are representations of subjective states and emotions, it might be difficult for an individual with imperfect self-control toobtain perfect information about past circumstances. Various studies highlight the diffi- culty that individuals face in separating situational factors from aspects of one’s innate character (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1994; Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997; Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003). Moreover, if the Doer observe a noisy signal of st and the Planner observes st but not the signal of the Doer, the imperfect monitoring model that emerges is equivalent to a noisy attribution framework.

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The inadequacy of learning highlights that when FCD fails, a modeler cannot preclude the possibility of partial learning. When learning fails, it does so in a systematic way: the Planner fully commits a Doer type that he would have offered flexibility had he been fully informed. The likelihood with which learning fails necessarily depends on the discount factor, the Planner’s prior, and the informativeness of the feedback that the Planner receives; I show in Theorem 4 below that such inefficiencies vanish as the Planner approaches perfect patience.

III.D. Remarks

The Role of Patience Posing self-awareness as an issue of ex- perimentation permits the study of the connection between the decision maker’s patience and his sophistication. As the Planner becomes more patient, he increasingly values sacrificing current payoffs to gain information that helps improve commitment choices in the future. This logic suggests that a more patient Plan- ner is less likely to fully commit when the Doer’s type warrants flexibility, and by the same token, will experiment more even if the Doer’s type warrants full commitment. I offer a limit result in this vein.

THEOREM 4. As the Planner approaches perfect patience, his pay- offs and choices approach the full information benchmark with probability 1 regardless of whether FCD is satisfied: for every prior μ0, limδ→1V(μ0; δ) =

∫ Θ π∗(θ)dμ0.

Theorem 4 follows from the observation that if a fully informed Planner is forced to select from a finite number of commitments CN in C, his payoff loss from this restriction can be made arbi- trarily small regardless of the Doer’s type. Analogous to results derived elsewhere in the experimentation framework,15 the Plan- ner can then approach the full information payoffs (restricted to a finite set of commitment choices) by conducting a large number of experiments and then forever selecting what appears to be the best commitment thereafter.

This result indicates the virtue of patience when it comes to learning; a patient Planner tolerates many lapses of self-control so as to optimally commit in the future. Generally, it is ambigu- ous as to whether the increased experimentation takes the form

15. For example, see Aghion et al. (1991) and Fudenberg and Levine (1993b).

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of flexibility for a greater number of periods or greater flexibility per period. However, for the simplest commitment setting studied in Section II, this result would suggest that the patient Planner will choose to remain fully flexible for many periods even when he sees the Doer choosing a = 1 with low probability. Accordingly, it would be difficult to distinguish between naive and patient Plan- ners merely on the basis of short-run commitment choices.

Identifying Awareness. The necessary and sufficient condition for adequate learning, FCD, is defined in terms of how a fully sophisticated Planner copes with the full range of possible tempta- tions. As in the applications in Section IV, it is relatively straight- forward to check this condition in full information models that we typically use; in many such contexts, specifying the full infor- mation model of temptation and commitment implicitly assumes FCD or its absence.

When a modeler or policy maker does not have a particular full information model, checking for FCD may be challenging be- cause how a decision maker copes with different levels of tempta- tion is not directly observed. Nevertheless, within some settings, an individual’s long-run preference for commitment can help iden- tify his eventual awareness.

To illustrate, if a decision maker strictly prefers some nonsingleton menu c to every singleton menu, then the decision maker is partially committing and therefore must have adequately learned. In the opposite case, if the decision maker weakly prefers some singleton menu to every other menu, then he is fully committing and so he may or may not be sophisticated. In this case, the policy maker can learn about the decision maker’s awareness by exposing him to different commitments and observ- ing how he responds. If temporary subsidies to commitments not in his most preferred set have long-lasting implications on the decision maker’s commitment choices, then learning was inadequate.16

Relationship to Self-Confirming Equilibrium. The dynamic process of learning that I have studied bears a resemblance to

16. Consistent with this possibility, temporary subsidies to drug rehabilitation are often believed to have effects after the subsidy has ended (Kaper et al., 2005). Given the experimentation challenge that individuals face in finding the appropri- ate commitment devices and therapy for addiction, it is natural that learning is inadequate.

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steady-state solution concepts motivated by learning, in particu- lar to the concept of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE), developed by Fudenberg and Levine (1993a). One way toviewthese results is as foundations for studying SCE (or a variant thereof) in dynamic self-control environments. In this section, I compare the limiting behavior and beliefs of the dynamic model with those that emerge from the steady-state concept.

In an SCE, players do not deviate given their beliefs about how others behave, and each player’s belief is consistent with ex- periences on the path of play; unlike a Nash equilibrium, these beliefs might err on how others would behave off the equilibrium path. Adapting this concept to the framework here requires addi- tional restrictions: the Planner’s beliefs both on and off the path of play must be compatible with his knowledge of the Doer’s type space, that is, how different levels of temptation lead to differ- ent distributions of behavior. Encoding these restrictions yields an adaptation of rationalizable self-confirming equilibria (RSCE) to Bayesian games: an RSCE refines the set of SCE by imposing the further restriction that any player’s belief about others’ actions, on or off the path of play, must be rationalized by her knowledge of their payoffs.17

Thus, the appropriate analogue to the framework here is a Bayesian game in which: (a) Nature chooses the Doer’s type, which is fixed once and for all, (b) the Planner and Doer have payoff func- tions specified above, (c) the Planner knows Nature’s distribution of states s and how the Doer chooses actions as a function of its type, and (d) the Planner observes only the action chosen by the Doer and the signal σ(a, s) at the end of each round. An RSCE of this game consists of a commitment choice c rationalized by some consistent belief μ about the Doer’s type and θ, the actual type of the Doer. The Planner’s belief μ is consistent with the path of play if the distribution over actions and signals generated by the commitment choice c and the Doer’s type θ coincides with what the Planner expects given belief μ.18 The following describes the RSCE of this setting.

17. RSCE is developed by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (1999). Dekel, Fuden- berg, and Levine (2004) adapt SCE to Bayesian games, including those in which a player’s type is fixed once and for all; however, they do not study RSCE in this setting. Fudenberg and Levine (2009) offer a survey of this literature.

18. Formally, when the Planner chooses commitment c, and the Doer’s type is θ, consistency of μ demands that if θ′ is in the support of μ, then ν (s: aD[s,θ, c] =/ aD[s,θ

′, c]) = 0.

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OBSERVATION 2. The set of RSCE in which the Doer’s type is θ comprises:

1. Complete learning: a commitment c in C∗(θ), rationalized by the belief that ascribes probability 1 toθ.

2. Full commitment: a commitment c rationalized by some be- liefμ, such that c induces typeθ and all types in the support

ofμtofully commit, that is, c is in Ĉ(θ)∩ ( ∩θ′∈Supp(μ)Ĉ(θ

′) )

Since the Planner’s beliefs must be consistent with observa- tions from repeated play, if the Planner retains some flexibility for the Doer, his steady-state beliefs must ascribe probability 1 to the true type of the Doer (because different Doer types respond differently to flexibility). The Planner may also hold a belief that rationalizes full commitment, which precludes the possibility for further learning. In contrast to the dynamic setting, full commit- ment may be chosen even if FCD is satisfied and the Doer’s type does not warrant it. A simple illustration of this RSCE is one in which the Planner assigns probability 1 to Θ̂ and chooses the singleton menu {â}. Regardless of the Doer’s actual type, these potentially incorrect beliefs are consistent with experiences on the path of play and rationalize the commitment choice. Because Theorem 2 demonstrates that such outcomes cannot emerge in the dynamic framework unless the Doer’s type is indeed in Θ̂, this inconsistency suggests that the limits of learning in the dynamic framework correspond to a particular selection of RSCE.

The source of this tension is that an RSCE permits the Planner to ascribe zero probability to the truth in contrast to the dynamic framework in which the Planner begins with a full sup- port prior and almost-surely includes the truth within the support of his limit beliefs. Selecting those RSCE that contain a “grain of truth” is sufficient to reconcile the two approaches. Define an RSCE to be absolutely continuous (AC-RSCE) if the commitment choice c is rationalized by at least one belief that is both consistent and includes in its support the Doer’s actual type θ. Although the full implications of this selection are better left for future work, it captures the implications of FCD in a steady-state setting.

THEOREM 5. If an environment Γ satisfies FCD in Models 1 and 2, then in every AC-RSCE in which the Doer’s type is θ, the

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Planner’s commitment choice is from C∗(θ) yielding the full information payoffs, regardless ofθ. If an environmentΓ fails FCD in Models 1 and 2a−b, then there exist AC-RSCEs for a strictly positive measure of θ in which the Planner fails to attain full information payoffs.

IV. APPLICATIONS

IV.A. Consumption-Savings

The canonical application of self-control models is toconsump- tion and savings decisions. Evidence suggests that individuals are tempted by immediate consumption, and a recent literature has studied how access to an illiquid asset offers a powerful instru- ment for commitment to such individuals.19 Holding wealth in illiquid form effectively sets a minimal level of savings and thereby protects some wealth from consumption splurges. At the same time, excessive illiquidity impedes a decision maker from respond- ing touninsurable risk, and soa delicate balance between commit- ment and flexibility must be maintained. The burgeoning literature on these issues has largely focused on decision mak- ers who are fully sophisticated about their imperfect self-control. While this is the natural starting point, it raises the question of whether experience would lead a decision maker who is initially uncertain about his self-control toeventually act as if he were fully sophisticated. This section answers the question in the affirma- tive in this canonical setting: when a decision maker is uncertain about his tendency to overconsume and has access to an illiquid asset, he eventually makes commitment choices as if he were fully informed. I demonstrate this positive learning result first in the setting studied in the prior literature—in which commitment cor- responds to the purchase of illiquid assets—and then show that it also extends to a setting in which singleton consumption sets are also available.

The simple savings environment that I study is a decision maker who faces a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility

19. The role of illiquid assets as commitment was discussed in some of the earliest work on self-control—for example, Strotz (1955) and Thaler and Shefrin (1981)—and studied in a number of subsequent articles, including Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2005), Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006). Harris and Laibson (2003) offer a sur- vey and discussion.

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in each period. His expected payoff from a consumption stream {ct}

∞ t = 0 is E

[∑∞ t = 0 δ

tutU( ct) ] , where U is a Constant Relative Risk

Aversion (CRRA) utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion σ > 0, and ut is a taste shock. The taste shock in each period affects the marginal utility of current consumption and fol- lows an i.i.d. process represented by a continuous density on [u, ū] with u > 0, and normalized so that E [u] = 1. The Planner begins with an initial wealth y0, and subsequent wealth is generated by the returns from savings in the prior period at gross interest rate R. To ensure that the transversality condition is satisfied, I as- sume thatδR1−σ < 1. The restriction to CRRA utility ensures that in the absence of a self-control problem, a decision maker would have a consumption rate that depends only on the taste shock: in period t, if he has wealth yt and faces a taste shock ut, he consumes cP( ut) yt.

In this dual self framework, consumption choices are made as follows: each period is divided into two subperiods. Wealth at the beginning of the period is denoted by yt, which can be in- vested by the Planner in illiquid assets or kept in a liquid form in the first subperiod. The Planner effectively selects a minimal sav- ings rate, st, by investing an amount styt in illiquid assets. In the second sub-period, the taste shock is realized, then the Doer se- lects consumption ct from the feasible set—which is [0, ( 1 − st)yt]— and invests the remainder in the asset. For expository con- venience, assume that returns from saving occur at the same rate regardless of whether the choice was made by the Planner or Doer.

As before, the Planner has the standard long-run preferences, whereas the Doer is a short-run behavioral type that is tempted by immediate consumption. Formally, a Doer of type θ will aim to consume c(u,θ)y when total wealth is y, and he selects the fea- sible consumption closest to this ideal. Doer types θ are in [θ, 1] drawn according to μ0. I assume that c(u,θ) is strictly positive, smooth in (u,θ), strictly decreasing in θ, and strictly increasing in u; morever, c(u, 1) coincides with the Planner’s ideal, cP(u). Ac- cordingly, for every taste shock, every Doer type has a constant saving rate that is (weakly) less than the Planner’s optimal sav- ing rate and strictly increasing in the Doer’s type. One special case is a linear specification c(u,θ)=

( 1 θ

) cP(u); another special case

inheres to standard formulations of present bias in which c(u,θ)

20. A guess and verify approach to solving the stochastic Euler equation yields that cP(u)=

u1/σC u1/σC + δ1/σR(1−σ)/σ

, where C solves E [(

Cu1/σ + δ1/σR(1−σ)/σ )σ]

= 1.

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corresponds to how the Planner would have chosen had his dis- count factor been θδ.21

Since my goal is to establish the inevitability of globally ad- equate learning, I make the most stark of informational assump- tions: the Planner observes only past consumption and not past taste shocks. Since learning emerges here, it continues do so in richer observational environments.

The setting here is similar to Model 2a of Section III in which partial commitment takes the form of interval menus. By invest- ing in illiquid assets, the Planner specifies a consumption cap (or a savings floor), and for every taste shock, the Planner would wish to consume less than the Doer. The contrast to Section III emerges in the introduction of a state variable other than beliefs, namely the Planner’s wealth, although the restriction to CRRA utility af- fords tractability. Although the set of feasible consumption choices changes over time, the preferred savings and consumption rates for the Planner and Doer are time and history invariant. To apply the methods developed earlier, one can formulate actions as sav- ings rates and states as (u)−1; with such transformations, both the Planner and Doer prefer higher savings rates in higher states, the Doer’s preferred savings rate in each state is increasing in its type, and the Planner prefers a higher savings rate than the Doer in every state.

Directly solving the model in which the Planner is uncertain about the Doer’s temptation is challenging because the specifica- tion of any menu induces different separating and bunching re- gions for different types of the Doer. Accordingly, the selection of a menu affects the Planner’s learning in intricate ways. The tools developed in Section III sidestep these complications alto- gether: I demonstrate that the simpler full information model (in which the Planner knows the Doer’s type) satisfies FCD and can then apply Theorem 2. Verifying FCD takes the following steps.

First, suppose that the Planner could not offer any flexibil- ity and were forced to commit to a particular consumption path irrespective of taste shocks; this selection corresponds to finding the analogue of the optimal full commitment â from Section III. The optimal binding consumption path in this case is one in

21. Specifically, c( u,θ) = u 1/σC(θ)

u1/σC(θ) + (θδ)1/σR(1−σ)/σ , where C(θ) solves

E [(

Cu1/σ + (θδ)1/σ R(1−σ)/σ )σ]

= 1.

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which the Planner ensures that the fraction ŝ = δ1/σR(1−σ)/σ is saved in each period and consumes the remainder.

Second, I solve for how the Planner resolves the tradeoff be- tween commitment and flexibility when he knows that the Doer is of type θ. In the Online Appendix, I demonstrate that he pur- chases the same fraction of illiquid assets, s∗ (θ), in each period to induce some commitment. Accordingly, the Doer can never con- sume more than 1 − s∗(θ) of the current wealth but can choose to consume less when consumption is less valuable. Without temp- tation toward present consumption (θ = 1), the Planner chooses to keep all wealth liquid and affords the Doer maximal flexibility; otherwise, the Planner may use a strictly positive level of illiquid assets as commitment. If it so happens that for all taste shocks, the Doer wish to consume more than the amount of wealth that is kept in a liquid form, the Doer is fully committed to a particular consumption path.

Using the above characterizations, one can then partition Θ into Θ̂, the set of types that a fully informed Planner chooses to leave with no flexibility, and its complement, to wit, types that the Planner offers (partial) flexibility. In the Online Appendix, I demonstrate that Θ̂ comprises all types that consume at least (1 − ŝ)yt for every realization of ut; to effectively fully commit such types, the Planner only keeps that level of wealth liquid, and holds illiquid assets of ŝyt in each period. In contrast, if the Doer con- sumes less than (1 − ŝ)yt for some taste shocks, the Planner ben- efits from maintaining some flexibility. When facing this milder temptation tooverconsume, the Planner purchases a smaller hold- ing of illiquid assets and thereby retains greater flexibility for the Doer. Thus, the types that are fully committed, Θ̂, corresponds to the set {θ ∈Θ: c(u,θ)≥ 1 − ŝ}.

Figure I illustrates these consumption caps. If a Planner faces a Doer of type θ, he sets the consumption cap so as to permit the Doer to select its most preferred consumption for all taste shocks u < û, and constrains the Doer to consume(1 − s(θ)) otherwise. In contrast, when facing a Doer of type θ̂, who has less self-control, the Planner’s optimally chosen consumption cap binds the Doer for every taste shock, inducing it to select 1 − ŝ for every taste shock; this latter type is in Θ̂.

It is straightforward to see how FCD is satisfied in this set- ting: when the Planner purchases ŝyt of illiquid assets in period t, he simultaneously fully commits every type in Θ̂ while retaining flexibility for types not in Θ̂. As shown in Figure I, when choosing

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FIGURE I Consumption Caps

Dotted curves indicate the Doer’s ideal consumption for each taste shock, and solid lines indicate the Doer’s actual consumption when the Planner selects com- mitment optimally.

from this menu, a Doer of type θ′ consumes the remaining wealth with probability 1, whereas the typeθ chooses below the consump- tion cap with strictly positive probability. Thus, even when se- lecting this commitment, the Planner can distinguish types in Θ̂ (for which such full commitment is optimal) from types not in Θ̂ ensuring globally adequate learning.

THEOREM 6. Learning is globally adequate in this consumption- savings framework for all priors and discount factors.

This positive learning result demonstrates that if a decision maker begins with uncertainty about his self-control, eventually, he purchases the same fraction of illiquid assets that he would if he could forecast his temptations perfectly. Thus, assuming so- phistication in this important setting can be justified by Bayesian learning. Of course, while learning, the Planner may make (ex post) inefficient choices that adversely affect his future income distribution relative to the full information benchmark.

The commitment mechanism studied so far in this applica- tion is empirically relevant to savings decisions and has been the focus of prior work. However, an inconsistency with the model of Section III is that this mechanism excludes singleton menus, which fully commit every type of the Doer. Establishing that the above results extend to a setting that includes both illiquid assets

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and singleton menus requires additional analysis; in the Online Appendix, I demonstrate that learning is globally adequate in this richer setting if the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is at least 1.

The full information model to which behavior eventually con- verges shares many predictions of sophistication in the quasi-hyperbolic savings model but is analytically distinct. It has a unique solution and a constant commitment rate with CRRA utility (similar to Fudenberg and Levine 2006). In contrast, the quasi-hyperbolic savings model in discrete time has a continuum of sophisticated solutions, even after assuming Markovian behav- ior (Krusell and Smith, 2003). Thus, equilibrium selection remains a challenge in the quasi-hyperbolic model, thereby making it dif- ficult to study learning in that framework but does not pose an issue here.

IV.B. Costly Self-Control

Fudenberg and Levine (2006) offer a simple but powerful Planner–Doer framework in which the Doer’s preferences are com- pletely characterized by the present and the Planner exerts costly self-control to induce the Doer to take actions more consistent with the Planner’s preferences. Here I analyze how a Planner who is uncertain about the cost or efficacy of self-control learns over time how much self-control to use, building on the bi- nary action environment studied in Model 1 of Section III.

Consider a decision maker who faces an infinite sequence of tasks. Completing a task in any period (at = 1) leads to a future benefit with a present value of b, which is not valued by the Doer. Not completing the task (at = −1) has the benefit of immediate leisure st, where st is uniform drawn from [0, 1]. I assume that b is in (

1 2 , 1 ) , generating a tradeoff between commitment and flexibil-

ity. Prior to the realization of st, the Planner chooses a menu from {−1, 1}. After the realization of st, the Planner can exert costly self-control to nudge the Doer to complete the task. If the Plan- ner exerts self-control of magnitude Γ ≥ 0, self-control is success- ful for a Doer of type θ if Γ is at least

st θ

; otherwise, it fails. The

Planner’s payoff from completing the task at date t is b −Γ , and the payoff from not completing the task is st −Γ . I assume that θ is drawn from an interval

[ θ, θ̄ ]

in which θ > 0; lower types re- quire the Planner exert greater self-control to complete the task, whereas higher types require less self-control.

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The full information model, in which the Planner knows θ, is similar to that considered by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). If θ is sufficiently high, then the Planner chooses the menu {−1, 1} and has an associated cutoff s∗ such that he uses costly self-control to complete the task in period t if and only if st is less than s

∗. Such a choice has the benefit of flexibility because the Planner can choose whether to exert costly self-control depending on the value of leisure. In contrast, when the cost of self-control is suffi- ciently high, the Planner may prefer tocommit through the single- ton menu. While such a choice relinquishes flexibility, it obviates costly self-control because the Doer no longer needs to be nudged to complete the task. The Planner prefers flexibility to full commitment if θ∗ is at least (1− b)

2b − 1 . When the Planner is uncertain about the cost of self-control,

he may use too much or too little self-control to influence the Doer. Employing too little self-control leads the agent to not complete the task, although the costs of self-control are still borne. In con- trast, too much self-control guarantees that the task is completed but at unnecessary expense. Over time, the Planner learns about the efficacy of self-control based on experience. As before, it is pos- sible to assess eventual beliefs and choices by studying the full information model rather than the more intricate model that em- beds uncertainty about the Doer’s type.

Before applying the tools developed for Model 1 in Section III, let me highlight two differences between costly self-control and nudges. In Section III, a nudge is costly if it induces the Doer to choose a = 1 toooften but otherwise is intrinsically costless. In con- trast, the self-control studied in this section is intrinsically costly. Although this distinction is of conceptual importance, it does not create any difficulty in applying the earlier results. The challenge arises from the distinction in timing. In the earlier analyses, the Planner’s choice of nudges and menus is made before the reso- lution of uncertainty; as such, if the Planner partially commits, his commitment choice induces a nontrivial distribution of be- havior that varies by type. In contrast, in the setting here, the Planner’s choice to exert costly self-control is made after uncer- tainty about the state is resolved. Thus, if the Planner chooses to exert costly self-control of magnitude Γ whenever the value of leisure is less than some level s and this is successful for types θ and θ′ of the Doer, the Planner cannot distinguish these types by behavior even though he is partially committing for both. To generate distinguishability with partial commitment, I assume

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that if the Planner remains flexible and exerts costly self-control, he observes some signal σ with support in < and whose distri- bution is increasing in Γ − s

θ (in terms of first order stochastic

dominance). The interpretation of this signal is that the Planner obtains partial information about the impact of self-control be- yond the action choice. With this modification, results analogous to Theorems 2 and 3 hold.

THEOREM 7. If θ > θ∗, then a fully informed Planner always chooses a flexible menu and exercises self-control. Thus, no type is fully committed, and FCD is satisfied. Learning is globally adequate for all priors and discount factors. In con- trast, if θ < θ∗, then the Planner chooses the menu {1} for sufficiently low types. FCD is violated, and for each δ > 0, learning may be inadequate for an open set of priors.

V. DISCUSSION

This article offers a simple and tractable nonequilibrium approach tostudying the evolution of beliefs, self-control, and com- mitment choices as a decision maker learns from experience. I de- rive a condition that reveals whether such learning inexorably leads to sophistication. When FCD is satisfied, even a passive learner eventually makes choices as if he were in the full informa- tion benchmark. Learning-based foundations for sophistication in these settings, such as a savings environment, can help address the criticism that it involves an unrealistic level of rationality.22

In contrast, when FCD fails, then an impatient decision maker may fail to learn adequately and make commitment choices that are inefficient relative to the full information benchmark. In these cases, policy interventions that subsidize experimentation may fa- cilitate greater awareness.

In this article, I have adopted a dual-self approach to un- derstand learning. By treating a Doer as nonstrategic, dual-self

22. Rubinstein (2005) offers such a criticism:

Sophistication is unrealistic since it suffers from the problems of subgame perfection. An agent is super-rational in the sense that he perfectly anticipates his future selves and arrives at equilibrium between them. Present bias is a realistic phenomenon, but the combination of the β,δ preferences with naivete or sophistication assumptions makes the model even more unrealistic than time consistency models.

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models are analytically simple and generally have unique solu- tions when a decision maker is sophisticated. From the perspec- tive of learning, this simplicity permits the investigation of whether the unique solution under partial awareness converges to the unique solution under sophistication. In contrast, the quasi- hyperbolic approach has multiple solutions even after imposing sophistication and a Markovian restriction on behavior. This chal- lenge of multiplicity is exacerbated when beliefs are endogenized because in the resulting intrapersonal game, uncertainty about self-control induces a motive for self-signaling. Multiplicity thus impedes the study of learning in the quasi-hyperbolic approach, especially in settings such as consumption-savings in which the entire set of sophisticated solutions has not been characterized. Since the dual-self framework captures issues of temptation and commitment with greater parsimony, this approach facilitates a more direct study of learning.

When learning fails at the limit, I find that it occurs in a particular direction, namely that individuals underestimate their self-control. It is important to understand the extent to which these results can be reconciled with findings in the field. Some of the evidence on self-awareness comes from individuals’ contractual choices and their subsequent decisionmaking. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) demonstrate that many indi- viduals choose monthly gym memberships but, given their usage of the gym, would have paid less per visit had they selected the pay-per-visit option. Similarly, Shui and Ausubel (2005) find that individuals accept introductory credit card offers with lower in- terest rates for a shorter duration rather than a higher interest rate with a longer duration though they might be better off with the latter choice. In both cases, behavior is consistent with indi- viduals being sophisticated about their self-control—valuing the commitment offered by a monthly membership or a shorter du- ration period—as well as them overestimating their self-control. In a model with overlapping generations, it is quite likely that both effects are present insofar as less experienced customers who have not had opportunities to learn may overestimate self-control. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) argue that delays in cancel- ing contracts are more consistent with partial naivete. However, even when a decision maker does not overestimate self-control, he has an incentive to delay canceling because there is an “op- tion value” from learning, particularly in this sample that com- prises first-time customers. This option value increases with the

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decision maker’s patience making it difficult to distinguish patience from naivete. Moreover, it would be natural to assume that many such individuals may be learning both about their self- control and the costs and benefits of going to a health club (as also argued by Fudenberg and Levine 2006).

Indeed, this point raises the tension of assuming that a de- cision maker is partially sophisticated about his self-control but somehow fully sophisticated about the payoffs from his choices. Although this article, like the prior literature, abstracts from this issue, it is surely realistic that individuals often have to learn both the payoffs of choices and whether their decisions are vulnerable to temptation. In settings in which feedback about payoffs are de- layed, we should expect learning to be slow. Although I defer a fuller treatment of this issue, I illustrate its potential implications through the following example.

Consider the two-type model from Section II, and suppose for simplicity that δ = 0. Instead of the distribution of costs be- ing known by the Planner, suppose that it depends on the real- ization of a random variable ξ; in particular, let st be distributed uniformly with support [ξ, 1 + ξ], and suppose thatξ itself is 0 with probability 1 −λ0 and

( θ̄−θ

) b with probability λ0. This particu-

lar support is assumed for simplifying reasons and is unnecessary for the analysis.23 To understand the implications of delayed feed- back about payoffs transparently, consider a limit model in which information about past costs does not emerge.24 In this setting, a complete breakdown of learning occurs because a Planner who ob- serves the Doer choose a = 1 with frequencyθb cannot distinguish his lack of self-control from a high average cost of taking the ac- tion. Prior beliefs then determine his choice to remain flexible or commit (in the long-run limit), and under certain conditions, such a Planner may perpetually undercommit relative to a full infor- mation benchmark.

PROPOSITION 3. If μ0 andλ0 are sufficiently high and (θ, 0) is the realized state, then a partially aware Planner always chooses flexibility. If, however, a sophisticated Planner knew that ξ = 0 or that θ = θ, then almost-surely, the Planner would choose to commit.

23. It suffices if ξ is drawn from a continuum with values in its support that are

( θ̄−θ

) b apart.

24. This stark setting is similar to cases studied by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) in which payoffs are not observed and tothe identification challenges that arise in Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2009).

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The assumption that a Planner never observes any ex post in- formation about payoffs is critical and instructive: when the Plan- ner obtains informative signals about payoffs, this sequence of signals identifies ξ in the long-run limit, eliminating the possi- bility for undercommitment. As such, if feedback is delayed but eventually forthcoming, one should expect undercommitment to persist for some length of time but to not be perpetual. More gen- erally, if the benefits and costs of an action are uncertain and take time to be realized and a decision maker has limited experience with the setting, learning should not be expected to be fast.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that the nature of long-run beliefs does not imply that a decision maker should never undercommit. Commitment often has costs apart from monetary ones or its loss of flexibility; in many contexts, such as addiction, the choice to commit is observable, and so a decision maker who recognizes his imperfect self-control may nevertheless choose not to commit to hide it from others. Moreover, to the extent that commitment requires self-control (Noor 2007), even a fully so- phisticated decision maker may not commit. Allowing for these considerations can explain why individuals might not commit to the extent that our models (which omit these features) predict, even when individuals learn about their temptations over time.

In spite of all the potential reasons for people not to com- mit, many recent studies highlight the demand for commitment that individuals exhibit.25 Such demand for commitment is con- sistent with both sophistication and the failure of learning that can emerge in tradeoffs between commitment and flexibility.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

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Introduction
A Simple Example
When Is Learning Adequate?

Adequate versus Partial Learning
Full Commitment Distinguishability

When Does FCD Hold?

Main Results
Remarks

The Role of Patience
Identifying Awareness.
Relationship to Self-Confirming Equilibrium.

Applications

Consumption-Savings
Costly Self-Control

Discussion

CIS 3100 - Database Design and Implementation

Products on Sale Database for Kahdea Inc.

1. Project Overview

The activities in this project are designed to provide a better understanding of how data is organized into a relational database. A relational database enables management information systems to support inventory, transactions and business intelligence capabilities.

Using Microsoft Access 2016, you will create and manage tables, perform data imports, link tables via relationships, create queries and finally create reports for executive summary.

A general overview of relational database fundamentals and Microsoft Access training via Lynda.com is provided in section 11 to enable your success in this project. Please allow enough time to expose yourself to this material before starting the project.

2. Company Background

Kahdea Inc. is a small startup company that sells sports merchandise online. The mission of the company is to successfully sell and deliver sports products for all. The company sells products for a wide variety of sports including football, basketball, baseball, soccer, hockey, and volleyball.

Kahdea is composed of twenty-eight (28) employees who work in different departments (production, operations, automation, accounting, human resources, finance, marketing, etc.). During their probation period, all employees are trained before being assigned into their positions.

Kahdea is planning to have their annual sale next month. This sale is an important event for the company because it can typically generate 31% of Kahdea’s annual revenue. The company has been planning this sale for some time now, and wants to make sure all transactions are supported without issue.

Your specific role in the project

You are a new hire at Kahdea. During your training, you are expected to learn about building and maintaining relational databases using Microsoft Access. The database you will support is being used to keep track of Kahdea’s sales during this period. Although the database has been constructed, the team needs your assistance inserting data, using forms, creating queries and reports.

Your first training task requires you to watch the Microsoft Access training videos on Lynda.com. A series of hyperlinks for reference information are provided for you at the end of this project document.

After you become familiar with Microsoft Access, open the Kahdea.accdb file.

3. Create a Table

Before you begin, the team wants to ensure you understand table structure. They would like you to create a table for Employees and populate a few records. The table should include the field names: EmployeeID(PK), Last Name, First Name, Phone and Attachments.

· Step 1: Click the “Create” tab on the top ribbon and select “Table Design”.

· Step 2: Enter the Field Names and Data Type. Include a Primary Key (EmployeeID) for

the table. Select attachment as the data type for the Attachments field.

· Step 3: Save the table as “Employee”.

· Step 4: Enter the following records into the table. Create a personal record by substituting the red text with your information (enter a fictitious phone number). This record will be used later in section 9 of this assignment.

EmployeeID	Last Name	First Name	Phone	Attachments
1	Kathleen	Salazar	(909) 869-5438
2	Kim	Stella	(909) 869-2360
3	Leen	Hlahza	(909) 869-5079
4	Mike	Jacob	(909) 648-1010
5	<your first name>	<your last name>	<a phone number>	see section 9

· Step 5: After you enter the records, close the table. The entries should be saved.

4. Importing Data

In preparation for the sale, the team has gathered information regarding products’ supplier, and customers that need to be entered into the system. Since there is a lot of information to upload, using the forms will not be effective. Microsoft Access allows for a bulk insert of data.

Populate Customer table with data

For this task you will need the Customer.xlsx file.

· Step 1: Right click on the Customer table (Under All Access Objects panel) and select

“Import”, choose “Excel”.

· Step 2: In the pop-up window click “Browse” and navigate to the Customer.xlsx file.

Select the file.

· Step 3: Click “Append copy of the records to the table” and in the drop-down menu

choose “Customer”, click “OK”.

· Step 4: Click “Next” until the final window. Click “Finish”.

4. Importing Data (continued)

Populate ProductSupplier table with Data

For this task you will need the ProductSupplier.txt file.

· Step 1: Right click on the ProductSupplier table (under All Access Objects panel) and

select “Import”. Choose “Text File”.

· Step 2: In the pop-up window click “Browse” and navigate to the ProductSupplier.txt

file, choose the file.

· Step 3: Click “Append copy of the records to the table” and in the drop-down menu

· choose “ProductSupplier”, click “OK”.

· Step 4: Click “Next” until the final window. Click “Finish”.

Note: For best results, right-mouse click on the ProductSupplier.txt file then save the file to your desktop to enable this data import.

5. Create Forms

As a new hire at Kahdea Inc. you are tasked to create forms. Database administrators can enter the data directly into the tables. However, your boss feels it would be more efficient to create a form that coaches users to enter information in the best order. Create a user entry form to capture suppliers and product category data.

Create the Supplier Form

Apply the following steps using the Form Wizard to create a data entry form with tabular layout. Include all fields except Webpage and Notes.

· Step 1: Click the “Create” tab on the top ribbon and select “Form Wizard”

· Step 2: In the popup window select the Supplier Table from the drop-down menu

(Tables/Queries). Select the fields you wish to use and move them to the

Selected Fields box by clicking the “>” button. Click “Next”.

· Step 3: Click and select “Tabular”, and click “Next”.

· Step 4: Name the form Populate Supplier, and click “Finish”.

· Step 5: Click the New Record icon.

· Step 6: Populate the form with new entries using the table given below, once all entries

are entered, save the form. Once finished, close the form.

Field	Input
CompanyName	Iamz Co
Address1	153 9th Street
City	Brea
State	CA
Zip	92821
Country	USA
Phone	7148884565
FaxNumber	6523937595

Create the ProductCategory Form

Apply the following steps using the Form Wizard to create a data entry form with a columnar layout, to add data into the ProductCategory table. Include all fields except ProductCategoryID and Active.

· Step 1: Click the “Create” tab on the top ribbon and select “Form Wizard”.

· Step 2: In the popup window select the ProductCategory table from the drop-down

menu (Tables/Queries). Select the fields you wish to use and move them to the

Selected Fields box by clicking the “>” button. Click “Next”

· Step 3: Click and select “Columnar”, and click “Next”.

· Step 4: Name the form Populate ProductCategory, and click “Finish”.

· Step 5: Click the New Record icon.

· Step 6: Populate the form with new entries using the table given below, once all entries

are entered save the form. Once finished close the form.

Field	Input
ProductCategory	Bodybuilding

6. Creating Relationships

Although the tables have been created, some of them are missing relationships. Without table relationships, inserts, updates, or deletions in one table, data will not propagate to the other tables. You will need to create the relationships for all tables in the database.

Note: All tables have at least one relationship while some have two.

· Step 1: Click the “Database Tools” tab on the top ribbon and select “Relationships”.

· Step 2: If a table is not displaying on the screen, click the “Database Tools” tab on the

top ribbon and select “Show Table”, on the popup window and click “Add”. After

selecting any missing Tables, click “Close”.

· Step 3: Drag the Primary Key from the first table to the Foreign Key on the second table.

A new window will appear displaying the joint keys. Check “Enforce Referential

Integrity”. Click “Create” to create the relationship.

· Step 4: Continue creating relationships for tables that do not have relationships.

· Step 5: Save all changes and the close the workspace.

7. Create Queries

Kahdea Inc. wants to gather information from the database. Create the following queries to enable decision making for inventory and logistics.

MostProductsSold Query

Create a query that displays the Product Code, Product Description, and number of times the Product was sold. Limit to the results to products that were sold at least 10 times. Save the query as MostProductsSold.

CustomerOrders Query

Create a query that displays CustomerID, ShipName, Order ID, Order Date, Product Code, Product Description, Quantity Sold, Price, and Total. Limit the results to Orders between 07/06/2017 and 09/07/2017. Save the query as CustomerOrders.

Note: In order to accomplish the Customer Orders query, you will need to create the “Total” field in your query results by using the “’Builder” tab. The following reference provides the method used to create a calculation query in Microsoft Access.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKHyv1GhdDY

7. Create Queries (continued)

CustomerOrders Query

ProductPrices Query

Create a query that displays the Company Name, Products Code, Product Description, Purchase Price, and Sale Price. Limit the query to products where purchase price is greater than sale price. Save the query as ProductPrices.

· Step 1: Click the “Create” tab on the top ribbon and select “Query Design”.

· Step 2: In the popup window, select the table you need for the query and click “Add”.

Once all tables are selected, click the “Close” button.

· Step 3: Select the fields required for the query.

· Step 4: Enter criteria for the query.

· Step 5: Click the “Run” button. Verify the query displays the correct data.

8. Reports

Your manager is impressed with your database skills and would like you to prepare the following information for reporting to the executive team. Your manager is a has high expectations on the reporting format, so you will need to display this information in a presentable format.

Create a report to display CustomerOrders. Include CustomerID, ShipName, Order ID, Order Date, Product Code, Product Description, Quantity Sold, Price, and Total. Include the title “Customer Report” in the page header. Include the run date, page number and total pages in the page footer. Save the report.

· Step 1: Click the “Create” tab on the top ribbon and select “Report Wizard” on the far

right.

· Step 2: In the popup window, select the query from the drop-down menu

(Tables/Queries). Select the fields you wish to use and move them to the

Selected Fields box by clicking the “>” button. Click “Next”.

· Step 3: Select the fields to group by. This is optional and is not always required. Click

“Next”.

· Step 4: Select the “sort order” of the report. Click “Next”.

· Step 5: Select the Format of the report and landscape orientation. Click “Next”.

· Step 6: Enter the name for the report. Click “Finish” and the report will display as a print

preview.

Note: In order to accomplish the Customer Report, you will need to use custom configuration via Design View. The following reference provides the method used to create this report.

https://youtu.be/T-HgfywQ2Y4 Runtime: 28:14

9. Project Assessment

Your manager is impressed with your performance supporting this information system and wants to measure your competency in the scope of your assignment. She has asked for your assessment of the following.

· What are the major advantages of DBMS software applications such as Microsoft Access?

· What are the components of a relational database table (entity)?

· What are the benefits of using queries (views) in management information systems?

· Describe one lesson learned in your efforts to complete this project assignment

· Step 1: Provide a comprehensive summary statement in paragraph form using Microsoft Word and name the file CIS 3100 Response <First Name Last Name> (Enter your first name and last name).

· Step 2: Upload your Microsoft Word file to the Employee table, attachment field of your personal record created in section 3 of this assignment.

10. Project Deliverables

Upload your Microsoft Access file to Blackboard, including your project assessment uploaded to your personal record (created in section 3 of this assignment) according to the specific instructions provided by your instructor.

11. Microsoft Access Training Videos

Use the following references to brief yourself on Microsoft Access and supporting activities to succeed in this project and any future work with relational databases. It is not necessary to navigate completely through each course for this assignment.

The additional three learning series are provided to further enable your success in this project. You should be able to find a section within this reference to support any questions you may have.

Learning Relational Databases

https://www.lynda.com/Access-tutorials/Learning-Relational-Databases/604214-2.html?srchtrk=index%3a33%0alinktypeid%3a2%0aq%3aMicrosoft+Access+training%0apage%3a1%0as%3arelevance%0asa%3atrue%0aproducttypeid%3a2

· Relational Structures

· Breaking Data Down Into Its Components

· Understanding Entities and Table

· Develop Relationships

· Develop Subtypes and Supertypes

· Following a Naming Convention

· Creating Tables in Access

· Establish Relationships in Access

· Write Queries in Access

Access 2016 Essential Training

https://www.lynda.com/Access-tutorials/Access-2016-Essential-Training/367064-2.html?srchtrk=index%3a8%0alinktypeid%3a2%0aq%3aMicrosoft+Access+training%0apage%3a1%0as%3arelevance%0asa%3atrue%0aproducttypeid%3a2

Access 2016 Queries

https://www.lynda.com/Access-tutorials/Access-2016-Queries/455726-2.html?srchtrk=index%3a18%0alinktypeid%3a2%0aq%3aMicrosoft+Access+training%0apage%3a1%0as%3arelevance%0asa%3atrue%0aproducttypeid%3a2

Access 2016 Forms and Reports

https://www.lynda.com/Access-tutorials/Access-2016-Forms-Reports/455727-2.html?srchtrk=index%3a17%0alinktypeid%3a2%0aq%3aMicrosoft+Access+training%0apage%3a1%0as%3arelevance%0asa%3atrue%0aproducttypeid%3a2

CIS 3100 - Database Design and Implementation 7

CIS 3100 - Database Design and Implementation

Scoring Rubric

Criteria		Points Possible	Points Earned
A. Employee Table 1. Table & data types created correctly 2. Records / attributes populated correctly	(5) (5)	10
B. Import Data 1. Customer data imported correctly 2. Product Supplier data imported correctly	(5) (5)	10
C. Forms 1. Supplier form is functional 2. Product Category form is functional	(5) (5)	10
D. Relationships 1. Relationships are properly configured	(20)	20
E. Queries 1. MostProductsSold query is functional 2. CustomerOrders query is functional 3. ProductPrices query is functional	(10) (10) (10)	30
F. Report 1. Report meets management expectations	(10)	10
G. Assessment 1. Assessment meets management expectations 2. Assessment embedded in personal record	(5) (5)	10
Total	100

Sheet1

LastName	FirstName	Address1	Address2	City	State	ZIP	Country	Phone	Email	Notes
Lahza	Haneen	654 W Street		Claremont	CA	91784	USA	2563252145
Skywalker	Luke	321 G Street		Boston	CA	91768	USA	5624541234
Lahza	Yasmeen	987 G Street		Rancho	CA	97412	USA	3216549874
Vi	Hu	542 N Street		Upland	CA	91874	USA	9093256655

59,58,8,2.50

TWO

A Sense of Mission

Leaders have a vision and a sense of mission that lifts up and inspires men and women to help achieve that mission. In fact, there is in every one of us a desire to commit to something bigger than ourselves; leaders have the ability to tap into that root of motivation, drive, and enthusiasm that allows us to commit ourselves to achieving that vision. As a leader, then, you have to have a goal that excites and inspires. And the only goals that

excite and inspire are goals that are qualitative. Nobody gets excited or inspired about raising the share price or making more money or getting a raise. But we do get inspired and excited about bringing a product or service to people who need it, and about being the best, and about winning great success in a competitive field.

Strive to Be the Best As a leader, the most important vision you can have for yourself is to be the best. And that same vision must apply to your business or your organization. You will accept nothing less for yourself or your company than to be the best at what you do. In business, that means asking:

What quality about your product or service is most relevant or important to your customers?

Once you’ve identified that quality, focus all the energies and creativity of your employees and managers on achieving superior performance in that area. We need to be the best. You won’t feel great or as good as you could feel, or capable of

extraordinary performance, unless you are aligned with the best people in your field and doing the very best job that people are capable of.

Instill Meaning and Purpose Being dedicated to a mission gives work meaning and purpose. As human beings, we need meaning and purpose as much as we need food and water and air. We need a sense of significance. And leaders are those people who make us feel significant. They make us feel important and remind us that what we are doing has value far beyond just the day-to-day work. They make us feel that we are an integral part of the mission team. There are four ways to make people feel important, and they each start with the letter A.

First is appreciation. Take every opportunity to thank people for the quality of their work and their role in making the company a success. Every time you thank individuals, they are going to

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feel more valuable and will be more motivated to justify your faith in them. The second way to make people feel more important and valuable is by showing approval.

Praise people at every opportunity, for any accomplishment, large or small. Praise them also for their suggestions and insight—for their thinking. People will take praise emotionally. Their self-esteem and self-worth rises. But it’s important to praise immediately and specifically, so that people know that it is genuine. The third way you can build a sense of importance and value in a person is through

admiration. Continually compliment people, whether it’s on their traits, such as persistence, on their possessions, such as clothes, or on their accomplishments. Perhaps the most important way for people to feel important and valued is through attention.

People aren’t going to be dedicated to the goals of the organization if they are continuously ignored. They are not going to feel like key players in the mission if they just receive commands without having any opportunity for input or feedback. Attention means listening to people, without interrupting. You don’t necessarily have to take their suggestions or agree to what they are saying. But give them a chance to say it.

A Common Cause A good goal or a good mission gives a clear sense of direction not only to the organization, but to every person in the organization. A good goal unifies everyone in a common cause. For example, IBM is one of the great

industrial leaders of business history. One of its goals is to give the very best customer service of any company in the entire world. One of its missions is to be known as the company that cares for its customers. This mission, which involves a qualitative not a quantitative goal, excites and inspires people throughout the company because they think about it and talk about it all the time. They believe they’re the best and that nobody takes care of customers like they do at IBM. Everyone in the company knows that his job, one way or another, is related to taking care of customers, and this knowledge unifies everybody in a common cause. The mission of a company will often be encapsulated in a mission statement. A mission

statement is a clear statement of why the company exists in the first place and what its overarching goal or purpose is. Mission statements usually involve the customer in some way —for example, how your product or service is going to help make the customer’s life better. YouTube founder Chad Hurley wanted people to be able to send homemade videos over the Internet. Charles Schwab’s mission was to be the “most useful and ethical financial services company.” Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin wanted to make navigating the Internet easier. Why does your company exist? What is its cause?

The Core Purpose of Every Business For a business leader, there is one core purpose above all, and that is to acquire and serve a customer. Leaders make the customer of the organization the central focus. Take the example of

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Nordstrom, whose leaders think incessantly and continuously about their customers. IBM thinks and talks about only its customers. More and more companies are becoming obsessed with the customer. You see, once everybody agrees on who the customer is and agrees that the purpose of the company is to satisfy that customer the very best way possible, then it’s easy to get everybody pulling together. As a matter of fact, I believe that you can tell how well led an organization is by applying a

very simple test. When you’re in that organization, look at and listen to how people refer to the customer. In a good organization, the customers are always referred to with respect. They are always referred to with pride, as though they are really important. When a customer calls, it is an important occasion. And when a customer has a problem and is helped, it is a cause for celebration. When a customer calls and is happy or satisfied with a product or service, everybody takes on a tremendous feeling of pride and accomplishment. In your organization, how do people talk about the customer? Let’s say you run a department that services another department within the organization. That

other department is your customer. Whoever has to use what you produce in your area of responsibility is your customer. And leaders have to be very much focused on satisfying that customer. If you are going to be a business leader or a leader of a department or any organization, you

have to sit down and think through what the mission or the overarching purpose or goal is going to be for that business or department. It is the determination of a mission to be the best, that does something to help others, that is the starting point of your ascension and rise to the top of leadership.

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Chapter 1 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

The importance of a shared sense of humor is made obvious by its absence. It is almost impossible to build a relationship with someone who never makes you laugh, who never laughs at jokes you make or even worse: who tries really hard to be funny but insists on telling the wrong jokes. Very few things are more painful than an attempt at humor that is not appreciated by those listening.

To tell the right joke at the right time requires considerable cultural knowledge. Someone who doesn't laugh when others do or who laughs when the rest are silent, exposes himself as an outsider: he reveals his lack of awareness of codes, habits, and rules. He doesn't belong. In social rela- tionships, humor has the role of measuring mutual understanding and sig- naling good intentions. When a joke fails, listeners usually feel like reject- ing the joke teller, and often do.

What counts as "good" humor differs from group to group, from person to person, and from moment to moment. The extent to which people differ in their opinions of what is funny is sharply illustrated in a form of humor prominent in day-to-day interactions: in joke telling. The joke is a humor- ous genre about which opinions are extremely mixed. There are true joke lovers - proverbial uncles at parties producing enough jokes, one after the other, to last the whole evening - but also self-declared adversaries. Certain groups welcome jokes with great enthusiasm while others reject the telling of a joke with demonstrative silence; the latter group sees joke telling as tasteless and vulgar.

Judging jokes goes further than expressing personal style or taste. Sense of humor is connected to social milieu and background. Not only are there individual differences in how humor is appreciated but there are also dif- ferences between men and women, between people with different educa- tional advantages, between old and young, and of course differences be- tween people from different cultures and countries. What people think is funny - or not funny - is strongly determined by how they were brought up and the company they keep.

This book has to do with the relationship between sense of humor and social background. As the starting point for understanding and plotting these social differences in sense of humor, I will be looking at how people

Kuipers, G. (2006). Good humor, bad taste : A sociology of the joke. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from asulib-ebooks on 2020-02-27 15:44:40.

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2 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

think about one specific humorous genre: the joke. More precisely: I will be looking at the standardized or "canned" joke: a short humorous story, ending in a punch line, which the teller usually does not claim to have in- vented himself. Dutch, the language in which most of this research was originally carried out, has a specific word for this genre: mop. In English, "joke" can refer both to this specific genre and more generally to something said or done to amuse people. However, even though there is no separate word in English for the specific genre, the joke was clearly recognized as being separate by the Americans I interviewed.

It may perhaps surprise the reader that I chose this, of all genres. The subject "humor" is capable of suggesting something profound and of prompting people to contemplate human nature, the importance of creativ- ity, or the connection between suffering, humor, and detachment, but the joke evokes many fewer grandiloquent associations. Jokes are amusement more than anything else, without many pretensions or profound purposes: they are meant to make people laugh and no more.

The joke is perhaps not a particularly chic genre but it does evoke em- phatic reactions. As I did my research, I interviewed people who consid- ered telling jokes to be "the acme of humor", "just part of any good night's fun", and even: "the essence of togetherness and pleasure, a reason to laugh till you cry". But I also talked to people who denigrated jokes as "a form of spiritual poverty", "tiresome things, enormously disrupting to conversa- tion". One of my informants stated very decidedly: "Jokes that's not hu- mor". In saying these things, people are also stating implicitly what humor means to them: what they consider funny, hilarious, corny, far-fetched, vulgar, or banal. They are verbalizing a decision about good and bad hu- mor. But just behind the scenes, ideas are lurking about what a good con- versation entails, what an enjoyable evening looks like, what being sociable means, and more generally: how people are supposed to interact with each other. Judgments about humor are directly connected with ideas about what constitutes pleasant and unpleasant communication.

Researching jokes

This variance of opinion itself makes the genre of the joke a suitable start- ing point for research into differences in how humor is appreciated. Re- search into preference for and aversion to jokes leads to more general ques- tions about humor: why do some people love certain forms of humor while others can't stand them? Which subjects are preferred joke material and

Kuipers, G. (2006). Good humor, bad taste : A sociology of the joke. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from asulib-ebooks on 2020-02-27 15:44:40.

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Researching jokes 3

which are not? Why do people consider something funny, amusing, hilari- ous or, rather, corny, feeble, or vulgar? What do people mean by "sense of humor"? How do people differ in their opinions on this? And what are the consequences of such differences in humor style?

In order to answer these questions I conducted interviews, I did a survey of humor styles, and I collected a large number of jokes. The research on which this book is based was carried out mostly in the Netherlands. How- ever, the final chapter presents the results of a similar, though smaller, study in the United States. In the Netherlands, I spoke extensively to sev- enty Dutch people about jokes and humor. First, I talked to thirty-four joke lovers, people who knew and told a lot of jokes. These were acquired through newspaper advertisements and through the grapevine, but primarily gleaned from people participating in the selection for the Dutch television program Moppentoppers, a program aired by RTL4, a large commercial TV channel. Moppentoppers (the name is a contamination of toppers, which means approximately the same in English, and moppentapper, a rather jocular word for joke teller) was a highly popular joke-telling contest for amateur joke tellers.

I also interviewed four editors of joke books. After that, I interviewed thirty-two "ordinary people" about their sense of humor: men and women, young and old, of different educational and professional backgrounds, joke lovers and joke haters. All these interviewees, under fictitious names, will be cited frequently in this book. The group of thirty-two was a sample taken from a group of 340 Dutch people who had filled in a questionnaire about jokes and humor in 1997/1998. In addition to this, I collected many thousands of jokes: I found them on the Internet, in joke books and maga- zines, in archives, and they were told to me by friends, acquaintances, and people whom I interviewed.

Differences in the appreciation of jokes touch upon three of the most important social distinctions in the Netherlands: gender, age, and particu- larly class. In the Netherlands, like in other Western countries, it is often said that class no longer plays a role of any importance. Classical distinc- tions between high and low culture are said to be fading; people can freely choose from a great diversity of "lifestyles". That educational level and social milieu played such a huge role in appreciating humor surprised me too. My questions about jokes, humorists, and humorous television pro- grams seemed to lead automatically to the subjects of vulgarity and good taste, high and low culture, common and elitist humor. The discourse about humor in the Netherlands turned out to be imbued with references to class.

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4 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

Five years after I did these interviews in the Netherlands, I carried out a similar, though much smaller, study in the United States: I interviewed twenty-eight people and 143 people filled in a questionnaire similar to the one used in the Netherlands. Not only did this enable me to compare Dutch patterns of humor styles and social background with American humor styles, it also gave me an opportunity to include national differences in the comparison. Moreover, the American study functioned as a cross-cultural validation of the approach to humor and social background I had developed in the Dutch study: it turned out that, in a different cultural context, the approach and the concepts still worked, even though actual social distinc- tions in the US were markedly different.

Jokes and humor

Jokes are - as all humor is - meant to amuse, to make people laugh. Ever since antiquity, many superior and inferior thinkers have reflected on hu- mor, and there is but one thing upon which they all agree: humor is a pleas- ant experience, often (but by no means always) accompanied by laughter. Humor is not solely amusement; it can bring people closer to each other, embarrass, ridicule, cause to reflect, relieve tension, or put into perspective serious affairs. However, if people do not like the joke, humor cannot fulfill these other functions competently. Humor can fulfill a great number of functions, but the first goal of the joke is to provoke mirth, amusement, and preferable laughter.

The joke is but one form of humor. In addition to jokes, many other humorous genres and styles exist, varying from slapstick to doggerel to cabaret critical of society. To investigate social differences in sense of hu- mor, it seemed most sensible to me to focus on one genre. It is simply not possible to allow all styles and genres sufficient space in a single book. It is also questionable whether one can make meaningful generalizations about such divergent genres as jokes, cabaret, revue, stand-up comedy, clowns, TV satire, sitcoms, humorous talk shows, let alone cartoons, regular col- umns, trick cigars, fake turds, clowns' noses, or the humor in advertise- ments, on signboards, or carved into toilet doors. And then these represent only standardized humor: spontaneous jokes like those made every day fall outside these categories. Therefore, I sought to limit my scope.

After serious consideration, I chose the joke, one of the most widely distributed and most recognizable humorous genres in the Netherlands and throughout the world. It is basically a short humorous text with at its end an

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Jokes and humor 5

unexpected turn or denouement, the punch line. Usually j o k e s have the form o f a story, but riddles are also considered to be jokes. These have, as j o k e s do, a clear punch line and are based frequently on the same themes. What happens in a j o k e generally follows a standard pattern: things often take place three times. There are standard formulas for the telling too: " A man walks into a bar..."; " A Dutchman, a German and a Belgian..." or their American counterparts, " A Polack, an Irishman and a . . . " Themes, set- tings, and personages are largely standard as well: a dumb blonde, a woman at the doctor's, a man in a bar, a f l y in the soup, three persons on the Eiffel Tower, in an airplane, or on a desert island - all personages and situations the good listener immediately associates with jokes. Some o f these charac- ters have a more national flavor: in the Netherlands the dumb character is usually Belgian, the little boy outwitting adults is called Jantje (Johnnie), and Jewish stock characters Sam and Moos (short for Samuel and Moses) will be out walking in the Kalverstraat, Amsterdam's main shopping street. However, the same jokes, featuring different characters, can be found in other countries around the world, from America to India or Chile.

The strong standardizing o f j o k e s has to do with the fact that jokes are orally transmitted. Jokes are written down, for instance in j o k e books, but the majority of the jokes contained in these derives from the oral culture o f storytelling. Such oral genres often have standard formulas and themes: this makes them easy to remember and repeat to others. In addition, new punch lines can be built into an existing pattern. Everyone w h o tells a j o k e is dip- ping into an enormous, pre-existing, repertoire of jokes. A j o k e teller will then never - at least almost never, and then very seldom rightfully - claim that he thought up the joke himself. Not only the j o k e itself is at issue in joke telling, but also the art of telling it: whether or not someone knows how to "present" it.

This verbal transmission means that jokes grant researchers a v i e w of the role, so difficult o f access, that humor plays in normal, day-to-day in- teractions. Jokes are not the domain o f professional humor producers, but are mainly told in everyday situations by "ordinary people". Jokes differ in this from other standardized humor usually taking place on paper or on a podium. Comedy often is a rather one-sided form of communication: the role o f the audience is limited to laughing or not, laughing right out loud or less enthusiastically - where in humor on paper, radio, or television the humorist does not even get to hear whether this happens. However, the teller makes direct contact with his audience in telling jokes. A l s o , the divi- sion of roles is not standardized: different people gathered together can tell

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6 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

jokes in turn. Jokes thus provide the opportunity to look at humor as a mode of communication.

The joke is a preeminently social phenomenon. Jokes belong to every- one: they are not thought up by any one person, but are told again and again and continuously redesigned in the interaction. A joke is a joke only if it is repeated: only at the moment of repetition does a joke become a joke, a "social event" instead of an individual creation. This too is one of the rea- sons why I chose the joke: research into cabaret or other humor whose au- thor can be clearly indicated would quickly have become a history of im- portant names and conflicting artistic movements. In research of this na- ture, I would also have run the risk of placing the emphasis on creation instead of communication. Jokes are what Emile Dürkheim ([1895] 1964) has referred to as social facts: phenomena that cannot be reduced to the level of individual decisions and motivations.

The consideration that finally determined my choice for the joke is how people think about jokes. As I have already mentioned: the joke has very definite advocates and opponents. In general, however, the joke's status is low. This means that the joke forms a good basis for this research: it is precisely the "low" and controversial genres that evoke explicit reactions and thus make visible social distinctions. Explicit judgments about the joke have a lot to do with the fact that joke appreciation is often couched in terms of good and bad taste. "Taste" does not usually point to matters of life and death but rather to mundane things like preferences for interior decoration, clothing, or television series. And yet, in judgments having to do with taste, preference or aversion is often highly present and deeply felt. Social boundaries are sharply delineated by what seem to be trivial matters, in which "tastes differ".

Given that this is mostly research into my own society, throughout the research I was very much aware of these opinions on good and bad taste. I have never been particularly tempted to tell jokes (in spite of my prolonged contact with them, I have never become a virtuoso joke teller) and in my social milieu I seldom hear them. This "anthropological impulse" also spurred me on to choose the joke as my research subject: researching some- thing you don't know well often produces more insight, even into what is very familiar and trusted, than researching something with which you are intimately involved. In choosing jokes, I was not choosing an unknown subject but a "strange" one, nevertheless, to those in my own circles.

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Humor as a social phenomenon 7

Humor as a social phenomenon

Thinking about humor has always been predominantly the domain of phi- losophers and psychologists, and more recently of linguists. While humor is preeminently a social phenomenon, social scientists have only dealt with humor research sporadically. The scientific background of the majority of humor researchers has influenced the questions they have asked about hu- mor. Philosophers see humor to a large extent as something intrinsically present in a text or an event. The question then quickly is focused on what "the substance" or "the essence" of humor is: what are the distinguishing characteristics of "humor", "the laugh", or "the comic"? (Morreall 1983, 1987). Within psychological research, the emphasis is strongly placed on humor as an individual matter: the confrontation between an individual, with specific moods, distinguishing personal characteristics, aspects of character and interests, and a joke (e.g. Martin 1998; Ruch 1998). Lin- guists, finally, have tended to focus on the formal characteristics of the humorous text: what distinguishes jokes and other funny texts from serious ones? (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1994, 2001)

In this book, I want to look at humor primarily as a social phenomenon: a form of communication that is embedded in social relationships. For this reason I have also chosen a working definition of humor in which the social aspect is prominent: I see humor as "the successful exchange of joking and laughter". Humor in this definition is viewed as an exchange involving a number of people. This communication can be more or less successful; there is only question of humor if the joke "succeeds". An unsuccessful exchange does still contain an aspiring joke - an attempt to make people laugh - but this is not successful humor: no one laughs, smiles, or other- wise acknowledges the joke.

While humor also can be unintentional, I will be looking primarily at conscious attempts to make people laugh: jokes, performances of comedi- ans, television comedy - all of these socially stylized invitations to laugh- ter. The ideal reaction to such a joke is always a laugh. Everyone who tells a joke hopes that it will be laughed at. The joke tellers I spoke to said with- out exception that the attractiveness of telling jokes lies in the fact that people laugh at them, "that people fall off their chairs laughing". "That the canteen resounds with laughter. The more people laugh, the more fun you have telling them." "What's fun about telling jokes? If I go to a bar, the moment I come in, everybody starts laughing. That's the nice thing about telling jokes."

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8 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

The explicit mention of laughter in this definition may be something of a provocation in current humor research, where humor and laughter are generally considered separate and partly unconnected phenomena. Not everyone who appreciates a joke expresses that by laughing, and there are many forms of laughter that are not responses to humor (Douglas 1975; Pro vine 2000). Still, everyone who makes a joke hopes for laughter as the result; and everyone who hears a laugh assumes that something funny has happened (and will also want to know "what's so funny?").

As the sociologist Rose Coser wrote: "To laugh, or to occasion laughter through humor and wit, is to invite those present to come close." (Coser 1959:172) Laughter signals the acceptance of this invitation. As so often happens with invitations, acceptance of the invitation is often interpreted as an acceptance of the inviter at the same time. Thus, humor and its counter- part and reward, laughter, are among the strongest signals of social solidar- ity and togetherness.1

Therefore the laugh is a fundamental part of the way people perceive humorous communication. It is the expected, intended, and coveted reac- tion of any joke teller. Laughter is the idealtypical expression of the emo- tion of amusement. As such, it cannot be ignored as a social phenomenon and a form of communication in any study of humor. But there are of course other possible reactions: these range from smiling and grinning to complicated (but culturally coded) reactions such as half-exhausted sighing at a corny joke, or verbal expressions of appreciation. When I was living in the United States, I was rather puzzled at the prevalence of verbal acknowl- edgements of jokes: "That's so funny" in addition to, or even instead of, laughing.

The description employed bypasses the crucial question about humor: what is it that makes people laugh? If people try to get other people to laugh by using a joke, how do they do that? Ever since Plato and Aristotle, people have asked themselves these questions but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to answer them conclusively and definitively. From the per- spective chosen here, this is not necessary either. Here we are concerned not with the essence of humor, but with its social functions and meanings. Thus, even though the question how humor works, and what mechanisms are central to it, will emerge several times in the course of this book, most extensively in Chapters 7 and 8, this book is not an attempt to construct a theory of the workings and mechanisms of humor.

Humor has peculiar contradictory meanings: a joke can be an invitation, as Coser states, but it can also put people off and exclude them (Bergson [1900] 1999; Billig 2004). Humor brings people together but it can also

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Humor as a social phenomenon 9

emphasize and augment differences in status. Humor can shock, insult, hurt, and consecutively be used as an excuse ("it was just a joke") but nev- ertheless a sense of humor counts as a positive feature. This multiplicity of contradictory functions has a lot to do with the fact that humor is "not seri- ous". Something that is said in the guise of a joke should not be taken liter- ally (Bateson 1972; Mulkay 1988). Because of this, the same joke can have different functions and meanings at one and the same time. Signals like laughter and smiling, as well as verbal cues of humorous intent ("Have you heard the one about...") separate humor from ordinary, serious communi- cation. This so-called framing separates playing behavior from serious be- havior; it separates what actors do on stage from what is done in the "real world"; and it separates humor from seriousness.

The different functions of humor often intersect and can hardly be sepa- rated in concrete situations (Palmer 1994; Ziv 1984). A regularly occurring event such as telling an ethnic joke - for instance about the Turkish minor- ity in the Netherlands - can be an attempt simply to amuse, as well as an expression of a shared negative attitude regarding a specific ethnic group. Perhaps a joke of this type is also an attempt to acquire status or to bring up in conversation the sensitive subject of migrants. If there are Turks present, it may be an attempt to shock, insult, or exclude them. Among Turks and Dutch people who know each other well it can, instead, be a way of show- ing that they are above such sentiments. One and the same phenomenon can therefore have a diversity of functions for different persons or in differ- ent situations; for separate persons it can, moreover, have another function than for the group or society as a whole.

The polysemy of a joke makes it impossible to say with certainty which function it fulfills or what the joke teller meant: humor is by definition an ambivalent form of communication. "The" function of the joke or humor- ous genre can thus not be firmly established. What's more: even "the" function of a single joke about Turks in one, specific, social setting gener- ally cannot be established firmly. Quite probably even the person telling a joke does not know for sure why he's doing it, let alone why he chose that joke. The only thing he will probably know for sure is that he wants to make people laugh.

If humor is seen as a social phenomenon, in addition to that communica- tive aspect two other aspects are of special importance. Firstly: differences in appreciation of humor are for a large part socially and culturally deter- mined. What people think is funny varies from culture to culture and from group to group: even within one culture there are differences in taste. Even

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10 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

though many scholars have commented on the cultural variability of hu- mor, comparative research on humor is almost absent.2

Secondly, humor often touches upon social and moral boundaries. Jokes often deal with taboos or "painful subjects"; this means that social and moral boundaries are often transgressed to some extent (Douglas 1966, 1975). Humor, however, also marks social boundaries: it is a powerful means of pulling people together and, in doing this, automatically shutting other people out. Sometimes this takes place directly, by laughing at peo- ple, but it can also be indirect: taking place through shared standards of what is funny and what is not, or because the joke includes a reference that not everyone understands. The laugh makes group boundaries clearly visi- ble and palpable: he who laughs belongs, he who does not laugh is ex- cluded.

Humor is a form of communication, a question of taste, a marking of social boundaries. These three aspects determine the social functions and meanings of humor, and these aspects will serve here as guidelines for an exploration of the sociology of the joke. These subjects lie at the cutting- edge of humor research and sociology: within social theory, taste, commu- nication, and social boundaries are important themes. Two of these, the connection between humor and social boundaries, and the role of humor as a form of communication, are important themes in the existing research in the social sciences into humor. The third - the connection between humor and taste - has hardly been investigated; thus in this book I have tried to establish a connection between humor research and theories about taste and taste difference in the social sciences.

Humor and taste

Anthropological research into humor also shows a clear connection be- tween humor and culture: the documented humor from cultures far distant from our own in time and place often seems coarse, strange, absurd, or simply unintelligible to us (Apte 1985). The impossibility of understanding someone else's humor has much to do with cultural knowledge: people do not understand each other's jokes because they fail to understand crucial references. Additionally, cultural background affects cultural boundaries, and that also affects sense of humor: something that is funny in one culture can be shocking, embarrassing, or even repugnant in another.

But mostly, cultural differences in sense of humor are also connected with culturally determined differences in style. For instance, the difference

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Humor and taste 11

between British and American humor has been summarized as the contrast between understatement and overstatement. This difference lies not in the themes or subjects of the joke but rather in the general tone or attitude: it is possible to conceive two completely different jokes about similar subjects, and with similar techniques, but with a completely different presentation, tone, and purport. Such differences, which reflect more general notions of what good and bad humor are, are matters of style. Style differences of this sort are difficult to verbalize; they are more subtle but more crucial than the more obvious differences in subject choice or language use.

Not only among cultures but also within any given culture, huge differ- ences exist in what people find funny. Within the Netherlands there is, for instance, a cultural difference between city and countryside, between the college and non-college educated and between young and old. These cul- tural differences are reflected in humor: the highly provocative stand-up comic Hans Teeuwen is thus for the young while the late Toon Hermans, who often seemed more a clown than a comic, and whose humor ranged from the absurd to the sentimental, is preferred by those who are older. Andre van Duin, a comic from the music-hall tradition, known for his im- personations of rather bizarre characters, is the popular humorist while Freek de Jonge, a critical comedian from the slightly moralist Dutch caba- ret tradition, with his dense, poetic style, and fast and chaotic presentation, appeals more to intellectuals. (Short descriptions of Dutch humorists and television programs mentioned in this book are provided in Appendix 2.)

The differences in humor between different groups within Dutch soci- ety, just as the differences between cultures, can to some extent be clarified by differences in cultural knowledge and sensitivity to certain boundaries. Most cultural differences within the Netherlands are, however, also a ques- tion of style. This is, for instance, the case for Andre van Duin, the most prominent popular comedian in the Netherlands. Probably very few people in the Netherlands have difficulty understanding him, he does not antago- nize people by transgressing boundaries, and no one doubts his professional skill. And yet there are many people who don't like him. Differences in the appreciation of van Duin are questions of style, of taste: his humor is a close or less close match with what people expect of good humor.

"Style" and "taste" are connected concepts: both have to do with es- thetic preference for and aversion to something. Each concept can be used both in the evaluative and the descriptive sense: someone who "has style", has good style; someone "with taste", has good taste. There are, however, differences: taste primarily has to do with judgment and appreciation while style implies a more active role: it can be linked to both appreciation and

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12 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

creation. Someone with a certain taste likes a certain style. Taste has to do with "what people see in something" while style has to do with "how peo- ple do it".

The social formation and determination of taste is one of the classical themes in sociology (e.g. Bourdieu [1979] 1984; Gans [1974] 1999; Vehlen [1899] 2001). Sociologists tend to speak of "taste" rather than "style" when describing how social background relates to esthetic appreciation. This reflects and reproduces a distinction between consumption and production of esthetic preferences, which does not make much sense when discussing joke telling and humor, where appreciation and creation are intimately con- nected. In this book, I will therefore often speak of "humor style" rather than "humor taste". However, the main theoretical inspiration of this book comes from sociologists studying taste, most notably Pierre Bourdieu.

The central proposition of sociological studies of taste is that they can be used to demarcate social boundaries (Lamont and Fournier 1992; La- mont 1992, 2000; Lamont and Molnar 2002). It is preferences for mundane things such as furniture, books, paintings, clothing, television programs, and hobbies that come to have exceptionally strong symbolic meaning. Choices of this nature can and do evoke vehement and emphatic reactions. Taste, just as humor, is felt to be something extremely personal and sponta- neous, but it also serves as a way of establishing whether or not people are on the same "wavelength". In this way, these taste differences function as a direct social delimitation, not just between cultures, but also between groups within one culture.

Cultural differences within one society are not completely independent of one another. Although different groups within Dutch society have to some extent their own values, norms, ideas, and symbols, differing from those of other Dutch subcultures, taste and style are defined and formed in relationship, and even in contrast, to tastes and styles of other groups (see Kuipers 2006a). Youth culture, for instance, often includes a more or less conscious rejection of the adult culture (Hebdige 1979; Willis et al. 1990). Class culture as well is often partially based on rejecting the taste, behavior and lifestyle of other classes. The higher middle class has always tried to distinguish itself from the culture of the lower classes. "Taste" is one of the weapons used by the higher classes in doing this: the power to define the preferences of other people as less valuable than one's own.

That taste is a way of distinguishing oneself - a means of distinction - is the central proposition of La Distinction (1984). In this book, Pierre Bourdieu shows that esthetical preference, therefore taste, is strongly con- nected to class. Not only the art form people appreciate, but also what they

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Humor and taste 13

prefer to eat, how they furnish their houses, what they prefer to photograph, is connected with their class position. Taste is not just a way to distinguish oneself from others, it also reveals one's status. The preferences of the col- lege educated are socially more valued than those of the non-college edu- cated. Their taste has more status because they have more status, and vice versa: they have more status because of their taste. Taste of the higher cir- cles very quickly becomes the legitimate taste. Taste is then, in Bourdieu's words, a form of symbolic capital: the status of certain groups is automati- cally equated with the status of their esthetical preferences.

In La Distinction, Bourdieu distinguishes two different sorts of capital: cultural and economic. Class, and thus taste, is connected with possessions and wealth: economic capital. Beside this, there is the influence of cultural capital: the education one has had and, connected to this, one's knowledge of "high culture". These two forms of capital do not completely coincide. There are people with a great deal of cultural but very little economic capi- tal - penniless but very cultivated intellectuals and artistic persons - and the nouveau riches with a great deal of money but the "wrong" cars, clothes, hairdos, and holiday destinations. The esthetical preferences of these two groups do not completely coincide: people with more economic capital are often somewhat more conservative; people with more cultural capital are often somewhat avant-garde. These are all "legitimate" tastes: they are not shared, however, in all high circles.

This relationship between taste and status is also the motor behind the trickle-down effect (Fallers 1954; Elias [1939] 1978): the mechanism by which many tastes, styles, and preferences diffuse through a society. People attempt to distinguish themselves from others in a positive sense by acquiring tastes and styles with higher status. The effect of this is that this taste or style diffuses further and further downward in the society, after which those in the upper layer seek something else to distinguish them- selves. The drive to distinguish oneself is thus an important source of cul- tural change.

Since Bourdieu's theory of cultural and economic capital was devel- oped, in the France of the 1960s, class systems have eroded considerably in most Western countries. Social hierarchies have become less strict, social mobility has increased, and other social distinctions, such as age or ethnic- ity, have become more influential. As a result of this, relationships between taste cultures are less clear-cut than Bourdieu's theory might suggest (cf. Holt 1997, Peterson 1997). Rather than "trickle down", processes of emula- tion and distinction may lead to elements of working-class and youth cul- ture "moving up" (e.g. blue jeans, pop music), or to taste groups combining

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14 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

high and popular tastes (Peterson and Kern 1996). Additionally, processes of distinction and emulation may not be limited to one society, leading to incorporation of foreign, cultural elements into taste cultures.

That taste is a means of distinction, does not however, mean that people necessarily allow themselves to be led by the need to be different or better than others in their preferences for humor, art, or television programs. Nei- ther is it so that assuming the taste of people with higher status, the legiti- mate taste, solely arises from the drive to imitate. Taste is more than an imposed attempt to belong somewhere; taste happens automatically. "Each taste is experienced as natural - and it is practically that, as habitus - which amounts to rejecting others as unnatural and consequently bad." (Bourdieu 1984: 56) Variations in taste and style, according to Bourdieu, are the em- bodiment of social distinctions, they are "symbolic re-creations of actual differences". Esthetic judgments are inevitably intertwined with social dis- tinctions.

Taste is an integral part of what Bourdieu calls the habitus·, embodied culture, culture that has become part of people's most automatic reactions and preferences. Habitus is culture worn in, as it were, to the body. This includes not only esthetical preference or aversion, but also how someone speaks, how someone moves, how someone sees himself and others. All these things are formed by culture and social position. What someone finds humorous is also part of habitus: the reaction to humor is almost a reflex - you either laugh or you don't. But at the same time the reactions - as will become apparent from this book - are strongly connected to social position: different people laugh at different things.

And yet "sense of humor" is not only linked to status arising from cul- tural and economic capital. Bourdieu and other sociologists of taste de- scribed primarily how taste differences mark class boundaries. Next to these, there are other, different, important social distinctions such as age, gender, religion, regional or ethnic background - all these distinctions are generally connected with taste and lifestyles, and thus: humor style.

Making the appropriate jokes and knowing which jokes to laugh at are always skills held in high esteem. A good sense of humor also is a way to distinguish oneself within one's own social group. The ability to tell jokes well is also a form of capital; the only thing is that it does not have the same value in every situation. Having "a sense of humor" always goes to- gether with social status, but not by definition with economic or cultural capital.

A good sense of humor, the ability to make, share, and appreciate the right jokes is always symbolic capital. But still, the humor of the groups

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The context of Dutch humor 15

with the highest status is not everyone's idea of the funniest humor. I will try in this book to classify not the lifestyles but the humor styles: the differ- ences in "humorous habitus".

The context of Dutch humor

A study of a country's humor inevitably becomes something of an ethnog- raphy of that country. This book, although primarily a book about humor, will probably reveal much about the Netherlands. The final chapter, while intended mainly as a cross-cultural validation of the approach developed in the first nine chapters, will also shed light on American culture.

T o approach a country through its humor is to produce a rather unusual image of that country. This study highlights the backstage areas of private interactions with family and friends, the minutiae of everyday communica- tion, and the subtle distinctions and judgments that people make about oth- ers. It is also so that the jokes I collected and discussed with my informants give a view of the Netherlands that may differ from the official "front- stage" image of the Netherlands. Like j o k e s around the world, Dutch jokes are mostly concerned with the sensitive areas in Dutch culture and society.

This book not only looks at Dutch society through the lens of humor, it looks at differences in humor. This focus on social differences highlights cultural rifts and distinctions within Dutch society. It w a s n ' t until I did a similar project in the U S that I realized there was something particularly Dutch about Dutch respondents, despite their great differences.

This Dutchness, and commonality within Dutch society, may need a short introduction here. Given the b o o k ' s focus on class differences, proba- bly it is important to note that the Netherlands is a fairly egalitarian society, even by Western European standards. Traditionally, the Netherlands had hardly any nobility, and n o upper class to speak of. Ever since the seven- teenth century, Dutch society has been solidly middle class, with the elite consisting of merchants and bankers rather than counts and princes. The country did not become a monarchy until the nineteenth century, after the defeat of Napoleon. The Royal Family, though very prominent in jokes, has never had m u c h real power and has always worked hard to cultivate a nor- mal, accessible, and middle-class image. Social mobility is relatively high and traditional indicators of class inequality such as elite universities and a very uneven distribution of income are not present in the Netherlands (Dronkers and Ultee 1995). The class difference in sense of humor found in this study is by no means a reflection of the Dutch self-image. Like Ameri-

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16 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

cans, Dutch tend to think of themselves as part of a classless society, mak- ing references to social class slightly taboo.

Currently, the Netherlands is one of the most secularized countries in the world. Until recently, religion significantly influenced all domains of life; witness the characteristic "pillarization": Catholics and the various Protestant denominations each had their own churches, political parties, and leisure activities (Lijphart 1968). A remnant of this system can still be found in public television: each of the old "pillars" has its own broadcast- ing corporation. In general, the various cultural revolutions of the past fifty years seem to have hit the Netherlands harder than other countries: the Netherlands has not only become one of the world's most secularized, and one of the world's most permissive countries (Kennedy 1995). This shows in Dutch humor, which has changed very quickly since the 1950s, becom- ing more transgressive and explicit than in other countries.

Another characteristic of the Netherlands that may be important to keep in mind is its ethnic composition. The Netherlands had a large Jewish mi- nority until the Second World War, when a large percentage of Dutch Jews was deported. Apart from the Jewish community, the country was ethni- cally very homogeneous. It was only after 1970 that the country gradually became more mixed, with the arrival of migrants from the (former) colo- nies of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, and guest workers, mainly from Turkey and Morocco. However, at the time of this research, even though migrants had become the target of many jokes, for the most part they did not take part in Dutch joke culture (this is changing quickly, see Meder 2001). The former guest workers in particular did not speak Dutch well as a rule. Thus, the Dutch research addresses class, age, and gender differences, but not ethnic differences. The sample simply did not include enough members of ethnic minority groups to say much about ethnicity.

A final aspect of Dutch society that may need some introduction is its humorous tradition. Although the research dealt primarily with jokes, to create a larger perspective for the appreciation of jokes, informants also were asked about comedians, humorists, comic television shows, and other standardized forms of humor. This was done both in the interviews and in the surveys, both in the Netherlands and in the United States.

The Dutch humorous tradition aptly illustrates the Netherlands' position in the world. All the main comic genres have foreign names: cabaret, revue, sketch, stand-up comedy, sitcom. However, each of these imported genres has acquired a highly Dutch flavor. The main humorous genre in the Neth- erlands is called cabaret, which has emerged from the French tradition of cafe entertainment (Ibo 1981). Nevertheless, Dutch cabaret generally con-

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The context of Dutch humor 17

sists of long performances in a theater setting rather than in a smoky cellar or cafe; one person is involved, doing humorous monologues, which may be combined with songs, poetic monologues, social satire, and social cri- tique. The best known representatives of cabaret are the late Wim Kan, Freek de Jonge, and Youp v a n ' t Hek, celebrities who will be mentioned many times in this book.

Many comedians have a rather ambivalent view of the "cabaret" label because of its association with intellectualism and elitist social critique. The late Toon Hermans, whose humor lies somewhere between the clownish and the poetic, explicitly rejected cabaret. More absurdist comics like Brigitte Kaandorp or Herman Finkers are not completely comfortable being called "cabaretiers" either (Hanenberg and Verhallen 1996). Younger performers like Hans Teeuwen or Theo Maassen often move back and forth between the cabaret tradition and the faster and shorter "stand-up comedy", imported from America and the UK in the 1990s. This Anglo- Saxon tradition is faster and more densely packed with jokes: the Dutch version of stand-up comedy does not leave much room for poetic musings or social satire.

Until the 1970s, there was a strong tradition of popular performance, va- riety shows called revue: a combination of sketch comedy with other tradi- tional, vaudeville disciplines like dancing and singing. Andre van Duin, the favorite comedian of most joke lovers, comes from this revue tradition, which was superseded in large part in the 1970s by television comedy. Television is now one of the main sources of comedy. TV comedy shows clear American and British influences, with most comedies following the sitcom format. Other genres on Dutch television are transnational too and include candid-camera shows, talk shows presented by comedians, and sketch comedy.

Different TV stations in the Netherlands target different audiences. RTL4, which aired Moppentoppers, is the largest commercial network, with popular shows and comedies aimed at large audiences. However, some of the public broadcasting corporations also aim for popular success. Andre van Duin had a variety show aired by TROS, one of the public broadcasting corporations, before joining RTL4, and the (formerly) social- ist broadcasting corporation VARA has a long tradition of producing suc- cessful sitcoms. The most explicitly intellectual or highbrow broadcaster is called VPRO. Over the years, this corporation has produced many forms of slightly experimental and avant-garde humor, ranging from the political satire of van Kooten and de Bie to the absurdist sketch comedy of Jiskefet.

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18 Introduction: Jokes, humor and taste

The design of this book

This book consists of three parts: following upon the introduction, one part deals with differences in the appreciation of the genre and another with differences in the appreciation of separate jokes. These two parts are fol- lowed by a chapter describing the American research into social back- ground and joke telling.

The first part is called Style and social background. This part deals with the question of where differences in appreciating the joke as genre arise. To begin with, Chapter 2 summarizes the coming into existence of the genre. I go into the history of the joke and try to connect this with the development of other humorous genres. There follow three chapters centered around the question of why people like the joke as a genre. In Chapter 3, I connect social differences in appreciation of jokes to differences in communication styles. Chapter 4 deals with the relationship between the appreciation of jokes and other forms of humor. In it, I contend that the appreciation of the genre of the joke is connected as well to differences in humor style: ideas about good and bad humor. Chapter 5 addresses humor styles in day-to-day life: here humor styles and communication styles are connected.

In the second part, entitled Taste and quality, the attention shifts to the content of separate jokes. Not everyone thinks every joke equally funny, or every subject equally suited to the making of a joke. But perhaps every joke is not equally funny, and differences in the appreciation of jokes are also a question of quality. I begin this part with a chapter about the repertoire: about the jokes being told at this moment in the Netherlands. Chapter 7 deals with the question of what a "good joke" is. In the last chapter of the Dutch study, I look at variations between groups in the appreciation of separate jokes. The content of the jokes is consciously placed after the chapters dealing with differences in the diffusion of the genre as a whole; if jokes are primarily told in certain social groups, this will also have an effect on their content.

The final part of this book is called Comparing humor styles. This con- sists of Chapter 9, which presents the results of the American study and compares these with Dutch humor styles. Some theoretical implications of this study are discussed in the concluding chapter.

While the book is not so much about jokes as about judgments about jokes, jokes are regularly quoted. Some of these will perhaps strike the reader as hurtful or shocking. This is intrinsic to jokes: humor always touches on social and moral boundaries. The fact that I quote a joke does

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The design of this book 19

not mean that I appreciate it or even approve of it; it means only that it illustrates or supports my arguments appropriately.

In writing this book, I consciously chose to make my own voice heard occasionally. In writing about tastes it is almost impossible not to reveal something of your own judgment. No matter how hard I try, my descrip- tions of elite humor will always sound more sympathetic than my descrip- tions of a typical sexual joke. This has played a role not only in the descrip- tions but in the whole research process. I am deeply persuaded of the fact that because I did the research and all the interviews personally, this has influenced the book. The central concept of this book makes this almost matter-of-course: the interviews with persons who shared my taste and conversational style went more smoothly. I simply did not always succeed in laughing at the jokes my informants told me; I could not always tell them jokes they thought were funny either. In research into humor a first-person perspective is not only honest, or difficult to avoid in collecting material, but also useful. The judgment of humor cannot be disconnected from the person judging. Both in conversations with the interviewees and in expos- ing myself to the humor, my own role and judgment formed an important research resource.

The judgment of whether something is funny or not is spontaneous, automatic, almost a reflex; people laugh almost without reflecting. This goes for someone investigating humor too. Sense of humor thus lies very close to self-image. My informants often found it strange and not entirely pleasant that I was trying to connect something as personal and spontane- ous as humor to social background: a scientific approach to humor seems to make its authenticity dubious. Resistance was particularly focused on my attempts to connect humor to class. While interviewees seemed quite ready to reflect on masculine and feminine humor, on the rough humor of the young and the respectable humor of the old, on the differing humor of be- lievers and nonbelievers, and even enjoyed expanding on differences be- tween people from different parts of Holland or the United States, the dis- cussion of humor and class obviously made them ill at ease. Here a re- searcher encounters double resistance. Neither the Dutch, nor the Ameri- cans, like to talk about class differences. Both societies are believed to be meritocratic and individualistic; this does not sit well with the notion that your parents' professions influence who you are. Thus, people do not easily admit that their own behavior might have something to do with class, and they are more wary still of making any statement whatsoever about the class of others.

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20 Introduction: Jokes, humor, and taste

To indulge in a sociological analysis of humor is not to opt for unquali- fied pleasure. Not only is this opting to strip something we hold dear - our sense of humor - of its magic, the serious tone of science is also hard to combine with the frivolity of the subject. A scholar dealing with humor must quickly mount an adequate defense against the lethal accusation of not having a sense of humor. Analyzing humor is, after all, not always easy to combine with appreciating it - let alone creating it. This is not meant as a funny book. It is a book about jokes and not in itself any funnier than other books in the same genre: social-scientific monographs.

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Kahdea Inc. is a small startup company that sells sports merchandise online. The mission of the company is to successfully sell and deliver sports products for all. The company sells products for a wide variety of sports including football, basketball, baseball, soccer, hockey, and volleyball.

Kahdea is composed of twenty-eight (28) employees who work in different departments (production, operations, automation, accounting, human resources, finance, marketing, etc.). During their probation period, all employees are trained before being assigned into their positions.

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