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Mandeponay: Chiriguano Indian Chief in the Franciscan Missions

Erick D. Langer

Bolivia enjoyed a rather splendid isolation during the quarter of a century following independence in 1825. The Catholic Church, the state, and elites generaiiy ignored the country's indigenous popula- tion as long as the Indians paid tribute, which was the principal source of government revenue in the first years of the republic. By midcentury, an economic renaissance had begun. Foreign and local capital re- vived silver mining and made possibie some agricultural expansion. Greater profitability of commercial farming naturally inflated the value of land and threatened the isolated harmony of many Indian commu- nities. By what tactics could the Indians guarantee their economic and cultural survival?

Passive accommodation would mean the rapid loss of land and of cultural autonomy, and the transformation of independent farmers into a pool of reserve day workers for plantations owned by others. Rebellion would mean even quicker destruction. Ethnic and regional differences among those whom others termed Indians also limited the possibility of real unity among Bolivia's indigenous people. The state, even if it had wanted to protect the indigenous population, in- creasingly embraced a laissez-faire ideology that tacitly favored the wealthy and powerful. Individuals such as Manuel Isidro Belzu in Bolivia and Juan Bustamante in Peru, who tried to enact reforms, met with derision from their recaicitrant colleagues and even death.

Mandeponay, chief of the Chiriguano Indians from 1868 until 1904, combined the skills of a caudiiio and of a traditional chieftain. The Chiriguano chief found a solution that worked-for a while. He invited one powerful institution, the Church, to place a check on the encroach- ments of the government and the elite. Still, the Franciscan fathers pacified as they protected, and their exhortations to the Indians to be good Christians and good citizens ultimately undermined the cultural autonomy of Mandeponay's people. So, too, did Mandeponay's policy of encouraging Indian migration to Argentina to seek jobs. In the short run, it gave the Indians independence, but in the long run, it threat- ened communal unity.

We cannot but admire the wily stratagems of a proud chief who secured the best deal he could for his people and himself in a

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changing world. Yet as historians we might ask what Mandeponay's story tells us about the "development of underdevelopment." Howand why did the modernization of Bolivia contribute to increasingmisery in the countryside?

Erick Langer, associate professor of history at Carnegie-Mellon University and adjunct associate professor at the UniversityofPitts- burgh, received his doctorate at Stanford University. He has done research on the rural society, ethnicity, and economy of southern Bolivia. His published works include Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia, 1880-1930 (Stanford, 1989); and, with Robert H. Jackson, The New Mission History (Lincoln,1995). He currently is completing a volume on contemporary indigenousmove- ments in Latin America.

Mandeponay became chief of the Machareti ChiriguanoIndians when his chieftain father, Taruncunti, was mur- dered in 1868. A group of Chiriguanos from Cuevo cut open Taruncunti's mouth from ear to ear because he had betrayed the Indians' cause and spoken to the Franciscan missionar- ies. Taruncunti's brother and a niece also were killed anda number of his relatives kidnapped and taken to Cueva. Mandeponay, the oldest son of Taruncunti and the next in line for the Machareti chieftainship, was not present andso escaped the massacre. Filled with rage, he immediately asked that a mission be established in Machareti as revenge for his father's death. Within one year the missionaries had built a fort at the Indian village. Despite a concerted attack by dissident Chiriguanos while the fort was still unfinished, the mission at Machareti had become a reality. As we will see, there was more than just revenge as a motive for Mande- ponay's request.

Together the murder of Taruncunti and Mandeponay's request for the establishment of a mission were one episode in the conquest of the Chiriguania, a vast region of rugged jungle-covered Andean foothills in southeastern Bolivia, ranging from one hundred miles south of Santa Cruz to al- most the northern outskirts of the city of Tarija on the edge of the desolate Chaco region. The Chiriguanos had held out against Spanish forces since colonial times. Viceroy Toledo mounted a large expedition against this ethnic group in the 1560s, but he suffered defeat at the hands of the Chiriguanos, who effectively used guerrilla tactics to combat the better-armed Spanish soldiers. Only in the late colonial pe· riod did Indian resistance weaken. After the failure ofthe

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Jesuits to convert the Chiriguanos in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Franciscans finally achieved some success. In the late eighteenth century the friars, based in Tarija, established a string of prosperous missions in the Chiriguania. However, patriot guerrillas and their Chiriguano allies during the wars for independence destroyed the missions and sent the Spanish friars packing.

The Chiriguanos were known as fierce warriors since the sixteenth century, when they migrated from what is now Brazil into southeastern Bolivia. They were able to survive the onslaught of the Spaniards and early republican society because of their military organization, their political decen- tralization whereby a number ofregional chiefs lorded it over chiefs of allied villages, and the training in the art of am- bush and weapons that every Chiriguano boy underwent at a relatively early age. The Chiriguanos were superb practi- tioners of guerrilla warfare and frequently raided white settlements throughout the early republican period. The village-based military society, the warriors' unconditional obedience to their chiefs, and the perpetual state of warfare between Chiriguano village alliances as well as against the whites kept the Indians well trained in all manner of death and destruction.

The Chiriguanos were largely left alone until the 1840s, when the Bolivian economy began to quicken again. The gov- ernment set up a series of military forts along the Chaco frontier on the southern borders of the Chiriguania. Also, settlers from Tarija entered Indian territory and joined the small garrisons in periodic raids deep into the frontier, de- stroying Chiriguano villages and kidnapping women and children. However, the cattle that the settlers brought proved evenmore destructive. Buoyed by increased demand for cattle in the highland silver mines, the colonists drove their herds into the Indians' cornfields. As a result, entire villages lost their means of subsistence and either had to migrate far- ther north, into the core of the Chiriguania, or submit to the settlers and work for them under extremely poor conditions as hacienda peons. Many villages resisted violently the en- croachment of the white settlers, but in the long term this proved futile.

The only other alternative was for the Chiriguanos to accept a Franciscan mission on their territory as a way of preserving their homeland. By the 1840s the Bolivian gov- ernment had retreated from its earlier anticlerical stance

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and, in fact, encouraged the Franciscans from the TarijaCon- vent to resume their missionary activities as a wayofneu. tralizing the still formidable Chiriguano military threat along the frontier. By 1854, under increasing pressure as settlers and ca ttle ranches encroached on their land, Chiriguano chiefs in Itau (1845), Aguairenda (1851),and Tarairi (1854) had accepted the establishment of missions as the lesser evil.

Macharetf, farther to the north, became the next goalfor the settlers. This location was particularly strategic, forit was the main meeting place between the Tobas, adept In- dian horsemen who controlled much of the Chaco, and the Chiriguanos. Taruncunti led the resistance to the establish- ment of the mission in Tarairi and, in alliance with the Guacaya Chiriguanos, attacked the mission in 1855.The assault failed. In revenge for this attack the mission Indi- ans of Tarairi joined with the soldiers in the military colo- nies farther south and launched a punitive expedition on Machareti. This expedition was completely successful, and as a result of the sacking of Macharetf and the capture of numerous women, the place was abandoned by Taruncunti's people. Only a small faction of Macharetefios, under the lead- ership of Guariyu, returned to Macharetf six years later af- ter making peace with the missionaries. Taruncunti, outraged by this betrayal, attacked with his people and al- lied Tobas, wiping out the new settlement. His erstwhile subordinate Guariyu barely escaped naked to the safety of the hil lside. Flush with success, Taruncunti marched on Tarairi but again failed to take the mission.

Mandeponay was a young boy during these assaults and counterassaults and probably did not participate in these wars. His father certainly inculcated in him a fierce senseof independence and of Chiriguano ethnic identity. However, Taruncunti could see that his position was tenuous at best on the frontlines in the war against the white settlers. In his later years, in exile in an allied Chiriguano village, he became conviricad that he would have to live with the whites and that friendship with the missionaries held the key to the. ~eestablishment of Machareti as the most important Chmguano settlement. In 1866 he decided to visit Tarairi mission and make peace with the Franciscans. Settlers were already moving their cattle herds into the Macharetf area, and Taruncunti saw that returning his people to the area was the only way of maintaining his claim there. Almost cer-

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tainly, Mandeponay, as the oldest son and heir apparent of his father, helped Taruncunti negotiate with the friars on the conditions for the Chiriguanos' return to Machareti.

Despite his wishes, Taruncunti could not move his people back to the old settlement. The Chiriguano bands farther north, in Guacaya and Cuevo, who knew that if Taruncunti buckled under white pressure they would be next, refused to let him return to his ancestral grounds. Deeply suspicious ofTaruncunti's motives and his steadily improving relations with the missionaries, they launched a sneak attack on Naunti, where Taruncunti was hiding, and killed the old chief. It is in this way that Mandeponay became chief of the Machareti Chiriguanos and invited the friars to establish a mission at his birthplace.

For the Tarija Franciscans, gaining Machareti was the greatest triumph of their careers as missionaries in republi- can Bolivia. Mandeponay controlled more than three thou- sand individuals, including the dissident band under Guariyu, almost certainly the largest concentration of Chiriguanos in the whole region. Moreover, establishing a mission at Machareti helped alleviate the constant threat of Toba and Chiriguano alliances against the whites, since it was the chief of Machareti who traditionally controlled Chiriguano-Toba relations. This move isolated the Tobas and made possible the colonization of the vast Chaco regions on the border with Paraguay. The Tobas, who were well known to the white colonists from Argentina to Bolivia as cattle and horse thieves, relied on the Chiriguanos in Machareti to pro- vide them with corn, a crop that the nomadic hunting and gathering Toba groups found impossible to cultivate in the difficult climate and soil of the Chaco desert. Traditionally, Tobas came after the rainy season to help the Machareteiios harvest their corn and, in return for their labor, received part of the crop. The Franciscans hoped that the Tobas might even be persuaded to accept the missionaries among them- selves if they got to know the fathers when they came to work and trade with the Machareti mission Indians.

Mandeponay knew that he had a strong bargaining posi- tion, and he was able to get concessions that none of the other Chiriguano chiefs ever got once they agreed to have missions. For one, Machareti had only a single central plaza. Unlike earlier colonial missions, the Franciscans could not force the Indians to convert if they did not want to, for there were no soldiers to back up forced conversions and the

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subsequent modifications in behavior required of the con- verts. However, the missionaries in the Chiriguania usually segregated neofitos (converts) from the heathens as a wayof better indoctrinating their charges and preventing the hea- thens' "savage" ways of life from infecting the Christianized natives. To do this, they had the converts build their houses around a separate plaza, which would assert in spatial terms the separation of heathens and ne6fitos. The ne6fitos gradu- ally received different authorities as well and lived accord- ing to the dictates of the missionaries, not the traditional chiefs. This Mandeponay did not permit when setting upthe Machareti mission. Instead, converts and heathens all lived around the one central plaza, although each group livedalong different streets. The settlement's layout, however, allowed Mandeponay to maintain his authority over the wholemis- sion population.

Mandeponay made sure that he kept his authority even over his father's old nemesis, Guariyu. Despite serious mis- givings, the missionaries and Guariyu had to accede to Mandeponay's demands; Guariyu kept his group separate from the larger group, but he was placed under the chief's overall jurisdiction. Mandeponay himself never convertedto Christianity and kept up traditional customs, much to the chagrin of the Franciscans. For example, he had six wives, clearly a violation of Christian injunctions. There was little the friars could do. It was Mandeponay who ran the mission and kept everyone in line. When problems arose, the mis- sionaries had to rely on this traditional chief to correct them, and thus they needed his full cooperation. In Chiriguano society, the chief played an extremely important rolein regu- lating the community and had tremendous power over his followers. Mandeponay kept up the custom of giving large feasts, to which he invited the whole mission population. Showing his largess in this fashion the chief was able to bind the mission Indians in a web of reciprocity. The feasts thus not only served to demonstrate his wealth and power,a desirable attnbute in any Chiriguano leader, but also cre- ated ties of mutual obligation upon which Mandeponay could call when necessary.

Mandepo.nay's example was very important, and, as a result,th~ friars had little success in converting their charges to ChnstJamty. In 1882, at the apogee of the mission's popu- latlo?" and fully thirteen years after the foundation of the mISSIOn,only nine families out of a total of over six hundred

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had converted. In the past five years, only three families had been baptized. Obviously, Mandeponay maintained a significant hold over his people, as evidenced by the tiny number of conversions. The chief clearly wanted to have his cake and eat it too: enjoy the protection of the missionaries and maintain the cultural integrity of his people and their land without giving up anything essential in return.

At this, Mandeponay was remarkably successful. In 1890 the missionaries decided to try and modify his behavior. In 1888 a new Franciscan had arrived from Italy. Terencio Marucci was appalled by the licentious behavior of Mande- ponay and the liberties he enjoyed with his many wives. Not only did Mandeponay maintain a harem but his son, Napo- leon Yaguaracu (also called Tacu), also kept three wives. Many of the chief's "soldiers" practiced polygamy as well. At first, the Franciscans called upon local authorities to pun- ish Mandeponay for his unlawful behavior, but the officials refused to antagonize the powerful Chiriguano ally. The au- thorities had very good reasons not to punish the chief of Macharetf. In the late 1880s the national government began to explore the uncharted reaches of the Chaco beyond the foothills of the Chiriguania and support colonization of that region. To accomplish this settlement they needed Mandeponay's support, for in his capacity as the head of the Machareti Chiriguanos he possessed extensive links to the Tobas and other Chaco tribes. The Daniel Campos expedi- tion in 1886, for example, employed a number of Machareti Indians to act as porters and attempted to use Mandeponay's influence to keep hostile Indian bands at bay. Other, later expeditions into the Chaco also usually made an obligatory stop at Machareti to get Mandeponay's assistance and gather intelligence from the Indian chief.

After their appeal to the authorities brought no results, the missionaries resorted to ostracism, isolating Mandeponay from the rest of the mission as much as possible. At first, they reported some success, asserting that now Mandeponay found himself "scorned by many of his soldiers and is fearful of some punishment." This optimism, however, did not last long. With Mandeponay cut out of the authority structure, the unconverted Chiriguanos, the vast majority, refused to obey the missionaries. Afraid that they would lose much of their liberty in this crackdown, many Chiriguanos either left the mission for the Guacaya region, where the whites only recently had penetrated, or simply went out into the

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countryside adjacent to the mission, away from the influ- ence of the friars. In one year the mission lost over 700indi- viduals, or about 20 percent of the total population of3,577. The missionaries were forced to back down. They asked Mandeponay to resume his duties in 1891, which immedi- ately helped get things under control at the mission. Mandeponay exiled a troublemaker, helped return a num- ber of families who had fled into the hills, and prohibited polygamy among the catecumenos, those who had madea commitment to converting to Christianity and were learn- ing the requisite rules.

The reincorporation of Mandeponay into mission lifeoc- curredjust in time. In 1892 the last revolt of the Chiriguanos broke out under the leadership of a messianic leader, Apiaguaiqui, from Ivo. Apiaguaiqui called himself a tumpa (messiah) who would rid the Chiriguania of its white inter- lopers and return all lands lost to their rightful owners.By this time, colonists had insinuated themselves in virtually every corner of Chiriguano territory and were forcing the Indians to work as poorly paid peons on their ancestral lands. Guacaya had fallen to the settlers in a war in 1874; the Franciscans from Potosi took the opportunity to establish a new mission in the area. Even Cuevo, at the heart of nineteenth-century Chiriguano resistance, in 1887 had ac- cepted the establishment of a mission after the Cuevefios' attempt at building a huge fence to keep out colonists' cattle had failed. Only Ivo and a scattered number of smaller settle- ments remained outside the control of the settlers.

The 1892 war was doomed to failure from the start be- cause no mission Indian chiefs joined their brethren from Ivo. A number of Chiriguano chiefs visited Apiaguaiqui to determine whether to follow the rebel leader or not. This group included Mandeponay, who by this time was among the two or three most powerful Chiriguano chiefs in the whole region. He refused to join in the growing movement hut, on the other hand, also never denied Apiaguaiqui's claims. Although the missionaries and local authorities liked to be- lieve that Mandeponay was their ally, in fact he was only agamst bloodshed and remained essentially neutral dur- mg the conflict. The assembly ofApiaguaiqui's followers de- clared war on the whites in January 1892, and Mandeponay, when he got the message, is reputed to have said: "War IS bad. There is no advantage in it. It means no homes, no

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chicha [corn beer, used as a staple in the Chiriguano diet]." It was rumored, however, that his son Tacu left to join the movement.

The Indians under Apiaguaiqui had planned to revolt during Carnival, when the whites would be celebrating and most men would be drunk, but the rape and murder of a Chiriguano woman by a colonist during a New Year's fiesta brought about a premature uprising. The Chiriguano army gained control over an extensive territory between the River Parapet! and Camatindi, a few miles north of Machareti. At this point, the Indian warrior bands suddenly retreated to the vicinity of Ivo to celebrate their victory over the white colonists. Almost certainly, the failure of the movement to spread among the missions just outside this area precipi- tated this retreat. Thus, the refusal of Mandeponay in Machareti and of the Cuevefios in the new mission limited Apiaguaiqui's success and doomed the movement. Reaction by a hastily mobilized militia and some troops from the regu- lar army was swift. The Ivo Indians and their allies fought bravely from a hillside near Ivo with their bows and arrows, spears, knives, and occasional firearms. They hastily dug trenches and erected walls of fallen trees, but even this tac- tic was of little use against the much better armed whites. A bloodypitched battle at Curuyuqui, where the fighting soon degenerated into hand-to-hand combat, decided the fate of the rebels. As a result of this battle and the subsequent re- pression, six thousand Indians were killed or taken prisoner. Those Indians who survived were given to white families in the region, and some children were sold to work as servants in households in Sucre, Monteagudo, and other towns.

Mandeponay, it seems, had been right. Violent resistance was futile. Rather, it was necessary to adapt to changing circumstances. The mission was the most viable alternative to becoming exploited hacienda peons or fleeing into the Chaco to join the Tobas. On the mission, the Chiriguanos enjoyed their own authority structure and, to a large extent, despite pressure from the missionaries to change their ways, were able to maintain many traditions. For example, while the friars forbade consumption of the beloved chicha, such an injunction had little effect in a mission such as Machareti, where the heathen population remained so large. In the af- termath of the 1892 uprising, Mandeponay gained even more power. In 1894 his archrival Guariyu, who had to a certain

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extent been a counterweight to Mandeponay's influence,was sent with his followers to a new mission, San Antoniode Padua, to help control the Tobas who were congregated there.

Mandeponay's plan ofpreserving Chiriguano ethnic iden- tity and projecting political power from the missions could not work in the long term. Although adults had a choiceof converting or not (something which they rarely did, leading a missionary to exclaim in frustration that "to baptize an Indian adult who is in perfect health is the same as asking for pears from an elm tree"), all children above age seven were required to attend mission school. This practice, of course, led to the progressive conversion of the mission popu- lation, a process that Mandeponay could do little to halt. Not only were the children taught the catechism, but they were also required to wear European-style clothes and speak Spanish instead of their native Guarani. They also learned how to play brass instruments for the mission band and some type ofcraft such as carpentry or shoemaking, and the bright- est boys learned some elementary reading, writing, and arith- metic. The girls received instruction in sewing, cooking,and other "womanly skills." The friars also often hired out the children to neighboring haciendas, where they were further imbued with Western ideas and habits. Thus, although the conversion process was lengthy, at least in theory bythe sec- ond generation the mission population would be completely converted.

The process was more lengthy than the missionaries or national authorities had counted on. It is quite possible that Mandeponay helped delay the inevitable, for there wereper- sistent reports that many families hid their children in the surrounding dense scrub forest to prevent them from being indoctrinated. Mandeponay certainly knew about this cir- cumvention but elected to do nothing to help the friars re- trieve the children. Moreover, Tacu refused to hand overhis own children, setting a dangerous example for the rest of the mission Indians. Another circumstance that made the conversion problem more intractable was the constant turn- over of Indians in the mission. Some families found tempo- rary refuge on the mission during the various uprisings or when the corn harvest was poor in other regions, a recur- rent phenomenon in the arid climate of the southeastern Andean foothills. Once families moved on again, the mis- ~lOnanes had to return the children to their parents, mak- mg many conversion efforts futile.

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Nevertheless, the neofito population continued to grow. By the 1890s they constituted approximately one-third of the total population living at Machareti, which during this period fluctuated between twenty-five hundred and three thousand individuals. Although mission residence patterns gaveMandeponay a larger say over even those who had con- verted, in the long term his authority was threatened by the ever-larger Christian population on the mission. The con- verts tended to heed the friars more and thus obviated the necessityfor an intermediary such as Mandeponay. The num- ber of mestizos who lived either on mission grounds or in the near vicinity also increased significantly during the 1890s,from about two hundred fifty at the beginning ofthe decade to double that number at the end. It was clear to Mandeponaythat Chiriguano ethnic identity was threatened evenin the relatively benign conditions of the missions. Another threat to traditional ways oflife was the increas-

ing integration of the mission Indians into the market economy.The mission's natural pastures and scrub forest providedabundant fodder for the cattle that the Indians were beginning to raise. By the 1890s mission residents raised overseven hundred head of cattle themselves, in addition to the large herd ofalmost two thousand head belonging to the mission. In the 1890s a new trail connecting Argentina with Santa Cruz to the north was developed that passed through Machareti. The Indians began to grow fruits, cotton, and other goods for their own consumption and for sale to the merchants who passed with ever-greater frequency through the mission. However, the land around Machareti was not as fertile as that at other missions because ofthe sandy soil and its proximity to the arid Chaco, making agriculture a difficult enterprise. Nevertheless, as more Indians entered the monetary economy, the emphasis on reciprocity through large feasts that showed the generosity of the chiefs, and the art oftraditional crafts such as hand-weaving cotton cloth and making beautifully ornamented pottery, slowly began to wane. Instead, many mission Indians refused to parti- cipate in the mutual shows of largess; others purchased ready made clothes and iron pots rather than engage in time-consuming artisanal activities. Mandeponay tried to adapt himself and his peopleto these

changes and used his great influence to provide his follow- ers with the best alternatives. The most important role the Chiriguanos played in the regional economy was not as

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producers or consumers, but as laborers. All white settlers who received land grants from the government in the Chiriguania attempted to include as many Indian villages as possible so as to provide an adequate source ofhacienda peons for the new estates. Unfortunately, labor conditions were miserable on the haciendas, where the Chiriguanos were treated as virtual slaves, lost their indigenous culture, and were perpetually mired in debt. Mandeponay was very much aware of this situation, and certainly his awareness of labor conditions in the region's estates had led him to ask for a mission rather than subordinate himself and his people to the white colonists. At times, of course, Mandeponay had permitted some of his people to work on surrounding estates. At least the Franciscans, who had considerable clout with the region's landowners as well as local and national authori- ties, were able to protect the mission Indians from the worst abuses. However, even there, pay was low and conditions far from ideal. How was Mandeponay going to give his people the best possible deal as the valuable labor resource that they were?

The solution presented itself in the 1880s, when a few labor contractors from the sugar mills in Jujuy, Argentina, came to the mission. Jujuy had a relatively large rural popu- lation, but most lived in the highlands and, because oftheir subsistence mentality, rarely came down to the valleys to help harvest the sugarcane. As a result, labor contractors began to look for other sources of workers, particularly among the indigenous peoples ofthe Chaco. These contractors, know- ing full well who had control over the majority of the mis- sion population, offered Mandeponay a fee for each Indian whom he could deliver to Jujuy for the sugar harvest. The deal seemed too good to be true. On the one hand, his people could make more than double the wages that they received in Bolivia. On the other hand, the work was only temporary and did not require permanent migration away from the mis- sion. Mandeponay used the fees that he collected to strengthen his ties with his soldiers and so increase his au- thority over the mission's inhabitants.

Thus, in the 1880s, with Mandeponay's help, Machareti Chiriguanos began to trickle over the border into Jujuy, par- ticularly to the Ledezma Valley, to work in the sugarcane harvest. The missionaries were against this temporary mi- gration for a number of reasons. They complained that when the mISSIOnIndians returned, the men had been corrupted

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bytheir experience in Argentina. The missionaries saw their tutelage over their charges and their efforts at conversion threatened by this absence. Many Indians brought back with them to the mission what the friars considered to be terrible habits. Most returning migrants had learned to fight with knives over even trivial matters, as was the custom among the gauchos of the Jujuy lowlands, creating serious prob- lems of insubordination at the mission. Also, since many of the men had left their wives behind during the harvest, the friars became very concerned about the breakup of family lives. The women and children often had insufficient re- sourcesto fend for themselves for the whole period that their menwere gone. After they returned, many Chiriguano men, the Franciscans complained, became abusive to their mates, leading to frequent instances ofwife beating. The friars also worried about problems of infidelity that the prolonged ab- sence ofthe men caused. However, Mandeponay's power re- mained such that despite these misgivings the Franciscans were unable to halt the migration.

In fact, in 1896, Mandeponay, by now an old man, went with his people to Jujuy to supervise the work there. On the sugar plantation he resided in a hut made ofsugarcane stalks and leaves, just like the other temporary Indian workers. Theowners ofthe mill gave him a monthly stipend and twelve pesosfor every able-bodied man that he had work for at least one month. Even a few Chiriguano women joined the cara- van; they did not work in the fields but remained home to cookand watch over the meager possessions that they and their spouses had brought along. At the end of the three- month stay, Mandeponay received, as was customary for Indian chiefs to keep them well disposed toward the mill owners, a few mules or mares as going-away presents.

The friars complained in 1896 that not enough able- bodied men remained to carry out even the basic tasks of maintaining the mission. The missionaries could do nothing to stop Mandeponay, but by this time it had become difficult to sustain the large population on the mission anyway. The years from 1897 to 1903 were exceptionally hard. At first, a plague oflocusts descended upon the region, wiping out vir- tually all the mission's crops. For the rest of the century, a prolonged drought dried out the corn plants before they bore ears, creating even worse problems for those who lived on the mission. Also, as the region's inhabitants lacked food, they resorted to cattle rustling, especially from the mission's

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herds, leading to an even greater breakdown in the mission economy. Hunger drove many of the Chiriguanos, including a number ofthe boys in the school, to go to Argentina rather than starve at home. Some friars condoned this migration, for they saw little alternative for their charges, despite the cries of outrage from local hacendados who relied on mis. sion labor for their farms.

In the meantime, Mandeponay as well as his sons be- came wealthier with their trade in mission workers. Asa good Chiriguano chief, Mandeponay distributed this wealth to his followers in the form of more expensive feasts, which he supplied with copious amounts of rum. The missionaries, who were already concerned with discipline problems brought about by the migrants' new habits learned in Argentina, were appalled at this drunkenness but again could do nothing about it. They continued to need Mandeponay, especiallyas the drought got worse, to prevent the mission from losingall its population. In fact, Mandeponay's ability to hold these feasts attracted for the first time large numbers of Tobas and Tapietes (another Chaco tribe), who were affected by the prolonged drought themselves and sought food and ref- uge on the mission. Thus, Mandeponay maintained his position as the indispensable intermediary between the mis- sionaries and the indigenous popula tion of the region.

This situation could not continue, however. The drought persisted into the twentieth century. Even Mandeponay's ability to purchase large quantities of alcohol could not pre- vent the Indians from noticing that they had no foodfortheir children and themselves. As a way of keeping the Indians on the mission, Mandeponay became more and more autocratic and, according to the friars, abusive. The feasts, in the con- text of the increasing commercialization of the mission and the subsequent breakdown of traditional ties among the In- dians, were simply no longer adequate for keeping his fol- lowers mIme. Instead, Mandeponay relied to a greater extent than before on force to maintain his authority. This tactic backfired, especially as the drought worsened. First to de- part were the Tobas and 'I'apietos, who left for regions that had been spared the disastrous crop failures.

The remaining heathens at the mission, Mandeponay's power base, left in increasing numbers as well. Once he had ahen~ted his followers, there was little reason for them to remain. Many instead elected to go to Argentina with their families and to stay there permanently. As the twentieth

, Mandeponay 107

century arrived, the exodus turned from a trickle to a flood. The missionaries in 1901 had to turn over seventy of their pupilsto families leaving the mission, a fact that they blamed on the drought and on Mandeponay's despotism. In 1903, ninety heathen families and forty neofito families left for greener pastures. The Franciscans threatened to depose him, and Mandeponay agreed to reform his ways. It was too late. By 1904, three hundred left, more than halving the mission population from its high point in early 1901 of over three thousand. Of the fourteen hundred people remaining, most were neofitos, since they had a greater stake in staying on the mission. As a result, for the first time in 1904 the mis- sioncontained more Christian Indians than heathens (in fact, twice as many), making Mandeponay's position as interme- diary superfluous. The friars could finally act against the old chief, and they deposed him as the supreme Indian au- thority of the mission. Although Mandeponay continued to send Indians to Argentina, his power was broken, and he died soon thereafter.

What does Mandeponay's life tell us about the human conditionin nineteenth-century Latin America? Mandeponay was representative of the leaders of indigenous groups who, during the course of the nineteenth century, were forced to accommodatethemselves to the expansion ofthe frontier into their territories. In a sense, Mandeponay's experience was relatively fortunate; neither he nor his band suffered total extinction as happened to many other, smaller native groups in, for example, the Amazon basin. Mandeponay wielded sig- nificant power during most of his long adulthood because he was able to act as an intermediary between his people, as wellas to a certain extent other frontier tribes, and national society.Even in these frontier conditions, where the strong subjugated the weak, Mandeponay was able to carve out a breathing space for his people and help them adapt to chang- ing conditions.

Mandeponay's experience shows that even relatively pow- erless indigenous groups, when led by creative leaders with political savvy and a firm understanding of their indispens- ability as intermediaries in the ever-changing circumstances along the frontier, were able to maintain a semblance of eth- nic cohesion and pride. Tragically, this could be only tempo- rary.The acceptance of a Franciscan mission spelled, through the indoctrination of the indigenous children, the eventual end of traditional cohesion and culture. Also, by bringing

-- ____________ ....."C1

108 The Human Tradition in Modern Latin America

the Indians into the regional economy, the missions guaran- teed that the Chiriguanos would move away from their cus- tomary ways of life. Even so, Mandeponay seized the initiative and gave his people the opportunity to work for much larger monetary rewards than were available in the immedia te vicini ty of the mission. This Machareti chieftried to maintain his traditional control over his people by spon- soring more festivals and distributing large quantities of drink. However, this effort failed. The immediate cause for this failure was the prolonged agricultural crisis that afflicted the area at the turn of the century, making it difficult for Mandeponay to keep his people in the region. In the long term, his political project was doomed anyhow; the drought probably accelerated his eventual downfall. By encouraging the mission Indians to migrate to Argentina, he helped ex- pose his people to the full force of the market and to ideas that entered the mission only in a filtered form. This cir- cumstance alone would have converted the Chiriguanos into the agricultural proletariat that by the first decades of the twentieth century the vast majority of these Indians had become.

SOURCES

Sources on Mandeponay, considering his importance in southeastern Bolivia for a generation, are relatively scarce and scattered. The founding of Machareti and Mandeponay's role in it is related in Antonio Comajuncosa and Alejan- dro M. Corrado, El colegio franciscano de Tarija y sus mis- iones (Quaracchi, 1884). Numerous reports highlight the conditions in Machareti and the other Chiriguano missions. Among them Manuel Jofre 0., hijo, Colonias y misiones: Informe de la visita practicada POI' el Delegado del Supremo Gobierno, D,: Manuel Jofre 0., hijo, en 1893 (Tarija, 1895); A. Thouar, Explorations dans L'Amerique du Sud (Paris, 1891); and Doroteo Giannecchini, Diario de la expedicion exploradora boliviana al Alto Paraguay de 1886-1887 are most revealing. In this study, I have relied extensively on the annual reports of the Tarija mission prefects for Machareti, which are in the archive of the Franciscan con- vent in Tarija, and on the annual reports of the minister of colonization, available in the Archivo N acional in Sucre Bolivia. '

u---------------- ...eq Mandeponay 109

For the 1892 revolt the basic secondary source is Her- nando Sanabria Fernandez's excellent Apiaguaiqui-Tumpa (LaPaz, 1972). For conditions in the Chiriguania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Erick D. Langer,"Franciscan Missions and Chiriguano Workers: Colo- nization, Acculturation, and Indian Labor in Southeastern Bolivia," The Americas 62, no. 1 (January 1987): 305-22; Langer and Robert H. Jackson, "Colonial and Republican MissionsCompared: The Cases ofAlta California and South- eastern Bolivia," Comparative Studies in Society and His- tory 30, no. 2 (April 1988); and Langer, Rural Society and the Mining Economy in Southern Bolivia: Agrarian Resis- tance in Chuquisaca, 1880-1930 (Stanford, 1988), chap- ter 6. By far the best analysis of the colonial Chiriguanos is Thierry Saignes, "Une 'fr ont.iere fossile': La Cordillere Chiriguano au XIXe siecle" (Ph.D. diss., Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris, 1974).

General studies on the Chiriguanos include Bernardino de Nino, Etnografia chiriguana (La Paz, 1912); Alfred Metraux, "Chiriguano and Chane," in Handbook of South American Indians, vol. 3, edited by Julian H. Steward, 465- 85(Washington, DC, 1948); Bratislava Susnik ,Chiriguanos (Asuncion, 1968); and Lorenzo Calzavarini, Na.ci6n chiriguana.: Grandeza y ocaso (La Paz, 1980).

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Nursing Research Utilization Project Proposal: Implementation Plan

Objectives

Content

Describe the methods to be used to implement the proposed solution

The methods that will be utilized in the implementation of the proposed solution are through coordination, collaboration, and brainstorming. Coordination is the process wherein stakeholders work together effectively in achieving goals of care while collaboration is where stakeholders are willing to assist each other in order to attain objectives. Brainstorming on the other hand is the exchange of ideas, expertise, and experiences necessary to produce a well-planned care for patients. Ensuring that each patient receives a patient-centered care is the primary objective of any healthcare organization. The involvement of stakeholders in creating measures to capture individualized care aligns perspectives on what’s important and how it is attained (Epstein & Street, 2011).

Develop a plan for implementing the proposed solution

A plan is a product of a strategic thinking process (Nunn & McGuire, 2010). The formulation of a judicious plan is a crucial step in any given project. The initial step is to identify and engage the stakeholders that will comprise the Interdisciplinary team (IDT) such as physicians, nurses, case managers, social workers, therapists and dieticians. Second step is to present to the IDT the objectives of the project which is to facilitate a patient-centered care discharge plan for patients post hospitalization. When the goals are known, IDT meets and discuss the plan of care of the patient through brainstorming and then presents the details to the patient and support system. The IDT will involve the patient and family in the finalization of the care plan. When all has been agreed upon among the IDT, patient and support system, then implementation of the objective is initiated.

Incorporate a theory to develop the implementation plan and explain how it is used to develop the plan.

The theory that will be incorporated with the implementation of the plan is the theory of reasoned action (TRA). The theory associates norms, behaviors, attitudes, and intentions to perform an action (Hill, 1977). It is the intention and goal of healthcare organizations to provide patient-centered care to their patients. Therefore, those involved with the care of the patient needs to have the same belief and intention to make patient safe and be well. The TRA theory will pave a way to propel stakeholders in ensuring that the patients they serve receive individualized plan of care that they do deserve.

Identify resources needed for the proposed solution’s implementation and how you plan to gather and incorporate them.

The resources needed for the implementation of the proposed solution are as follows: manpower, access to electronic records, writing materials, and available conference room space to facilitate the meeting. In order to obtain all resources needed, the Executive Manager of the organization needs to buy-in with the proposed solution and the benefits of its implementation. If a project has the support of upper management, the acquisition of resources is favorable. Leadership endorsement is essential in any project success (Ur Rehman Khan, et al., 2014).

Describe outcome measures aligned with planned outcomes

The intent of the project is for 85% of patients will have a patient-centered care discharge plan post hospitalization following an IDT conference on patient’s care plan. The conference will focus on a plan suited for patient’s needs, which will be carried over to the next level of care. A staff or a third-party vendor will initiate a post discharge call within 24 hours of patient’s discharge from the hospital. The aim of this call is to ensure that the patient is safe and confirm that the care plan, which was established in the hospital, was carried over by the patient (and support system) at home or other post hospital destination.

Discuss the feasibility of the implementation plan.

Patients are readmitted to the hospital sometimes due to poor and individualized discharge planning. The effects of patient returning the hospital not only affect the institution financially but the comfort and safety of the patient is at stake as well. The proposed solution to this issue is to involve stakeholders in formulating a plan to promote patient-centered care. With the knowledge and participation of upper management and staff on the initiative of personalized care, project objectives can be attained significantly. Therefore, implementing an IDT conference

References

Epstein, R. M., & Street, R. J. (2011). The values and value of patient-centered care. Annals Of Family Medicine9(2), 100-103. doi:10.1370/afm.1239

Hill, R. (1977). Contemporary Sociology, 6(2), 244-245. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2065853

Nunn, L., & McGuire, B. (2010). The importance of A good business plan. Journal of Business & Economics Research, 8(2), 95-105. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/194892288?accountid=35812

Ur Rehman Khan, S., Sang Long, C., & Muhammad Javed Iqbal, S. (2014). Top management support, a potential moderator between project leadership and project success: A theoretical framework. Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology,11(8), 1373-1376. doi:10.19026/rjaset.8.1109

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Nursing Research Utilization Project Proposal: Monitoring

The delivery of individualized care is important in ensuring receipt of optimal benefits of care rendered to patients. Discharged patients should be released to community agencies that provide in-home assistive services. The transition plan must consider the patient's home environment as well as the risks for injury and find ways of mitigating them as soon as possible. Service providers should take advantage of family conferences to advise the patients’ family of how to care for the patient after they have been discharged from the hospital. Hence, there is a need for post-discharge follow-up especially for high-risk patients, to deter readmission rates (Potera, 2009).

This paper aims to discuss methods of monitoring solution implementation; evaluate the solution; and lastly, tackle outcome measures and data collection evaluation.

Monitoring

Monitoring is a scheduled collection and analysis of data so as to track the progress of the implemented solution and ensure that the solution is in compliance with the set health standard regarding patient discharge (Popejoy, L.L., et al., 2015). Monitoring is a critical aspect of any implementation process since it helps in establishing patterns and coming up with strategies for proper management and quality improvement. Monitoring and evaluation in the health care sector are paramount in ensuring quality services. It is critical to monitor the implemented solutions for the issues affecting patient-centered care and discharge planning (Potera, 2009).

The Stetler Model assists in the monitoring of the solution using its steps. “The monitoring consists of preparation, validation, decision-making, application and finally evaluation according to the steps of the Stetler Model (Stetler, 2001).” The preparation for monitoring begins with the purpose; sources of the evidence of the research; and then the context of health care. The identification of purpose depends on the solution proposed. Therefore, the contextual factors must be examined to determine the appropriate monitoring strategy.

The second phase is the validation of the monitoring process. The solution identified was for the IDT to ensure that patients receive individualized care, which are carried out post hospitalization and prevent patients returning to the hospital. Therefore, the patient-centered care and reduction of readmission would be the ultimate goal of monitoring. The monitoring process starts with the formulation of healthcare providers with unified policy-driven structure ensuring that there are proper communication and coordination and culminates with patient being released in the community.

Evaluation

All the IDT will be involved in the designing as well as the implementation of the program. Stakeholders are expected to obtain and report their expertise, perspectives and feedback. The next step will be clarifying the scope of the solution plan. In this case, the scope would entail defining the purpose as well as evaluating other aspects of the program as the budget and the target clientele. The second step will entail developing questions, which will be addressed based on outcome solutions, after which it would be viable to develop indicators of change and performance. The third step is developing the questions that the program is intended to answer. After developing questions comes along the selection of relevant indicators. Indicators are useful mechanisms for measuring achievements, as well as reflect any changes in the program. Following the selection of the indicators is deciding on the viable methods of data collection. Data collection method can be qualitative or quantitative approach. Once data is collected, analysing of data collected comes into play. Final step would be communicating the findings, insights, and recommendations to the stakeholders.

Outcome measures. “Patient-reported outcomes measures (PROMs) are an important component of assessing as well as evaluating whether clinicians are improving the health of patients. Unlike process measures, that assist in capturing provider productivity and adherence to the patient experience measures, or standards of recommended care which focus on aspects of care delivery such as communication, the PROMs seeks to measure whether the services provided improved patients' health and sense of well-being (Black, 2013).” The outcomes measures determine whether the process implementation is successful or not. The outcomes measures include the following:

· The understanding of the discharge process that starts from the admission of the patient.

· The effectiveness of unified policy-driven structure that would ensure that there are coordination and proper communication amongst different health care providers.

· The number of community agencies that provide in-home assistive service

· The impact of home environment on the risk of injury.

· The ways to find mitigating strategies to reduce the risk of injury to the discharged patient.

· The service provider should take advantage of the family conferences to advise the patients’ family of how to care for the patient after they have been discharged from the hospital.

· The facilitation of post-discharge follow-up especially for high-risk patients, to deter readmission rates.

Evaluation Data Collection . The ways to deal with estimation is useful to make a qualification amongst quantitative and subjective techniques. Reviews utilizing organized surveys are the most widely recognized type of quantitative measures of patients' experience (Petitti, D.B., et al., 2000). These are intended to create numerical information that can be examined measurably and used to portray and think about results from the example populace all in all and particular sub-bunches. The accentuation is on analyzing examples and patterns from a vast specimen, giving broadness and the capacity to look at, however regularly inadequate with regards to profundity since inquiries and reaction alternatives foreordained.

The accompanying quantitative techniques and advancements for acquiring tolerant criticism (Petitti, D.B., et al., 2000):

· self-consummation postal studies

· Interviewer-managed vis-à-vis studies

· telephone reviews utilizing live questioners

· automated phone reviews (intuitive voice reaction – IVR)

· online reviews utilizing electronic or email polls

· surveys utilizing compact hand-held gadgets (PDAs or tablets) (on location)

· surveys on touch-screen booths (on location)

· surveys on bedside comforts (nearby)

· Administrative information/routine measurements.

Qualitative techniques are diverse in that the attention is on acquiring an inside and out comprehension of individual encounters and the way they clarify or decipher these (Black, 2013). Subjective information is typically reported utilizing words, not numbers, and it is harder to utilize the confirmation to make examinations or speculations. Some subjective techniques that would be utilized incorporates (Black, 2013):

· in-profundity eye to eye meetings (might be sound or recorded)

· Discovery interviews completed by clinical staff

· Focus group

· web-based free content remarks

· comment cards or proposal boxes (nearby)

· Complaints and compliments

· Patient journals

Conclusion

It is important for clinicians to be aware on the goals of patient-centered care and discharge planning to ensure understanding that care process starts from patient’s admission. It is also crucial to set up a unified policy-driven structure that will ensure coordination and proper communication among different health care providers in regards to patients’ plan of care. This paper discussed methods of monitoring solution implementation; evaluation of solution; and lastly, tackled outcome measures and data collection evaluation.

References

Black, N. (2013). Patient reported outcome measures could help transform healthcare. BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.), 346, f167.

Petitti, D. B., Contreras, R., Ziel, F. H., Dudl, J., Domurat, E. S., & Hyatt, J. A. (2000). Evaluation of the effect of performance monitoring and feedback on care process, utilization, and outcome. Diabetes Care, 23(2), 192-196. doi:10.2337/diacare.23.2.192

Popejoy, L. L., Jaddoo, J., Sherman, J., Howk, C., Nguyen, R., & Parker, J. C. (2015). Monitoring resource utilization in a health care coordination program. Professional Case Management, 20(6), 310-320. doi:10.1097/NCM.0000000000000120

Potera, C. (2009). Lowering hospital readmissions and costs. The American Journal of Nursing

Stetler, C. B. (2001). Updating the stetler model of research utilization to facilitate evidence-based practice. Nursing Outlook, 49(6), 272-279. doi:10.1067/mno.2001.120517

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