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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
N°05/13 MAY 2013 | GOVERNANCE
Reiko Hasegawa (IDDRI)
JAPAN’S 2011 DISASTER: RESPONSES TO NATURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES The triple disaster that hit the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011
triggered a massive human displacement: more than 400,000 people
evacuated their homes as a gigantic tsunami induced by a magnitude 9.0
earthquake engulfed the coastal areas, and the following nuclear accident
in Fukushima released a large amount of radioactive materials into the
atmosphere. This study analyses the disaster response, with a particular
focus on evacuation of the population, and social consequences of this
complex crisis, based on intensive fieldwork carried out one year after the
catastrophe. It reveals that the responses of the Japanese authorities and
population were significantly different between a natural disaster and an
industrial (man-made) accident.
TWO EVACUATION PATTERNS: RISK PERCEPTION VERSUS VULNERABILITY Being prone to both earthquakes and tsunamis, Japan had been preparing
itself against such risks for many years. A tsunami alert was immediately
issued and the population knew how and where to evacuate. In contrast,
the evacuation from the nuclear accident was organised in total chaos, as
a severe accident or large-scale evacuation had never been envisaged—let
alone exercised—before the disaster. The population was thus forced to
flee with no information as to the gravity of the accident or radiation risk.
In both cases, the risk perception prior to the catastrophe played a key role
in determining the vulnerability of the population at the time of the crisis.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THE DISASTER: DIVIDED COMMUNITIES AND FAMILIES While tsunami evacuees are struggling with a slow reconstruction
process due to financial difficulties, nuclear evacuees are suffering from
uncertainty as to their prospect of return. One year after the accident,
the Japanese authorities began to encourage nuclear evacuees to return
to the areas contaminated by radiation according to a newly established
safety standard. This triggered a vivid controversy within the affected
communities, creating a rift between those who trust the government’s
notion of safety and those who do not. The nuclear disaster has thus
become a major social disaster in Japan dividing and weakening the
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Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings,
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Citation: Hasegawa, R. (2013), Disaster Evacua-
tion from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Studies No.05/13.
IDDRI, Paris, France, 54 p.
The author would like to thank both the French
and Japanese DEVAST teams for their signifi-
cant inputs and contributions in producing this
study, especially Dr Francois Gemenne (IDDRI),
Project Leader of the French DEVAST team, and
Dr Alexandre Magnan (IDDRI) for the very great
support they extended throughout the implemen-
tation of the project. The author also received
valuable and insightful advice from Dr Michel
Colombier, Scientific Director of IDDRI, and
Professor Claude Henry of Sciences Po/Columbia
University (Chair of the Scientific Council of
IDDRI). Special thanks go to Ms Rina Kojima, who
worked as an intern during the fieldwork in Japan.
Without her help, many of the interviews would
have simply been unrealisable. The field research
was successfully conducted thanks to Associate
Professor Norichika Kanie of the Tokyo Institute
of Technology (TITech), who kindly hosted IDDRI
researchers in his office during the field mission,
and also to Mr Shinji Tanada, Ms Yui Nakagawa
and Ms Miho Akatsuka, who provided valuable
assistance in conducting field visits. My sincere
thanks are also extended to all the evacuees and
municipal officers who agreed to be interviewed
despite their difficult circumstances. Lastly, the
author would like to express sincere gratitude to
the French National Research Agency (ANR) and
the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST),
which provided the necessary funding for the
project implementation.
For more information about this document,
please contact the author:
Reiko Hasegawa - [email protected]
ISSN 2258-7535
IDÉES POUR LE DÉBAT 05/2011 3IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Reiko Hasegawa (IDDRI)
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 4
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
1. INTRODUCTION 9
2. METHODOLOGY 9
3. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 15 3.1. Overview of the event 15 3.2. Disaster response and evacuation 15 3.3. Perception of risk 17 3.4. Prospects of resettlement 19 3.5. Post-disaster challenges 20
4. THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT 22 4.1. Overview of the event 22 4.2. Disaster Response and Evacuation 23 4.3. Perception of risk 28 4.4. Prospects of return 30 4.5. Post-disaster challenges 35
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TSUNAMI EVACUATION AND THE NUCLEAR EVACUATION 42
6. CONCLUSIONS 44
REFERENCES 46
APPENDICES 48 Appendix 1: Questionnaire for evacuees
(tsunami and nuclear) 48 Appendix 2: Questionnaire for
self-evacuees (only nuclear) 49 Appendix 3: Questionnaire for
municipalities 50 Appendix 4: List of meetings and seminars
attended during the field research 52 Appendix 5: Map of nuclear power plants
in Japan 53
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Number of persons interviewed 11 Figure 1. Age of evacuees interviewed 11 Figure 2. Gender of evacuees interviewed 11 Table 2. Target municipalities for interviews 13 Map 1. The Tohoku region and three heavily affected prefectures 14
Map 2. Map of Fukushima Prefecture 14 Map 3. Example of a hazard map (Rikuzentakada City) 17
Figure 3. Photos of temporary shelters (prefabricated housing) 19
Figure 4. Changes in the number Fukushima evacuees 23
Figure 5. Changes in the total number of evacuees 23
Table 3. Chronology of the Government’s evacuation orders/recommendations 24
Map 4. Official evacuation zones prior to 30 September 2011 24
Figure 6. Trends in public opinion on nuclear energy 31
Map 5. Reorganisation of the evacuation zone (as from August 2012) 32
Table 4. The government’s proposal on the reorganisation of the evacuation zone 33
Figure 7. Changes in willingness to return 34 Figure 8. Willingness to return according to age 34
Map 6. Radiation contour map of the affected region 40
Table 5. Comparative analysis of the two evacuations 43
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AAR Association for Aid and Relief
ADRA Adventist Development and Relief
Agency
ANR Agence nationale de la recherche
(France)
FoE Friends of the Earth
ICANPS Investigation Committee on the
Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power
Company (appointed by the Cabinet
Office)
IIC Independent Investigation Commission
on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
JST Japan Science and Technology Agency
M Magnitude
METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry
MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology
MHLW Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
NAIIC Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission
(appointed by The National Diet)
NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(under METI)
(replaced by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority in September 2012)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NSC Nuclear Safety Commission (under the
Cabinet Office)
(integrated into the Nuclear Regulation
Authority since September 2012)
NUMO Nuclear Waste Management
Organization of Japan
OCHA United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
TITech Tokyo Institute of Technology
UNU United Nations University
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 1 5IDDRI
3. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI
3.1. Overview of the event
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake
struck off the Pacific coast of Tohoku in north-
eastern Honshu, the main island of Japan. The
tremor triggered a tsunami that had a mean inun-
dation height of 10–15 m and a run-up height of
40 m in some places (Mori and Takahashi, 2012:
pp.1 and 13). According to the National Police
Agency, 15,871 people lost their lives, with 2,778
people missing (feared dead) and 6,114 people
injured, as on 10 October 2012.13 Nearly 400,000
houses were either severely damaged or comple-
tely destroyed. The Cabinet Office estimates
the direct financial damage from the disaster at
approximately 16.7 trillion yen (€167 billion).14 It
was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded
in Japan,15 and one of the world’s biggest earth-
quakes after the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake
(M 9.1–9.3). The then Japanese Prime Minister,
Naoto Kan, described the disaster as the worst
crisis that Japan has had to face since the Second
World War.
According to the official figure, the disaster dis-
placed a total of 386,739 people, recorded at one
week after the disaster.16 In March 2012, one year
on from the disaster, the number was still as high
as 344,290,17 which indicates that most of the evac-
uees had not yet returned to their home or reset-
tled in permanent shelters. Half of these evacuees
originate from the Fukushima Prefecture and most
were displaced following the nuclear accident.
The number of evacuees who left on account of
the earthquake and tsunami alone can thus be es-
timated at around 170,000 people.
These evacuees are currently accommodated
in three types of temporary shelters: prefabricat-
ed houses, private apartments and public-sector
apartments. As early as April 2011, one month af-
ter the disaster, prefabricated houses were erected
13 Source: National Police Agency (http://www.npa.
go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf). (in Japa-
nese)
14 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.bousai.go.jp/oshi-
rase/h23/110624-1kisya.pdf). (in Japanese)
15 Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). (http://
www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake/2011_Earth-
quake.html). (in Japanese)
16 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/1-
hisaisha/pdf/5-hikaku.pdf). (in Japanese)
17 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/ topics/ 120413hinansya.pdf). (in Japa-
nese)
to house the displaced population. By May 2012,
a total of 52,858 prefabricated houses had been
constructed for the disaster evacuees, of which
48,884 units are currently occupied.18 There were
68,317 families living in private apartments, with
rent covered by the government. Public-sector
apartments, which were initially built to provide
housing for public servants, were also utilised as
evacuee accommodation. There were 19,041 of
such apartments occupied by the evacuees.
3.2. Disaster response and evacuation
This sub-section presents the major findings from
the field interviews on the disaster response and
evacuation process induced by the earthquake and
tsunami.
Evacuation with a tsunami warning that underestimated the gravity of the situation Japan is a country prone to earthquakes and
tsunamis due to its geological conditions. Over
the years, it has thus developed an adaptation and
disaster prevention mechanism using advanced
technologies. The coastal communities of Tohoku
in particular had prepared themselves for the
eventuality of a disaster, as they have already
experienced many tsunamis. When the earth-
quake hit the Tohoku region on 11 March 2011, the
tsunami warning was issued by the Japan Meteo-
rological Agency (JMA) only three minutes after
the earthquake, and immediately disseminated
to the municipalities likely to be impacted (JMA
2011b: p.3). The warning was then transmitted
through loudspeakers installed in these coastal
towns for the purpose of public broadcasting. The
disaster prevention mechanism was thus acti-
vated as planned. However, the field interviews
revealed that the system had many shortcomings.
First, the estimated tsunami height announced in
the warning was considerably different from the
actual tsunami height. The JMA issued a warning
of a 6 m tsunami for Miyagi Prefecture and no
more than a 3 m tsunami for Iwate and Fukushima
Prefectures (JMA 2011a: p.3). On hearing this
alert, some residents decided to stay on the second
floor of their house instead of evacuating to higher
ground. In addition, the fact that these coastal
towns had 5–10 m breakwaters built along the
coast for protection against the inflow of tsunami
waves further delayed the residents’ decision to
flee. One evacuee from Ofunato City said:
18 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/topics/120521genjototorikumi.pdf). (in
Japanese)
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
When I first heard a tsunami warning for 3
metres, I thought that it would be all right be-
cause the breakwater in our town is higher than
that.
The survey conducted by the JMA in June 2011
on the post-disaster evacuation following the
tsunami alert also collected the similar testimo-
nies from tsunami survivors (JMA, 2011a: p.5).
During our interviews, a couple of evacuees also
mentioned that those who had already evacu-
ated to higher ground even went back home after
hearing the expected height of tsunami, thinking
that they would survive in their house. Further-
more, citizen volunteers from the Community
Fire Brigade19 went to the coastal area to close the
breakwater gates, a task allocated to them by the
contingency planning, expecting the breakwater
to be high enough to stop the tsunami. Many of
them lost their lives as the tsunami engulfed the
breakwaters. In reality, the tsunami that hit the
three prefectures had a 10–15 m mean inundation
height and a 40 m run-up height in some places. It
was only after the arrival of the tsunami that the
JMA amended the height to ‘more than 10 m’ for
all three prefectures. As a result, despite the early
tsunami warning, many residents were caught by
surprise when the actual tsunami arrived.
Later, it was also discovered that the govern-
ment possessed GPS-controlled tide gauge equip-
ment, installed off the coast of Tohoku by the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism (MLIT), which had accurately predicted
the height of the tsunami prior to its arrival on the
coast. According to the presentation made by the
Member of Parliament, Itsunori Onodera, at the
House of Representatives on 2 February 2012, the
information from the GPS gauge was transmitted
to the JMA before the tsunami arrived, but the
JMA did not take this into account until after the
event as it was neither part of their procedure nor
integrated into their method of calculating the tsu-
nami height.20
The second shortcoming of the tsunami warning
was the way in which the warning was disseminat-
ed. The alert is usually transmitted by the relevant
municipal offices via loudspeakers installed all
19 This is a voluntary fire corps formed by the residents of
each community/district in towns and cities. It partici-
pates in and helps the activities of fire fighters on a com-
munity level in case of fire and disasters.
20 The testimony of Itsunori Onodera (Liberal Demo-
cratic Party) at the House of Representatives during the
Budget Committee of the House of Representatives on
2 February 2012 can be viewed on the following site:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efGa86LURHg (in
Japanese).
over town. The interviews with evacuees and local
authorities found that many of these loudspeak-
ers did not function either because the earthquake
had knocked down the speaker poles or because
transmission had been disrupted by the power cut
following the earthquake. According to the survey
conducted by the JMA after the disaster, 17 out of
27 affected municipalities responded that their tsu-
nami alert transmission system had broken down
and did not function properly at the time of the
disaster (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
2011: p.7). This indicates that the installed system
was simply not well adapted to the magnitude of
the disaster and thus not reliable during the actual
crises.
Thirdly, according to the interviewed survivors,
even when the public speakers were functioning,
the warning message issued by the municipal
office was given in such a polite and calm tone
(‘Please evacuate’) that the residents did not fully
appreciate its gravity. The field research found
that only 3 out of 28 interviewed evacuees had
been prompted to flee on account of the tsunami
warning transmitted by the local authority over
the loudspeakers. The majority of residents fled
after actually witnessing the tsunami, on the ba-
sis of their own judgement or previous experience,
listening to the radio broadcasts, or being directly
warned by the community fire brigade on patrol.
In summary, the tsunami warning during the
11 March disaster, although timely, suffered from
failings with respect to an assessment of the grav-
ity of the tsunami, the transmission system used
and an inadequate communication of the level of
risk.
Relief operations and a limited capacity to accept aid In the field, local governments – both municipal
and prefectural authorities – were the main coor-
dination bodies for relief operations. The inter-
views with municipal officers and aid workers
from NGOs made it clear that the affected local
authorities in the remote coastal region of Tohoku
often lacked experience in working with civil orga-
nisations such as NGOs and citizen volunteers,
and were simply overwhelmed by the number
of offers. In Ishinomaki City, according to the
Director of Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteers
Centre (PBV), the offer of volunteers was initially
turned down by the local authority on the grounds
that the city had no coordination or reception
arrangements in place for the volunteers. In addi-
tion, one municipal officer from the same city
recalled during the interview that food aid was
sometimes wasted when the person in charge of
evacuation centres, often municipal officers, did
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 1 7IDDRI
not know how to distribute it properly. According
to him, when food aid of rice balls arrived in an
evacuee camp, the camp manager realised that
the number of rice balls was not enough to distri-
bute to everybody in the camp and thus decided to
simply throw them in the garbage in order to avoid
strife and chaos in the centre. In other instances,
the municipal officials managing the distribution
of relief items required the donating organisa-
tions and companies to provide ‘each survivor
with items that were exactly the same in brand,
type and size’ and, as a result, ‘many resources
were wasted or used inefficiently’ during the relief
operations (Yeoh, 2012: p.8).
The Secretary General of the Association for Aid
and Relief (ARR), which operates mainly in devel-
oping countries, also pointed out the cultural hesi-
tancy to accept aid, specific to Japanese society.
The relief operation in Tohoku made him aware
that, compared to beneficiaries in other countries,
the Japanese population generally lack the capac-
ity to seek help and accept assistance. When help is
offered, Japanese people tend to decline, either to
preserve their dignity or out of concern not to in-
convenience others. Another aid worker from AAR
recalled one scene:
When I arrived at a house badly damaged by
the tsunami, there was a woman still living in-
side the house without any electricity, water or
food. There was no heating stove either. When I
asked her what I could bring to help her, she said
‘No, don’t worry about me. There are people who
are in greater need than I am’.
In Japan, an industrialised country with a func-
tioning social welfare system, the local authori-
ties were simply not used to receiving help and
thus quickly became overwhelmed by all the of-
fers of assistance that came in from all over Japan
and abroad. Thus, the field interviews found that
the population’s cultural hesitancy to receive as-
sistance compounded the difficulties that volun-
teers, NGOs and other private donors encountered
in delivering aid to the needy during the relief
operations.
3.3. Perception of risk
The affected region of Tohoku had long been aware
of the tsunami risk and was thus highly prepared
for the eventuality prior to the disaster. This sub-
section attempts to analyse how this perception
influenced individual decisions to flee and disaster
mitigation during the actual crises.
High perception of tsunami risks Prior to the 11 March disaster, the affected
coastal cities had already been expecting a major
earthquake (M 7.4) to occur with a 99% prob-
ability within the next thirty years, and the To-
hoku region had thus prepared intensively against
such risk (Mori and Takahashi, 2012: p.2). In the
Hazard map of Takada district
Municipal Office
Stairs Public loud speakers
Evacuation route
First Evacuation Point Evacuation Centres Watergate
Map 3. Example of a hazard map (Rikuzentakada City)
STUDY 05/20131 8 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
estimation, the tsunami was predicted to have a
10.2 m run-up height in Rikuzentakada City and
7.3 m in Naraha town.21 On the basis of these esti-
mates, the municipalities had created hazard maps
to mark out the zone at risk of flooding in the re-
spective cities (Map 3). Based on the hazard maps,
evacuation drills were organised regularly. All of
the evacuees interviewed mentioned that they had
been informed of such risk prior to the disaster. In
addition, most of them were familiar with tsunami
disasters and knew what to do in such an event,
having learnt from previous experiences and sto-
ries told by the elderly.
The shortcomings of hazard maps The field survey found that the hazard maps desi-
gned to prepare the residents against tsunamis did
not always help to save lives in the actual disaster.
According to the local government employee of
Rikuzentakada City that we interviewed, the map
had indeed helped to raise the awareness of those
residents living in the predicted inundation zone
and prepare them for an eventual tsunami. On
the other hand, it also created a feeling of reas-
surance for those who lived outside the predicted
inundation zone, giving them the impression that
they were safe from the tsunami risk. Another map
shown by the same official during the interview
indicated the location of houses whose residents
lost their lives, and clearly shows the causal rela-
tionship between the hazard map and the survival
of individuals. On the map,22 it was evident that
victims resided just outside the predicted inun-
dation zone indicated on the hazard map – those
residents who were not included in the tsunami
drills. This suggests that the perception of risk and
the disaster preparedness did, in the vast majority
of cases, influence the survival of individuals at
the time of disaster.
Location of emergency evacuation points All four evacuees interviewed in Ishinomaki City
referred to the disaster as ‘man-made’, critici-
sing the local authority for insufficient prepare-
dness against a tsunami risk. In Ishinomaki City,
which had the highest death toll (3,47123) of all the
affected towns, survivors accuse the shortcomings
of the municipality’s disaster preparation as a main
21 Information provided by Rikuzentakada City and
Naraha town councils during the interview.
22 The map was shown to us by the official of Rikuzen-
takada City during the interview but he declined to pro-
vide us with a copy of such a sensitive document out of
respect for the victims’ families.
23 Source: Miyagi Prefectural Government (http://www.
pref.miyagi.jp/kikitaisaku/higasinihondaisinsai/
pdf/09071600.pdf) (in Japanese).
cause of this high fatality rate. One of their accusa-
tions targets the location of emergency evacuation
points. These points were generally designated at
schools and public buildings but also at public car
parks or a flat field. Originally intended as gathe-
ring points in case of fires or earthquakes, some of
them were situated on lower ground close to the
shoreline or on river banks. When the earthquake
hit on 11 March 2011, many inhabitants gathered
at these emergency points instead of taking refuge
on higher ground, quite simply because these
places were regularly used during disaster drills
as the first assembly points. As a result, some of
these residents lost their lives as the locations were
completely inundated by the tsunami. One of the
most tragic examples is the case of Okawa primary
school in Ishinomaki City. Teachers decided to
take the children to the emergency evacuation
point located on the river bank instead of climbing
the hill just next to the school, because it was the
evacuation point designated in the contingency
manual. As a result of this decision, 70% of the
school children and teachers lost their lives when
the tsunami travelled up the river.24
These instances indicate that the evacuation
points were not necessarily adapted to tsunami
disasters and that the residents were not adequate-
ly informed or trained for tsunami evacuations in
Ishinomaki City. This lesson needs to be properly
addressed in future disaster planning.
Vulnerability created by previous tsunami experiences During the interviews, municipal officials and
evacuees mentioned that having previous tsunami
experiences had sometimes adversely affected
individuals’ decision to flee and hence their
survival during the 11 March tsunami. It is often
assumed that people with previous disaster expe-
rience respond more effectively to a subsequent
disaster and that the lessons learnt from past
experience help them to avoid similar mistakes
in the future. As Alexandre Magnan argues in the
context of adaptive capacity to climate change, in
societies regularly exposed to natural hazards, the
experience of risk may confer a certain ability to
respond to a changing climate and to integrate its
effects (Magnan, 2010: p.8). Yet in the case of the
11 March disaster, although experience did help to
24 The newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, ‘3.11 shogen: jidou, nakisakebi outo, gakkou saita no giseisya’ (Author’s
translation: Testimony of 3.11: screaming and vomiting
pupils, the worst death toll for schools), 19 April 2011; the newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, ‘hinan yori giron data 40 fun, giseisyatasuu no ookawasyou’ (Author’s transla-
tion: 40 minutes of discussion instead of evacuation pro-
duced many victims), 13 June 2011.
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 1 9IDDRI
save lives of many, it also created a feeling of reas-
surance with respect to risk and thus made some
of the population more vulnerable. The popula-
tion in these coastal cities had their perception of
the tsunami risk shaped mainly by the experiences
of the 1960 Chile Earthquake (M 9.5), which
produced a 6 m-high tsunami that took 142 lives,
and the 2010 Chile Earthquake (M 8.8), which
occurred almost one year before the 11 March
disaster and induced a 1 m-high tsunami affecting
the region. The field interviews found that these
recent experiences had given the inhabitants a
rather fixed idea that the biggest tsunami likely
to hit their cities would be around 6 metres high.
Moreover, in the past, all of the tsunami warnings
issued by the JMA and transmitted via the munici-
palities had always predicted much higher waves
that those that actually occurred, thus creating
a misperception that an actual tsunami would
always be much smaller than the one predicted
by official warnings. Given such convictions, the
population underestimated the height and gravity
of the tsunami that hit on 11 March 2011. Several
evacuees also asserted that the experience of the
foreshock (M 7.3) that struck on 9 March 2011,
two days before the 3.11 also led the population
to underestimate the tsunami risk of 11 March. At
the time of the foreshock, a tsunami warning was
announced but the tsunami that actually arrived
was only 0.5 m high.
Another fixed idea based on previous experi-
ences involves the time lag between the occur-
rence of an earthquake and the arrival of the ensu-
ing tsunami. According to the interviews, the past
tsunami experiences of the local population had
given them the idea that a tsunami would arrive
10–15 minutes after an earthquake. During the 11
March disaster, the tsunami reached the shoreline
30–40 minutes after the earthquake in the towns
(JMA, 2011b: p.10), contrary to the population’s
expectations. As a result, many of those who had
evacuated to higher ground immediately after the
earthquake decided to return home once the fif-
teen minutes had elapsed, convinced that no tsu-
nami would follow on from the earthquake, and
were hit by the enormous tsunami that arrived
thirty minutes later.
From these instances, we discovered that the
lessons learnt from previous experiences had para-
doxically sometimes been a contributing factor to
the population’s underestimation of the risk or its
misinterpretation of the danger signs during the 11
March disaster, and that their experience had not
always helped to mitigate the impacts. The inter-
views with tsunami survivors led us to the follow-
ing factual conclusion: while risk perception based
on former experience did indeed help to save lives
of many, in the face of an extreme disaster that ex-
ceeded all assumptions in terms of its magnitude,
it also produced the reverse effect by creating false
assumptions as to the level of risk.
3.4. Prospects of resettlement
From the interviews, we learnt that most of the
evacuees wish to resettle on new land located
on higher ground either because they no longer
feel safe living in the place where their houses
had been swept away or because it is not emotio-
nally possible to return as they are deeply trau-
matised by the loss of family members. One year
after the disaster, the resettlement process began
but evacuees were encountering many adminis-
trative and financial obstacles. The resettlement
Figure 3. Photos of temporary shelters (prefabricated housing)
Photo (top): A prefabricated housing unit in Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture, for tsunami evacuees. Taken by R. Hasegawa on 22 March 2012. Photo (bottom): A prefabricated housing unit in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, for nuclear evacuees. Taken by R. Hasegawa on 5 April 2012.
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
plan proposed by the government has three main
components. First, the local authority purchases
the land owned by each evacuee affected by the
tsunami. With the money from this sale, evacuees
are expected to purchase new land for resettle-
ment. Although the cost of house construction is
not covered by the scheme, evacuees are entitled
to receive financial assistance of up to around
€30,000 as well as a special low-interest housing
loan set up by the government worth up to
€146,000 in order to rebuild their houses.25
The field research found that evacuees were
finding it very hard to resettle despite the various
forms of government assistance. First, there is a
problem of ‘double loans’. Some evacuees contin-
ue to pay for the mortgage of a house swept away
by the tsunami. For these evacuees, it is extremely
difficult to commit to another housing loan, even if
it is part of the government scheme. Furthermore,
many of them are still unemployed as their offices
and factories were destroyed by the tsunami and
have not yet been reconstructed. Secondly, pur-
chasing the new land for resettlement is difficult
simply because land located on higher ground is
scarce in some cities or because landowners are
sometimes unwilling to sell land that has been in
the family for generations. In other instances, the
land is sometimes protected as a natural reserve
and cannot be purchased, or landowners cannot
be found as they are either dead or living abroad.
Another obstacle stems from one of the condi-
tions laid down by the government resettlement
scheme: at least five evacuee families must join
together and decide collectively to resettle in the
same place in order to benefit from the scheme.
This condition was initially aimed at maintaining
community ties, but it is instead creating many
problems on the ground as the population is now
scattered around different parts of the town or
sometimes outside the town. This means that it is
extremely difficult for the evacuees to get in touch
with friends and former neighbours who would
agree to resettle together.
Lastly, the field interviews found that the man-
agement of resettlement schemes was very poorly
synchronised by the local authorities. Many mu-
nicipal governments lost patience with what they
considered to be a slow or inadequate process and
began their own assistance schemes to comple-
ment the government scheme. The problem is that
they started these without consulting neighbour-
ing towns, which has sparked off jealousy among
the different communities and made it difficult to
reach a consensus within the evacuee community.
25 Source: Cabinet Office.
For example, Ishinomaki and Rikuzentakada Cit-
ies have proposed to purchase the tsunami-affect-
ed land for 70–80% of its original value, while
Higashi-Matsuyama City (just next to Sendai City)
has offered the evacuees up to 80–97% of the land
value.26 As a result, evacuees in some localities
began to renegotiate the terms of resettlement
schemes with the municipal administration, thus
causing further delay in the whole resettlement
process.
In this context, the resettlement process for
evacuees is not advancing at a full speed. The situ-
ation is exerting an additional psychological strain
on the evacuees, who have already suffered from
the loss of close relatives or friends and now find
themselves in the plight of displaced persons in
camps and temporary shelters.
3.5. Post-disaster challenges
The following points are developed to illustrate the
situation and challenges facing tsunami evacuees
and the affected communities one year after the
disaster.
Reinventing the affected communities – ‘building back better’ Prior to the disaster, Tohoku was already a margi-
nalised region facing the challenge of an aging
population and the migration of its youth to
larger cities in search of better job opportunities.
In 2010, 26.3% of the population in Tohoku was
over 65 years old, 3.3% higher than the national
average (and compared to 16.8% in France).27 The
economy of Tohoku was mainly based on agricul-
ture and fisheries, with the average wage standing
17% lower than the national average.28 This trend
is likely to accelerate in the wake of the disaster.
One year after, reconstruction operations were
intensified in the affected towns. The govern-
ment budget for reconstruction amounts to €150
billion for the year 2011 and €37 billion for 2012.29
Yet, so far, the authorities’ reconstruction efforts
have seemed to focus more on rebuilding the
physical infrastructures – the traditional notion of
26 Source: Japan Institute of Construction Engineering
(JICE) (http://www.jice.or.jp/sinsai/sinsai_result.
php?q=%93y%92n%94%83%82%A2%8E%E6%82%E
8&t=2). (in Japanese)
27 Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/
kihon1/pdf/gaiyou1.pdf) (in Japanese).
28 Source: Cabinet Office (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/
sna/data/data_list/kenmin/files/contents/pdf/gai-
you2_1.pdf) (in Japanese).
29 Source: Reconstruction Agency (http://www.recon-
struction.go.jp/).
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 2 1IDDRI
reconstruction – and less on smaller but innovative
social and economic projects to revitalise the com-
munities.30 During the interviews, several evacu-
ees expressed concern that many young people
were leaving the town due to the lack of job op-
portunities after the disaster. According to them,
the reconstruction works created many temporary
job opportunities but these were confined to the
construction sector and contracts were on a short-
term basis. Unable to find stable employment,
many young people, especially those with qualifi-
cations, began to leave the town for big cities. Ac-
cording to a survey of 1,033 evacuees in Iwate, Mi-
yagi and Fukushima Prefectures conducted by the
newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, between January and
March 2012, 40% of them were still unemployed
either because they had lost their jobs or their em-
ployers had suspended activity following the dis-
aster.31 The results of the same survey showed that
the affected cities, including Ishinomaki City, had
on average lost 6% of their population between
2011 and 2012 (excluding the number of dead and
missing due to the disaster) and, in the case of Ri-
kuzentakada City, the figure was 13.8%.32
Under these circumstances, rebuilding the af-
fected communities as they were before the dis-
aster seems not only inefficient but also unsus-
tainable both demographically and economically.
The affected municipalities are thus dealing with
the enormous challenge of implementing a well-
thought-out reconstruction plan to ensure a rapid
recovery from the disaster, whilst at the same time
dealing with the chronic problem of a shrinking
economy and aging population.
The elderly and persons with reduced mobility were the hardest hit The tsunami claimed many lives among the elderly
and persons with reduced mobility living at home
or in specialised facilities. During one interview, an
Iwaki City employee explained that, for those who
were living with their families, it was expected that
the family members would help them to evacuate.
But as the earthquake hit during the day, these
members were either at work or at school and were
unable to return home in time to rescue them.
The elderly and persons with reduced mobility
living alone at home were allocated to designated
neighbours to assist them in case of disaster. But,
likewise, these designated helpers were at work
30 The Japan Times, ‘Reconstructing Tohoku to fit today’, 2 April 2012.
31 Asahi Shimbun, ‘Jinko-gen keieishano-urei’ (Author’s translation: Falling population, business owners’ grief),
11 March 2012.
32 Asahi Shimbun, Ibid.
and could not assist those who needed help to
evacuate. As a result, many lost their life as they
were unable to move from the house. According
to the 2011 White Paper on Disaster Prevention
edited by the Cabinet Office, 64.4% of fatalities
from the 11 March disaster were over 60 years old,
whereas the proportion of the population over 60
in the region was 31%. The mortality rate for those
in their seventies rose as high as 23.7%, and 21.8%
for those in their eighties.
As for persons with reduced mobility, it was re-
ported that their fatality rate was 2.5 times higher
than that for all the affected populations.33 Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by a network of associa-
tions for disabled persons, Japan Disability Forum
Miyagi, the average fatality rate among 13 affect-
ed municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture was 1.4%
while the rate for the persons with disabilities was
as high as 3.5% and 3.9% for those with physical
disabilities.
These statistics show that the disaster preven-
tion measures were flawed when it came to ad-
dressing the needs of vulnerable groups in case of
disaster, a lesson that should be taken into account
for the future disaster preparations.
Divided communities The field interviews with evacuees found that the
disaster had caused tensions and divisions among
the local population, which still persisted one year
on. While stories of mutual help and solidarity
were often emphasised by the evacuees, they also
pointed up the different treatments and discrimi-
nations in the distribution of the aid received at
the time of disaster. It emerged from the inter-
views that the evacuees categorise themselves into
three groups: those who lost their houses and all
their belongings in the tsunami; those who lost
their houses but not their belongings due to the
earthquake; and those whose houses were only
partially destroyed. The third group of evacuees
was considered ‘less affected’ compared to the first
two groups and thus regarded as ‘less qualified’
to receive aid. As an evacuee from Rikuzentakada
City explained:
When someone from a partially destroyed
house came to an evacuation centre to get food
and relief items, the evacuees in the centre open-
ly complained that the person did not have the
right to receive assistance because her house was
not completely destroyed. After such experiences,
33 The newspaper, Nikkei Shimbun, ‘Higashinihon- daishinsai no shougaisyasibouritsu, zentaino 25 bai.
Nigeokureta kanousei’ (Author’s translation: The fatal-
ity rate from the Great East Japan disaster is 2.5 times
higher among the disabled population: a possibility that
they were unable to evacuate in time)’, 30 July 2012.
STUDY 05/20132 2 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
those who were living in partially destroyed
houses with no electricity, water or food often
had to survive by their own means, hesitating to
seek help.
In addition, disparities also appeared depending
on the evacuation centres. Large evacuation cen-
tres that attracted media attention received many
offers of assistance from all over Japan, while small
centres were most often ignored. These experi-
ences have created jealousy and mistrust among
neighbours and friends, leaving deep scars in rela-
tionships that had been nurtured over generations
in these remote coastal communities.
While the public service is overwhelmed by re-
construction projects and the evacuee resettle-
ment process is stagnating, the economic and so-
cial disparities that existed among the inhabitants
before the disaster are also growing larger and
more visible. According to the aid workers inter-
viewed from Child Fund Japan in Ofunato City and
PBV in Ishinomaki City, both of which assist evacu-
ees in prefabricated housing units, evacuees with
financial means tend to move out of the temporary
shelters quickly as they construct their new home
without waiting for financial assistance from the
government, whereas the vulnerable and the mar-
ginalised are left behind. Those with a strong so-
cial network and personal connections also move
out rapidly as they easily find new job opportuni-
ties. Information Technology (IT) literacy is also
creating a new disparity. Evacuees who know how
to surf the Internet are able to find more informa-
tion on the various forms of assistance offered by
the authorities, NGOs and individuals, while those
who are not IT-literate have little access to such in-
formation as they rely solely on written material.
In the absence of an effective public service during
post-disaster recovery, this disparity is exacerbat-
ing the rifts in communities and leaving vulner-
able populations in even greater destitution and a
state of traumatism.
4. THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT
4.1. Overview of the event
The earthquake and the ensuing tsunami caused
serious damage to the installation of Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant situated 230 km north
of Tokyo. This resulted in hydrogen explosions
and nuclear meltdowns of three of the six reac-
tors on site, due to the loss of all power supply and
subsequently of control of the cooling systems.
Tens of thousands of residents had to evacuate
their homes as radiation leaked into the atmos-
phere, the sea and the food chain. Japanese offi-
cials rated the incident at level 7 (the maximum) on
the International Nuclear and Radiological Event
Scale (INES) defined by International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), which ranks the accident
as the largest nuclear disaster since the 1986 Cher-
nobyl accident (which is also rated at level 7). The
post-accident management measures, including
the decommissioning of the crippled reactors and
compensation for the nuclear evacuees, are esti-
mated at a cost of more than €200 billion.34
One year after the disaster, there were more than
160,000 evacuees, known as nuclear evacuees,
from the Fukushima Prefecture. They represent
47% of all the persons displaced by the 11 March
catastrophe.35 A total of 11 municipalities (113,000
residents) were forced to evacuate following the
government’s evacuation orders. In addition to this
forced displacement, there were also cases of vol-
untary evacuation where residents living outside
of the official evacuation zone became worried
about radiation effects and decided to flee on their
own. As the Japanese government and TEPCO re-
vealed the true scale of the radioactive contamina-
tion, there was a gradual increase in the number
of voluntary evacuees, also referred to as self-evac-
uees. It is very difficult to obtain official statistics
on the number of self-evacuees but we can esti-
mate these at 47,000 from the difference between
the total number of evacuees from the Fukushima
Prefecture and the number of forced evacuees
from the evacuation zone. In September 2011, the
number was estimated at 50,327 by the Fukushima
Prefecture.36 This trend was continuing one year
34 Source: Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER)
(http://www.jcer.or.jp/policy/pdf/pe%28JCER20110
719%EF%BC%89.pdf). (in Japanese)
35 Source: Reconstruction Agency.
36 Source: MEXT. (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/
shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afield-
file/ 2011/11/25/1313502_3.pdf).(in Japanese)
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 2 3IDDRI
after the disaster: the number of nuclear evacu-
ees is increasing rather than decreasing (Figure 4)
and is also pushing up the overall number of evac-
uees from the 11 March disaster (Figure 5). This
phenomenon is specific to the 11 March catastro-
phe and is not often observed for other types of
disaster.
4.2. Disaster Response and Evacuation
This sub-section describes the evacuation process
implemented following the Fukushima nuclear
accident. The field interviews found that the
affected municipalities and population were
taken by surprise and that the evacuation was
organised in a chaotic manner, which reveals that
the scenario of a serious accident had never been
envisaged or adequately prepared for prior to the
accident.
Changes to the evacuation zones From the onset of the crisis, the Japanese govern-
ment issued various evacuation orders with vastly
differing instructions and timing. From what
evacuees said in the interviews, this created a
great deal of confusion, uncertainty and distress
among the affected population. Table 3 gives the
chronology of the different evacuation orders
issued by the government. As shown in the list,
these orders were gradually expanded over a
three-month period starting on 11 March 2011 and
created four different evacuation zones (Map 4).
First, a compulsory evacuation order was issued
Figure 4. Changes in the number of Fukushima evacuees Figure 5. Changes in the total number of evacuees
Source: Japanese Reconstruction Agency.
for the zone within a 2 km radius37 from the
crippled station and then, in the space of twenty-
four hours, this was extended to a 20 km radius.
This area was designated as a ‘Restricted Zone’
with entry prohibited. Three days after issuing
the compulsory evacuation order, the government
then instructed residents living within a 20–30 km
radius from the station to shelter indoors, in what
was called the ‘Evacuation Prepared Area’. This
‘shelter indoors’ order continued for more than a
month and finally, on 22 April, the same residents
were advised to self-evacuate. On the same day,
the government issued a new evacuation order
to the area where a high airborne radiation level
had been detected and which was located outside
of the 20 km radius evacuation zone (‘Deliberate
Evacuation Area’ shown in Map 4). The residents
living in this area were instructed to evacuate
within a month. It was at this time that the govern-
ment began to take the threshold radiation dose
of 20 millisieverts38 per year (mSv/year) as a basis
for recommending evacuations. In June 2011, the
government began to identify ‘hot spots’ where
an air radiation dose of more than 20mSv/year
had been detected outside the evacuation zones
(‘Specific Spots recommended for Evacuation’
37 This first evacuation order was issued by the Fukushima
prefectural government as a precautionary measure.
38 The sievert (Sv) is a unit to measure the radiation dose.
1 sievert (Sv) = 1,000 millisieverts (mSv). The Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
recommends limiting artificial irradiation of the public
to an average of 1 mSv per year, not including medical
and occupational exposure (ICRP 2007).
150 000
152 000
154 000
156 000
158 000
160 000
162 000
164 000
NOV 2011
DEC 2011
JAN 2012
FEB 2012
MAR 2012
APR 2012
MAY 2012
JUN 2012
325 000
330 000
335 000
340 000
345 000
350 000
NOV 2011
DEC 2011
JAN 2012
FEB 2012
MAR 2012
APR 2012
MAY 2012
JUN 2012
STUDY 05/20132 4 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Table 3. Chronology of the Government’s evacuation orders/recommendations 2011 Target Orders Name of the Zone
11 March 2 km radius from the station Compulsory Evacuation (issued by the Fukushima prefectural government)
Restricted Zone
3 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
12 March 10 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
20 km radius Compulsory Evacuation Restricted Zone
15 March Between 20–30 km Shelter indoors Evacuation Prepared Area
22 April Between 20–30 km Shelter indoors or evacuation by own means
Evacuation Prepared Area
Areas with air radiation dose more than 20 mSv/year
Evacuation within 1 month Deliberate Evacuation Area
16 June Spots with air radiation dose of over 20 mSv/year
Recommended for Evacuation Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation
30 Sept. Between 20–30 km Lifting of the order to shelter indoors or evacuation by own means
Lifting of Evacuation Prepared Area
Map 4. Official evacuation zones prior to 30 September 2011
Source: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Economy.
Specific Spots recommended for evacuation
Deliberate Evacuation Area
Evacuation Prepared Area
Restricted Area
Minamisoma
Namie
Futaba
Ookuma
Tomioka
Naraha
Hirono
Tamura
Koriyama
Fukushima Iitate
Katsurao
Kawauchi
Kawamata
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (No.1)
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (No.2)
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 2 5IDDRI
shown in Map 4). In this fourth category, the
government first designates the spots after measu-
ring radiation levels on a house-by-house basis
upon a resident’s request and then issues a ‘recom-
mendation for evacuation’ instead of ‘orders’. If
the residents of the house qualified as a hot spot
decide to evacuate, the government provides
financial assistance.
On 30 September 2011, the government decid-
ed to do away with the second evacuation zone,
‘Evacuation Prepared Area’, situated within a 20–
30 km radius from the station. Then in March 2012,
it proposed reorganising the ‘Restricted Zone’ and
‘Deliberate Evacuation Area’ into three new areas
according to the airborne radiation level, thus cre-
ating a zone to which evacuees were expected to
return. This latest government proposal will be
analysed in detail in the following sub-section.
Through these different decisions, taken one
after the other by the government in a rather ad
hoc manner, both the affected municipalities and
residents were obliged to evacuate repeatedly from
one place to another with scant information about
their future prospects. The field interviews with
evacuees found that this caused significant psycho-
logical stress for the evacuees during their flight.
Improvised evacuation orders The field survey revealed that at the outset of
the crisis, the municipalities had very little infor-
mation on the accident or the evacuation orders
issued by the government. Only Futaba town, one
of the two towns39 hosting the crippled nuclear
power plant, received the initial evacuation order
from the central government.40 The other three
municipalities that we interviewed, Naraha, Mina-
misoma and Iwaki, learnt of the first evacuation
order only through a television broadcast and
were not directly notified by the government.
Naraha town, which hosts another nuclear power
plant (Fukushima No.2), managed to obtain some
information on the situation of the Fukushima
No.1 nuclear power plant from the plant operator,
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO),41 thanks
to the relationship that it had built up with TEPCO
over the years. On the basis of this information,
Naraha town made the decision to evacuate the
entire population, while Minamisoma City, for
39 The other town that jointly hosts the crippled nuclear
station is Okuma town.
40 From the DEVAST interview with the municipality;
NAIIC, 2012: pp.50-61.
41 TEPCO is the largest of the ten electric utility companies
in Japan and the fourth largest in the world after the
German RWE, the French EDF and the German E.ON. It
was set up in 1951 and de facto nationalised in July 2012 after the Fukushima nuclear accident.
example, had nothing but the televised broad-
casts to guide its decision. According to the survey
conducted by NAIIC (NAIIC, 2012: pp.50-61),42
none of the affected municipalities, except two
towns hosting the damaged nuclear power station,
were informed officially of the evacuation order:
they had to decide on their own to evacuate their
residents.
According to the Disaster Prevention Guideline43
drawn up by the Nuclear Safety Commission of
Japan (NSC) in 1980 based on the Act on Special
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Prepar-
edness, Field Emergency Response Headquarters
(referred to as the Off-Site Centre) should be set
up within 5 km of the power station in case of an
accident. The Off-Site Centre, comprising per-
sonnel from the nuclear regulatory agencies, the
nuclear operator and the concerned municipali-
ties, is in charge of managing the crisis and mak-
ing decisions about the evacuation zone. During
the 11 March disaster, this Off-Site Centre could
not function properly given that communication
equipment was damaged by the earthquake and
that the personnel who were supposed to assemble
there did not arrive as they judged the location of
the centre too close to the affected station and thus
too dangerous (Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting
Unit44, 2012: pp.72-74). Given these circumstances,
the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo took over the
role of the Off-Site Centre when the crisis broke
out. As a result, the procedure for issuing evacu-
ation orders was never applied as planned in the
disaster manual and the municipalities were left
without any specific advice as to how to proceed
with the evacuation.45 Thus, the mayors had no
choice but to act on their own initiative and evacu-
ate all the inhabitants regardless of the govern-
ment’s decisions.
As the municipalities were at a loss at what to
do, local residents took the advice of TEPCO em-
ployees, families and friends and fled before re-
ceiving the official evacuation orders. Among the
23 evacuees interviewed, only 9 had decided to
flee on the basis of the evacuation order from the
local authority. According to them, those who had
information from TEPCO employees were the first
to evacuate, as early as the night of 11 March, while
the majority fled on the following day.
42 The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investi-
gation Commission (NAIIC) set up by National Diet of
Japan.
43 http://www.bousai.ne.jp/vis/shir you/pdf/bousai_
shishin_h2208.pdf
44 Author’s translation of Asahi shimbun tokubetsu houduo bu.
45 Information collected from the interview with the
affected municipalities.
STUDY 05/20132 6 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Privileged evacuees Information on the preoccupying situation at the
power station thus first reached those who had
relatives and friends working for TEPCO at the
damaged station. Many evacuees interviewed told
the same story. On the night of 11 March, a large
number of residents had gathered in the evacua-
tion centres as aftershocks were continuing and
many houses had lost electricity. In the middle of
that night, a handful of residents who had relatives
and friends working for TEPCO started to receive
calls from these contacts on their mobile phones
and discreetly began to leave the evacuation
centres as they had been informed on the real state
of the accident and had been urged to evacuate
immediately. They thus learnt about the severity
of the accident and the need for evacuation even
before the municipality and most of the popula-
tion. What made matters worse is that they did
not inform their fellow residents in the evacuation
centres why they were leaving. As one evacuee
from Futaba town explained:
On the night of the accident, the families of
TEPCO employees started to receive calls on their
mobile phones. After the conversation, they dis-
appeared from the centres. I managed to catch
one of them and asked why she was leaving. She
answered that she wanted to go back home in or-
der to pick up something. After she left, I realised
that her house had been completely destroyed by
the tsunami and so it was impossible for her to go
back home. Then, I understood that she did not
want to tell me that she was actually fleeing from
the town. I felt I was going crazy with fear when I
saw people sneaking out of the evacuation centre
in the middle of the night, one by one, while I was
left stuck and couldn’t do anything.
Those residents fortunate enough to know
someone in TEPCO thus escaped sooner, leaving
the others behind with no information. This inci-
dent deeply traumatised relationships among resi-
dents, a trauma that will probably take a long time
to heal.
Evacuation without preparation The interviews with affected municipalities and
evacuees revealed that the organisation of the
evacuation had been chaotic, as the municipali-
ties had been trying to find ways to evacuate all
of their residents, a situation for which they had
never practiced before. Prior to the accident,
nuclear disaster drills were conducted mainly
for the employees of the plant operator and the
municipal offices along with a limited number
of residents living in the immediate vicinity of
the nuclear power station, and the crisis scenario
used had been of a minimal nature. Out of all the
29 nuclear evacuees interviewed during the field
research, one person had ever participated in such
an exercise. A municipal worker also admitted that
the participation of the residents was limited, a
maximum of 30 persons at a time, mainly elderly,
who were available during the day. The evacuee,
a school teacher in Futaba town, had taken part in
one nuclear disaster drill and described the exer-
cise as follows:
These drills lacked seriousness. The partici-
pants were gathered in the school yard where a
hot meal was prepared and served to everybody.
The atmosphere was rather festive. What’s more,
we were eating and chatting outside during the
exercise as if a radiation leak in the air was never
expected from a nuclear accident.
According to the Disaster Prevention Guideline
of the Nuclear Safety Commission, the zone with-
in an 8–10 km radius from the nuclear power sta-
tions is considered as an Emergency Planning Zone
(EPZ), targeted for nuclear disaster drills and prep-
arations. The guideline explains that the EPZ was
set up ‘based on the assumption that it is almost
impossible to occur technically’46 and that ‘between
8 and 10 km there would be little difference in the
response to the radiation effect’. In other words, as
Akira Imai puts it, ‘the nuclear disaster preparation
was to be implemented only within 8 km and no
further as the EPZ was designated on the basis of a
nearly impossible scenario’ and ‘this, indeed, con-
stitutes the basis of the notion in public policy that
nuclear power stations were accident-free’47 (Imai,
2012a: p.24). The NSC’s report on nuclear disaster
drills conducted during 2008 in 11 prefectures, for
example, shows that the evacuation exercise for
residents was conducted only within a radius of
1–3 km from the stations.48 Therefore, at the time
of the crisis, the municipalities and residents were
not at all prepared for such an evacuation and thus
completely at a loss. As a result, in the absence of
an organised evacuation led by the municipalities
as planned in the disaster manual, many people
self-evacuated, using their own cars if they were
lucky enough to have some fuel left. This created
an enormous traffic jam on the escape route and
delayed the whole evacuation process, leaving the
population significantly distressed.
46 Author’s translation.
47 Author’s translation.
48 Source: NSC (http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/
sisetubo/sisetubo019/ssiryo5.pdf). (in Japanese)
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STUDY 05/2013 2 7IDDRI
Evacuation without information The field research also found that evacuees had
not been informed on the severity of the acci-
dent or the eventual radiation risk at the time of
evacuation. Even when residents were ordered to
evacuate by the municipal authorities, they were
not told how long the displacement was going to
last or what was happening at the nuclear power
station, let alone what the radiation risk would be.
As a result, many residents left without any extra
clothes, food or money, thinking that it would be
a matter of three or four days before they could
go back home. According to the NAIIC report,
only 20% of the residents in Futaba and Naraha
towns, both of which host nuclear power plants,
knew about the accident on the first day (NAIIC,
2012: p.52). The remaining 80% of residents learnt
about the accident only on the following day when
the evacuation order was finally issued by the
municipalities, twelve hours after the first evacua-
tion order issued by the government. The same
report revealed that only 10% of the residents were
aware of the first evacuation order issued by the
government.
The interviews with evacuees and municipali-
ties confirmed that the information on radia-
tion risk was not communicated to them by the
central and prefectural governments, despite the
fact that this (albeit incomplete) information had
been in authorities’ possession from the outset of
the crisis. The Japanese government had invested
a total of €130 million in developing the System
for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information (SPEEDI) since the 1980s (Asahi
Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.21; Mat-
suoka, 2012: p.130). The system is designed to
predict the likely pathway of radioactive materi-
als emitted from a damaged nuclear power plant
and carried by winds and rains, by calculating
the weather and geographical conditions of the
concerned area. After the accident, it was dis-
covered that the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) was ac-
tively utilising the SPEEDI from the first day of
the accident to predict the pathway of radiation
leaks from the crippled station. This information
had even been communicated to the US army as
early as 14 March 2011, three days after the ac-
cident, through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs upon a specific request made by the US
government (Matsuoka, 2012: p.130). Further-
more, this information was also transmitted to
the prefectural government of Fukushima as ear-
ly as 12 March 2011 via 86 e-mails sent by MEXT’s
Nuclear Safety Technology Centre. However, the
Fukushima Prefecture not only failed to inform
the concerned municipalities but also deleted
most of these e-mails.49 When interrogated as to
why this SPEEDI information had been deleted,
the Fukushima Prefecture explained that ‘these
e-mails contained attachment files that were too
heavy for our system to deal with’. When the gov-
ernment was interrogated as to why the informa-
tion from SPEEDI was not made public in a timely
manner, Special Advisor to the then Prime Minis-
ter Goshi Hosono explained that it was in order to
‘avoid panic among the population’.50
While the SPEEDI information was kept from
the public, MEXT dispatched a radiation monitor-
ing team to Namie town, which lay in the radioac-
tive pathway predicted by SPEEDI, as early as 15
March 2011 (Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting
Unit, 2012: pp.61-62). There, the team measured
a radiation dose rate as high as 330 microsieverts
(μSv) per hour (see Box 1).51 Namie town was situ-
ated outside of the official evacuation zone (31 km
north west of the nuclear station) and thus all the
residents were still living in the town. Information
on this high radiation dose rate was not communi-
cated to the Namie administration or the residents
and was made public only on the MEXT website
the following day: a point was indicated on a blank
map with no name shown for the place where this
dose rate had been detected. In the meantime,
the government spokesman repeated a televised
message that ‘this radiation dosage poses no
49 The newspaper Tokyo Shimbun, ‘Kakusan yosoku: fuku- shima-ken ga sakujo syazai’ (Author’s translation:
The Fukushima Prefecture apologizes for deleting the
SPEEDI information’, 21 April 2012.
50 Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.76;
Joint Government/TEPCO Press Conference held on 2
May 2011 (http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/
godokaiken_110502.pdf). (in Japanese)
51 The newspaper, Tokyo Shimbun, ‘SPEEDI information used by the government prior to being made public’, 12
June 2012; Asahi Shimbun Special Reporting Unit, 2012.
Box 1. Basic information on air radiation dose levels
m Airborne radiation can be measured by a Geiger counter, which detects particles of ionising radiation.
m 1 millisievert (mSv) per year is the reference dose level in normal exposure situations, recommended by International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). It is the dose limit for artificial radiation exposure (thus excluding natural radiation exposure) set for the public, excluding medical and occupational exposures.
m 1 mSv/year can be calculated on average as 0.11 microsievert (μSv)/ hour.
m 0.001 Sv = 1 mSv = 1,000 μSv m The average air radiation dose rate in Fukushima Prefecture before the
accident was 0.038 μSv/hour.6
STUDY 05/20132 8 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
immediate risk to human health52’ (Asahi Shimbun
Special Reporting Unit, 2012: p.54). Consequently,
many evacuees were unnecessarily exposed to
high levels of radiation during the initial phase of
the evacuation, especially those who fled to the
north-west of the station. This zone was in fact the
pathway of the radiation clouds that SPEEDI had
already predicted, but such information had not
been shared with those concerned. The SPEEDI
information was finally released to the public on
23 March 2011, twelve days after the accident, and
additional evacuation orders for residents living in
the area with high radiation levels were not issued
until 22 April 2011, one month after the public re-
lease. As the NAIIC report states: ‘Some residents
were evacuated to areas with high radiation lev-
els and were then neglected, receiving no further
evacuation orders until April’ (NAIIC, 2012: p.19),
and by acting in this way, ‘the government effec-
tively abandoned their responsibility for public
safety’ (Ibid, p.38).
Emergency response measures against radiation exposure In addition to the lack of information on the radia-
tion risk, other emergency measures implemented
by the authorities came under criticism in the wake
of the disaster. These measures involved, in parti-
cular, the emergency medical care aimed at redu-
cing the health effects of radiation exposure. The
final report by the Investigation Committee on the
Fukushima Accident commissioned by the Cabinet
Office examined some of these measures in detail,
notably the full-body screening procedure53 for
decontamination and the administration of stable
iodine tablets (ICANPS, 2011: pp.353-361).
Prior to the accident, the Fukushima Prefec-
ture had established an external contamination
screening procedure for residents, whereby those
exposed to high radiation levels would receive de-
contamination treatment in case of an accident.
In the procedure, the threshold level triggering
this treatment was set at 40 Bq/cm2 (equivalent
to 13,000 cpm).54 Two days after the accident,
the prefectural government decided to raise this
52 Author’s translation.
53 The screening procedure involves measuring the level of
radioactive contamination on a person’s outer body by
placing dose measurement equipment over the body’s
surface. The medical team then is able to determine
whether or not a person has been contaminated by radi-
oactivity and thus needs to be decontaminated.
54 The becquerel (Bq) is a unit of radioactivity. 1 Bq rep-
resents the amount of radioactive material that will
undergo one nucleus decay per second. Counts per min-
ute (cpm) is a measure of the detection rate of ionisation
events due to radioactivity.
screening level to 100,000 cpm: eight times higher
than the pre-accident level. The Nuclear Safety
Commission of Japan (NSC), although it had ini-
tially expressed some concerns, finally endorsed
this threshold level on 19 March 2011. As a result,
full-body decontamination procedures, including
removal of contaminated clothes, showers and
other preventive measures such as administration
of iodine tablets, were not systematically applied
to people whose external contamination level read
below 100,000 cpm.
On 16 March 2011, the NSC recommended the
administration of stable iodine tablets for those
residents still inside the restricted zone within a
20 km radius from the crippled power station. In
line with the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, all the
concerned municipalities had a sufficient stock of
stable iodine tablets for the residents in case of
an accident. However, the Fukushima prefectural
government did not communicate the NSC’s in-
struction to the concerned municipalities since it
had already confirmed that everybody had evacu-
ated and that nobody remained in the area (infor-
mation that was not correct according to our inter-
views with evacuees). The ICANPS interim report
published in December 2011 presents the case of
Miharu town, situated 50 km from the crippled
nuclear station. Assuming a high level of exposure
to radiation, the town decided on its own initia-
tive to advise residents to take stable iodine tab-
lets. When Fukushima Prefecture was informed of
this decision, it issued an order to the Miharu town
officials to suspend the distribution and recall the
tablets on the grounds that no such instruction
had yet been given by the central government. Dis-
regarding this instruction, the Miharu municipal-
ity decided to go ahead and distribute the iodine
tablets to the residents. As a result, apart from Mi-
haru town, no evacuees or other concerned popu-
lations in Fukushima took the stable iodine tablets
during the disaster due to absence of instructions
from the central and prefectural governments.
These examples show that the authorities did
not properly follow the emergency procedures that
were inscribed in their contingency manuals and
hence failed to provide a maximum protection to
the population against radiation exposures. These
incidents led the population to lose trust in the
handling of central and prefectural governments
in effectively mitigating the effects of the accident
and doing their best to protect their citizens.
4.3. Perception of risk
Prior to the accident, both evacuees and munici-
palities believed that the nuclear power station
was extremely safe and that a severe accident was
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 2 9IDDRI
almost impossible. The following section explores
the circumstances that existed in these commu-
nities before the accident and analyses how
this perception of nuclear risk heightened their
vulnerability when faced with an actual disaster.
Changes in the risk perception of nuclear energy
among both the evacuees and the general public
are also closely examined in order to demonstrate
the immediate and profound impact that the acci-
dent produced on Japanese society.
The myth of ‘absolute safety’ During the interviews, most of the evacuees
pointed out the myth of ‘absolute safety’ that had
underpinned their confidence in nuclear power
stations prior to the accident. During our field
survey, the majority of interviewees said that they
had believed that the nuclear stations were absolu-
tely safe. Most interestingly, a couple of evacuees
responded that they had previously never given
thought to the nuclear power plant as it had been
built long before their birth and they took its exis-
tence for granted. An evacuee from Naraha town
recalls:
TEPCO used to tell us that its nuclear power
plant was the safest in the world and that the oc-
currence of an accident was impossible. We were
all brainwashed by them…
As another evacuee from Futaba town
remembers:
Every year TEPCO organised a town festival
through which they carried out their informa-
tion campaign, telling the residents that the nu-
clear power station was absolutely safe. I won-
dered, if it was so safe, why do they have to come
every year to tell us the same thing? TEPCO also
transferred 10,000 yen (€100) to all the house-
holds in town every year [as a sign of apprecia-
tion for hosting its nuclear facilities]. When I
think of it now, why did they regularly send us
money if their station was so safe and there was
nothing to feel guilty about?
Although few in number, there were also evacu-
ees who had been sceptical about this myth. These
evacuees are mainly people who had worked on
site for TEPCO or those who, as members of their
Local Nuclear Resident Committee, had been in
regular contact with TEPCO and the state nuclear
regulatory agencies.55 Those who were connected
55 This committee is composed of residents and members
of the town assembly to represent the residents’ inter-
ests in matters concerning the nuclear power plant. It
had regular contacts with the plant operator, TEPCO,
and the nuclear regulatory agencies.
in some way with the nuclear facility knew that the
nuclear power stations were not failsafe, but they
did not share their opinion with others at the time
as it was considered as taboo for them to question
the safety of nuclear installations. Their ultimate
interest was to maintain the presence of the nu-
clear power plant on account of the benefits that
it brought to their community, and questioning its
safety was regarded as compromising this mutual
interest (see the section below ‘Nuclear-dependant
communities’).
Since the introduction of nuclear energy in 1955,
the myth of ‘absolute safety’ – according to which
a severe nuclear accident could never occur in Ja-
pan – has been nurtured by nuclear advocates in
industry, government and academia, initially in
order to convince rural communities to accept the
installation of nuclear power stations and later to
gain the population’s continuing support. Accord-
ing to Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa, who are
the main authors of the report of the Independent
Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nu-
clear Accident (IIC) established by the Rebuild Ja-
pan Initiative Foundation, this myth was regarded
as necessary by nuclear proponents in order to
overcome the general public’s strong opposition
to nuclear power, an aversion that had its roots in
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
(Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012: p.14). The authors
explain that the disaster risk in the nuclear energy
sector had been deliberately downplayed by these
interest groups over the years. As time passed, the
myth became ingrained in the thinking of nuclear
regulators and plant operators, who also finally
came to believe that an accident was impossible
(IIC, 2012: p.298). The myth went as far as to mis-
construe and distort common-sense logic. The IIC
report describes the myth as ‘the notion of safety
where questioning is forbidden and logic is for-
mulated in such a way as to preserve an already
established idea’.56
At a symposium organised by Waseda Univer-
sity in March 2012, Professor Shunichi Murooka
of Waseda University presented an interesting ex-
ample to illustrate how this myth functioned prior
to the disaster.57 He explained that, in the wake of
the Chernobyl accident, many nuclear facilities in
Europe installed vent filters in order to avoid pol-
luting the air with highly radioactive materials in
56 P.324; author’s translation.
57 Presentation made by Professor Shunichi Morooka
(Waseda University) at the Symposium on ‘One Year
after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukush-
ima Nuclear Disaster: The Cause, Impact, Countermeas-
ure and Reconstruction from a Complex Mega Crisis’,
held at Waseda University on 8 March 2012.
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
the event of a severe accident. In Japan, however,
the authorities and the nuclear operator consid-
ered that, if they fitted such filters, this would send
out a message to the public that a severe accident
might indeed happen one day and they therefore
decided against this precautionary measure. Ac-
cording to Professor Murooka, had these vent fil-
ters been installed, the Fukushima accident would
not have emitted as much radioactive material in
the air as it did. The same logic governed the or-
ganisation of disaster drills for residents. When Ni-
gata Prefecture, host to one of the nuclear power
plants, planned to conduct nuclear accident drills
for an earthquake scenario in 2010, the former Nu-
clear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), which
reported to METI, advised that such drills would
cause ‘unnecessary anxiety and misunderstand-
ing’ among residents and thus suggested that they
should not be implemented (Funabashi and Ki-
tazawa, 2012: p.14). In Futaba and Naraha towns,
disaster drills were conducted on a minimal scale
with a minor incident scenario in which only those
residents within the immediate vicinity of the
power station were to be evacuated. In the logic of
the safety myth, disaster preparation in itself had
become a source of contradiction: if the nuclear
power stations are so safe, why prepare the resi-
dents for an accident that would never happen? As
a result, the local population was not sufficiently
prepared for a disaster and eventual evacuation
and, prior to the accident, their risk perception
of nuclear power plants remained very low or, in
some cases, non-existent.
The safety myth shattered after the disaster All the evacuees interviewed, except a few of those
who were employed directly by the nuclear power
plants, said that they had completely lost confi-
dence in the safety of nuclear power plants and
wanted their towns to abandon nuclear energy.
This tendency is also observed within the general
public. Opinion polls taken prior to the accident
showed that the majority of the Japanese popu-
lation were in favour of stepping up the nuclear
share of the energy mix. In the 2009 census
conducted by the Cabinet Office, close to 60%
of the respondents were in favour of promoting
nuclear energy and another 20% were for main-
taining the current nuclear energy production.58
In total, almost 80% of the respondents approved
of nuclear energy in 2009. However, in June 2011,
three months after the accident, the opinion poll
conducted by the Nippon Housou Kyoukai (NHK),
Japan’s national public broadcasting organisation,
58 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://
www8.cao.go.jp/survey/tokubetu/h21/h21-genshi.pdf
revealed a complete turn-around with those in
favour of nuclear energy falling sharply to 28%,
while the proportion of those preferring a reduc-
tion or halt of nuclear energy rose to 66%.59 One
year after the accident, in March 2012, the same
opinion poll found 71% were in favour of phasing
out and abandoning nuclear energy, while only
23% were in favour of promoting or maintai-
ning nuclear energy.60 Figure 6 below summa-
rises these results and shows a reversal in public
opinion toward nuclear energy in the wake of the
Fukushima disaster.
Among the nuclear evacuees, this U-turn is even
more pronounced. According to the survey con-
ducted by Professor Akira Imai from Fukushima
University in February 2012, the opposition to
nuclear energy among the Fukushima evacuees
rose to 82% (Imai, 2012a: p.33). Considering that
an absolute majority of the local population sup-
ported the nuclear installation prior to the disas-
ter (Kainuma, 2011), a fact also confirmed by our
interviews, the change of opinion is most striking
among the evacuees from those municipalities
hosting the nuclear power plants. During the inter-
views, many voiced strong opposition to restarting
the nuclear power stations (all the stations were
in temporary shut-down for stress tests at the time
of the interviews) and to nuclear energy in gen-
eral, stating that there was no such thing as 100%
safe nuclear power generation. At the same time,
they also emphasised that the specific situations
of the municipalities hosting nuclear power plants
should be taken into account for any decision on
whether or not to abandon nuclear energy. Being
acutely aware of the benefits that a nuclear power
plant also brings to a town in terms of job creation
and economic prosperity (see the section ‘Nuclear-
dependant communities’), they did not wish to
impose their opinion in favour of ceasing nuclear
activities on the other hosting communities.
4.4. Prospects of return
The prospect of return for nuclear evacuees
remained uncertain one year after the disaster. The
following sub-section analyses the situation facing
nuclear evacuees with respect to their return and
explores why the evacuees remain ambivalent on
this question.
59 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://
www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summar y/yoron/social/
pdf/110709.pdf
60 The survey result available in Japanese at: http://www.
nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/120401.
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STUDY 05/2013 3 1IDDRI
The question of return is highly politicised Unlike the return of tsunami evacuees, the return
of nuclear evacuees has become a highly politi-
cised issue one year on from the disaster. In the
aftermath of the Fukushima accident, as early
as 19 April 2011, the government raised the dose
limit for public exposure to radiation from 1 mSv/
year to 20 mSv/year.61 Accordingly, the authori-
ties, including the Fukushima prefectural govern-
ment and several affected municipalities, began
to emphasise that it was safe to return and live
in areas with an annual radiation dose of less
than 20 mSv. Policy priorities have thus focused
on decontamination operations to ‘cleanse’ the
affected communities of radiation and on the early
return of evacuees. On the other hand, our field
research found that the majority of evacuees are
still anxious about the radioactive contamina-
tion of their houses and communities and remain
highly sceptical about the effectiveness of deconta-
mination operations. They are thus still undecided
about their return.
In March 2012, one year on from the accident,
the government proposed a new plan to reorgan-
ise the evacuation zone into three categories de-
pending on the air radiation doses measured.62
The first area, which has an air radiation dose of
less than 20 mSv/year, is designated for intensive
61 The reference dose for artificial irradiation for the pub-
lic, excluding medical and occupational exposures,
in ‘regular exposure situations’ defined by Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
is 1 mSv/year (ICRP, 2007). The Japanese government
refers to the ICRP’s recommendation on the reference
dose fixed for ‘existing radiation exposure conditions’,
applied to occupational exposure situations and residual
exposure situations after a nuclear reactor accident, to
justify its decision to raise the dose limit to 20 mSv/year.
The reference dose for ‘existing radiation exposure con-
ditions’ is between 1–20 mSv/year according to ICRP.
62 Source: METI (http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/
nuclear/pdf/20120330_02f.pdf).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2009 JUN 2011
OCT 2011
MAR 2012
Promotion
Status Quo
Abandon (Phase-out)
Don't know
Figure 6. Trends in public opinion on nuclear energy
Source: Cabinet Office for 2005-2009 and NHK census for 2011-2012.
decontamination operations and the early return
of evacuees. The second zone is defined as an area
with a radiation dose of between 20–50 mSv/year,
with return not deemed feasible for at least two to
three years. The third zone is the area with more
than 50 mSv/year, where the return will be diffi-
cult for at least the next five years (Table 4).
Table 4. The government’s proposal on the reorganisation of the evacuation zone
Area Name Threshold Radiation Dose
(airborne)
Timing of Return
1 Areas for which evacuation orders
are ready to be lifted
Less than 20 mSv/ year
Intensive decontamination and early return
2 Areas in which the residents are not permitted to live
Between 20-50 mSv/year
Evacuees cannot return for at least
2-3 years
3 Areas where it is expected that the residents will find
it difficult to return to for a long time
More than 50 mSv/ year
Evacuees cannot return for at least
5 years
Source: Reconstruction Agency.
Box 2. The government’s compensation scheme for nuclear evacuees
The compensation scheme for the nuclear evacuees following the reorganisa- tion of the evacuation zone was disclosed by the government in July 2012. The main elements of the scheme are as follows:
Psychological damage caused by the evacuation In addition to the reimbursement of transportation and accommodation costs related to the evacuation, TEPCO will pay 100,000 yen (€1,000) per person per month from the date of the accident until the date when the evacuation orders are lifted by the government.
Damages to fixed-assets (houses and land) As for private houses and lands located in the third zone (difficult to return to for 5 years), TEPCO will pay compensation equivalent to the pre-accident value of such assets. Those located in the first and the second zones will be compensated proportionally to the number of years the elapse until the lifting of evacuation orders for these zones.
Damages to household effects The amount of compensation varies according to the size of families. For example, a family of two adults and two children will receive between €50,000–67,000 on the basis of the newly classified areas.
Economic damages TEPCO pays an amount equivalent to the salary that an evacuee was earning prior to the accident (for a period of two years) and compensates for loss of business earnings based on the average profits that business owners were making before the accident (calculated on the previous five years for agricul- ture and forestry businesses, and three years for other business activities).
Source: METI. For further details, the following documents are available on the METI website in Japanese: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/institution.pdf; http://www.meti.go.jp/pr ess/2012/07/20120720001/20120720001-1.pdf
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Area 1: Areas to which evacuation orders are ready to be lifted
Area 2: Areas in which the residents are not permitted to live
Area 3: Areas where it is expected that the residents have difficulties in returning for a long time
Restricted Area Deliberate Evacuation Area
Map 5. Reorganisation of the evacuation zone (as from August 2012)
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
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STUDY 05/2013 3 3IDDRI
However, this proposal raised many concerns
among the affected communities, obliging the
government to hold consultations with each mu-
nicipality. In August 2012, only 5 out of 11 affected
towns had officially adopted the plan, while the
other 6 were still in consultation and undecided.63
According to the interviews, their main cause for
concern was that the proposal splits towns into
three areas each benefiting from different levels
of financial assistance (Box 2), which is likely to
create jealousies among the residents and threat-
en the cohesiveness of the community. Secondly,
it creates patches of land to which residents can
return while the rest remain restricted access are-
as (Map 5). During the interviews, several evacu-
ees questioned the feasibility of returning to such
areas if vital social infrastructures such as clinics,
schools and shops are located in the second or the
third zone and thus simply not accessible. Third-
ly, many evacuees, especially those with small
children, are deeply anxious about radiation ef-
fects if they return. They remain sceptical of the
new safety standard of ‘less than 20 mSv/year’,
despite the government’s reassurances.
Since the redefinition of the evacuation zone,
the government, Fukushima Prefecture and sev-
eral affected municipalities have mobilised to
encourage evacuees to return to the localities
classified as Area 1, which has annual air radia-
tion dose below 20 mSv. For the municipal gov-
ernments, the question of return is a matter of
their own survival: if the residents do not return,
the town will disintegrate and ultimately disap-
pear from the map, thus putting their existence
and identity into jeopardy. With slogans such as
‘Without the revitalisation of Fukushima, there
is no revitalisation of Japan’64 and ‘Don’t give up
Fukushima!’, the authorities are setting priority
on the ‘normalisation’ of the Fukushima disaster
situation and urging the evacuees to return and
reconstruct their lives. The majority of evacuees,
however, are still fearful about the risks of radia-
tion. One evacuee from Naraha town expressed
his frustration:
The government forced us to evacuate in the
first place. Now it’s trying to force us to return
without much information. When it comes
to the issue of return, I feel as if we will do it
at our own risk. We don’t know whether the
63 Minamisoma, Iitate, Tamura, Kawauchi and Naraha
have accepted the government’s proposal. Tomioka,
Okuma, Futaba, Namie, Katsurao and Kawamata have
not yet made a decision.
64 Prime Minister’s speech at a press conference on 2 Sep-
tember 2011 available in Japanese at: http://www.kantei.
go.jp/jp/noda/statement/2011/0902kaiken.html.
government will compensate the medical fees
when we get sick [from radiation effects] after
returning.
The authorities’ emphasis on return is thus
making the evacuee communities mistrustful of
the public authorities and becoming a source of
grievances. Meanwhile, the municipalities are
confronted with the extremely difficult task of
making the right choice for a future that both en-
sures the evacuees’ best interests and maintains
their community’s cohesiveness and identity.
The nuclear evacuees’ unwillingness to return During the field research, the majority of evacuees
said either that they wished to return but knew this
would not be possible, or simply that they did not
wish to return. This clearly shows the reality that
nuclear evacuees are facing on the ground. Most
express a wish to return, which in fact means that
they will not probably return considering the situa-
tion, but they do not want to state this outright. In
the field interviews, the DEVAST research team
often felt that the evacuees were hesitant to give a
clear response to the question of return, as return
is closely linked to their community’s cohesive-
ness and survival; any expression of unwillingness
to return could be seen as lacking solidarity and
betraying their community. The issue of return,
therefore, has become an almost taboo subject and
a fault line dividing the evacuee communities.
Professor Akira Imai from Fukushima University
conducted a panel survey among the nuclear evac-
uees in which same questions were asked to same
interviewees over time. He then analysed how
their opinions had evolved. The first survey was
conducted three months after the accident in June
2011, the second six months after in September
2011 and the third twelve months after in February
2012 (Imai, 2011a; 2011c; 2012a). The survey find-
ings show that the willingness to return decreases
with the passage of time and an increasingly real-
istic picture of the hometown situation (Figure 7).
The evacuees who expressed their wish to return
in June 2011 represented 61.7%, whereas in the lat-
est survey conducted in February 2012 this figure
had dropped to only 36.1%. In addition, a clear di-
vision of opinion was observed between the gen-
erations under the age of fifty and the over-sixties
(Figure 8). According to a resident survey con-
ducted by Naraha town in February 2012, the pro-
portion of evacuees aged between twenty and fifty
who expressed a willingness to return was around
34%, while more than half of those aged over sixty
declared their wish to return (Takaki, 2012). In the
same survey, over half of the respondents (56%)
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
stated that a decrease in the radiation level was a
condition of their return, with their second biggest
concern being the rehabilitation of basic social in-
frastructure (29.7%). During our own interviews,
evacuees also raised the issues of employment
prospects and the decontamination of their houses
as conditions of their return. But the phrase that
we heard repeatedly in all the municipalities is:
‘people under sixty years old will probably not re-
turn as they are afraid of the radiation effects on
their children’. If this turns out to be the case, the
return of the evacuees aged over sixty will also
pose enormous challenges. Several of those inter-
viewed raised the following question: ‘if there are
no shops open in town, no doctors and nurses in
the clinics and no helpers in elderly homes, how
can we return and rebuild our lives?’. The prospect
of return therefore remains uncertain and contin-
ues to cause a great deal of psychological stress for
the evacuees.
The government’s contradictory policies for return During the interviews, the municipal workers
and evacuees from the towns hosting the nuclear
power plants often expressed frustration at the
contradictory policies proposed by the govern-
ment with regard to return. In March 2012, when
the government proposed a reorganisation of the
evacuation zones, it also put forward a plan to
set up an interim storage facility for the contami-
nated soil collected during the decontamination
operations around the two nuclear power plants
in Fukushima Prefecture. To this end, it officially
requested the four hosting communities65 to accept
the plan. However, both the municipalities and the
evacuees criticised this plan as being at odds with
the government’s policy for decontamination and
65 Futaba, Okuma, Tomioka and Naraha towns.
the early return of evacuees. They fear that if they
accept the installation of an interim storage faci-
lity, they will not be able to return to the commu-
nity given that highly irradiated soil will be stored
in the vicinity.
The field interviews clearly evidenced a situa-
tion of ‘passing the buck’ between the central and
municipal governments on the issue of return.
Municipal governments sometimes asked the cen-
tral authority to make a decision on their return
to ensure that the final responsibility for assisting
their returning and for assuring the welfare of the
returning communities would remain with the
central government. On the other hand, the cen-
tral government insists that it is up to each munici-
pality whether or not to accept the plan for the re-
organisation of the evacuation zone. In reality, the
municipalities and evacuees have had little choice
but to accept the plan as no other alternatives are
proposed by the government. As things stand, nei-
ther the government nor the municipality have
forced evacuees to return and thus neither party is
ultimately responsible for the future of returnees.
Decontamination or contamination- transfer? Evacuees refer to the decontamination of their
community as a key condition for their return.
Yet, during our field survey, most of them were
profoundly sceptical as to its effectiveness. Imai’s
survey revealed that 80% of the evacuees were
unconvinced by the results of the authorities’
decontamination operations since these are
proving much less efficient than initially expected
(Imai, 2012a). The standard decontamination
operation involves removing topsoil, cutting away
undergrowth and pressure washing roof tiles and
asphalt roads.66 In reality, the Fukushima evacuees
66 Source: Ministry of Environment (http://josen.env.
go.jp/material/download/pdf/josen.pdf).
0,0% 20,0% 40,0% 80,0% 100,0% 120,0%
3 months after
6 months after
12 months after
Wish to return Wish to return if possible Do not wish to return so much Do not wish to return Undecided Others
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
20s
30s
40s
50s
60s
Over 70s
Total
Wish to Return Do not wish to return Do not know
Figure 7. Changes in willingness to return Figure 8. Willingness to return according to age
Source: Akira Imai, The Third Resident Survery, 2012. Source: Naraha town’s resident survey in February 2012.
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 3 5IDDRI
and residents have discovered, using their own
Geiger counters, that if it rained or snowed after
the operation, the radiation level went up again.67
The survey conducted in Fukushima City by the
international NGO, Friends of the Earth, showed
that, after a decontamination operation, the radia-
tion level had decreased by only 6.7% on average
at 1 m above the ground (Yamauchi, 2011). Another
problem is that the removed contaminated topsoil
is put into plastic bags and stockpiled next to the
site or inside the city limits, given that so far no
specialised storage facility has been designated to
stock the contaminated soil satisfactorily. As long
as the removed soil is left on site, radiation levels
in the area are not likely to decrease to any great
extent. Furthermore, when roads and roofs are
cleaned with water, the contaminated water ends
up in the sewers or is absorbed into the surroun-
ding fields and remains radioactive. This means
that the decontamination operation is merely
transferring radioactive materials from one place
to another. Once materials become contaminated,
their radioactivity cannot be eliminated simply
by ‘cleansing’. One evacuee from Futaba town
expressed his frustration as follows:
There are many farmers in our town. When
we return, if we cannot eat what we grow on our
farms and we cannot drink the water because it
comes from the contaminated river, how are we
going to live?
Another evacuee also from Futaba town added:
There are many radiation hot spots in individ-
ual houses as well. The authorities say ‘it’s safe
to live in your area because the radiation level is
OK but please don’t get close to the four corners
of your house [where the rain water drops from
the gutter]’. When I actually went to my house
and measured the radiation level, I was shocked
to detect a very high radiation level around the
gutters and the corners of window frames. It is
impossible to live in a house that has hot spots in
different places.
In addition, radioactivity is often concentrated
in the vegetation and soil of nearby hills, moun-
tains and river banks. Many evacuees remarked
that decontaminating the mountains was an al-
most impossible task. As the affected communi-
ties are often in a rural setting surrounded by hills
and mountains, the evacuees are highly sceptical
about the effectiveness of the decontamination op-
erations and the prospects of their eventual return.
In this context, some evacuees have started to
67 Information obtained from the evacuees and the resi-
dents of Fukushima City during our interviews.
question whether it is useful for the government to
pursue its decontamination policy, which receives
a large slice of the reconstruction budget.
4.5. Post-disaster challenges
This sub-section presents the major challenges
facing the evacuees, the residents of Fukushima
Prefecture, the affected municipalities, the govern-
ment and the Japanese population at large one
year after the Fukushima accident.
Discrimination towards the ‘contaminated’ Some evacuees that we interviewed complained
that they had suffered from discrimination both
during their displacement and in their place of
refuge. In the early stages of the crisis, the evacuees
from Fukushima Prefecture were considered as
‘contaminated’ by the rest of the population. They
often met with different forms of discrimination
and, in some cases, were openly avoided by the
public. As Japanese vehicle number plates indicate
the place of registration, evacuees who fled by
car were easily identifiable. A couple of evacuees
mentioned that the cars with a Fukushima number
plate were banned from using certain roads
or entering certain localities. An evacuee from
Okuma town recounted one of her experiences:
When I evacuated to Niigata Prefecture
[200 km west of the Fukushima Daiichi plant], I
was really discriminated against… For example,
when I went to a public bath to take a shower,
there was a hand-written notice saying ‘Entry
prohibited to persons from Fukushima’. I was
really shocked. Actually, I experienced the same
thing even in Aizu region [the western part of
Fukushima Prefecture; 100 km from the nuclear
station]. Although Aizu is part of Fukushima
Prefecture, I saw a notice saying that the place
is reserved for non-Fukushima people. Moreover,
every time I parked my car in a supermarket car
park, when I came back to my car, there were no
cars parked around mine. In fact, because of my
number plate, everybody could see that I came
from the area included in the evacuation zone.
So no one wanted to park their car close to mine.
Some evacuees also mentioned that their chil-
dren were often bullied at school in the towns
where they had taken refuge: they are seen as ‘con-
taminated’ or called ‘Mr/Miss Fukushima’ by other
pupils. As the crippled nuclear power station and
the Prefecture share the same name, ‘Fukushima’,
the accident has been amalgamated with the Pre-
fecture and the entire Fukushima region is now
viewed as ‘contaminated’ or ‘condemned’. The ad-
ditional traumatism of discrimination is one of the
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
key aspects that differentiates the nuclear evacua-
tion from the displacement caused by the tsunami.
The widespread image of Fukushima as ‘contami-
nated’ and the self-image of nuclear evacuees as
irradiated and discriminated against will have a
lasting effect in the minds of the evacuees and the
rest of the population.
Nuclear-dependent communities When explaining the pre-accident context, the
municipal workers and evacuees from the towns
that host the nuclear power plants often referred
to the ‘special relationship’ they had enjoyed with
the plant operator, TEPCO. They describe it as a
relationship of ‘co-existence and mutual pros-
perity’. The municipal officers from both Futaba
and Naraha towns confessed that it was difficult
to criticise TEPCO even after the accident, as
they were only too aware of TEPCO’s substan-
tial contribution to the prosperity of their towns.
Hiroshi Kainuma explains, in his book entitled
Theory of Fukushima: How was the ‘Nuclear
Village’ Formed?,68 the process whereby a town
ends up becoming utterly dependent on the exis-
tence of a nuclear power plant for its economic
survival. Whenever a nuclear installation plan is
proposed, various upstream financial incentives
are generally offered by the government and the
nuclear operator so as to convince local residents
to support the plan. The sites targeted for these
nuclear facilities were often remote and sparsely
populated regions, largely impoverished and with
little industrial fabric. Traditionally, the men in
such localities have to move to bigger towns and
cities to find employment, leaving their wives
and children behind. However, when a nuclear
plant arrives and creates jobs for a hefty share
of a town’s population69 and the local govern-
ment receives large amounts of tax and subsi-
dies, the town’s economy flourishes and the
presence of nuclear industry becomes indispen-
sable to the residents’ livelihoods. According to
Kainuma, before the arrival of a nuclear facility,
these towns were among the poorest municipa-
lities in Fukushima Prefecture. Yet, by 1977, six
years after the arrival of the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power station, the residents from the two
hosting towns were earning the highest salaries
in the whole prefecture, even surpassing salaries
68 Author’s translation from the Japanese title: Fukushima ron, genshiryoku mura ha naze umaretanoka?
69 From the interviews with the municipalities of Futaba
and Naraha. In addition to offering direct employment,
TEPCO also generated a great deal of indirect employ-
ment in these towns, such as restaurants for the plant
workers and hotels for the technicians who came peri-
odically to maintain the nuclear reactors.
in Fukushima City, the prefecture’s capital city
(Kainuma, 2011: pp.130-141). One evacuee from
Futaba town recalls:
Thanks to the nuclear power station, our men
did not have to look for a job away from the
town. Everybody’s life improved and we became
the richest in all Fukushima Prefecture. As a re-
sult, no industry developed in the town except
agriculture. When the station was installed dur-
ing the 1970s, I was earning 52,000 yen (€520)
per month at the agricultural cooperative. If
you worked with TEPCO during that period, you
earned 120,000 yen (€1,200), more than double
your salary!
But as the nuclear facility ages, it brings dimin-
ishing financial revenues to the town70 (IIC, 2012:
pp.329-330). Accustomed to a certain level of fis-
cal expenditure, these towns then begin to show
budget deficits as the income from the nuclear fa-
cility declines. For this reason, the municipalities
often ask the government to install more nuclear
facilities in their town in order to offset the short-
fall. The report from the Independent Investiga-
tion Commission71 calls it the ‘nuclear addiction’
of the host communities (IIC, 2012: p.330). During
one interview, a municipal employee of Futaba
town murmured:
TEPCO was good for us. Most of us benefited
from them in one way or another. I want to de-
nounce them on account of the accident, but I
also feel grateful to them for having given us a
prosperous life. It’s complicated. You know, be-
fore the accident, all the high school graduates
in Futaba town found jobs in town thanks to the
nuclear power plant. We had a privileged life.
During the interviews, many evacuees from
these communities voiced concerns about their
job prospects when they eventually return to their
hometowns. Since the government announced the
decommissioning of the four damaged reactors in
Fukushima Daiichi power plant, they are worried
that they will not be able to return to their former
jobs or find any other employment, given that
most of the local jobs were connected with the nu-
clear industry. In addition to problem of radioac-
tive contamination, the uncertainty of job oppor-
tunities further complicates the evacuees’ decision
to return.
70 The revenue from a fixed property tax paid by the
nuclear plant operator to the host community dimin-
ishes every year due to the depreciation of assets.
71 The independent investigation panel on the Fukushima
accident set up by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Founda-
tion.
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Controversy on the health risks of low-dose radiation exposure72 On 19 April 2011, the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
set an interim reference radiation dose rate of
1–20 mSv/year for schools in the Fukushima
Prefecture, whereas the normal reference dose
rate for public exposure to radiation73 remained
at 1 mSv/year in other parts of Japan (ICPR,
2007).74 Since taking this decision, the authorities
have been using the annual dose rate of 20 mSv
(which is the upper limit of the 1–20mSv interim
dose rate) as the threshold value to mark out the
evacuation zones and declare an area safe for
return (see section 4.4. Prospects of return). To
justify this choice, the Japanese government refers
to the ICRP’s recommendation on the reference
dose rate for ‘existing radiation exposure condi-
tions’ including occupational exposure situations
and residual exposure situations after a nuclear
accident, which should be limited to between 1
and 20 mSv/year.75 The field interviews with the
Fukushima evacuees, residents and local NGOs
suggest that there are three main controversies on
this governmental decision.
First, the 20 mSv limit is not only applied to
adults but also to children, who are generally con-
sidered to be more sensitive to radiation effects
than adults.76 According to the ICRP recommen-
dation, 1–20 mSv/year is also the reference dose
for occupational radiation exposure applied to
workers at nuclear facilities or radiological depart-
ments in hospitals (ICRP, 2007). This means that
nuclear power plant workers and children in Fuku-
shima are placed under the same dose limit. Fur-
thermore, MEXT established the threshold dose
limit per hour for children to play in the school-
yard at 3.8 μSv/hour.77 However, this dose limit
was calculated from 20 mSv/year on the assump-
tion that children spend only eight hours outside
per day. If the average hourly rate is calculated
72 Low-dose radiation exposure means an exposure situa-
tion under the dose of 100 mSv.
73 Here ‘radiation’ means artificial radiation excluding nat-
ural background radiation.
74 Source: MEXT (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hou-
dou/23/04/1305174.htm).
75 http://www.irsn.fr/EN/Research/publications-docu-
mentation/Scientific-books/Documents/CIPR_103.pdf.
76 Koide refers to the book, Radiation and Human Health, published in 1981 and written by the late John W. Gof-
man, who was Professor Emeritus of Molecular and Cell
Biology at University of California, Berkley. Citing this
book, Koide mentions that ‘an infant under one year old
has four times more sensitivity to radiation exposure
than an adult aged 20–30 ‘ (author’s translation).
77 Source: MEXT (http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/sai-
gaijohou/syousai/1305173.htm).
normally from the 20 mSv annual dose78, this gives
2.28 μSv/hour. Thus, the hourly dose limit fixed by
the government for Fukushima school children is
1.5 μSv higher than the average hourly rate of the
20 mSv/year threshold fixed by the same author-
ity. Compared to school children in other parts of
Japan, where the reference dose remains 1 mSv/
year, the children in Fukushima are exposed to
the radiation level which is as much as 30 times
higher.79 On 1 May 2011, Tokyo University Professor
Toshiso Kosako, a specialist on radiation safety, re-
signed his position as special advisor to the Cabinet
in protest against this ‘3.8 μSv/hour’ and ’20 mSv/
year’ limit for children in Fukushima. He explained
in his resignation statement80 that ‘it is completely
wrong to use this standard for schools’ and this
limit must ‘be used in cases of exceptional or ur-
gent circumstances (for two to three days or one to
two weeks maximum)’, emphasising that ‘it is very
rare even among the occupationally exposed per-
sons to be exposed to radiation of 20 mSv per year’.
He concluded by saying that he could not possibly
accept that this dose level be applied to babies,
infants and primary school pupils, not only from
his viewpoint as an academic but also on account
of his humanistic beliefs. Despite many criticisms
from both inside and outside Japan against this
policy, the Japanese government has not yet re-
viewed its decision, and a radiation exposure dose
of 20 mSv/year is still tolerated for the Fukushima
population including children, with no fixed time-
frame (as at September 2012).
The second controversial issue involves the au-
thorities’ dissemination of information on the
health effects of radiation exposure. Since the
decision on a new reference radiation dose, the
authorities have started information campaigns
designed to reassure the public rather than to alert
them and raise their awareness of the radiation
risk. MEXT has issued a number of information
booklets on radiation intended for the general pub-
lic and schools, in which it repeatedly emphasises
that ‘a causal relationship between radiation expo-
sure and developing cancer is not clearly proven
under the accumulative exposure dose of 100 mSv’
(see Box 3) and that ‘under the exposure dose of
100 mSv, the probability of developing a cancer
is higher from other causes such as smoking or
78 20,000 μSv (20 mSv) / 24 hours / 365 days = 2.28 μSv/
hour.
79 The regular dose limit is around 0.11μSv/hour calculat-
ing on the basis of 1m Sv/year.
80 Cf. Professor Kosako’s statement of resignation at a press
conference held in Tokyo on 29 April 2011 (http://www.
japanfocus.org/events/view/83). (in-text quotations
translated by Izumi Tanaka and the author).
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
insufficient consumption of vegetables’81 (MEXT,
2011a: pp.10-12). In addition, a booklet issued on
24 June 2011 clearly states that ‘there is almost no
possibility of developing thyroid cancer due to the
recent Fukushima accident’. It concludes by saying
that ‘the psychological stress caused by the anxiety
of “being irradiated” has more harmful effects to
health than radiation exposure itself and that this
stress causes many health troubles’.82 These book-
lets do refer to the hypothesis underpinning the
ICRP recommendation for radiation protection:
the probability of developing a cancer is propor-
tional to the dosage exposed, even under 100 mSv
(ICRP, 2007). However, this message is only very
briefly mentioned, usually in one sentence, and
the focus is more on reassuring the public that
there is little cancer risk for exposure to radiation
doses of under 100 mSv.
81 Author’s translation.
82 Author’s translations.
One week after the disaster, the Fukushima
Prefecture invited Professor Shunichi Yamashita
from Nagasaki University, appointing him as Ra-
diation Risk Management Advisor for Fukushima
Prefecture. He has given talks on radiation risk
in all major cities in Fukushima, reiterating that
there is absolutely no health risk from radiation
exposure under 100 mSv per year and that chil-
dren can play outside without any problem.83
However, several months later he corrected this
information stating that ‘it was rather 10 mSv/
year, not 100 mSv/year, under which there is no
health effect’.84 A similar message was dissemi-
nated by other prefectural authorities such as the
Tokyo Metropolitan Government and public re-
search institutions such as the National Institute
of Radiological Sciences.85
Thirdly, this reference dose concerns only ex-
ternal exposure to radiation and does not include
the effects of internal exposure (Box 3). In its 2007
recommendation, ICRP urges that, in the case of
emergency exposure situations, an individual’s
total exposure dose from different sources be
taken into account when developing radiation
protection measures (ICRP, 2007). People living
in Fukushima most likely consume local produce
that could be contaminated by radioactive sub-
stances. The government policy, which focuses
only on the air radiation dose and external expo-
sure, thus tends to overlook other exposure risks
and fails to fully address the radiation protection
needs of the concerned population.
According to the field interviews, this situation
occasioned a great deal of confusion and distress
among the residents and evacuees of Fukushima
Prefecture, as they no longer knew whom or what
to trust concerning the risk related to radiation
exposure. Furthermore, such circumstance cre-
ated divisions and tensions among the affected
population depending on the individual opinion
and perception of the radiation risk, as explored
below.
83 Author’s translations. Lecture on Radiation Risk organ-
ised by Fukushima City Council on 21 March 2011, available
in Japanese at: http://wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/pcp_
portal/PortalServlet?DISPL AY_ID=DIRECT&NEXT_
DISPLAY_ID=U000004&CONTENTS_ID=23695
84 Ibid.
85 The official statement concerning the ‘safe-
under-100 mSv’ level is quoted in many Twitter messages
and on Internet blog sites (For example, http://blog.
livedoor.jp/wisteriabook/archives/3289454.html), but
today it is untraceable on the websites of those institu-
tions consulted at the time of the writing (September
2012). The author assumes that the pages were simply
erased or made inaccessible by the institutions after they
received criticisms from members of the public.
Box 3. ICRP guidelines (ICRP 2007)
The health effects from radiation: ‘deterministic effects’ and ‘stochastic effects’ Deterministic effects occur once a threshold dose of exposure is exceeded, generally following high radiation exposure events. These effects include skin redness, cataracts, infertility and, in the worst cases, death. Stochastic effects such as cancer or heritable effects are caused by relatively low radia- tion doses. For exposure to a radiation dose of more than 100 mSv, there is a clear causal relationship established between the exposure dose and cancer rate. But for exposure under 100 mSv, this causal relationship has not yet been scientifically proven conclusively. Notwithstanding, the ICRP recom- mendation is based on a hypothesis that there is also a proportional relation- ship between exposure doses and cancer rates even under 100 mSv exposure.
The reference level* for three different exposure situations (ICRP, 2007: p.102; Holm, 2007):
Between 20–100 mSv
Emergency exposure
situations
Radiological emergency situations which require urgent action in order to avoid
undesirable consequences.
Between 1–20 mSv
Existing exposure situations
Occupational exposures in planned situations; natural background radiation (radon in
dwellings); post-accident recovery situations
Under 1 mSv Planned exposure
situations Public exposures in planned situations
* An acute dose or an annual accumulative dose.
Two types of radiation exposure: ‘internal exposure’ and ‘external exposure’ External exposure is irradiation from external radioactive sources such as airborne radioactive materials. Internal exposure is irradiation from radioac- tive sources inside the body such as ingested contaminated food and water. After the intake of radioactive materials into the body, the person is con- tinuously exposed to radiation until the radioactive source has completely decayed, a process that can take many years. The above reference dose does not include such internal exposure.
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The plight of Fukushima residents – the phenomenon of ‘self-evacuees’ In order to fully understand the grave social
consequences of the Fukushima nuclear disaster,
we must look at the situation in the Naka-dori
region of Fukushima. Fukushima Prefecture
comprises three regions (Maps 2 and 6): Hama-
dori on the coast, most of whose territory was
designated as evacuation zones, Naka-dori in
the middle, the political and economic centre
of the Prefecture, and Aizu located inland to the
west. In the Hama-dori region, many residents
were forced to evacuate on the government’s
orders, whereas the residents in the Naka-dori
region were reassured by the authorities that it
were safe to stay despite the elevated radiation
dose, which in some places was as high as that
of the official evacuation zones. For example, the
Onami and Watari districts of Fukushima City
have spots where radiation doses of 3.87 μSv/
hour and 10.36 μSv/hour were detected by the
residents and an NGO (Yamauchi, 2011).86 On 16
June 2011, the government began to designate
the areas identified as having a radiation dose
of more than 20 mSv/year (or 3.0 μSv/hour)87
as Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation
(Specific Spots), and decided to provide finan-
cial assistance for the evacuation of the resi-
dents involved. However, these districts were not
finally designated as Specific Spots as the autho-
rities’ own readings showed a radiation dose
under the threshold level. Moreover, in May 2011,
MEXT disclosed information on the level of soil
contamination in Fukushima Prefecture, which
indicated that the amount of cesium-137 detected
in the soil of Fukushima City and other cities in
the Naka-dori region was more than 550 kBq/
m2 (kilobecquerels per square metre) (Kawata,
2011). This level equals the threshold contami-
nation level for the Strict Radiation Control Area
where residents were temporarily resettled after
the Chernobyl accident, fixed by the radioprotec-
tion regime of the former Soviet authorities at
the time.88
86 The newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun, ‘Higashinihon daishinsai: fukushima daiichi genpatsujiko onami dis-
trict, menteki josen ha isshin ittai jisshi ichinen senryou
saijousou no basyo mo’ (author’s translation: One year
from whole-area decontamination operation - radiation
dose increased in some places), 17 October 2012.
87 The threshold hourly radiation dose required for an area
to be designated as a Specific Spot changes depending
on the municipality, as does the method of calculating
the hourly dose from the 20 mSv/year threshold value.
The 3.0 μSv/hour is the threshold dose adapted by Date
City, Fukushima (http://www.City.date.fukushima.jp/
profile/k-kaiken/pdf/h23/20111125-shiryo01.pdf).
88 Kawata, 2011.
In this context, the residents in the Nada-dori
region, fearing the radiation effects, started to
evacuate from their homes to other parts of Ja-
pan without any government assistance.89 Many of
these self-evacuees were mothers with small chil-
dren90 who had either financial means or family
connections outside Fukushima. Moreover, those
with Internet knowledge and thus able to obtain
information other than the official announcement
made by the government and Fukushima Prefec-
ture were among the first to flee. Meanwhile, oth-
ers, due to financial or family reasons were obliged
to remain in Fukushima, living with high levels
of anxiety about the radiation risk. To cope with
these fears, many of them are trying to convince
themselves that they can trust the authorities’ as-
surance that it is safe for them and their children
to live in Fukushima as long as the radiation dose
does not exceed 20 mSv/year.91 As a result, these
‘stayers’ started to criticise self-evacuees as well
as other residents who remain sceptical of the of-
ficial reassurances, labelling them as cowardly and
selfish. As one self-evacuee from Koriyama City
explained:
The words, ‘radiation’ and ‘evacuation’, have
become a taboo in Naka-dori region. Voluntary
evacuation is considered as an escape from the
hardship that the community is trying to over-
come collectively and thus labelled as an act of
betrayal… Mothers who oblige their children to
wear masks all the time or to refuse the lunch
served at school cafeteria [as schools in Fuku-
shima purchase local produce to cook lunch] in
order to protect their children from internal ex-
posure, are often considered by other mothers as
paranoid and annoying. In this situation, many
mothers have become depressive and developed
other psychological conditions, as their level of
anxiety and the pressures from society are be-
coming too high.
This is a tragic situation for both self-evacuees
and the residents who stay on. Self-evacuees often
89 In December 2011, the government decided to provide
compensation for self-evacuees from the selected 23
cities located mainly in the Naka-dori region of Fuku-
shima. However, the scheme targeted only those who
self-evacuated between 11 March and 31 December 2011,
and was a one-off payment of 80,000 yen (€800) for an
adult and 400,000 yen (€4,000) for a child or a preg-
nant woman.
90 In culturally traditional regions such as Fukushima Pre-
fecture, it is mainly the mothers who take care of the
children and generally stay at home as housewives. It is
thus easier for them to flee with the children while their
husbands stay on and continue to work in Fukushima in
order to financially support such evacuation.
91 From the interviews with the residents and self-evacu-
ees from the Naka-dori region of Fukushima.
STUDY 05/20134 0 IDDRI
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Map 6. Radiation contour map of the affected region
Source: map created by Professor Yukio Hayakawa*, 11 September 2011. Professor Yukio Hayakawa is a geologist at Gunma University (http://kipuka.blog70.fc2.com).
Fukushima
Tokyo (Shinjuku)
Sendai
Koriyama
Iwate
8 μSv/h and more
* Sv/h (microsievert per hour)
Hama - Dori
Naka-Dori
Aizu
4 Sv/h and more 2 Sv/h and more 1 Sv/h and more 0.5 Sv/h and more 0.25 Sv/h and more
0.125 Sv/h and more
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 4 1IDDRI
feel isolated and abandoned in their place of ref-
uge, as their relationship with their hometown has
been cut off; they have lost friends and sometimes
their husbands if these opposed voluntary evacu-
ation and decided to stay in Fukushima. The re-
search team also learnt that self-evacuees often
evacuated during the night without telling any-
body in order to avoid uncomfortable encounters
with neighbours and friends. Once they evacuate,
it is difficult for them to return as they are stigma-
tised by the community. For those who stay, the
situation is no easier. In particular, mothers who
are worried about the radiation effects on their
children but do not have a choice of voluntary
evacuation are experiencing significant psycho-
logical distress. The resident survey conducted
in May 2012 by Fukushima City found that 34%
of the residents still wished to evacuate from the
City, with 89% of these respondents saying that
they were worried about the future health of their
children.92 Over a long run, this situation will have
devastating consequences for the welfare of the
population in the Naka-dori region. Yet, neither
Fukushima Prefecture nor the government has
set up any concrete programme to assist the self-
evacuees and the ‘stayers’, thus leaving a deeply
divided and broken community.
Divided communities and families The nuclear accident is creating many rifts and
tensions in Fukushima’s affected communi-
ties. One of the main causes of these divisions
stems from the government’s decision to raise
the radiation dose reference level for Fukushima
from 1 mSv/year to 1–20 mSv/year, as well as
its emphasis that radiation exposures of up to
20 mSv/year, and in some cases up to an accumu-
lative dose of 100 mSv, have little effect on health.
This policy of reassurance, rather than precaution,
has created an atmosphere where those who chal-
lenge the official notion of safety are viewed as
anti-establishment, disturbing the harmony of the
community, and egoistic, jeopardising the commu-
nity’s joint effort to overcome hardship.
The main divisive issue for the evacuees is that
of return. Those who openly express unwillingness
to return are often regarded as selfish and disloyal
to the community to which they belong. This has
thus become a taboo subject among the evacu-
ees, as revealing one’s preference implies that the
person concerned is likely to be pigeonholed into
one of two boxes: ‘willing to return’ (loyal) or ‘not
92 The newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, ‘Ima demo hinan shitai, fukushima shimin no 34%: shi tyousa’ (Author’s transla-
tion: 34% of residents in Fukushima City currently wish
to evacuate, the City’s survey found), 17 September 2012.
willing to return’ (disloyal). Fukushima university
professor Akira Imai, author of the three afore-
mentioned evacuee surveys, asserts that forcing
the evacuees to choose between ‘return’ and ‘no re-
turn’ should be avoided (as a policy) because this
transforms a situation of ‘not being able to return’
into one of ‘not wanting to return’ thus leaving
those who are anxious about the radiation risk and
reluctant to return to condemnation exposed to
judgement from the rest of the community (Imai,
2012b). Thus, whereas previously individuals had
had no choice but to evacuate and this common
plight had given them a sense of unity, the choice
of return is now dividing communities, stigmatis-
ing those reluctant to return and causing further
trauma to the evacuee communities.
Moreover, tension has also arisen between evac-
uee communities and host communities within
Fukushima Prefecture. Iwaki City, situated 30–40
km south of the crippled nuclear station, for ex-
ample, hosts the highest number of evacuees
(23,00093) from the evacuation zone due to its
geographical proximity. The interviews with the
evacuees and Iwaki residents revealed friction be-
tween the evacuee community and the city’s resi-
dents. This is mainly caused by the government’s
different treatment for the affected population.
During the first six months following the accident,
the northern part of Iwaki City was included in
the recommended evacuation zone and thus many
residents, including those who were living outside
of the designated zone, evacuated with or without
government assistance. In addition, the city’s agri-
culture and tourism industries have been hard hit
by radioactive contamination from the accident.
Life has become difficult for the residents but,
despite this hardship, they do not receive much
financial compensation or assistance from the gov-
ernment because the city has not been included
in any evacuation zone since October 2011 and
they perceive this situation as unfair. On the other
hand, the evacuees from the evacuation zone who
took refuge in the city receive various types of
compensation from the government. As an Iwaki
resident explains:
These evacuees who receive a lot of money
from the government act like the ‘new rich’ buy-
ing all the goods in a shop and always eating at
restaurants. They don’t work and spend all day
in a gambling house wasting the compensation
money. Plus, there are many car accidents in the
city because they are villagers and do not know
how to drive in a city.
93 Source: Iwaki City council. (http://www.city.iwaki.
fukushima.jp/info/dbps_data/_material_/info/zhi-
gai20120912.pdf)
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
This situation is further isolating the evacuee
community from the host community and adding
more stress to their displacement.
Furthermore, residents from the Naka-dori re-
gion in the Fukushima Prefecture are divided on
the issue of evacuation. The interviews with self-
evacuees and the Naka-dori residents found that
those who self-evacuated are seen as ‘the privi-
leged’ or ‘the escapees’ within the community
and they thus often feel isolated and abandoned.
On the contrary, those who stay, mostly for eco-
nomic reasons,94 are frequently envious of those
who evacuate and often feel deprived and mar-
ginalised. Moreover, this division or tension does
not stop at the community level: it also penetrates
family relationships. Differing perceptions of ra-
diation risk are causing tensions within families
or couples both among self-evacuees and stayers.
The recent survey conducted by the Fukushima
City found that 62% of self-evacuees are living
apart from other family members and 71% of them
answered that they had no prospect of going back
to live together.95 The field interviews also found
that the majority of self-evacuees are mothers with
children, whose husbands have stayed behind in
Fukushima. The main reason for this separation is
the husband’s employment. In order to meet the
costs of voluntary evacuation, husbands often
stay behind in Fukushima to continue working.
A few self-evacuees also pointed to a difference
of opinion between husband and wife as a reason
for separation. In their view, in the traditional
communities of Fukushima, the husband and his
parents tend to give credence to the authorities’
reassurances on the radiation risk, whereas the
wife tends to worry about the radiation effect on
their children. These wives are sometimes treat-
ed as cowardly and naive by their husbands and
parents-in-law. Frustrated by their husbands’ in-
action, some mothers decide to evacuate on their
own, taking the children to their maternal grand-
parents’ house if this is located outside Fukushima
Prefecture. Equally, among the stayer families, the
wife becomes disillusioned with her husband due
to different opinions on radiation risk and fissures
appear in their relationship. Communities and
families in Fukushima are thus suffering from rifts
and weakening community ties that will take long
time to heal.
94 The survey conducted among the self-evacuees and resi-
dents in the Fukushima Prefecture by two NGOs, Friends
of Earth Japan and Fukuro-no-kai, in September-Octo-
ber 2011 revealed that residents stayed in Fukushima
mainly for economic or job-related reasons.
95 Asahi Shimbun, 17 September 2012, op.cit.
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TSUNAMI EVACUATION AND THE NUCLEAR EVACUATION From the field interviews, we found that the
pattern and consequences of the two evacuations,
one caused by the tsunami and the other by the
nuclear accident, were markedly different. In
particular, the evacuation process, the authori-
ties’ disaster response, the prospect of return and
the challenges facing the evacuees one year after
the disaster are significantly dissimilar, though
both displacements were induced by the same
combined disaster. This section attempts to iden-
tify the specific features of the two evacuations
through a comparative analysis. Table 5 illustrates
the main elements of these differences.
Firstly, as regards the reasons for evacuating,
evacuation from a natural disaster is ultimately
‘voluntary’ while nuclear evacuation can be com-
pulsory or ‘voluntary’ depending on one’s loca-
tion – in other words, depending on whether an
individual evacuates from within or from outside
the official evacuation zone. Certainly, evacu-
ation from a tsunami is not strictly voluntary in-
sofar as a person flees because his or her life is at
risk. By the same token, the self-evacuees from
Fukushima decided to evacuate because they felt
their lives and those of their children were under
threat. Nevertheless, the distinction between vol-
untary and compulsory evacuation impacts the na-
ture of post-disaster financial assistance that the
displaced receive from the state: financial aid on
compassionate grounds for the tsunami evacuees,
financial compensation for the nuclear evacuees
from the evacuation zones and little assistance for
the self-evacuees.
One of the specific characteristics of the nuclear
evacuation is that the displaced have tended to
flee further and are now dispersed throughout the
country, while tsunami evacuees are most often
displaced within the town or the same prefecture.
The main reason for this is that as nuclear evacu-
ation is induced by the risk of radiation, distance
is an important way for evacuees to protect them-
selves and feel safe. For example, half of the inter-
viewed population of Futaba town is currently dis-
placed outside Fukushima Prefecture.96 Another
distinct characteristic of the nuclear evacuation
is that evacuees were displaced many times com-
pared to the tsunami evacuation. Our field inter-
views show that nuclear evacuees changed their
place of refuge four or five times on average before
settling into temporary shelters. In contrast, tsu-
96 Source: Futaba town (http://www.town.futaba.fukush-
ima.jp/hinan.html/). (in Japanese)
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 4 3IDDRI
nami evacuees changed their place of refuge two
or three times on average. Many of the tsunami
evacuees first evacuated to hilltops to avoid the
tsunami, then moved quickly to emergency evacu-
ation centres such as schools and finally settled in
temporary shelters three to six months later. The
NAIIC report (NAIIC, 2012) also confirmed the re-
sult of our study and found that 70% of the nuclear
evacuees were displaced at least four times. One
of the main causes of this phenomenon is that the
evacuation zone was expanded over time by the
authorities, thus obliging the already displaced
population to flee further away each time. Over a
three-month period starting on 11 March 2011, the
authorities (Fukushima Prefecture and the gov-
ernment) issued a total of eight evacuation orders
and recommendations. Another reason for this
repeated displacement is that, at the time the nu-
clear evacuees fled, they were not informed of the
severity of the accident or the radiation risk level.
As a result, they initially sheltered in locations
close to their hometown and later evacuated fur-
ther afield once they learnt more about the status
of the accident and the radiation leak. This repeat-
ed flight inflicted both psychological and physical
distress on the nuclear evacuees.
As for psychological stress, both categories
of evacuees are currently deeply anxious about
their uncertain future, but the trauma of the nu-
clear evacuees appears to be persisting over the
longer term. The tsunami evacuees experienced
acute psychological stress immediately after the
disaster, having suffered the sudden loss of fam-
ily members, friends, and homes. However, the
trauma caused by this loss could subside with
time. Nuclear evacuees, on the other hand, are
suffering from a psychological stress that seems to
be increasing with time. The authorities provide
them with scant information about their future
and whether they will eventually be able to return
to their towns or homes, which means that they
are unable to take the next step in rebuilding their
lives. They feel blocked in permanent uncertainty
and this psychological imprisonment is taking a
toll on their health and well-being over time.
There is also a difference between the two evac-
uations with respect to the target of the evacu-
ees’ complaints. In the case of natural disasters,
it is hard to lay the blame for psychological pain
on a specific party. To vent their frustration, the
tsunami survivors thus tend to criticise their lo-
cal municipal office for its shortcomings as it was
the main actor in the disaster management. On
the contrary, the Fukushima nuclear disaster was
caused by human error as well as by a natural dis-
aster and the nuclear victims have well-defined
interlocutors for their complaints – TEPCO, the
operator of the nuclear power plant, and the gov-
ernment. The handling of the Fukushima accident
by TEPCO and the authorities is severely criticised
not only by the evacuees but also by the public at
large. In Imai’s survey (Imai, 2011a), 86% of the
evacuees said that they were not satisfied with the
government’s disaster response and 83% were dis-
satisfied with TEPCO.
The current challenges facing evacuees are also
quite dissimilar. For the tsunami evacuees, the
prime concerns are resettlement and the rebuild-
ing of their houses and lives. Nuclear evacuees,
however, are still a long way from the reconstruc-
tion phase as they are not even sure where they
will live in the near future. Their concerns are fo-
cused on the issue of return, decontamination and
compensation from the government. They are un-
able to make plans for the future and suffer from
the loss of their previous life and identity.
Finally, the issue of resettlement/return reveals
another marked difference between the tsunami
evacuation and the nuclear evacuation. First of
all, the resettlement of the tsunami evacuees is or-
ganised on a purely voluntary basis and individual
choice is fully respected by both the authorities
and the community. Resettling in a safe place is
Table 5. Comparative analysis of the two evacuations Tsunami
(Natural Disaster) Nuclear Accident
(Industrial/Man-Made Disaster)
Nature of Evacuation
‘Voluntary’ Imposed/’Voluntary’
Place of Refuge Within the City or within the Prefecture
Outside of the City and often the Prefecture,
scattered all over Japan
Frequency of Displacement
2–3 times 4–5 times or more
Psychological Stress
Acute stress immediately after and progressively less with
time
Stress of not knowing its own future lingers over a long term, increment
with time
Main Target of Complaints
Municipal government Central government, TEPCO
Challenges Resettlement of the population, population
loss, building back better
Issue of return, decontamination,
community survival, loss of identity
Reconstruction Concentrate on infrastructure
Not yet reached this stage
Resettlement/ Return
Safety of the population is main concern,
individual choices
Highly politicised, collective choices
Transparency of Information
High Low
Decision-Making on Return
Democratic Top-Down
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
the primary concern for the evacuees and the local
authority. Should they decide to settle elsewhere,
this does not put their loyalty to the community
or their courage in overcoming hardship into ques-
tion. The only obstacles faced for the resettlement
of these evacuees are of a financial and adminis-
trative nature. For the nuclear evacuees, on the
other hand, the question of return involves com-
pletely different stakes. First, the issue is highly
politicised: the authorities including the govern-
ment, the prefectural government and several af-
fected municipalities have been encouraging these
evacuees to return. The municipalities, in par-
ticular, have emphasised that the choice to return
must be made on a collective basis as the town’s
very existence is at stake. Priority is thus placed
on the cohesiveness of the community rather than
on individual choices. One of government officials
interviewed during our research repeated that ‘we
will not abandon Fukushima’. The authorities’ em-
phasis on the region’s recovery and their determi-
nation to ‘normalise’ the Fukushima disaster situ-
ation have had many serious consequences for the
residents and the evacuees.
This official stance on the question of return
has also impacted the transparency of the infor-
mation communicated on the level of radioactive
contamination, the effect of radiation on human
health and the effectiveness of decontamination
operations, all of which are key issues condition-
ing the nuclear evacuees’ decision whether or not
to return. While the majority of these evacuees
are hesitant about going back due to the lack of
information, the decision to return has often been
made by the municipal offices without any thor-
ough discussion or consultation with the evacu-
ees. Thus, when it comes to resettlement/return,
a democratic decision-making process is wanting
in the case of nuclear evacuees in a contrast to the
case of the tsunami evacuees.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The triple disaster that hit Tohoku on 11 March
2011 is the most serious crisis that Japan has had to
face since the end of the Second World War. Some
refer to the disaster as the second largest defeat
that Japan has experienced after its 1945 defeat. In
many ways, the disaster has served as a revelation
as well as a reality check for the democratic, pros-
perous, safe society that the country has aspired to
build over the last sixty-six years.
Our field study confirmed the assumption that
Japan had intensively prepared itself against
tsunami disasters. The disaster drills conducted
prior to the disaster and countermeasures such
as tsunami barriers constructed along the coast
indeed saved many lives. Yet, in some instances,
these preparations in fact created an excessive de-
gree of reassurance among the local population,
who came to believe that they were immune to
the risk of tsunamis and thus underestimated the
threat during the actual disaster. In other cases,
previous tsunami experiences had instilled a fixed
idea about tsunami risk in people’s minds, which
led them to misjudge both the need to evacuate
and the timing. In other words, the risk percep-
tion shaped by disaster preparations and previous
experience did not always lessen the population’s
vulnerability in the wake of extreme disasters such
as the 2011 Japanese tsunami. In addition, one of
the most serious shortcomings revealed by the
catastrophe was the lack of preparedness regard-
ing the evacuation of the elderly and persons with
reduced mobility. Given that Japan is facing the
growing demographic challenge of an aging popu-
lation, future disaster plans need to urgently ad-
dress this issue.
The Fukushima nuclear accident, on the other
hand, has revealed the total unpreparedness of the
Japanese authorities and the local population. The
evacuation of the population by the local authori-
ties amounted to chaotic improvisation and the
population was forced to evacuate with no infor-
mation as to the gravity of the situation or the risk
of radiation. Furthermore, the authorities did not
promptly or fully communicate information on ra-
dioactive contamination and health risks from ra-
diation exposure to the concerned population. The
choice of return tends to be a foregone conclusion
decided on more or less unilaterally by the author-
ities without much consultation with evacuees
and municipalities, and the collective choice for
return is encouraged at the expense of individual
choices and safety concerns. The displaced popu-
lation thus remains at a loss with little prospect for
the future. Moreover, the way in which the disas-
ter has been handled by the authorities has creat-
ed profound divisions and tensions in the affected
communities. The nuclear disaster has triggered
a major social disaster in which communities re-
main divided regarding both the perceived radia-
tion risk and the issue of return. The population
has lost trust in public authorities as well as among
themselves, which is threatening the social cohe-
sion and the sense of solidarity that previously ex-
isted within these communities.
What we have also seen in the case of the nu-
clear accident, in contrast to the tsunami case, is
that the likelihood of an accident was purposely
understated by the government and the plant op-
erator, creating the myth that their nuclear power
plants were almost failsafe. In the quasi absence
Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
STUDY 05/2013 4 5IDDRI
of a realistic perception of risk, the municipalities
and population in the vicinity of the nuclear power
plants were extremely vulnerable and insufficient-
ly prepared for a severe accident and evacuation.
The disaster demonstrated, especially concern-
ing the exploitation of SPEEDI data, that Japan’s
advanced technology and financial capabilities
served little purpose when it came to improving
disaster preparedness and response, as there was
a lack of political will to use them effectively.
Japan is one of the world’s largest economies,
best known for its highly advanced technologies.
The experience of the 11 March triple disaster has
shown that even a country with such economic and
technological resources could not fully mitigate
the effects of the disaster or avoid a serious nuclear
accident. It suggests that no country is immune to
the risk of extreme disasters and that the basic as-
sumptions and disaster scenarios used to design
disaster prevention measures should be thoroughly
revisited, particularly in the current context of cli-
mate change. Moreover, the post-disaster manage-
ment of the Japanese authorities, particularly re-
garding the Fukushima nuclear accident, revealed
many shortcomings in terms of transparency of
information and democratic decision-makings vis-
à-vis the affected population. This confirms our hy-
pothesis that democracies do not always respond
better to disasters, especially a nuclear one. The
repercussions of the Japanese disaster thus go well
beyond the national borders and other democra-
cies can learn many relevant lessons.
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Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
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http://icanps.go.jp/eng/final-report.html
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) (2011a), Tohoku
chiho taiheiyouoki jishin ni taisuru tsunami keihou
happyou keika to kadai (author’s translation: The process
and challenges of issuing tsunami warnings for the
earthquake that hit the Tohoku region off the Pacific
coast), 13 June 2011, available in Japanese at: http://
www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/higashinihon/2/1.pdf
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) (2011b), Saigaiji
jishin tsunami sokuhou (author’s translation: Report on the
earthquake and tsunami alert in disasters “2011 Tohoku off
the Pacific Coast Earthquake), 17 August 2011, available in
Japanese at: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/kishou/books/
saigaiji/saigaiji_201101/saigaiji_201101.pdf
Kainuma, H. (2011), “Fukushima” ron genshiryoku mura
ha naze umaretanoka (author’s translation: The Theory
of Fukushima: How was the Nuclear Village formed?),
Seidosya, Tokyo.
Kawata, T. (2011), “Dojou osen mondai to sono taiou”
(author’s translation: The radioactive soil contamination
and its management), a presentation given by a research
fellow of Nuclear Waste Management Organisation of
Japan (NUMO), at the 16th Atomic Energy Commission
meeting held on 11 May 2011, available in Japanese at:
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2011/
siryo16/siryo2.pdf
Koide, H. (2012), Genpatsu no uso (author’s translation:
The Lie of Nuclear Power), Fusosha, Tokyo.
Magnan, A. (2010), “For a better understanding of adaptive
capacity to climate change: a research framework”, Studies
No.02/10 May 2010, IDDRI-Sciences Po, Paris.
Matsuoka, S. (2012), “Fukushima Nuclear Accident and
Japan’s Nuclear Safety Regulation”, Asia Pacific Research,
No.18, March 2012 (in Japanese)
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT) (2011a), Guide on
Radiation for School Teachers, 24 June 2011,
available in Japanese at: http://www.mext.go.jp/
Tiered Instruction
To Challenge all Learners
What is Tiered Instruction?
Tiered instruction is a way of teaching one concept and meeting the different learning needs in a group.
Teachers may vary:
task
process
product
Tasks and/or resources vary according to:
learning profile
readiness
interest
Who is Tiered Instruction best for?
- Below level learners
- On level learners
- High level learners
- EVERYONE
Why Tiered Instruction?
For Best Practices tiered instruction is fundamental because:
each student is appropriately challenged.
the focus is on the concept as opposed to focusing on learning differences.
it maximizes learning.
What are the steps for tiered instruction?
There are 5 major points to tiering instruction:
Choose a concept from Standards that students should know or understand and choose whether to tier according to readiness, interest, or learning profile.
Assess student's profile, readiness, and/or interest.
Create an activity or project that is clearly focused on the concept.
Adjust the activity to provide different levels of difficulty.
Match students to appropriate tiered assignment.
We all start on a different level!
We all have different needs
Tiered Chocolate Activities
for Active Participation
- ALLOW 15 Minutes
- At your table, there is an envelope with 6 different activities, centered around the key concept “Attributes of Chocolate”.
- Take a moment to make sure you all know what is in the envelope and then divide the cards so everyone at your table has a different activity.
- Take two minutes to complete your activity independently. You may write directly on the card.
- After 2 minutes…..
- Move to assigned groups to compare your work to others who worked on the same activity. Before we conclude, tables will share out responses. (Designate where in the room each group will meet to share their common activity.)
- Share out several responses.
- Sample questions for whole group:
- Did any of you work on an activity with which you weren’t comfortable?
- Is it ok for teachers to assign a tiered activity to a student? Why or why not?
- What would a teacher do if he/she realized they had assigned the inappropriate level of work to a student?
- What if a student does something totally unrelated to the attributes of chocolate?
*
What if a student does something totally unrelated to the attributes of chocolate?
In designing a Standards-based tiered lesson:
- Start with grade-level standards, concepts or skills
- Modify the content into two to three progressive levels of depth and complexity
- Differentiate by process, product, resources or outcome
Research, Interview, Read book, Use Internet….
Perform, create, present, write….
*
Bloom’s levels of questioning and Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences will help you level process and products.
When using a Teacher’s Edition ask these questions:
- Does the activity help the student reach the standard?
- Is the activity basic or advanced?
- Do the suggested extensions offer more depth and more complexity, or just more work?
- Are there multiple activities that provided opportunities for tiering the content to support the standard?
*
Note: Remember that advanced level work needs to be more challenging, NOT just MORE work.
Examples of Tiered Instruction
Find Handouts for different grade levels and subjects on TAG website
See Educator Resources www.pps.k12.or.us/departments/tag/1399.htm
*
(Use handouts of examples appropriate for participants’ grade level and subject)
How to Assess before using Tiered Instruction
In Tiered Instruction assessment is used to create the different levels, groups, Scaffold, or tiers.
Find many different methods of pre-assessment on the TAG website under Educator Resources
*
See Pre-assessment documents on TAG “Educator Resource” web site
Note: for under achievers
Some students achieve high in formal testing, but are not performing to level in class. To help these students begin achieving success again, a few different things to try:
- Use student interest groups.
- Allow student choice.
*
Stop and discuss how these suggestions might effect students’ motivation and level of success
How to Assess after using the Tiered Instruction Technique
The assessment of individual projects, etc. varies with each. You may choose some of the following assessment strategies and more:
Rubrics, tests, checklists, contracts, self-evaluation, peer evaluation, or conferences.
Rubrics
- General enough to apply to all tiers
- Key concepts are clear and included
- The Standard that students need to meet is clear
- Students understand how the varied activities, resources, products, etc help them demonstrate key concepts or State Standards
- Make sure the key concepts are
evaluated separately from the
quality criteria
*
This is just to reiterate the main ideas of rubrics. When developing rubrics for tiered assignments, make sure you use the SAME criteria for all assignments. The rubric is not tiered.
Standards based scoring- Rubrics
- The Standard that students need to meet is clear.
Key Concepts are included, but general enough to apply to all tiers.
Regardless of assignment, activity (or “tier”) students understand how their work demonstrates the standard.
- Quality, Effort, or Career Related Learning Standards (CRLS)
Criteria for Quality of Product, Measured Effort, or CRLS is separate from the evaluation of proficiency in meeting the standard.
Neat, Organized, ON-Time work is recognized, but not directly tied to meeting the Standard.
*
Standards-based scoring of a differentiated activity can be fairly easy to evaluate. Make sure the criteria for showing knowledge of the key concepts are clear, and give the same value for each individual assignment that follows the criteria.
Quality Criteria are listed and evaluated so that students know their work needs to meet quality standards.
Keep CONTENT evaluations and QUALITY evaluations separate.
Additional Resources for
Tiered Assignments
- Differentiating Instruction in the Regular Classroom by Diane Heacox
- How to Differentiate Instruction in the Mixed-Ability Classroom by Carol Ann Tomlinson
- Tiering Assignments & Compacting Curriculum: It’s for Everyone! By Lynda Rice
*
These books are available for check-out from the TAG Office. Contact your TAG Coordinator.
Look in Educator Resources
- on the TAG website
pps.k12.or.us/departments/tag/
Anchor Activities
I’m done. Now what?
What are anchor activities?
specified ongoing activities on which students work independently ongoing assignments that students can work on throughout a unit self-directed include aspects that can be completed on an ongoing basis relate to the concepts and the content being learned engaging, meaningful tasks, not busywork or packets of worksheets activities that everyone in the class will have a chance to do
Why use anchor activities?
provide a strategy for teachers to deal with “ragged time” when students complete work at different times
they allow the teacher to work with individual students or groups provides ongoing activities that relate to the content of the unit provide differentiation due to student choice of activities (DI Bingo) allow the teacher to develop independent group work strategies in order to
incorporate a mini lab of computers in classroom
When are anchor activities used?
to begin the day
when students complete an assignment
when students are stuck and waiting for help
How can I assess anchor activities?
Help students to take responsibility for their roles in classroom routines. Clear expectations, rationale for expectations and student self evaluation are integral to developing classroom procedures and student ownership within the learning environment.
How can I assess individual anchor activity work?
Ongoing anecdotal records and checklists
Student conferences for evaluation and goal setting
Learning journals
Learning Contracts
Student portfolios
Rubrics
Random checks
Peer review
How can I manage the classroom?
“The brain seeks to make order out of chaos….You can establish patterns of appropriate behavior and systems for doing things in a classroom… Confusion and frustration will be reduced as the brain feels secure in knowing and detecting the pattern for appropriate behavior.”“Begin with the Brain” Martha Kaufeldt, 1999
Post a daily or weekly AGENDA Create simple PROCEDURES for the expected behaviors on how things are to be done in the
classroom Guide students to create personal GOALS for themselves.
Establish routines, rituals, celebrations Practice
Anchor Activities
Language Arts
Silent Reading
Journaling Guinness Book Scavenger Hunt Brain Quest Respond to the quote of the day. Create own Brain Quest questions
Word analogy games and puzzles
Word Wall Bulletin Board Free computer time Fluency tests Write Jingles – to help recall content Create Magnetic Poetry Mad-gabs or Mad-libs
Word Sorts (Parts of Speech) Sentence sequencing Check out and read a biography about the life of
someone you are interested in learning about. Then, prepare a short biography in your own words to share with the class.
Write a letter to the author of a book you've enjoyed.
Create a best-seller list for your ten favorite books! Compare and contrast two books by the same author. Find two works that could be apired together. (a
nonfiction book about WWII and a poem about WWII) Compare and contrast two books from the same genre
(i.e.: fiction, biography, mystery, realistic fiction, humorous, etc).
Forecast the sales of a new book in a series or by a certain author. Justify your sales forecast.
Rewrite the ending of a book you've read and make it end a different way.
Create an original dialogue between two characters from a book you've read.
Math
Create test questions/Story problems
Do “Problems of the Week” Create a folder of review activities Create a folder of problem solving activities Puzzles and math games Create math games
Manipulatives
Magazines (Have kids connect articles to math) Extended activities/Module project Math journal writing Research a math topic Computer programs Practice budgeting (holiday shopping, check book,
weekly allowance) Review electric bills/water bills from the last three
months. Find an average amount spent for the three months. Think of a list of ways we might be able to reduce the amount of energy or water we use to save money and resources.
Research calendars or other time-keeping devices. Find out when and by whom they were first used.
Research money and bartering systems. Work to discover where and when these systems originated.
Find out the names and values of at least 5 different types of foreign currency. Be sure to tell where the currencies come from and what denominations they come in.
Imagine a trip you'd really like to take. With permission from your teacher, visit a travel website (such as travelocity.com) and check on available plane tickets and lodgings. Add up the total amount it would cost you to take the trip. How could you get the best deal?
Plan a road trip across the U.S. stopping by at least 5 famous landmarks. Use a map/map scale to measure distances. Then, add up the total amount of mileage the entire trip (round trip) would take. Decide how many days you'd be gone and calculate the cost of gas, motel rooms, and meals for a family of four. What would the total cost of
the trip be?
Social Studies
Create vocabulary flash cards
Map activities
Board games Create brochures guides Summarize chapters in FUN ways (TV Guide) Independent reading (Historical Fiction) Create a mini-activity menu
Create a crossword puzzle Journal Write a song to help you learn Brain Teasers Design a monument Create a play or skit Write a biography about your historic hero
Choose an important event that took place in U.S. or world history (example: the first atomic bomb explosion during WWII). Explain how science advancements at the time made the event possible.
Choose an important individual from some part of U.S. or world history. Then, write a first-hand journal entry that might have been written by him/her during that time period.
Find similarities and differences between two events that took place at different times in history. You may want to illustrate the comparisons with a Venn diagram.
Critique a political leader's "platform" on a debatable issue in current events. Create an imaginary continent. Then, draw and name the countries on thatcontinent. Be sure to include borders, capital cities, etc. Then, write about one of the countries. Explain its government, culture, and laws.
List the populations of 8-10 countries in order from greatest to smallest. Explain why you think the populations are the way they are.
Brainstorm ways you could've contributed to your family's well-being during the depression if you lived during that time.
Research a famous entrepreneur of the "gilded age." Find out how he/she earned a fortune and what he/she did with it.
Find an interesting book written during a particular period in history. Explain how this book might've had an impact on how people thought about issues during that time period.
Come up with a "get rich quick" scheme you could've used during the "roaring twenties" to make your fortune. Write a business plan.
Science
Mini-lab centers
Science “Question of the Week”
Learning log Read science articles Create a mini-experiment Science puzzles and games Draw vocabulary pictures
Create a review game Act out vocabulary Add to “Science in the News” board Write content songs Add illustrated words to the word wall Add to class timeline Write scientist biographies
Write a letter to a member of the government about an environmental issue we've talked about in class.
Write a letter to a famous scientist or person who has contributed to science. Be sure to include questions you'd really like this person to answer for you.
Come up with a list of new "essential questions" you'd like to have answered about our unit of study (or future units from our web).
Create a perfect "habitat" for an animal of your choice. Use any format you'd like to illustrate your habitat.
Write an experiment you could conduct to teach others about a science concept you've learned in class.
Create a mind map/web using Thinking Maps on the computer to illustrate a science concept to share with others.
Research an important event or invention in Science. Find out what was going on at the time of this event in world or U.S. history.
Make a list of what you think are the top ten environmental issues in today's world. Be sure to put them in order of importance.
Make a list of ten things about life that are difficult and/or inconvenient and come up with ideas for inventions that could help make these things easier or more convenient.
Go to the library and find a non-fiction book about something scientific that interests you. Become the "resident expert" for our class and share your findings during class meeting.
Miscellaneous
Games and puzzles Reading Logic Activities
Individual Inquiry
Computer Search Novel/Short Story Writing Research project
Anchor Activity Planning and Implementation
Indicators and Outcomes: Have all the skills and/or concepts been taught previously? Name and description of Anchor Activity: Differentiation of Anchor: How will you make it respectful of each ability level/ learning profile in the class? Instructional Task: What do you have to do so all students can work on the anchor independently? Materials needed: What will students need? Where will the materials be? Management and Monitoring Expectations: When do you expect students to work on this? Due date: How much time do you want it to take? Will there be checkpoint due dates along the way? Points and/or rubric: What is the activity worth as a grade? Do you want to grade them or just give credit? Accountability: What’s collected? Where does finished work go? What is checked by the teacher? the students? Additional Implementation Suggestions:
Go over the entire anchor activity with the class.
Model all of the games.
If you are using contracts, go over the contract with everyone and make sure they all understand the expectations.
Hand out rubrics and review them.
Point out where materials will be kept.
Be clear on expectations.
Review management strategies with the class so they know what to do if they have a question and you’re busy.
Let students know if any of the activities can be done at home or if they’re all meant to
Analogy Activities Mapping Graphing Computer Time
Life Plan project Social action project Career Planning Hobby or Passion
Music/Art
Play piano with headphones Create new rhythm pattern Read “Music Alive” or Art Articles Create rap or song or visual mnemonic for
another content area
Create a new melody (choose instrument) Research favorite music or art, musician or artist
Physical Education
Practice sports drills Walk or jog Do stretches Yoga or aerobics Research a PE or health topic
Meditate
be done in class.
Sample Generic Rubric 4 Exceeds the requirements (ex: does more than the minimum number of
constructions), more creativity displayed, understanding of concept demonstrated at a deeper level
3 Meets all requirements of task, all mathematics is accurate, understanding of the concept is demonstrated, creativity is demonstrated
2 Most of the requirement is accurate, understanding of concepts partially developed, some or little creativity displayed
1 Some or little requirements correct, understanding of concept poorly developed, little or no creativity
Sample Student Contract for Anchor Activity Title: ___________________________________________________ Name__________________________________ I will complete the following activities: Activity Completed ______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ Check point due dates ________________ Due date signatures ________________ ________________________
FINAL DUE DATE ________________ student signature__________________ parent signature______________________ teacher signature_____________________ Sources: file:///E:/Strategies%20Materials%20for%20Participants/Anchor%20Activities/anchoractivities.htm http://curry.edschool.virginia.edu/files/nagc_anchor_activities.pdf http://www.webster.k12.mo.us/education/components/docmgr/default.php?sectiondetailid=40844 http://www.beginwiththebrain.com/resources/I_M%20DONE_NOW_WHAT_ASCD_07_comp.pdf
- Anchor Activities.pdf
- Anchor%20activites.pdf
Georgia Standards of Excellence (GSE)
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Application
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Synthesis |
Evaluation
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Discourse |
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Selected Response |
Extended Response |
Performance Based
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Personal Communication
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Review the intended learning that comes before and after the standard
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KNOW YOUR LEARNERS
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Tools of Differentiation |
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When it will be used |
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Accommodations
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2017
Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami
Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan
ANAWAT SUPPASRI, 1
NOBUO SHUTO, 1
FUMIHIKO IMAMURA, 1
SHUNICHI KOSHIMURA, 1
ERICK MAS, 1
and AHMET CEVDET YALCINER 2
Abstract—In 2011, Japan was hit by a tsunami that was gen-
erated by the greatest earthquake in its history. The first tsunami
warning was announced 3 min after the earthquake, as is normal,
but failed to estimate the actual tsunami height. Most of the
structural countermeasures were not designed for the huge tsunami
that was generated by the magnitude M = 9.0 earthquake; as a
result, many were destroyed and did not stop the tsunami. These
structures included breakwaters, seawalls, water gates, and control
forests. In this paper we discuss the performance of these coun-
termeasures, and the mechanisms by which they were damaged; we
also discuss damage to residential houses, commercial and public
buildings, and evacuation buildings. Some topics regarding tsunami
awareness and mitigation are discussed. The failures of structural
defenses are a reminder that structural (hard) measures alone were
not sufficient to protect people and buildings from a major disaster
such as this. These defenses might be able to reduce the impact but
should be designed so that they can survive even if the tsunami
flows over them. Coastal residents should also understand the
function and limit of the hard measures. For this purpose, non-
structural (soft) measures, for example experience and awareness,
are very important for promoting rapid evacuation in the event of a
tsunami. An adequate communication system for tsunami warning
messages and more evacuation shelters with evacuation routes in
good condition might support a safe evacuation process. The
combination of both hard and soft measures is very important for
reducing the loss caused by a major tsunami. This tsunami has
taught us that natural disasters can occur repeatedly and that their
scale is sometimes larger than expected.
Key words: The 2011 East Japan earthquake and tsunami,
tsunami countermeasures, Sanriku coast, Sendai plain.
1. Introduction
On 11 March 2011, a strong earthquake of mag-
nitude M = 9.0 (JMA, 2011) occurred in East Japan,
generating a devastating tsunami. No one was
expecting an earthquake of this magnitude in Japan.
Japan is well known as a leading tsunami disaster
prevention country, because it has countermeasures
and evacuation plans set in place. Along the Sanriku
ria coast, where V-shape coastlines can cause a tsu-
nami wave to accumulate inside the bay, tsunamis can
easily be amplified to heights exceeding 10 m.
Therefore, many structural and non-structural tsunami
countermeasures were constructed along the Sanriku
coast (ABE and IMAMURA, 2010). Nevertheless, the
600 km Sanriku coast, which extends northwards
from Sendai and covers the Miyagi, Iwate, and Ao-
mori prefectures, was heavily damaged by the 2011
tsunami. Some of the damage was observed during
primary damage field surveys in Miyagi (SUPPASRI
et al., 2012a) and Iwate prefectures (YALCINER et al.,
2012). In this paper, the effectiveness of these coun-
termeasures during the 2011 tsunami, and the
mechanisms by which they were damaged, are dis-
cussed briefly; examples of breakwaters in Kamaishi
and Ofunato; tsunami gates in Fudai and Minami-
Sanriku; seawalls in Taro, Yamada, and Ishinomaki;
and control forests in Rikuzentakata and Natori are
discussed. The damage to houses in relation to the
materials that were used and number of stories is also
discussed; overturned reinforced concrete buildings in
Onagawa are presented as examples. Similar to the
lessons learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
(SANTOS et al., 2007; SUPPASRI et al., 2012c), the les-
sons learned from this tsunami, including those
regarding the effects of the tsunami on a highland
1 International Research Institute of Disaster Science,
Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan. E-mail: [email protected].
ac.jp; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected].
jp; 2
Department of Civil Engineering, Ocean Engineering
Research Center, Middle East Technical University, Ankara,
Turkey. E-mail: [email protected]
Pure Appl. Geophys. 170 (2013), 993–1018
� 2012 The Author(s) This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
DOI 10.1007/s00024-012-0511-7 Pure and Applied Geophysics
residence in Toni-Hongo, the Namiwake shrine in
Sendai, and damage data from historical tsunamis in
the Sanriku area, are discussed. Examples of suc-
cessful evacuations, for example the ‘‘Miracles of
Kamaishi’’ and ‘‘Inamura no Hi’’, the tsunami festival
in the Wakayama province are provided.
2. Historical Tsunamis that have Affected
the Sanriku Coast and Sendai Plain Areas
The Sanriku coast is often hit by giant tsunamis. If
we limit our discussion to tsunamis generated by
earthquakes over M8.0, the first historical tsunami is
the Jogan tsunami in 869, followed by the Keicho-
Sanriku tsunami in 1611, the Meiji-Sanriku tsunami
in 1896, the Showa-Sanriku tsunami in 1933, the far-
field tsunami from Chile in 1960, and the Great East
Japan tsunami in 2011 (Fig. 1; Table 1). The 1896
tsunami caused nearly 22,000 deaths (YAMASHITA,
2008a), the highest number of deaths caused by a
tsunami in Japanese history. In fact, large earthquakes
such as that which generated the Jogan-type tsunami
occurs, on average, every 800–1,100 years (MINOURA
et al., 2001). More than 1,100 years have passed
since the Jogan tsunami, so there was a high proba-
bility that a large earthquake and tsunami would
occur. However, with only one historical record of
the Jogan tsunami and the limited Jogan tsunami
deposit areas (mainly in Sendai and Ishinomaki
plains), information about the magnitude of this
earthquake and the probability of another Jogan event
required additional support data and verification.
Before the 2011 event, there was a 99 % proba-
bility that another M = 7.5–8.0 earthquake would
occur off of the Miyagi Prefecture within the next
30 years (Table 2) (SENDAI CITY, 2010). A series of
M7.4–M8.0 earthquakes have occurred in the Miyagi
Sea since 1793, and the average time between them is
37 years (SENDAI CITY, 2010). Many countermeasures
have been constructed in preparation for these tsu-
namis, which are predicted to damage the Sanriku
coast and the Sendai plain.
The Sendai plain is a low-hazard area compared
with the Sanriku coast. Historical records show there
have been no large tsunami events in the Sendai plain
area since the 1611 Keicho-Sanriku tsunami, whereas
the Sanriku coast was affected by great tsunamis in
37
38
39
40
41
0 10 20 30 40
L a
ti tu
d e
Maximum tsunami height (m)
2011 Tohoku
1960 Chile
1933 Showa
1896 Meiji
1611 Keicho
Figure 1 Historical tsunamis in the Sanriku area, the areas that were affected by the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, and the maximum tsunami height of
historical tsunamis
994 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
1896, 1933, and 1960 (Fig. 1). The primary concern
is for the ria coast, with its remarkable tsunami-
amplification property because of its narrow,
V-shaped topography, rather than the plain coast. In
addition, because of the location of the earthquakes in
1896 and 1933, which occurred in the north, the
Sendai plain was protected from these tsunamis
because it is located inside a bay behind the Sanriku
coast (Fig. 2). For instance, in Ofunato, maximum
runup heights of 38.2 and 28.7 m were recorded for
the 1896 Meiji and 1933 Showa tsunamis, respec-
tively. However, for these two tsunamis, maximum
runup heights of less than 5 and 3.9 m, respectively
(Fig. 1), were recorded in the Sendai plain (SAWAI
et al., 2008; YAMASHITA 2008a, b). The tsunami in
1960 that was generated by the great earthquake in
Chile also concentrated in, and mainly damaged, the
Sanriku areas. However, the 2011 tsunami was gen-
erated by a large earthquake, and its 500 km rupture
covered the whole area of the Tohoku region.
3. Tsunami Countermeasures
3.1. Tsunami Breakwaters
Large-scale tsunami breakwaters are present
along the Sanriku coast. They were constructed to
protect cities from future tsunamis, because of the
region’s long history of devastating tsunamis. The
tsunami breakwaters were designed to resist tsunamis
that are similar in strength to the 1896 Meiji Sanriku
tsunami. Two well-known tsunami breakwaters are
located in Kamaishi city and Ofunato city. In
Kamaishi, the tsunami breakwaters were constructed
at the entrance to the bay; they are 63 m deep and
hold the Guinness world record for the deepest
breakwaters (Fig. 3, left). Construction of the break-
waters was completed in 2009; they have a 300 m
opening and are 670 and 990 m long (KAMAISHI PORT
OFFICE, 2011). The two tsunami breakwaters in
Ofunato city were constructed after the city was
struck by a large tsunami with long-period waves
caused by resonance with the tsunami generated by
the 1960 Chilean earthquake (Fig. 3, right). The two
breakwaters are located at the bay entrance where the
water is 38 m deep; they have a 200 m wide opening
and are 290 and 250 m long (KAMAISHI PORT OFFICE,
2011). Construction of the breakwaters was com-
pleted in 1967 and successfully protected the city
from the Tokachi-oki tsunami in 1968.
However, the 2011 Tohoku tsunami was higher
than the designers expected. The tsunami caused
major damage to the breakwaters and inundated both
cities. Nevertheless, the breakwaters helped to reduce
Table 1
Historical tsunamis in the Sanriku area and the damage which resulted
DD/MM/YY Name Earthquake
magnitude
Damage Maximum tsunami
height (m)/location
9 July 869 Jogan [8.3 More than 1,000 deaths 2 Dec 1611 Keicho Sanriku [8.1 More than 5,000 deaths 15 June 1896 Meiji Sanriku 8.5 21,959 deaths and more than
10,000 houses destroyed
38.2/Ryori area, Ofunato city
3 Mar 1933 Showa Sanriku 8.1 3,064 deaths and 1,810 houses
destroyed
28.7/Ryori area, Ofunato city
22 May 1960 Great Chilean 9.5 142 (in Japan) and 1,625 houses
destroyed
22 May 1960
11 Mar 2011 Great East Japan 9.0 19,000 deaths and more than 836,500
houses damaged and destroyed
40.5/Omoe-Aneyoshi area,
Miyako city
Table 2
Records of earthquakes in the Miyagi Sea
DD/MM/YY Lag time Magnitude
17 Feb 1793 8.2
20 July 1835 42.4 years 37.1 years on
average
7.3
21 Oct 1861 26.3 years 7.4
20 Feb 1897 35.3 years 7.4
3 Nov 1936 39.7 years 7.4
12 June 1978 41.6 years 7.4
Before 11 Mar 2011 33 years had passed,
so the possibility of
occurrence was 99 %
7.5–8.0
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 995
the impact of the tsunami (both tsunami height and
arrival time) on the cities, especially Kamaishi, where
many houses still remain (Fig. 4). Figures 5 and 6
show the performance of the Kamaishi breakwaters
and the mechanisms by which they were damaged
(PARI, 2011). The breakwaters were located on a
rock foundation. Thirty-meter-wide blocks were
arranged on top of the rock foundation along the
Figure 2 Comparison of the propagation patterns of the 1896 Meiji-Sanriku tsunami and the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami after 10, 30, and 60 min
996 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
direction of the axis of the breakwaters. The blocks
rose 6 m above sea level and were designed to protect
the city from a 5.6 m high tsunami. A tsunami height
of 6.7 m was measured at a GPS station in Kamaishi
Sea. On the basis of these data, two simulations were
performed for cases with and without breakwaters
(PARI, 2011). From the results, the height (mean sea
level, MSL) of the tsunami was 10.8 m in front of the
blocks and 2.6 m behind the blocks; therefore, the
blocks helped to reduce the tsunami height by 8.2 m
(Figs. 5, 6). With regard to inundation by the
tsunami, the breakwaters reduced the tsunami height
(at the shoreline) from 13.7 to 8.0 m and reduced the
runup height from 20.2 to 10.0 m (PARI, 2011).
Because of the strong current in the 30 cm spaces
between the blocks, the rock foundation was dam-
aged. Eventually, *70 % of the blocks were destroyed. This process occurred slowly; as a result,
the arrival time of the tsunami inundation was
delayed by 8 min (from 28 to 36 min) (PARI,
2011). However, the tsunami breakwaters at Ofunato
were more seriously damaged and are currently
submerged in the sea. Possible reasons are that the
Ofunato breakwaters were constructed using earth-
quake resistance design of nearly 40–50 years ago
and the wave period of the strong tsunami current
Figure 3 Tsunami breakwaters in Kamaishi city and in Ofunato city (before the 2011 tsunami)
Figure 4 Damage from the tsunami inundation of Kamaishi city with a maximum runup height of 11.7 m (1/6/2011) and of Ofunato city with a
maximum runup height of 10.9 m (1/6/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 997
might have been nearly the same as the natural period
of a wave inside Ofunato bay.
3.2. Seawalls
Seawalls are found almost everywhere along the
coasts of Japan. According to reports from Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism
(MLIT, 2011), the length of the seawalls damaged
and destroyed in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
prefectures is *190 km out of a total length of *300 km. According to the reports, tsunami over- flows of \1 m caused a relatively small amount of damage but overflows larger than 3–4 m completely
destroyed the seawalls because most of them were
designed to protect the land from high tides or
Figure 5 Mechanisms of damage to the Kamaishi breakwaters
Figure 6 Tsunami impact reduction performance of the Kamaishi breakwaters (PARI, 2011)
998 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
typhoons. However, some of them, for example the
seawall in Taro town, were meant to serve as tsunami
barriers. Taro town experienced tsunamis in 1611,
1896 (a tsunami height of 15 m, 83 % fatality, and
100 % of the houses destroyed) and 1933 (a tsunami
height of 10 m, 32 % fatality, and 63 % of the houses
destroyed). In 1934, construction of two, 10 m high
seawalls (measured from the mean seawater level)
was started; the purpose of the seawalls was to
protect the town by allowing the tsunami to flow
along both sides of the seawalls. They were com-
pleted in 1958, two years before the 1960 Chile
tsunami, and could fully protect the town from a
maximum tsunami height of 3.5 m. In the 1970s, the
town constructed another two lines of 10 m high
seawalls to accommodate the increasing population
(KAMAISHI PORT OFFICE, 2011). The total length of the
seawalls is *2.4 km, as shown in Fig. 7, left. The designs of both of the seawalls took only the 1933
tsunami into consideration. However, the 2011 tsu-
nami flowed over the two-line seawalls, damaged
most houses, with 5 % fatality, and destroyed the
eastern part of the new seawall (Fig. 7, right).
There are three main reasons why the seawalls
were damaged.
• The two seawalls crossed in an X shape, which caused the tsunami to accumulate and increase in
size at the center of the seawalls.
• The foundations of the seawalls were weakened by the river on the eastern side of the town. Soil
properties near rivers may have disrupted the
stability of foundations.
• The seawalls were not maintained properly and had not been adequately connected to each other. The
tsunami flowed over the seawalls and became a
high-speed water jet. The strong current at high
speed caused scouring around the foundations.
Examples of damage to typical seawalls can be
found in Ishinomaki city (Fig. 8, left) and in Higashi-
Matsushima city. The tsunami height near the control
forests of both cities was 7–8 m. On the sea side, the
surfaces of the seawalls survived, but on the land side,
severe scouring occurred at the foundations. Another
example of damaged seawalls is shown in Fig. 8, right.
In Yamada town, five blocks of seawalls of total length
Figure 7 Seawalls in Taro town. Damage occurred to the eastern parts of the new seawalls (9/11/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 999
of 50 m were moved by the tsunami. The block structure
survived but failed because of poor connection with the
foundations and with neighboring blocks. Figure 9
shows typical mechanisms of damage to seawalls
including sliding because of the pressure difference,
overturning because of collision of the wavefront, and
scouring by strong currents (PARI, 2011).
3.3. Tsunami Gates
Fudai village developed along the Fudai River. It
suffered from the 1896 and 1993 tsunamis that
propagated along the river. In 1984, 15.5 m high
tsunami gates were constructed to close the river
mouth in case of tsunamis. Fudai was the location of
a successful countermeasure structure that protected
the village from the 2011 tsunami. The 17 m high
tsunami flowed over the gate but inundated only a
few hundred meters past the gate (NIKKEI NEWSPAPER,
2011), as shown in Fig. 10, left. Most of Fudai
village, including the evacuation shelters (primary
and secondary schools), was protected, as shown in
Fig. 10, right, and no loss of human life was reported
(TOKEN, 2011). If there had not been a tsunami gate,
Figure 8 Seawalls damaged by scouring in Ishinomaki city (left, 26/4/2011) and by sliding in Yamada town (right, 31/5/2011)
Figure 9 Typical mechanisms of damage to seawalls (PARI, 2011)
1000 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
the tsunami would have damaged the center of the
village (IWATE PREFECTURE, 2011).
The residents of Minami-Sanriku town have high
tsunami awareness because of previous experience
with tsunamis. The maximum height of the tsunami
in Minami-Sanriku town was [10 m in some areas, whereas the average height of past tsunamis was
\5 m. Seawalls and tsunami gates were constructed at ?4.6 m MSL after the 1960 Chile tsunami
(MINAMI-SANRIKU TOWN, 2011) and residents did not
expect such a large tsunami, because the first tsunami
warning had prediced 3 m in Miyagi prefecture.
Tsunami evacuation drills are conducted every year.
However, the tsunami gates and seawalls were
overwhelmed and did not stop the 2011 tsunami,
which was higher than 15 m (Fig. 11, left). As a
result, 95 % of the town, including the disaster
prevention building, was destroyed (Fig. 11, right),
and approximately half of the population was missing
immediately after the tsunami. Approximately 1,000
people died or are missing as a result of the tsunami.
Another important issue raised by the 2011
tsunami is that many firemen were lost in the call
of duty as they closed many tsunami gates and the
gates of seawalls. Two-hundred and fifty-four casu-
alties were reported in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima
prefectures, and more than 70 of these were while
closing these gates (YOMIURI NEWSPAPER, 2011a).
Figure 10 The tsunami gate that protected Fudai village and led to no reported casualties (9/11/2011)
Figure 11 The damaged tsunami gate in Minami-Sanriku town and the town’s condition after the tsunami (25/3/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1001
According to a questionnaire given to 471 firemen in
5 cities (Miyako, Kamaishi, Kesennuma, Ishinomaki,
and Iwaki) (KAHOKU NEWSPAPER, 2011), 61 % of
firemen met at their office and went out for duty.
Among them, 23 % went to the coast to close the
gates, and 47 % went to help the evacuation. The
percentages of fireman killed by the tsunami were
22 % during gate-closing work and 31 % during
evacuation work. Thus, the Japanese government has
a plan to install a new system to control these gates
remotely.
3.4. Control Forests
An example of a great loss of control forests is in
Rikuzentakata city. The city is known for having a
2 km stretch of shoreline lined with *70,000 pine
trees (Fig. 12, left). The 2011 tsunami, which was
nearly 20 m high, swept away the entire forest; only
one 10 m high, 200-year-old tree remains (Fig. 12,
right). This surviving tree became a very important
symbol of the reconstruction for people in the city.
The forest not only could not protect the town but
also increased the impact of the tsunami because of
floating debris.
In Natori, where Sendai airport is located, a
tsunami with a height of 10–12 m, as measured from
garbage remaining on trees (SUPPASRI et al., 2012b),
overturned most of the trees (Fig. 13, left); however,
the control forest helped to protect the airport,
because the tsunami inundation depth was only 4 m.
Unlike the first two examples, almost all of the
pine trees in the control forest in Ishinomaki survived
(Fig. 13, right). The forest reduced the destructive
Figure 12 Control forest in Rikuzen-Takata city. Approximately 70,000 pine trees were completely swept away
Figure 13 Damage to a control forest in Natori city (11/5/2011), and a control forest that survived in Ishinomaki city (26/4/2011)
1002 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
power of the tsunami and trapped debris, for example
cars, from the water before it entered the city. The
trees may have been saved because the height of the
tsunami at Ishinomaki was lower (*6 m). The seawall (which was later destroyed) may also have
helped protect the trees. YOMIURI NEWSPAPER (2011b)
reported results based on the estimates from a field
survey of tsunami-affected areas conducted by the
Forestry and Forest Products Research Institute.
Without control forests, it is predicted that a 16 m
high tsunami would have inundated 600 m in 18 min
with an average velocity of 10 m/s. However, with
the control forest, the tsunami arrival time was
delayed by 6 min, and its velocity was reduced to
2 m/s.
In general, control forests can withstand tsunamis
up to 3–5 m high, on the basis of historical Japanese
tsunami data in 43 locations, namely, 1896 Meiji-
Sanriku, 1933 Showa-Sanriku, 1946 Nankai, 1960
Chile, and 1983 Japan Sea, as shown in Fig. 14, left
and right (SHUTO, 1985). The circles indicate trees
that have survived whereas triangles and the rectan-
gles indicate trees that collapsed or were cut down,
respectively. For example, a tree with a diameter of
10 cm can withstand a tsunami inundation depth up
to 3 m but will collapse or be cut down if the
inundation depth is greater than 4 and 5 m, respec-
tively. Figure 14, right, shows the effectiveness of the
control forest in trapping debris and reducing the
wave current. The effectiveness of the control forest
was limited at an inundation depth of 3 m for a forest
width of \20 m. Historical data show that a forest width [100 m is expected to be effective up to an inundation depth of 5 m. The maximum 2011
tsunami heights in both Rikuzen-Takata (150 m
forest width) and Natori (500 m forest width) were
[10 m (out of the data range), and caused devastat- ing damage. On the other hand, a 6 m tsunami
attacked the control forest in Ishinomaki (150 m
forest width); the damage that was caused is shown in
Fig. 14, left.
Figure 15 shows a good example of how control
forests and breakwaters could have helped to reduce
the damage to areas behind them in Ishinomaki city.
This figure was created by visual inspection of
satellite images, with gray indicating the area of
tsunami inundation by the 2011 tsunami, red indicat-
ing the areas where houses were washed away, and
blue indicating the areas with surviving houses (TEL,
2011). It is very clear that the number of houses
washed away in zone B (behind the control forest) is
much smaller than that in zone A (without a control
Figure 14 Tree damage as a function of inundation depth and tree diameter, and the effectiveness of control forests as a function of inundation depth and
forest width (SHUTO, 1985)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1003
forest). GOKON and KOSHIMURA (2012) showed that
the probability of a building being washed away in
zone C (inside the breakwaters) was *40 %, whereas in zone D (outside the breakwaters), it was almost as
high as 90 %, confirming the 50 % reduction effect,
although both areas experienced a maximum tsunami
height lower than 7 m.
4. Residential Structures
4.1. Residential Houses
The tsunami left 115,163 houses heavily dam-
aged, 162,015 houses moderately damaged and
559,321 houses partially damaged (NATIONAL POLICE
AGENCY, 2011). Most houses in residential areas are
constructed from wood. The relationship between the
tsunami hazard level and the structural damage is
described by tsunami fragility curves. Figure 16, left
shows the tsunami fragility curves that were devel-
oped, using data from the 1993 Okushiri tsunami
(most of the houses were constructed out of wood)
(KOSHIMURA et al., 2009). These curves indicate that
the probability of damage (destroyed or washed
away) is very high when the tsunami inundation
depth exceeds 2 m. The structural materials and the
number of stories are directly related to the proba-
bility of damage. For example, the probability of
damage (destroyed or washed away) from a tsunami
with an inundation depth of 4 m is 0.3, 0.7, and 0.9
for a reinforced concrete (RC) house, a mixed-type
house in Thailand (SUPPASRI et al., 2011), and a
wooden house, respectively (Fig. 16, left). For the
same tsunami, the probability of damage is 0.9 for a
one-story house and 0.5 for a house that has more
than one story (Fig. 16, right). Figure 17, top, shows
examples of three damaged houses. Although all
three houses experienced an inundation depth of 4 m,
the level of damage is different, depending on
building typology. In Fig. 17, bottom, the first
building on the left side (green rectangle) is a two-
story RC office that sustained broken windows but no
structural damage. The two-story wooden house in
the center (yellow rectangle) sustained damage to
some of its walls and columns. The one-story wooden
house on the right (red rectangle) completely col-
lapsed. However, the impact from floating debris is
complex and difficult to ascertain at this time. In fact,
the velocity of the tsunami wave current was also
important in the structural destruction, because of the
hydrodynamic force. Nevertheless, the current veloc-
ity is quite difficult to measure using only tsunami
traces found during field surveys, especially along the
Sanriku ria coast, where the tsunami wave easily
accumulated such hydrostatic and hydrodynamic
force that the tsunami height and velocity became
Figure 15 Tsunami damage reduction effect because of the control forest and breakwaters in Ishinomaki city
1004 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
larger than in the Sendai coastal plain. Comparison of
the housing damage ratio between the plain and ria
coast of Ishinomaki city shows that the damage ratio
for houses washed away at 3 m of inundation depth
was 0.1 along the plain coast but as high as 0.6 along
the ria coast (SUPPASRI et al., 2012b). This result
confirms the effect of current velocity on different
damage levels at the same inundation depth.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20
D am
ag e
p ro
b ab
il it
y
Inundation depth (m)
Japan_W
Thai_Mix
Thai_RC
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20
D am
ag e
p ro
b ab
il it
y
Inundation depth (m)
Thai_One story_LV2
Thai_> one story_LV2
Figure 16 Tsunami fragility curves for different types of structural material and for different numbers of stories (KOSHIMURA et al., 2009; SUPPASRI et al.,
2011)
Figure 17 Examples of different damage levels for the same tsunami inundation depth (26/4/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1005
4.2. Commercial and Public Buildings
In tsunamis it is usually recommended that people
evacuate to high-rise RC buildings or steel-reinforced
concrete (SRC) buildings if there are no mountains
nearby. The building code for earthquake-resistant
buildings was revised in 1981 and 2000 but did not
take into account tsunami load. The guideline for
tsunami evacuation buildings was established in 2005
(CABINET OFFICE, 2005). The practical instruction for
evacuation of buildings stated in the guideline is to
evacuate to higher than the third or fourth floor if the
expected tsunami inundation depth is 2 or 3 m,
respectively. However, the 2011 tsunami shows that
this guideline may not always be correct. There are
six overturned buildings in Onagawa town (Fig. 18,
left), and two each in Akamae village, Miyako city,
Otsuchi town, and Rikuzen-Takata city. None of
these were tsunami evacuation buildings, and they
were not designed to resist tsunami loads. The four-
story RC building (building B) pictured in Fig. 19,
right, was moved 70 m from its original location
before stopping at a hill (Fig. 20, left). However, a
five-story RC building (building X) survived and did
not overturn (Fig. 19, left), even though it was in the
same place.
The reasons these buildings may have overturned
are as follows (Fig. 18, right):
• First, many pile foundations were damaged by the strong shaking and soil liquefaction that preceded
the tsunami which reduced the frictional resistance
of the pile foundations. A large lateral load
occurred during the earthquake, and liquefaction
might have caused cap failure. In other words, pile
connections failed, and the cap could not resist
overturning moments from the vertical load of the
building and lateral hydrodynamic load of the
tsunami. The building that is pictured in Fig. 20,
right had only one pile remaining.
• Second, because of the ria coast, the tsunami was amplified by a narrow bathymetry and resulted in
runup heights of 15–20 m, as measured near the
locations of the overturned buildings. The tsunami,
which was generated by a large earthquake (large
fault width), had a long wave period, which led to a
Figure 18 Six buildings that were overturned (A–F) in Onagawa town and the mechanisms that mediated overturning
1006 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
long time of interaction of the tsunami force acting
on the buildings.
• Third, the ratios of openings (windows and doors) to walls in the overturned buildings were small.
Therefore, pressure suddenly accumulated at the
tsunami-facing wall, which caused local scouring
at the foundations. Table 3 summarizes detailed
information on the overturned and non-overturned
RC buildings in Onagawa town, as measured
during field surveys. Most of the buildings in
Onagawa town (including buildings C and E) were
overwhelmed by the tsunami, except building X.
Figure 19 Building X (sea front), which survived (29/9/2011), and building B, which was overturned (29/3/2011)
Figure 20 Building B, which was moved 70 m from its original location (upper-left corner), and a detailed picture of a pile foundation from building B
(3/9/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1007
The overturned buildings were directed toward
land, meaning that they were overturned by the
striking wave and not the receding wave. It is very
clear that all of the overturned buildings had an
opening area equal to or less than 10 %.
• Fourth, buoyancy created an uplifting force that raised the buildings. All of the overturned build-
ings were overwhelmed by the tsunami, resulting
in a large uplift force because of buoyancy. In
some cases, buried structures can literally be
floated out of the ground because of the increased
pore water pressures. In addition, there was
sufficient time for water to flow inside the build-
ings, because of the long period of the wave, which
increased the vertical load of the building. Accu-
mulated air between the top level of the windows
and the ceiling also generated buoyancy.
• Fifth, because of outdated structural design codes, the buildings had poor reinforcement against
longitudinal and lateral pressure (Fig. 20, right).
Most were probably constructed during 1970–1980,
before the new building design code for earthquake-
resistant buildings in 1981.
All of these phenomena and forces generated an
overturning moment on the buildings.
4.3. Evacuation Buildings and Shelters
There were many designated evacuation buildings
and shelters that failed to protect lives because of the
unexpected tsunami height and runup. For instance, a
community gym was designated as an evacuation
shelter in the flat region of Rikuzen-Takata city.
The tsunami overwhelmed the gym, and only three
people survived out of more than 80 evacuees.
Another example in Rikuzen-Takata is a five-story
residential building (Fig. 21, left). The tsunami
reached only the fourth floor; however, the building
had no stairway that would enable people to evacuate
to the roof in the case of a larger tsunami. Another
example of an unfortunate result of the unexpected
tsunami was at Okawa primary school (Fig. 21,
right), located near the mouth of a river. The tsunami
claimed 74 out of a total of 108 children and 10 staff.
Most of the children that survived climbed the
mountain behind the school; the others went to the
bridge where they were struck by the tsunami. The
school had not conducted evacuation drills and had
no tsunami plans before the 2011 event.
Officers and staff members that were stationed at
the Otsuchi town office (Fig. 22, left) and the disaster
prevention building (Fig. 22, right) in Minami-
Sanriku also lost their lives. In Otsuchi town, the
town leader and his staff lost their lives; this loss has
caused the reconstruction process in Otsuchi town to
be slower than at other locations. A staff member in
Minami-Sanriku town lost her life while announcing
the evacuation; other staff members inside the
building also lost their lives.
In the Unosumai area of Kamaishi city there is a
famous story called ‘‘Miracles of Kamaishi’’ because
all 580 students and teachers from two schools
survived the tsunami even though their schools were
destroyed by the tsunami. Although their schools
were located outside the expected tsunami inundation
area, on the basis of historical records, the students
Table 3
Information about overturned and non-overturned RC buildings in Onagawa town
ID Story Building
height (m)
Opening
area (m 2 )
Opening
ratio (1)
Footing
area (m 2 )
Length/
width (2)
(1)/(2) Direction
of overturn
A 2 10.5 6.6 0.0524 68.4 2.11 0.024 Sea
B 4 14.0 4.3 0.0427 26.6 1.95 0.022 Land
D 2 10.5 19.72 0.0806 172.4 3.15 0.026 Land
E 2 7.0 7.71 0.1039 42.4 2.65 0.039 Land
X 5 17.3 38.64 0.1679 90.4 1.95 0.086 –
Y 4 13 121.5 0.5841 208.0 1.23 0.475 –
Z 2 8.5 19.25 0.1258 153.0 2.12 0.059 –
Most of buildings are pile foundation except for building A, which is shallow foundation. Building C is steel frame with ALC wall building
and building F is an RC building but the town removed the building before the measurements were performed. At present, only three buildings
(A, C, and E) will remain as memorial parks
1008 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
decided to leave their schools and evacuate to higher
ground, and all of them survived. However, there was
also great loss in this area because of an incomplete
evacuation drill. The evacuation drill was performed
on 3rd March (the memorial day of the Showa-
Sanriku tsunami), *1 week before the tsunami. The town selected the two-story RC building as the
disaster prevention center (a group evacuation shelter
located outside the expected inundation area) rather
than other evacuation areas on high ground, because
the center is easily accessible by the elderly. A fatal
tragedy occurred when most of the evacuation drill
participants evacuated to the center rather than to
high ground. As a result, there were only 25
confirmed survivors from the total 200 evacuees,
with 54 found dead inside the center and the number
of estimated dead and missing [100. Some other successful cases are reported here.
Onagawa town hospital is located *15 m above the sea level, and the tsunami reached the first floor
(Fig. 23, left). A school in Ishinomaki city that was
located behind the control forest was inundated to the
second floor (Fig. 23, right). The tsunami reached the
first floor at the sightseeing ferry terminal in Shio-
gama city; the evacuation sign suggests evacuating to
the second or third floor (Fig. 24, left). Last, a school
in Arahama town was the only building in the area
that was located on high ground; it survived because
the tsunami reached the second floor only (Fig. 24,
right).
Figure 21 A five-story apartment building in Rikuzen-Takata city, and Okawa primary school
Figure 22 The Otsuchi town office (31/5/2011) and the disaster prevention building in Minami-Sanriku town (3/9/2011)
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1009
To summarize, in the entire Tohoku region the three
worst designated evacuation shelter locations inundated
by the tsunami (MURAI, 2011) were those for Rikuzen-
Takata: Iwate prefecture (35 out of 68 places, 51.5 %),
Onagawa (12 out of 25 places, 48 %), and Minami-
Sanriku (31 out of 78 places, 39.7 %), leading to
fatalities at the three locations as high as 11.7, 11.2, and
6.3 %, respectively (SUPPASRI et al., 2012a).
5. Tsunami Awareness and Disaster Mitigation
5.1. Tsunami Experience and Awareness
People who live along the Sanriku coast have
more experience of tsunamis than those who live on
the Sendai plain. The occurrence of two huge
tsunamis in 37 years (the 1896 Meiji tsunami and
the 1933 tsunami) taught the residents of the Sanriku
coast about the dangers of tsunamis. From the
questionnaire results (CeMI, 2011), 90 % of the
people in Kamaishi city evacuated quickly, with
60 % of them starting their evacuation \10 min after the earthquake, whereas only 60 % of the
people in Natori city evacuated quickly, and 30 % of
them started their evacuation within 30 min of the
earthquake. However, there were many cases doc-
umented in the media of people who quickly
evacuated to a safe place but then went back to
their houses for many reasons and ultimately
became casualties.
Figure 23 Evacuation buildings in Onagawa town (29/3/2011) and Ishinomaki city (12/5/2011)
Figure 24 Evacuation buildings in Shiogama city (29/4/2011) and Arahama town (16/4/2011)
1010 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
Historical records from the Sanriku area were
used to compare the number of deaths caused and the
number of houses damaged (houses that were washed
away or sustained major or moderate damage) by the
1896, 1933 (YAMASHITA 2008a, b), and 2011 tsunamis
(IWATE PREFECTURE, 2011; MIYAGI PREFECTURE, 2011).
Fatalities as a result of the 1896 tsunami were very
high, and not comparable with those of the 1933 and
2011 tsunamis (Fig. 25, left). House damage as a
result of the 1896 and 2011 tsunamis are not very
different in the Iwate province; however, they are
very high for the 2011 tsunami in the Miyagi
prefecture because of land development in this area
(Fig. 25, right).
Despite high house damage and the largest runup
height (Fig. 26, right), fatalities as a result of the
2011 tsunami were much smaller because tsunami
experience resulted in the people recognizing the
need to evacuate, and evacuating quickly. The
tsunami evacuation effect can also be confirmed by
the number of deaths per damaged house, which is
shown in Fig. 26, left. For the 1896 tsunami, there
were more than 2.0–4.5 deaths per damaged house
whereas for the 2011 tsunami there are \0.5 deaths per damaged house. One reason why the number of
deaths for the 1933 tsunami was still high in some
locations can be explained by using Taro town as an
example. The 1896 tsunami killed nearly 90 % of the
people in Taro town. Therefore, most of the people
who were affected by the 1933 tsunami were
newcomers who had settled in the area after the
1896 tsunami.
Figure 27 shows the relationship between the
fatality-to-damage ratio and the maximum runup
height of the three tsunamis that affected the Sanriku
area, on the basis of data from YAMASHITA (2008a, b)
for the 1896 and 1933 tsunamis, and data from IWATE
PREFECTURE (2011) and MIYAGI PREFECTURE (2011) for
the 2011 tsunami. The 2011 tsunami (MORI et al.,
2012) had runup heights in excess of 20 m in most
areas; fatalities were limited to *10 % whereas damage was as high as 50–80 %. Figure 28 shows the
death-to-damage ratios as a function of the maximum
runup height for the 2011 Tohoku tsunami for two
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Hirono
Kuji
Noda
Fudai
Tanohata
Iwaizumi
Miyako
Yamada
Otsuchi
Kamaishi
Ofunato
Rikuzen-Takata
Kesennuma
Minami-Sanriku
Onagawa
Ishinomaki
Death ratio (%)
1896 Meiji
1933 Showa
2011 Tohoku
0 20 40 60 80 100
Hirono
Kuji
Noda
Fudai
Tanohata
Iwaizumi
Miyako
Yamada
Otsuchi
Kamaishi
Ofunato
Rikuzen-Takata
Kesennuma
Minami-Sanriku
Onagawa
Ishinomaki
Damage ratio (%)
1896 Meiji
1933 Showa
2011 Tohoku
Figure 25 Tsunami deaths and house damage for the Sanriku coastal communities
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1011
different types of coastline: the ria topography along
the Sanriku coast and the Sendai plain. The maximum
runup height on the Sendai plain was 10 m; however,
in some areas, fatalities and house damage were as
high as 10 and 75 %, respectively. In brief, fatalities
and house damage in the Sendai plain were similar to
those of the Sanriku ria coast, despite much lower
maximum runup heights.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Hirono
Kuji
Noda
Fudai
Tanohata
Iwaizumi
Miyako
Yamada
Otsuchi
Kamaishi
Ofunato
Rikuzen-Takata
Kesennuma
Minami-Sanriku
Onagawa
Ishinomaki
Number of deaths per damaged house
1896 Meiji
1933 Showa
2011 Tohoku
0 10 20 30 40 50
Hirono
Kuji
Noda
Fudai
Tanohata
Iwaizumi
Miyako
Yamada
Otsuchi
Kamaishi
Ofunato
Rikuzen-Takata
Kesennuma
Minami-Sanriku
Onagawa
Ishinomaki
Maximum runup height (m)
1896 Meiji
1933 Showa
2011 Tohoku
Figure 26 The number of deaths per damaged house and the maximum recorded runup heights for tsunamis that have struck Sanriku coastal
communities
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1 10
F a ta
li ty
r a
ti o
( %
)
Runup height (m)
1896
Meiji
1933
Showa
2011
Tohoku
0.1
1
10
100
1 10
D a m
a g
e r
a ti
o (
% )
Runup height (m)
1896 Meiji
1933 Showa
2011 Tohoku
Figure 27 Fatality-to-damage ratio as a function of the maximum runup height for coastal communities along the Sanriku coast and the Sendai plain
1012 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
5.2. Self Evacuation
As mentioned in the section above, experience
with tsunamis in the past promoted tsunami aware-
ness in the people of the Sanriku areas. However,
there were many cases, including the 2011 event, of
people remaining in their house waiting for their
family, or taking their belongings after the earth-
quake, who were ultimately washed away by the
tsunami. Self evacuation is very important to prevent
this type of tragedy. On the basis of experience from
the tsunamis in 1896 and 1933, in which some
families lost all of their members because of the
tsunami, an idea of self evacuation called ‘‘Tsunami
tendenko’’ was proposed (YAMASHITA, 2008b). ‘‘Tsu-
nami tendenko’’ is a phrase in the dialect of the
Sanriku region that is used to encourage people to
evacuate from the tsunami alone without taking any
belongings or waiting for their family; this phrase can
be translated as ‘‘you should protect your life by
yourself’’. Therefore, it is acceptable not to blame
people who did not help others. The ‘‘Miracles of
Kamaishi’’ was a very good example of the practical
use of ‘‘Tsunami tendenko’’ because the children
started their evacuation by themselves, and all were
saved. Examples of similar stories of self evacuation
were also reported for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
on Surin Islands, Thailand, and Simeulue Island,
Indonesia.
5.3. Residences on High Land
The Toni-Hongo village was struck by the 1896
tsunami (with a tsunami height of 14.5 m and 224
houses destroyed) and the 1933 tsunami (with a
tsunami height of 9.3 m and 101 houses destroyed)
(MEIJI UNIVERSITY, 2011). After the 1933 tsunami, the
village was rebuilt on high land at an elevation of
20 m (MSL), as shown in Fig. 29, left. The village
survived the 1960 Chilean tsunami, which was *5 m high. After this event, many houses were built in the
lowland areas to accommodate the increasing popu-
lation, as shown in a picture from 2009 (Fig. 29,
center) and a satellite image from 2010 (Fig. 30, left).
The 2011 tsunami destroyed the lowland houses but
not the highland houses (Figs. 29, right, 30, right).
5.4. Tsunami Memorials
Tsunami memorials, for example stone monu-
ments, can be found in many areas along the Sanriku
coast. These memorials can be found in Minami-
Sanriku town, where there are monuments for the
1896 Meiji, 1933 Showa, and 1960 Chile tsunamis.
The message on the stone monument for the 1933
Showa tsunami (Fig. 31, left) reads ‘‘to be cautious of
an abnormal receding wave’’. However, these mon-
uments, including a 2.6 m high monument for the
1960 Chile tsunami (Fig. 31, right), were destroyed
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1 10 100
F a ta
li ty
r a
ti o
( %
)
Runup height (m)
2011 Ria 2011 Plain
1
10
100
1 10 100
D a m
a g
e r
a io
( %
)
Runup height (m)
2011 Ria 2011 Plain
Figure 28 Fatality-to-damage ratios as a function of the maximum runup height of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami for the ria topography along the Sanriku
coast and the Sendai plain
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1013
by the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. The Namiwake shrine
(Fig. 32, left) is a monument in the Sendai area that is
located *5.5 km from the sea (Fig. 32, right). The shrine is located in a low-lying area in the Waka-
bayashi ward of Sendai city, and was originally built
in 1703. Many flood and tsunami disasters have
occurred in this area in the past. In the 1611 Keicho
event, the tsunami inundated the shrine’s original
site, and *1,700 people were killed. At one site, the tsunami wave, which approached from the East, was
split in the north–south direction; at the time, people
believed that the tsunami was created by the god of
the sea. In 1835, the shrine was moved to that site to
protect it from the next tsunami; it was given the
name ‘‘Namiwake’’ (‘‘Nami’’ means wave and
‘‘Wake’’ means separate) and is viewed as a symbol
of tsunami prevention. In fact, deposits from the 869
Jogan tsunami were found 200–300 m from the front
of the shrine. Although the 2011 tsunami was larger
than expected, the shrine survived the 2011 Great
East Japan earthquake and tsunami (Fig. 32). Addi-
tionally, many shrines along the Pacific coast of the
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures survived
this tsunami. They were built at locations that were
regarded as safe on the basis of historical tsunamis,
for example the 1611 Keicho tsunami, and left as a
warning message to future generations.
5.5. Tsunami Festivals
A good example of a tsunami festival in Japan is
the festival in the Wakayama prefecture that cele-
brates a real story titled ‘‘Inamura no Hi’’. The story
originated from the Nankai tsunami in 1854. Ham-
aguchi Goryo (Fig. 33, left), the leader of Hirogawa
town in Wakayama province, noticed a tsunami after
a strong shake (WAKAYAMA BROADCAST, 2009). He
knew that it would be difficult to convince people to
Figure 29 Toni-Hongo village after the 1933 Showa Sanriku tsunami, before the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, and after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami
Figure 30 Satellite images of the Toni-Hongo village in May 2010 and in April 2011
1014 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
evacuate from the tsunami. Therefore, he set fire to
his own rice straw and asked people to help him
extinguish the fire (in Japanese, ‘‘Inamura’’ means
rice straw and ‘‘Hi’’ means fire). All of the town
residents came to help him and were saved from the
huge tsunami that destroyed the village. Hamaguchi
became a hero to the village and spent his own money
to construct a seawall. This seawall helped to protect
the town from the 1944 Tonankai and 1946 Nankai
tsunamis. In memory of this story, the local people,
especially the children in the community, help to pile
on the earth embankment (Fig. 33, right) and improve
their tsunami awareness every year (MATSUSAKA,
2007). Tsunami evacuation drills and education may
also increase their skills and knowledge for the next
tsunami.
6. Conclusions, Lessons Learned
and Recommendations
• Many tsunamis have affected the Sanriku coast and Sendai plain in the past, including the 1611 Kei-
cho, 1896 Meiji, 1933 Showa, and 1960 Chile
tsunamis. In particular, Sanriku has a ria coastline
that is capable of amplifying the height of a
Figure 31 The stone monuments for the 1933 Showa Sanriku tsunami and the 1960 Chile tsunami in Minami-Sanriku town (25/3/2011)
Figure 32 Namiwake Shrine and the inundation area of the 2011 tsunami
Vol. 170, (2013) Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami 1015
tsunami. Due to of its ria coastline, Sanriku is one
of the areas that has experienced the highest tsu-
namis in Japanese history. Most of the tsunami
countermeasures failed to stop the 2011 Tohoku
tsunami because they were not designed to resist an
event of this earthquake magnitude. Recent tech-
nology has made it possible to build massive
structures that could fully protect against 500–1,000-
year return-period tsunamis; however, these struc-
tures are impractical when budget and time are
considered. Nevertheless, the scale of damage and
loss can be reduced by enacting proper structural
design and land-use management policies.
• From the perspective of structural damage, break- waters and seawalls should have stronger
foundations, and there should be more secure
connections between neighboring blocks. New
designs for stronger and more stable coastal
structures should be developed. Tsunami gates
and gates in seawalls should be remotely con-
trolled. However, these structures may reduce the
tsunami awareness of residents by leading them to
believe that the structure fully protects them rather
than simply reducing damage; an example of this
thinking occurred in Taro town. The scenery
should also be considered after the construction
of high seawalls; Matsushima town, for example,
has one of the best views in the Tohoku area.
• Control forests are not only unable to stop or reduce huge tsunamis such as the 2011 event but
may also cause more damage when the trees
become floating debris, as observed in Ofunato and
Rikuzen-Takata. Because they can only withstand
tsunamis with heights up to 5 m, control forests
should be planted as a second barrier behind
seawalls or at elevations that are higher than the
level of the seawalls. Another option is to plant the
control forest more deeply in the ground so that
their roots can be more connected with the land and
increase their strength.
• Wooden structures are good for earthquakes, because of their light weight, but poor at resisting
the hydrodynamic force of a tsunami. For areas
where the tsunami inundation depth is expected to
be low and residential areas are constructed, the
first floor of houses should be built as RC
structures. The tsunami current velocity is also an
important factor in the tsunami force and damage
to port facilities including fishing boats. Recent
technology, for example video camera analysis,
can aid estimation of the velocity. The locations of
gasoline and other fuel tanks should be reconsid-
ered; they should be put in safer places where they
will not cause fires during a tsunami, as in
Kesennuma city.
• The design codes for evacuation buildings should be revised after the examples in Onagawa and
some other areas; openings should be considered,
and pile foundations should be strengthened. The
elevations of railways and roads should be raised
so that they can serve as secondary or tertiary
tsunami barriers.
Figure 33 Statue of Hamaguchi Goryo and the activity during the tsunami festival
1016 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
• Evacuation shelters in plains (e.g., the community gym in Rikuzen-Takata city), low-rise buildings
(e.g., the disaster prevention building in Minami-
Sanriku town), and primary schools near the sea or
river mouths (e.g., Okawa School in Ishinomaki
city) are all examples of failed evacuation shelters.
The design and location of tsunami evacuation
buildings should be reconsidered. Escape hills can
be constructed in plain areas using debris from this
tsunami. Evacuation signs should include informa-
tion not only about tsunami height but also about
the height above sea level of each evacuation
shelter, evacuation building, and escape hill.
• Although the tsunami was higher along the Sanriku coast, experience and awareness encouraged people
to evacuate rapidly. On the other hand, people in the
Sendai plain area had less tsunami experience and
were slow to evacuate, but the tsunami was lower.
These factors may explain why fatalities in the two
areas were similar. It is important to remind people in
the Sanriku area not to go back once they have
evacuated to a safe place. A greater number of high
ground areas and evacuation buildings are necessary
for the Sendai plain area, and awareness should be
encouraged after the 2011 event. Although many
structural tsunami defenses can be constructed,
evacuation is still the most important and effective
method for saving human lives.
• Land use policies for future development should be used to avoid relocation to tsunami-prone areas.
Moving to the highland is good for tsunami disaster
reduction, but it is also important to evaluate other
hazards in sloped areas, for example landslides and
floods. Many examples of tsunami warning mes-
sages from people in the past are shown on
memorial stones, shrines, and temples, especially
along the Sanriku coast; these provide information
on tsunami heights, arrival times, and inundation
limits. These tsunami memorials are important for
building awareness and remembering past events,
and remain ready for possible future events.
Predictions of future population growth are also
necessary for designing countermeasures for the
100–1,000-year return-period tsunamis.
• It is important to develop both hard countermea- sures, for example breakwaters, seawalls, and
tsunami gates, in conjunction with proper land
use and soft countermeasures, for example evacu-
ation plans and tsunami awareness education;
tsunami education can take the form of memorial
parks or hazard maps. These measures prepare
towns well for the next tsunami.
Acknowledgments
We express our deep appreciation to the Tokio Marine
and Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd, through the
International Research Institute of Disaster Science
(IRIDeS) at Tohoku University, the Willis Research
Network under the pan Asian/Oceanian tsunami risk
modeling and mapping project, and the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
(MEXT) project for their financial support. Professor
Yalciner acknowledges the Turkish Chamber of Civil
Engineers and the TUBITAK 108Y227 Project for their
support. We would like to express special thanks to the
anonymous reviewers and editor for their comments on
improving the quality of the paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
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1018 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
- Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan
- Abstract
- Introduction
- Historical Tsunamis that have Affected the Sanriku Coast and Sendai Plain Areas
- Tsunami Countermeasures
- Tsunami Breakwaters
- Seawalls
- Tsunami Gates
- Control Forests
- Residential Structures
- Residential Houses
- Commercial and Public Buildings
- Evacuation Buildings and Shelters
- Tsunami Awareness and Disaster Mitigation
- Tsunami Experience and Awareness
- Self Evacuation
- Residences on High Land
- Tsunami Memorials
- Tsunami Festivals
- Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations
- Acknowledgments
- References
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com www.ijdrs.org www.springer.com/13753
Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. 2011, 2 (1): 34–42 doi:10.1007/s13753-011-0004-9
ARTICLE
* Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
The 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster: Overview and Comments
Okada Norio1, Tao Ye2,*, Yoshio Kajitani1, Peijun Shi2, and Hirokazu Tatano1
1Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Kyoto 611-011, Japan 2State Key Laboratory of Earth Surface Processes and Resource Ecology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Abstract This article briefly reviews the causes and impacts of the massive eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011, and comments on the response measures taken by Japan to cope with this devastating disaster. Mass losses occurred mostly because the intensity of the quake and the induced tsunami exceeded local coping capacity. Particularly, the nuclear power plant crisis triggered by the tsunami significantly increased the short- and long-term impacts of the disaster. While the coping capacity Japanese society built after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji great earthquake tremendously mitigated the damages, there is room for improvement despite Japan’s great efforts in this disaster. Investigating the tsunami preparedness of the coastal nuclear power plants is an issue of paramount importance. In response to future large-scale disasters, there is an urgent need for a highly collaborative framework based on which all available resources could be mobilized; a mutual assistance and rescue system against catastrophes among regions and countries on the basis of international humanitarian aid; and further in-depth research on the multi-hazard and disaster-chain phenomenon in large-scale disasters and corresponding governance approaches.
Keywords 2011 Eastern Japan Earthquake, earthquake- tsunami disaster chain, Fukushima nuclear crisis, impact and response
1 Introduction
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred in the international waters of the western Pacific and induced a huge tsunami. These natural disasters hit the northeastern part of Japan and caused heavy casualties, enormous property losses, and a severe nuclear crisis with regional and global long-term impact. On April 1, the Japanese government officially named the disaster “The 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami” (東日本大震災, Higashi Nihon Daishinsai, literally “Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster”).
2 Characteristics of the 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
The main earthquake disaster hit Japan at 14:46 Tokyo time on 11 March 2011. The epicenter was estimated at 38.322°N and 142.369°E (Figure 1), merely 77 km (47.9 miles) off the eastern coast of Japan’s Honshu island, 129 km from Sendai, 177 km from Fukushima, and 373 km from Tokyo. The hypocenter was at an underwater depth of 32 km (19.9 miles).
According to the Japan Meteorological Agency (2011), the magnitude estimate of this quake was initially 7.9, then revised to 8.4, 8.8, 8.9, back to 8.8, and finally set at 9.0. The data released by the United States Geological Survey was 8.8, but revised to 8.9 the same day. On March 14, it was finally set at 9.0. This 9.0 magnitude earthquake is the third highest ever recorded in the world, after the 9.5 magnitude quake that hit Chile in1960 and the 9.2 magnitude quake that hit Alaska in 1964.
Figure 1. Epicenter of the 2011 Great Earthquake in Japan Tokai and the hypocentral regions classified by the Earth- quake Survey Committee, Japan Source: Earthquake Survey Committee, Japan 2011.
Norio et al. The 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster 35
A number of foreshocks and aftershocks occurred before and after the main quake. Several thousand quakes were recorded by April 11. Relatively severe foreshocks and aftershocks included a magnitude 7.2 foreshock on March 9, and magnitude 7.0, 7.4, and 7.2 aftershocks at 15:06 Japan Standard Time (JST), 15:15 JST, and 15:26 JST on March 11. On April 7 and 11, magnitude 7.4 (revised to 7.1) and 7.1 aftershocks occurred.
The main quake triggered a massive, destructive tsunami (Figure 2). It reached the eastern coast of Honshu, Japan within a couple of minutes after the quake, and spilled into the interior to a maximum distance of 10 km. It was estimated that the tsunami wave was up to 38 m high (Kyodo News 2011), while field observation suggested that the record was 24 m, according to the figure released by the Port and Airport Research Institute (2011) on March 23. Based on the analysis of the Japan Meteorological Research Institute (JMRI 2011), the wave source zone of the tsunami covered about 550 km from north to south and about 200 km from east to west, setting a record for the most extensive wave source zone around the Japan Sea.
The tsunami caused by the quake affected almost the whole Pacific coast, and over 20 countries on both sides of the Pacific issued tsunami warnings, including Japan, Russia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and the United States.
The quake released surface energy of 1.9 ± 0.5 × 1017J (USGS Earthquake Hazards Program 2011a), two times that of the Indonesia tsunami in 2004. The total energy released, including shaking and the tsunami, amounted to 3.9 × 1022J (USGS Earthquake Hazards Program 2011b), slightly lower than that of the Indonesia tsunami, equivalent to 9.32 × 1012 t of TNT or about 600 million times that of the Hiroshima atom bomb.
Analysis of the USGS (USGS Earthquake Hazards Program 2011b) showed that this earthquake was triggered as the Pacific Plate slipped beneath Japan, while moving towards the Eurasian Plate to the west. Before this disaster, the Pacific Plate moved a few centimeters west away from the North American Plate every year, which led to this large earthquake as plate movement released energy.
The March 11 earthquake was induced by at least four dif- ferent hypocenters slipping in a short period (see Figure 1). Based on the aftershock records, these hypocenters include not only Sanriku-Oki and Miyagiken-Oki, the two hypocenters considered most likely to have slipped, but also Fukushimaken-Oki and Ibaragiken-Oki. Such large-scale, interrelated earthquakes had not been envisioned by many earthquake experts.
3 Impacts of the 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster
3.1 Geophysical Impact
The violent shock resulting from the seismic intensity moved the Honshu island of Japan about 3.6 m to the east, shifted the earth’s axis by 25 cm, and accelerated the planet’s rotation by 1.8 microseconds (Chai 2011; CBS News 2011). A total of 400 km of Japan’s east coast has subsided about 0.6 m because of the quake (Chang 2011). Ojika-hantou of Miyagi-ken, located northwest of the epicenter, has moved about 5.3 m southeast towards the epicenter, with a simulta- neous subsidence of about 1.2 m. The World Meteorological Organization has warned the Japanese government of poten- tially more severe flood risk in the northeastern part of Japan in the future (Xinhuanet 2011).
Figure 2. Tsunami caused by the 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Source: NOAA 2011.
36 Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011
3.2 Humanitarian Impact
The influence exerted by the seismic event itself was not so striking. Only one prefecture was impacted with a seismic intensity of VII, and eight prefectures were impacted with a seismic intensity greater than VI (Figure 3). But the losses incurred by the earthquake and tsunami together were extremely severe. According to statistical data from the Japan National Police Agency (Table 1), by April 13, there were in total 13,392 people dead nationwide and 15,133 missing. More than 335,000 refugees in northeast Japan are lacking in food, water, shelters, medical care, and even the necessary means to conduct funerals for the deceased.i
3.3 Impact on Buildings
Up to April 3, there were 190,000 buildings damaged, among which 45,700 were totally destroyed. The damaged buildings in Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima were 29,500, 12,500, and 2400, respectively (NHK World 2011). By April 13, the number was further verified by the Japan Police Agency and increased (Table 1). About 250 million tons of rubble and debris were produced in Japan because of the earthquake and tsunami disaster.
3.4 Impact on Key Infrastructures
Several nuclear power plants and thermal power plants were heavily damaged in this disaster and details will be elaborated later in this article. The power supply of the Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO) was reduced by 21 GW, causing outages for 4.4 million families in eastern Japan (Japan Times 2011; The Nikkei 2011). From March 14 to March 29, TEPCO implemented rolling blackouts in most areas of Tokyo. Meanwhile, with the support of Tokyo residents’ power-saving activities and temporary supply from steel manufacturers’ power plants, rolling blackouts are expected to be avoided throughout this summer (Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2011).
The quake severely affected Japan’s transportation system. After the quake, all ports in Japan were closed for a short time, and the 15 ports impacted by the disaster were not fully reopened until March 29 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2011). Because of the quake, the northeastern part of the Tokaido Shinkansen high-speed rail line was shut down and not reopened to the public until March 24 (The Guardian 2011). Sixty-two of the 70 railway lines run by the East Japan Railway were affected to various degrees, and 23 railway stations and seven lines were completely destroyed (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2011). The Sendai airport incurred massive losses because it was attacked by the flood caused by the tsunami one hour after the quake. Both Tokyo’s Narita and Haneda airports were closed for about 24 hours (The Aviation Herald 2011).
3.5 Economic Impact
It is estimated that 23,600 hectares of farmland were ruined and 3–4 percent of the rice production in Japan was affected in this great earthquake and tsunami disaster (Martin 2011). Many large-scale manufacturers of automobiles (for example, Toyota, Nissan, and Honda), steel (for example, Nippon Steel), and chemicals (for example, Mitsubishi Kagagu) were off production (Mainichi Daily News 2011), causing a decline in global automobile production.
The Japan earthquake led to significant fluctuations in the global financial markets. On the day of the earthquake, March 11, the Nikkei Stock Average dropped 5 percent (Reuters 2011), and it dropped another 1000 points (10.6 percent) on March 15, when the seriousness of the nuclear accident became clear (CNBC 2011). Subject to the earthquake, Germany’s DAX index and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index also decreased in varying degrees. But the main American stocks experienced a slight increase of 0.5 to 0.7 percent. The world’s largest reinsurers, Munich Re and Swiss Re were speculated to suffer total reinsurance losses of 10 billion U.S. dollars (Kucera 2011) even after the losses absorbed by primary insurers and grants from the Japanese government.
The earthquake brought about the rapid appreciation of the Japanese yen, and the yen against the U.S. dollar at one point reached 76.25 yen to 1 U.S. dollar, the highest point since World War II (BBC 2011). Appreciation of the yen is harmful to the Japanese economy, which is heavily dependent on exports.
The Industrial Production Index dramatically decreased by 15.5 percent compared to the index in February (Table 2). Not
Figure 3. Estimated seismic intensity from observation stations right after 14:46 on 11 March 2011 Source: Japan Meteorological Agency 2011.
Seismic Epicenter
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Table 2. March 2011 Japan Industrial Production Index (100 in year 2005)
Item Seasonally Adjusted Index Original Index
Index Changes from February (%) Index Changes from February (%)
Production† 82.7 -15.5 88.7 -13.1 Shipping‡ 85.0 -14.6 95.0 -12.1
Source: Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2011 (Confirmed version reported on May 19). †: Weighted average of the amount of major items (521 items) produced by the industrial sector. Weight of each item is determined by the added value for each item with respect to the reference year (2005). ‡: Production items shipped from factories, a measurement for actual transaction of goods.
Table 1. Damage from the 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake and Tsunami (as of April 13)
People impacted Buildings damaged Damaged places on
roads
Bridges damaged Prefecture
Death toll
Missing Injured Full
damage Half
damage Washed
away Totally burnt
Half burnt
Hokkaido 1 3
Northeast Aomori 3 1 61 272 970 6 2 Iwate 3867 4101 154 18,742 1024 30 4 Miyagi 8190 8025 3055 36,772 3452 1006 23 Akita 12 9 Yamagata 2 29 37 80 21 Fukushima 1272 3003 240 2417 959
Tokyo 7 77 3 6 3 16 1
Kanto Ibaraki 23 1 691 711 3453 307 41 Tochigi 4 135 146 1142 257 Gunma 1 35 1 7 Saitama 42 5 1 1 160 Chiba 18 2 223 706 1636 3 3 321 Kanagava 4 128 Niigata 3 Yamanashi 2 Shizuoka 4
Central Gifu 1 Mie 1
Shikoku Tokushima Kochi 1
Total 13,392 15,133 4896 59,806 12,728 6 7 4 2137 69
Source: Japan National Police Agency 2011 (excerpt from original table).
only the damaged area, but also the non-damaged areas were suffering from scarcity of materials, and final demand decreases. Because many industries in the upper streams of the supply chains were located in Tohoku, the northeast region of Honshu, and the northeast areas of the Kanto region around greater Tokyo, their damages caused widely spreading economic impacts, which were unforeseen by many crisis managers.
According to an early evaluation by analysts, the earth- quake disaster caused direct economic losses of about 171– 183 billion USD, while the significant cost for recovery might reach 122 billion USD (Pagano 2011). On June 24, the Prime Minister’s office crisis management center announced a rough estimation of over 16 trillion yen for property damages alone (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2011). This estimation is based on the damage ratio of buildings of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. In the best case scenario (16
trillion yen), the total property damages are 14 trillion yen in three prefectures in the Tohoku region alone. This amounts to about 20 percent of the total economic value of property in these three areas.
4 The Nuclear Power Plant Crisis
The earthquake and tsunami created a serious nuclear crisis. Affected by the quake, the 11 nuclear power plants in north- east Japan, including the first and second nuclear power plants in Fukushima, and the nuclear power plants in Onagawa, Genshiryoku, and Hatsudensho, automatically stopped oper- ating their nuclear reactors. However, the cooling system of the first nuclear power plant in Fukushima also stopped work- ing because of the impact of the tsunami, causing the reactor temperature to rise. Although the Japanese government and
38 Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011
the operator Tokyo Electric Power Company adopted a series of measures, the nuclear accident gradually became a level 7 nuclear event, which is a major accident and the highest level on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), equivalent to the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986. The radiation in the vicinity of the reactor rose steeply, becoming a deadly threat to the local residents, as well as polluting vegetables, milk, and water. TEPCO also released tens of thousands of tons of low radiation nuclear pollution water into the Pacific, resulting in grave concern and criticism from neighboring countries.
The way that the nuclear incidents were triggered is plant- specific. However, the most catastrophic consequences have arisen from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, where three units were exposed to level 7 accidents and one unit was exposed to a level 3 incident. The critical issue in the crisis became the cooling systems failures.
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant mainly uses reactors to boil water, lets the steam drive steam engines, and returns the cooled water to the reactors to cool them down. In the system, water immerses the fuel rods and cycles in the system with radioactive isotopes. Under normal conditions this is not a problem because the process occurs in a closed cycle. None of the water, steam, and radioactive isotopes can escape from the closed vessel.
The earthquake and subsequent tsunami broke the closed cycle and delivered a deadly strike against the cooling system (Figure 4). The cooling system was designed to be supported with four different power supplies. The offsite power supply from the power grid and the internal power supply from the reactor were down because of the earthquake. The on-site fuel generator started working once the other two power sources failed, but was damaged by the tsunami wave. Emergency back-up batteries appeared to be affected by the tsunami as well, but could at most have lasted for eight hours even if they
had been spared from damage. As a result, the cooling system stopped working and this triggered the set of extremely severe consequences.
Due to the nature of the nuclear fuel used in the plant, the core temperature of the reactors dropped only very slowly after the cooling system was down because there was still slow decay even after the reactors had gone off-line. The high temperature turned most of the internal coolant water into steam, which in turn exposed the fuel rods to air. Without the provision of a cooling alternative, the high temperature would have melted down the nuclear fuel rods. Fuel would escape away from control rods, intensify decay, melt through the reactor floor, and consequently induce a massive release of radioactive isotopes, a worst case scenario.
In order to avoid the most catastrophic consequences, operators of the plant tried to inject coolant water from external sources (first seawater, later freshwater). The injecte d external coolant water, however, was then turned into steam and further increased the vessel pressure, which hampered water injection. As a result, operators had to bleed-off pres- sure, which resulted in hydrogen explosions and the release of radioactive isotopes from the vessel. Radioactive isotopes released from Fukushima were later detected in North America and other regions in the world. Coolant water that did not escape the vessel in the form of steam accumulated in the bottom of the reactors in highly radioactive form. These waters either leaked or were released by the operator into the Pacific Ocean. Widespread radioactive pollution was created. Worse yet, though countermeasures were adopted, the fuel rods in units 1, 2, and 3 of the plant were reported to have experienced major damage and possibly fully melted (TEPCO 2011a, 2011b; CNN 2011). The long-term impact of the nuclear crisis to Japan, the Asia-Pacific region, and the entire world is still not fully revealed.
Figure 4. Illustrative chart of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis
Norio et al. The 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster 39
5 National and International Response
5.1 Response of Japan
After the earthquake, a countermeasure office was immedi- ately set up in the Prime Minister’s office crisis management center. The Japanese government established a special head- quarters for emergent disasters headed by Prime Minister Naoto Kan. At the press conference on April 13, the Prime Minister declared that it was the most serious disaster in Japan after World War II. The other main response head- quarters, also lead by the Prime Minister, was set up for the nuclear crisis. These two headquarters became the main decision-making bodies on crisis management.
The Japanese government also established a government emergency response headquarters headed by Foreign Minister Matsumoto. He said that Tokyo welcomes foreign countries to provide any assistance to Japan, and Japanese government would check foreigners in Japan and confirm security situation of the embassies in Tokyo.
The Japanese government also established a countermea- sure headquarters against disasters headed by the Defense Minister, Toshimi Kitazawa. On April 13, the Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan asked the Ministry of Defense to send out 100,000 self-defense officers to participate in rescue work. The total number of troops mobilized, including those provid- ing logistics, was 180,000, the largest number dispatched by the Japan Self-Defense Forces since World War II.
On April 14, the Bank of Japan (the Central Bank) held a monetary policy meeting, discussing the new monetary easing policy to be implemented after the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster. On March 14, 15, 17, and 22, the Bank of Japan successively injected capital of up to 4 trillion yen in cash into the market (Wearden 2011).
5.2 International Involvement
After the quake, Japan specifically requested quake rescue teams from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (Nebehay 2011). It also requested satellite images of available types of the quake and tsunami regions according to the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters.
By March 30, 134 countries and regions and 39 interna- tional organizations had expressed their willingness to provide aid to Japan (Figure 5). Twenty-three countries and regions sent out rescue teams and experts on nuclear accidents. The statistical data released by the Narita branch of Tokyo Customs on March 29 showed that, in total, 190 batches and 1300 tons of relief goods from 29 countries and regions arrived at Narita Airport between March 12 and 25. Of these 190 batches, 60 were from China, 40 from the United States, 30 from Thailand, and 20 from Korea. The major types of goods included food, blankets, mineral water, radiation protection suits, and emergency lamps. By April 3 the Japanese Red Cross had received over one billion USD in donations in response to the disaster, and dispatched more than 200 emergency relief teams to the disaster zone.
The earthquake-tsunami induced nuclear crisis has been of grave concern. Many countries started to evacuate their citizens from the northern part of Japan right after the disaster. UN agencies were widely involved in the nuclear issue, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Avia- tion Organization (ICAO), the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). The WHO together with the Food and Agriculture Organiza- tion (FAO) conducts inspections and provides information on (sea)food safety after the nuclear accident. The IAEA Briefing on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident is updated on a daily basis since the quake (IAEA 2011). Tourists and other visitors to Japan are advised by the IMO, ICAO, UNWTO, and Japanese government agencies on travel and transport from and to Japan by air or sea.
Figure 5. Countries and regions expressed willingness to provide aid to Japan after the 2011 Earthquake disaster Source: Wikipedia 2011.
40 Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011
6 Comments and Discussion
6.1 Prepared for the Expected
After the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, the Japanese government and society profoundly reflected on the precau- tions that needed to be taken against earthquake disasters. Many new measures became the solid foundation for Japan to cope with this most recent earthquake-tsunami catastrophe to some degree.
For example, Japan attaches great importance to scientific research and technological development on disaster preven- tion and mitigation. The Japan Meteorological Agency oper- ates the world’s first earthquake early warning system, which can warn the Japanese people ahead of a quake. It also can detect seismic waves near the epicenter, and send out early warnings through national television and radio networks, even through mobile phones. On the day of the main quake, alarm was sounded around 80 seconds before the beginning of shaking in Tokyo area.
In Japan there are various ways for the public to get access to disaster information—by mass media and cell phone services, for example. The Japanese media have developed a rapid and systematic reporting system for disaster situations, and will promptly disclose all kinds of useful information whenever a natural disaster occurs. Japan also invests heavily in public disaster education, making one of the highest disas- ter risk aware populations in the world. With the help of disaster preparedness training carried out in communities, the Japanese people have developed the skills and habits of self-relief.
The Self-Defense Troops are granted much power by the government in response to disasters. This is a significant gain from the experience of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. In response to the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster, the Self-Defense Troops played an indispensible role in orga- nizing emergency response actions and accomplished many in-field missions. All of these preparations constituted a solid foundation for the Japanese to raise evacuation rates during the tsunami disaster and reduce the loss of lives.
Japan is also implementing one of the most stringent con- struction standards in the world, with intensively reinforced residential buildings, bridges, and other infrastructures. It is worth noting that Japan is a leader in earthquake proofing nuclear plants, although a severe nuclear crisis was induced by the earthquake-triggered tsunami. All nuclear reactors automatically stopped operating after the quake. The building damages and the nuclear plant crisis were induced by the tsunami rather than the quake per se.
6.2 Prepared Beyond the Expected: Where to Go from Here
The 2011 earthquake-tsunami was so severe that it went far beyond the expectation and coping capacity of Japanese society. The quake was of high magnitude and the energy
released was huge. The tsunami triggered by the earthquake critically overwhelmed the coping capacity of the stricken areas. Preparedness is based on expectation and prediction, which had not taken into account the extreme situation that actually unfolded. From that standpoint Japan is not prepared enough.
First, the disaster impact easily overwhelmed local coping capacity. Although local evacuation centers and public build- ings were available for the local people, there were cases in which many old people died because they were not able to evacuate quickly. In the field survey conducted by the authors, some concrete buildings stood after the tsunami disaster, which potentially could have become emergent evacuation shelters if they had been reinforced/upgraded. Although disaster evacuation drills were held regularly in many local communities, they were not helpful to all segments of the population because the evacuation centers were not easily accessible for many old people and it was dif- ficult for them to be really involved in these drills. Emergency evacuation plans and drills require further improvement.
Second, Japan is not prepared for a truly “mega” disaster. Experiences in other countries have shown that a large-scale disaster cannot be coped with solely by local capacities and aid from outside of the stricken region is indispensible. In this earthquake disaster, the damaged/affected areas were so extensive that clusters of local governments for cities and prefectures were paralyzed. Not only the public sectors, but also many private sectors were unable to provide adequate services during this disaster due to damaged infrastructures. These services include providing energy, food and water, and medical treatment. A typical example of these difficulties is the power frequency difference between East Japan and West Japan. In Kansai area the frequency of electricity is 60 Hz, while in Kanton area it is 50 Hz. Though there are two stations able to covert frequency, the capacity is limited to 1 GW, far below the drop due to power plant failure.
Third, Japan’s response system is not as efficient as it could be. A valuable lesson drawn from the Chinese experi- ence in dealing with the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 (Shi et al. 2009) is the significance of centralized power in coping with large-scale disasters. In this earthquake-tsunami disaster, the Japanese government appeared not as powerful as had been expected in resolving many issues, particularly with respect to the nuclear crisis. Coordination between the government (emergency response headquarters), the Tokyo Electric Power Company, and the nuclear and industrial safety agency were not sufficiently organized. Information was not simultaneously shared right after the disaster, which delayed efficient decision making.
Finally, Japan, as well as probably all nuclear countries in the world, is not truly prepared for nuclear crises. Although there were two types of back-up power supply available in the Fukushima nuclear power plant, they simply failed because they were as vulnerable as the major power supply systems. “Backup” did not make sense in this case. Obviously, a major tsunami was not in the plan of the designer and operator of the
Norio et al. The 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster 41
plant. This is a serious mistake because these plants are located exactly in the coastal and earthquake-prone region of the country.
6.3 Prepared for Unexpected Large-Scale Disasters
Several issues regarding the governance of large-scale disaster risk arise from the experience of the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster.
(1) The severity and unexpectedness of large-scale disas- ters require a global, synergic, and efficient response system. The response needs to mobilize all available resources, from public and private sectors, affected and unaffected areas, domestic and abroad. The response needs to highly coordi- nate all disaster response entities so that the synergic effect is achieved. The response must be founded on rational strategies with orderly and efficient arrangements based on the emergency plans. In this sense, centralized power in the face of large-scale disasters is indispensible.
(2) The regionalized and globalized impacts of large-scale disasters call for a new international platform to cope jointly. The recent experiences of catastrophes worldwide imply that the impact of a catastrophe is no longer confined to the affected areas but spreads around the world in the context of globalization. The mismanagement of the affected countries will bring about serious consequences for the surrounding countries or even the whole world.
The radioactive contamination caused by the nuclear accident following the earthquake and tsunami is affecting the rest of the world through atmospheric circulation. The polluted water released by the Tokyo Electric Power Company is likely to affect the entire Pacific Ocean in the coming decades. In the long term, impacts of radiation should be carefully monitored and assessed based on data derived from previous nuclear accidents and state-of-the-art medical knowledge. International frameworks are required to do so.
The Japanese economic instability caused by the quake affects the yen and Japan’s domestic economy, which draws attention from the G7 (Group of Seven) that is already plan- ning to intervene against the yen when necessary. Moreover, the existing international framework of humanitarian aid cannot meet the demand of coping with large-scale disasters. A mutual assistance system that incorporates a higher degree of international involvement in coping with large-scale disasters should be established.
(3) The complexity of the catastrophic impact urges us to conduct further studies on multi-hazard and disaster-chain issues. Due to the super-energy released in the catastrophe, many regional physical-geographical factors are likely to cross critical thresholds of balance and create secondary hazards, which will transmit and enlarge the disaster in the form of disaster chains to an extent beyond regional endur- ance. In the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China, for exam- ple, the quake generated a huge amount of loose soil and rocks, inducing landslides and debris flow. In the Eastern
Japan Great Earthquake Disaster, what mattered most was not the quake but the tsunami as well as the nuclear crisis that it triggered. The chained-triggering phenomenon is similar to other catastrophes in recent years. It is also a critical reason that large-scale disasters generally claimed huge losses. Therefore, it is necessary to study the formation mechanism of disaster chains and issue region-specific precautions against potential disaster chains.
(4) Key infrastructures require more robust systems planning and design. Here key infrastructures refer to those that can largely facilitate disaster relief efforts, for example, life-line projects and transportation hubs, or those that create serious threats, such as nuclear power plants and major water dams. Failure of a key infrastructure would lead to the failure of an entire system. In most cases problems only need to occur in one or several small but critical components. The power supply for the cooling system is only a subsystem of the Fukushima power plant, but its failure collapsed the entire system and was fatal. Event tree analysis, network analysis, and systems engineering will be necessary for understanding this issue.
Note
i NHK, March 17, 04:01 am. Evacuees by prefecture: Miyagi- 205,418, Fukushima- 64,040, Iwate- 44,433, Yamagata- 2217, Aomori- 371, Akita- 40, Ibaraki- 12,347, Chiba- 1010, Tochigi- 1696, Gunma- 63, Saitama- 107, Niigata- 3200, Nagano- 1579.
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nancially strapped and concerned about the cost of reform and its ability to meet their population’s needs.
Maine, Florida, Iowa, and other states have already indicated that they will seek waivers for some insurance rules that could desta- bilize local insurance markets. A recent proposal by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Scott Brown (R-MA) would grant states addi- tional f lexibility but falls short of giving them full authority to develop their own reform ap- proaches. Since reform cannot be implemented without them, states could choose to take a more in- dependent role even if Washing- ton is slow to give it to them.
Will the President’s health care reform look burdensome and un- workable 2 years from now? Re- form is no longer a 2000-page bill sitting on the desk of a sen- ator or representative. The exec- utive branch has been issuing guidance and regulations that are beginning to fill holes in the
legislation and will change the way the law works in practice. Much to the chagrin of the leg- islation’s most ardent support- ers, Secretary of Health and Hu- man Services Kathleen Sebelius has been granting waivers when the rules don’t work for every- one, albeit on a selective basis designed to avoid the worst po- litical heat.3 Although such de- cisions will soften the impact of reform, they neither alter the shift toward greater government control nor slow the growth of health care spending.
Despite the talk of repeal, Congress will not pass any major health legislation over the next 2 years, and the health sector and private employers will be hard at work preparing for 2014, when many ACA provisions take ef- fect. That does not make health care reform a fait accompli. Ab- sent a miracle, the country will still face crushing budget defi- cits when the next president takes office. A Republican president,
backed by a Republican Congress, would be wise to delay enroll- ment in the health insurance ex- changes, using the time and mon- ey to develop a more targeted plan that closes off open-ended sub- sidies for health insurance and gets the economic incentives right. A Democratic president would do the same thing out of neces- sity — but it would take longer.
Disclosure forms provided by the author are available with the full text of this arti- cle at NEJM.org.
From the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1012299) was published on December 8, 2010, at NEJM.org.
1. Streeter S. Continuing resolutions: FY2008 action and brief overview of recent practices. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008. (CRS report RL30343.) (http:// www.rules.house.gov/archives/RL30343.pdf.) 2. Idem. The congressional appropriations process: an introduction. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. (CRS report 97-684.) (http://www.senate.gov/ reference/resources/pdf/97-684.pdf.) 3. Adamy J. Federal agency flexible on Mc- Donald’s plan. Wall Street Journal. October 1, 2010. Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Reforming Health Care Reform in the 112th Congress
Responding to Cholera in Post-Earthquake Haiti David A. Walton, M.D., M.P.H., and Louise C. Ivers, M.D., M.P.H.
Related article, p. 33
The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, decimated the already fragile country, leaving an estimated 250,000 people dead, 300,000 injured, and more than 1.3 mil- lion homeless. As camps for in- ternally displaced people sprang up throughout the ruined capital of Port-au-Prince, medical and humanitarian experts warned of the likelihood of epidemic disease outbreaks. Some organizations responding to the disaster mea- sured their success by the ab- sence of such outbreaks, though
living conditions for the dis- placed have remained dangerous and inhumane. In August 2010, the U.S. Centers for Disease Con- trol and Prevention (CDC) an- nounced that a National Surveil- lance System that was set up after the earthquake had confirmed the conspicuous absence of high- ly transmissible disease in Haiti.
However, on October 20, more than 55 miles from the nearest displaced-persons camp, 60 cases of acute, watery diarrhea were recorded at L’Hôpital de Saint Nicolas, a public hospital in the
coastal city of Saint Marc, where Partners in Health has worked since 2008. Stool samples were sent to the national laboratory in Port-au-Prince for testing. The hospital alerted Ministry of Health representatives in the region and in the capital, as well as World Health Organization representa- tives managing the Health Clus- ter, a coordinating group formed after the earthquake. In the next 48 hours, L’Hôpital de Saint Nico- las received more than 1500 ad- ditional patients with acute di- arrhea.
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By October 21, preliminary re- sults from the national laborato- ry confirmed our clinical impres- sions: though cholera had not been seen in Haiti in at least a century and may never have been recorded in laboratory-confirmed cases, it had somewhat unexpect- edly emerged in a densely popu- lated zone with little sanitary in- frastructure and limited access to potable water. As the contours of the epidemic began to take shape, following the winding course of a large river in the Artibonite re- gion, hospitals in central Haiti started recording rapidly increas- ing numbers of cases of acute diarrhea. Between October 20 and November 9, Partners in Health recorded 7159 cases of severe cholera. Among these patients, 161 died in seven of its hospitals in the Central and Artibonite re- gions.
In Port-au-Prince, sporadic cases were reported in the early phase of the outbreak; most were deemed “imported cases.” On No- vember 8, 48 hours after Hurri- cane Tomas caused flooding and worsening of living conditions in Parc Jean-Marie Vincent, one of the largest settlement camps, Partners in Health reported seven clinical cases of cholera within the camp. On the same day, Doc- tors without Borders reported see- ing as many as 200 patients with cholera in nearby slums. By No- vember 9, the Ministry of Health had reported 11,125 hospitalized patients and 724 confirmed deaths from cholera.
Although we responded as quickly as we could, we were ham- pered by the rapidity with which the epidemic spread, overwhelm- ing our hospitals with hundreds of patients and stretching already thin resources, staff, and mate- rials. Because there was minimal
practical institutional knowledge about cholera in Haiti, we worked with other nongovernmental or- ganizations to design treatment protocols and institute infection- control measures in affected hos- pitals. Our network of community health workers began distributing oral rehydration salts, water-puri- fication systems, and water filters and instructing people about hy- giene, hand washing, and decon- tamination of cadavers. Body bags were distributed to community leaders, and rehydration posts were set up throughout the coun- tryside. A network of cholera treatment centers and stabiliza- tion centers was established in coordination with the Ministry of Health.
The cholera outbreak took most people by surprise. Unexpectedly, it was centered in rural Haiti and not in the displaced-person camps that are situated mainly in the greater Port-au-Prince area. But history would suggest that an epidemic outbreak of waterborne disease was just waiting to strike rural Haiti. It is well known that Haiti has the worst water secu- rity in the hemisphere. In 2002, it ranked 147th out of 147 coun- tries surveyed in the Water Pov- erty Index.1 After the earthquake, more than 182,000 people moved from the capital to seek refuge with friends or family in the Artibonite and Central regions, increasing stress on small, over- crowded homes and communi- ties that lacked access to latrines and clean water. In addition, in many areas of Haiti, the costs associated with procuring water from private companies and the lack of adequate distribution sys- tems have rendered potable wa- ter even less accessible for those most at risk.
Waterborne pathogens and fe-
cal–oral transmission are favored by the lack of sanitation in Haiti. Typhoid, intestinal parasitosis, and bacterial dysentery are common. Only 27% of the country bene- fits from basic sewerage, and 70% of Haitian households have either rudimentary toilets or none at all.2 But the sudden ap- pearance of cholera, a pathogen with no known nonhuman host, raises the question of how it was introduced to an island that has long been spared this dis- ease. Speculations on this ques- tion have caused social and po- litical friction within Haiti in recent weeks. Early in the epi- demic, the CDC identified the cholera strain Vibrio cholerae O1, serotype Ogawa, biotype El Tor. Chin and colleagues (pages 33– 42) report on DNA sequencing of two isolates from the recent outbreak, which showed that the cholera strain responsible for the Haitian epidemic originated in South Asia and was most likely introduced to Haiti by human activity. The implications of the appearance of this strain are worrisome: as compared with many cholera strains, it is asso- ciated with increased virulence, enhanced ability to survive in the environment and in a human host, and increased antibiotic resistance. These factors have substantial epidemiologic ramifi- cations for the entire region and implications for optimal public health approaches to arresting the epidemic’s spread.
As the infection makes its way to the capital city, there is de- bate about the likely attack rate inside displaced-person camps, as compared with the rate in sur- rounding communities. The latter often have worse access to water and sanitation than the former. But 521 of 1356 displaced-person
Responding to Cholera in Post-Earthquake Haiti
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5
camps listed by the United Na- tions camp-management cluster reportedly have no water or sani- tation agency, and most are far from reaching the established guidelines for sanitation in hu- manitarian emergencies.3 The liv- ing conditions of most of Haiti’s poor, whether they’re living in camps or communities, are equal- ly miserable in terms of the risk of diarrheal disease.
The reported numbers of cases and deaths, though shocking, rep- resent only a fraction of the epi- demic’s true toll. We have seen scores of patients die at the gates of the hospital or within minutes after admission. Through our net- work of community health work- ers, we have learned of hundreds of patients who died at home or en route to the hospital. In the first 48 hours, the case fatality rate at our facilities was as high as 10%. Though it dropped to less than 2% in the ensuing days as the health system was rein- forced locally and patients be- gan to present earlier in the
course of disease, mortality will most likely climb as the disease spreads and Haiti’s fragile health system falters.
This most recent crisis in Haiti has reinforced certain lessons regarding the provision of ser- vices to the poor. Complemen- tary prevention and care should be the primary focus of the re- lief effort. Vaccination must be considered as an adjunct for con- trolling the epidemic, and anti- biotics should be used in the treatment of all hospitalized pa- tients. These endeavors should proceed in concert with much- needed improvements to sanita- tion and accessibility of potable water. More generally, reliable partnerships are essential, espe- cially if local partners are depend- able and have practical experi- ence and complementary assets. Long-term reinforcement of the public-sector health system is a wise investment, permitting pro- vision of a basic minimum set of services that can be built upon in times of crisis. And community
health workers who can be rap- idly mobilized as educators, dis- tributors of supplies, and first responders are a reliable back- bone of health care. In Haiti, such workers can bring the time- sensitive lifesaving therapy of oral rehydration right to the pa- tient’s door.
Disclosure forms provided by the au- thors are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School; the Division of Global Health Equity, Brigham and Women’s Hospital; and Part- ners in Health — all in Boston.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1012997) was published on December 9, 2010, at NEJM .org.
1. Sullivan CA, Meigh JR, Giacomello AM. The Water Poverty Index: development and application at the community scale. Nat Re- sour Forum 2003;27:189-99. 2. Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population, Haiti. Enquête mortalité, mor- bidité et utilisation des services (EMMUS- IV): Haiti, 2005-2006. (http://new.paho.org/ hai/index.php?option=com_docman&task= doc_download&gid=25&Itemid=.) 3. 101112 WASH Cluster situation report. November 12, 2010. (http://haiti.humanitarian response.info/Default.aspx?tabid=83.) Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Responding to Cholera in Post-Earthquake Haiti
Antibiotics for Both Moderate and Severe Cholera Eric J. Nelson, M.D., Ph.D., Danielle S. Nelson, M.D., M.P.H., Mohammed A. Salam, M.B., B.S., and David A. Sack, M.D.
Related article, p. 33
The 2010 Haitian cholera out-break has pressed local and international experts into rapid action against a disease that is new to many health care provid- ers in Haiti. The World Health Organization (WHO) has time- tested management protocols for emerging cholera outbreaks. These protocols have been used by the Haitian government to fight an epidemic that is merely one of several recent tragedies in Haiti. The use of these protocols has
allowed for a high standard of care in this complex and evolv- ing medical landscape. But where- as the current WHO cholera- treatment protocol (www.who.int/ mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/ index.html) recommends anti- biotics for only severe cases, the approach of the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Re- search, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B), recommends antibiotics for both severe and moderate cases.
Several antibiotics are effec-
tive in the treatment of cholera, including doxycycline, ciprof lox- acin, and azithromycin, assuming that the cholera strain is sensi- tive. Currently, the epidemic strain in Haiti is susceptible to tetracy- cline (a proxy for doxycycline) and azithromycin but is resistant to nalidixic acid, sulfisoxazole, and trimethoprim–sulfamethoxazole. The WHO advocates giving anti- biotics to patients with cholera only when their illness is judged to be “severe.” This recommen-
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Overview of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake
Reginald DesRoches,a) M.EERI, Mary Comerio,b) M.EERI, Marc Eberhard,c) M.EERI, Walter Mooney,d) M.EERI, and Glenn J. Rix,a) M.EERI
The 12 January 2010 Mw 7.0 earthquake in the Republic of Haiti caused an estimated 300,000 deaths, displaced more than a million people, and damaged nearly half of all structures in the epicentral area. We provide an overview of the historical, seismological, geotechnical, structural, lifeline-related, and socioeco- nomic factors that contributed to the catastrophe. We also describe some of the many challenges that must be overcome to enable Haiti to recover from this event. Detailed analyses of these issues are presented in other papers in this volume. [DOI: 10.1193/1.3630129]
INTRODUCTION
On 12 January 2010, at 4:53 p.m. local time, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the Republic of Haiti, with an epicenter located approximately 25 km south and west of the cap- ital city of Port-au-Prince. Near the epicenter of the earthquake, in the city of Léogâne, it is estimated that 80%–90% of the buildings were critically damaged or destroyed. The metro- politan Port-au-Prince region, which includes the cities of Carrefour, Pétion-Ville, Delmas, Tabarre, Cite Soleil, and Kenscoff, was also severely affected. According to the Govern- ment of Haiti, the earthquake left more than 316,000 dead or missing, 300,0001 injured, and over 1.3 million homeless (GOH 2010). According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) the earthquake was the most destructive event any country has experienced in modern times when measured in terms of the number of people killed as a percentage of the country’s population (Cavallo et al. 2010).
The Republic of Haiti occupies the western third (27,750 km2) of the island of Hispa- niola, located in the northeast Caribbean between Puerto Rico to the east and Jamaica and Cuba to the west (Figure 1), and had a population of approximately 9.6 million prior to the earthquake. The metropolitan area surrounding its largest city, Port-au-Prince, has an esti- mated population of 3 million. Haiti has been impacted by other natural disasters in recent years. In 2008, more than 800 people were killed by a series of four hurricanes and tropical storms that struck Haiti during a two-month period.
a) Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 790 Atlantic Dr., Atlanta GA 30332-0355
b) University of California Berkeley, Department of Architecture, 232 Wurster Hall, Berkeley, CA 74720-1800 c) University of Washington, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 233 More Hall, Seattle, WA 98195-2700
d) Earthquake Science Center, US Geological Survey, MS977, 345 Middlefield Rd., Menlo Park, CA 94025 1The number of casualties is a highly debated issue, with estimates ranging from 70,000 to 316,000. At the time of this publication, the official number from the Government of Haiti is 316,000.
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Earthquake Spectra, Volume 27, No. S1, pages S1–S21, October 2011; VC 2011, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute
The damage to the infrastructure from the earthquake in Haiti was staggering. More than 300,000 homes collapsed or were critically damaged. It is estimated that 60% of the nation’s administrative and economic infrastructure was lost, and 80% of the schools and more than 50% of the hospitals were destroyed or damaged (GOH 2010). More than 180 government buildings and 13 out of 15 key government offices collapsed, including the presidential palace and parliament. The partial destruction of the main port of Port-au-Prince and blockage of roads from debris hampered the response and recovery for many months af- ter the earthquake. Even nine months after the earthquake, the destruction continued to dis- rupt the lives of many Haitians. The Interim Haitian Reconstruction Commission estimated that as of 12 October, 1.3 million people were still displaced—either in one of the more than 1,300 camps and other settlements registered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or in temporary housing situations in both the quake-affected zone and in non-affected regions (IHRC 2010).
Overall losses and damages from the earthquake are estimated to be between US$7 bil- lion and US$14 billion (approximately 100%–200% of Haiti’s gross domestic product), making this the most costly earthquake event in terms of the percentage of a country’s gross domestic product (Cavallo et al. 2010).
PRE-EARTHQUAKE HAITI: SETTING THE CONTEXT
It is difficult to quantify the impact of pre-earthquake conditions on the devastation resulting from the earthquake in Haiti. However, there is no doubt that the dire socioeco- nomic conditions that existed prior to the earthquake were a major contributor to the
Figure 1. Geographic and tectonic setting of the island of Hispaniola, of which Haiti occupies the western third. The 2010 earthquake occurred on or near the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault zone and was preceded by earthquakes in southern Haiti in 1751 (two events, in October and November), 1770, and 1860. The location of the main shock of 12 January 2010 and aftershocks are shown in Figure 2.
DESROCHES ET AL.S2
resulting damage. Following a slave rebellion in 1804, Haiti became the first free black nation in the world. It was subsequently forced to pay France a massive indemnity for prop- erties lost in that rebellion, and was ostracized socially and economically by countries all around the world. Haiti subsequently became entrapped in a cycle of poverty and misgov- ernment from which it has never emerged (Heinl 1996).
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, ranking 145 out of 169 on the UN Human Development Index (UNDP 2010). Less than 10% of the population has access to potable tap water and less than one-third has access to electricity, even intermittently (UNSD 2010), which are the lowest respective percentages in the Western Hemisphere. More than half of Haiti’s population lives on less than US$1 per day, and more than three- quarters live on less than US$2 per day. Haiti has the highest rate of mortality among infants, children under 5, and during maternity of any country in the Western Hemisphere (UNSD 2010). Haiti’s exports are small: 10% of the gross domestic product. Haiti’s poor economic performance is, in part, the result of the decline of its agricultural sector, which in turn is due in large part to the degradation of the environment. Haiti ranks 155 out of 163 countries when it comes to general environmental degradation. For years, Haitians have cut down trees to use as cooking fuel, resulting in less than 3% of Haiti being covered by forest, a stark contrast to the lush forests of its neighbor, the Dominican Republic. The environ- mental degradation only increases Haiti’s vulnerability to natural hazards.
In addition to its poor socioeconomic standing, Haiti’s limited recent history of large earthquakes (Figure 1) left it unprepared for the 12 January 2010, earthquake. Haiti had few seismologists and no seismic network in the country. It only had one seismic hazard map, which was outdated and lacked sufficient detail to be useful. The best geological map dated to 1987 (Lambert et al. 1987). The building code was outdated, rarely used, and not enforced (CUBiC 1985). There was no earthquake preparedness program and no contin- gency plan for earthquakes. The typical university curriculum did not include seismic design, seismology, or the geosciences.
SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS
GEOLOGY AND TECTONICS
The geologic evolution of Hispaniola can be traced to the Mesozoic breakup of Pangea and the creation of the Atlantic Ocean. This process resulted in the formation of the Carib- bean microplate, with subduction zones forming around the margins (Garcia-Casco et al. 2008). The geology of Hispaniola, including Haiti, consists of igneous rocks formed within a volcanic island arc, as well as abundant marine sedimentary rocks that have accreted at the oceanic subduction margin (Woodring et al. 1924, Maurrasse 1982).
The 12 January 2010 earthquake occurred on or near the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden Fault, a prominent strike-slip fault that is clearly evident in high-resolution relief maps of the Southern Peninsula of Haiti. Field studies confirmed that the mapped Enriquillo-Plantain Garden Fault in the epicentral region separates basaltic rocks south of the fault from marine sedimentary rocks (chalk, sandstone, and limestone) to the north. Thus, the fault can be eas- ily discerned by its morphology and geology. However, detailed field and geophysical stud- ies indicate that the fault rupture was a complex event that involved slip on more than just
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S3
the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden Fault (Nettles and Hjörleifsdóttir 2010, Prentice et al. 2010, Calais et al. 2010, Hayes et al. 2010).
SEISMICITY
For several decades prior to the 12 January 2010 earthquake, seismic activity within the island of Hispaniola had been heavily concentrated in the eastern two-thirds of the island in the Dominican Republic, and Haiti had been relatively seismically quiescent. Indeed, since the establishment of a modern global seismic network in 1964, the Port-au-Prince region of southern Haiti has experienced only one earthquake of magnitude greater than 4.0, with sev- eral additional events occurring 100 km to the west. However, studies of historical seismic- ity have established that large (magnitude 7.0 or greater) earthquakes have struck the Port- au-Prince region in the historic past. These earthquakes are all attributed to movement on the east–west oriented Enriquillo Fault (Figure 2). The largest earthquakes occurred in 1751 (two events), 1770, and 1860 (O’Loughlin and Lander 2003). One of the two earthquakes of 1751 occurred near the longitude of Port-au-Prince and destroyed buildings throughout the city (modified Mercalli intensity [MMI] of X). The 1770 earthquake occurred an
Figure 2. Topographic map of the Southern Peninsula of Haiti: (a) Port-au-Prince, (b) Léogâne, and (c) Port Royal. The east–west oriented Enriquillo Fault (red line) passes the main shock epi- center (single larger focal mechanism SE of Léogâne). The Enriquillo Fault is a left-lateral fault that accommodates 7þ=�2 mm=yr of strain (Manaker et al. 2008). Aftershocks (yellow circles) are concentrated to the west of the main shock, and their focal mechanisms (orange) indicate reverse faulting. Panels centered on Léogâne indicate the extent and magnitude of fault slip on three rupture planes (Figure 3).
DESROCHES ET AL.S4
estimated 30–50 km further to the west on the Enriquillo Fault, and once again resulted in the widespread destruction of buildings in Port-au-Prince and Léogâne (O’Loughlin and Lander 2003). The 1860 earthquake was located still further to the west of Port-au-Prince and was observed to cause uplift of the sea floor. This uplift is significant because it indi- cates that crustal strain accommodation and release is partitioned between pure strike-slip and reverse-faulting structures (Nettles and Hjörleifsdóttir 2010, Hayes et al. 2010, Calais et al. 2010).
THE MAIN SHOCK AND AFTERSHOCKS
The 12 January 2010 event occurred at 04:53:10 p.m. local time. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) located the epicenter at 18.44� N, 72.57� W, which placed the event 25 km WSW of Port-au-Prince, on or near the Enriquillo Fault. The estimated depth was 13 km, but the lack of local seismic data made the precise depth uncertain. The USGS assigned a horizontal uncertainty of þ=� 3.4 km. The first-motion focal mechanism (ref) for the main shock indicated left-lateral oblique-slip on an east–west oriented fault. However, there was clear evidence of coastal uplift north of the Enriquillo Fault (Hayes et al. 2010) as well as vertical ground deformation imaged by interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) data. These observations require significant slip on a nearby reverse fault (Figure 2). The fi- nite fault model by Hayes et al. (2010) showed slip on three fault planes and satisfies seis- mologic, geodetic, and geological observations. This model showed a maximum slip of 3.5 m on the reverse fault (Figure 3). The earthquake source zone (i.e., the surface area of the fault that slipped) was quite compact, with a down-dip dimension of approximately 15 km and an along-strike dimension of close to 40 km. This source dimension is about two-thirds the size of a typical Mw 7.0 earthquake. The earthquake rupture was very abrupt and sharp; maximum moment release occurred in the first 4–8 seconds of the fault slip, and 80% of the moment release occurred in 12–14 seconds (Hayes et al. 2010).
The main shock was followed within 20 minutes by two large aftershocks with moment magnitudes of 6.0 and 5.7, respectively. Eight days after the main shock, on 20 January 2010, a Mw 5.9 aftershock occurred. Overall, the early aftershock sequence from this earth- quake was three times more productive than a typical aftershock sequence in California.
SEISMOLOGICAL AND GEODETIC FIELD ACTIVITIES DURING 2010
The first accelerometer to measure aftershocks was installed on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince on the evening of 27 January 2010 (Eberhard et al. 2010). In March 2010, additional temporary seismographs were deployed by the USGS and French and Canadian research groups and these data were being interpreted at the time of this writ- ing. GPS and InSar data have been collected (Calais et al. 2010, and references therein), and Coulomb stress changes imparted by the 12 January 2010 event have been calculated (Lin et al. 2010). These data and additional analytical models will be used to guide the next generation of seismic hazard maps (Frankel et al. 2010).
GEOTECHNICAL
The earthquake-affected region is a physiographically diverse area with a complex geo- logic history. The topography within the study area is relatively rugged, with steep mountain
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S5
ranges and hillfronts, deeply incised streams and narrow intermountain stream valleys, and broad coastal delta fans and valleys. Quaternary deposits in the epicentral zone include Holo- cene to late Pleistocene fluvial alluvium (channel, terrace, floodplain overbank deposits) de- posited in the Port-au-Prince valley and interior incised river valleys, alluvial fan and collu- vial wedge deposits along the margins of larger valleys, coastal delta fan complexes where larger streams discharge into the sea along the coast, localized organic sediments within marshes and swamps, and beach sands along protected portions of the coast. Port-au-Prince spans a broad region from the relatively level floor of a large alluvial valley underlain by Holocene to Pleistocene deposits, southward to low hills underlain by Mio-Pliocene deposits. Léogâne and Carrefour are located on large delta fans and are underlain by Holocene to Pleistocene alluvium. Coastal areas adjacent to Port-au-Prince are mostly composed of artifi- cial fill placed during westward expansions of the city during the past 200 years. Post-earth- quake reconnaissance visits to Haiti have provided opportunities to acquire detailed informa- tion on geologic and geotechnical conditions throughout the affected area (Cox et al. 2011, Green et al. 2011, Rathje et al. 2011, Hough et al. 2011, Lekkas and Carydis 2011).
Figure 3. Geometry of fault ruptures for the January 2010 Haiti earthquake. Fault plane A (red outline) contains the earthquake hypocenter (locus of slip initiation; red star) and is a steeply- dipping (70�) left-lateral strike-slip fault. Fault plane B (blue outline, top) is a blind thrust fault (55� dip), shows the largest slip displacement (up to ca. 350 cm) and is responsible for approx. 80% of the seismic moment released during the earthquake. Fault plane C (black outline, bot- tom) is a reverse fault with a modest amount (ca. 100–200 cm) of slip (from Hayes et al. 2010).
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The observed structural damage from the earthquake correlates well with these geologic conditions. Ground-motion amplification was a primary factor in alluvial soils in the north- central and coastal region of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, and Léogâne. Hough et al. (2010) used weak-motion data from aftershock recordings at seismograph stations deployed fol- lowing the earthquake to determine that the mean amplification ratio of peak ground accel- eration (PGA) for stations on alluvium was 1.78 þ=� 0.58 compared to a reference station on hard rock. Rathje et al. (2011) documented that the largest concentrations of damage occurred in areas underlain by Holocene alluvium with average shear wave velocities in the upper 30 m (VS30) of approximately 350 m=s, which corresponds to National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) Site Class D.
Large concentrated zones of damage also occurred in the southern portion of Port-au- Prince that extends into the hills underlain by Mio-Pliocene, weakly cemented deposits. In these areas, both topographic amplification and site effects contributed to higher levels of shaking. Hough et al. (2010) compared weak-motion recordings at sites located in the foot- hills of Port-au-Prince with a hard-rock reference station and found that the PGA was ampli- fied by a factor of 2.94 þ=� 1.06; amplification ratios as high as 5 were calculated for fre- quencies of several Hertz. Rathje et al. (2011) and Hough et al. (2011) have used digital elevation models to correlate observed damage patters with topographic features in the area.
Artificial fill in the port areas of Port-au-Prince and Carrefour experienced extensive liquefaction, lateral spreading, and settlement damage. At the Port de Port-au-Prince, lique- faction-induced lateral spreading (Figure 4) resulted in the collapse of the pile-supported North Wharf, damage to two steel-frame warehouses, and other port facilities (Green et al. 2011, Werner et al. 2011). Geotechnical site investigations performed after the earthquake includes soil borings with standard penetration tests (SPT), dynamic cone penetration tests (DCPT), and surface wave (MASW and SASW) tests (Green et al. 2011). Grain size analy- ses indicated that the coarse-grained soils were well-graded mixtures of sands and gravels
Figure 4. Liquefaction-induced lateral spreading leading to the collapse of the North Wharf at the Port de Port-au-Prince.
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S7
with median grain sizes ranging from 0.2 mm to 10 mm. The calcium carbonate (CaCO3) content of the materials was 80%–90% and is attributed to the marine origin of the fill mate- rials. Level-ground liquefaction analyses performed using the SPT and DCPT data indicated that the liquefaction potential of the soils is very high, which is consistent with the extent and severity of liquefaction-induced ground failures at the port. Green et al. (2011) also compare observed values of permanent deformation with estimates obtained from various empirical methods and found that the observed values generally exceed the estimated val- ues. Ground-motion amplification in the soft fill soils was likely a contributing factor to the partial collapse of and extensive damage to the remaining portion of the South Pier at the Port de Port-au-Prince (Werner et al. 2011).
Many of the road failures observed along the coast west of Carrefour occurred where the road crosses marshy ground and the distal ends of small alluvial valleys. Settlement and localized creep=slumping of sediments underlying the roadbed appear to be responsible for many of the road failures, rather than lateral spread failure, because cracking typically was confined to the roadbeds and fill and did not extend through natural soils shoreward of the roadways. Localized liquefaction of loose, saturated sediments in these areas may have con- tributed to the road failures, but was not the major factor.
Numerous landslides and rockfalls occurred within the Mio-Pliocene and older lime- stone bedrock in steep slopes and roadcuts within the epicentral zone. In some cases these failures appear to have been restricted to colluvial soil and fractured=dilated rock within a weathered zone that extends about 1–3 m deep into the slopes. However, some deeper- seated slumps and debris avalanche/slide failures occurred in less-weathered, deeper bed- rock in steep mountainous slopes. These failures appear in part to be influenced or con- trolled by bedrock joints or weak zones. In places, developments on steep slopes appear to have been impacted by slope raveling or foundation sliding=slumping. Additional analyses of landslides in the epicentral zone are described in Liu et al. (2011).
PERFORMANCE OF BUILDINGS
The earthquake caused extensive damage to buildings throughout the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, and in the rural areas and towns to the west and south of the city. Nearly all of the severe damage and collapses appeared to occur in buildings that were constructed without considering the effects of earthquakes. The majority of buildings that were designed for earthquakes and that were well constructed did not collapse in the earthquake.
BUILDING INVENTORY
A nationwide census conducted in 2003 documented many characteristics of Haitian so- ciety, including the frequency of common building types, as well as the materials used to construct the walls, roofs, and floors. The percentage of each type of building is reported for urban and rural areas in Table 1, which was compiled with data from the Haitian Ministry of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI). Within urban areas, 78% of the buildings were classi- fied as one-story houses and another 14% were classified as multistory houses or apartments (IHSI 2010). The remaining 8% of the buildings consisted of slum housing or traditional forms of construction (two common types are kay atè, buildings with a combined roof and walls, and ajoupas, rural homes with thatch, straw, or palm leaf roofs). Within rural areas,
DESROCHES ET AL.S8
ordinary one-story houses were again most common (69%), multistory structures were rare (<1 percent), and ajoupas made up 25% of the building inventory.
The wall materials for each building type in urban areas are summarized in Table 2, which was also developed from the IHSI data. In urban areas, concrete block walls predo- minated (79%), particularly in multistory houses and apartments (97%). In rural areas, the most common wall material was earth (33%), followed by concrete block (22%), and clis- sage (19%), consisting of intertwined sticks, twigs, and branches. Considering all building types and regions, approximately two-thirds (69%) of the structures had metal roofs, but for multistory houses and apartments, 89% had roofs made of concrete (IHSI 2010).
Typical reinforced concrete frame buildings with concrete block infill had numerous vulnerabilities known to cause seismic damage. Figure 5 shows a typical low-rise reinforced concrete frame building with infill concrete block walls that was under construction at the time of the earthquake. Columns were slender with depths in the range of 200 mm to 250 mm. Such columns were often reinforced with 4 #4 bars, sometimes deformed and some- times smooth. Column and joint transverse reinforcement was minimal (e.g., #2 smooth ties) and spaced at a distance roughly equal to the column depth. Concrete and mortar
Table 1. Distribution of building types in urban and rural areas (IHSI 2010)
Location
Type of Building Urban Areas (%) Rural Areas (%) Combined (%)
Kay atè (combined roof and walls) 0.5 1.9 1.4
Taudis (slum housing) 3.2 2.5 2.8
Ajoupas (rural home with roof made of thatch, straw, or palm leaves)
3.7 25.3 17.6
One-Story House 78.3 69.2 72.5
Multistory House=Apartment 13.7 0.8 5.4
Others 0.6 0.3 0.4
Table 2. Distribution of wall materials for each building type in urban areas (IHSI 2010)
Wall Material
Type of Building Concrete
Block (%) Earth (%)
Wood/ Planks (%)
Clissage (%)
Other (%)
Kay atè (combined roof and walls) 0.0 91.3 0.0 7.6 1.1
Taudis (slum housing) 11.3 8.3 15.3 8.5 56.6
Ajoupas (rural home with roof made of thatch, straw, or palm leaves)
0.0 54.6 9.6 28.2 7.6
One-Story House 82.4 3.8 2.9 3.0 8.0
Multistory House=Apartment 97.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.9
Others 67.0 0.4 6.2 0.7 25.7
All 78.7 5.7 3.2 3.7 8.8
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S9
quality appeared to vary significantly. In the building shown Figure 5, concrete blocks were placed outside the frame lines. More typically, the concrete block walls were used as infill. In some structures, column steel splices were placed directly above the elevation of the floors.
BUILDING PERFORMANCE
Damage to residences and commercial buildings was widespread. According to Figure 11 (USAID 2010), approximately 40%–50% of buildings were “destroyed” in Carrefour and Gressier, communes near Port-au-Prince. In downtown Port-au-Prince, Eberhard et al. (2010) found that 28% of the 107 buildings surveyed had collapsed partially or totally, and an additional 33% were damaged enough to require repairs. The damage was even higher in Léogâne, the city nearest the epicenter. According to Figure 11, 80%–90% of buildings there were destroyed.
Two adjacent structures in downtown Port-au-Prince illustrate the consequences of poor seismic proportioning and detailing. Figure 6 shows the collapse of the multistory Turgeau Hospital, constructed in 2008. The building’s lateral-force resistance was provided by a re- inforced concrete frame with masonry infill. As with the residence shown in Figure 5, the columns were slender, and the columns and joints had little transverse reinforcement. In contrast, the Digicel building (Figure 7) across the street had only minor structural damage, consisting mainly of concrete spalling at the base of the columns. The building had been designed to resist earthquakes; it had much larger columns with closely spaced ties and included shear walls.
It appears that some buildings performed better than their neighbors because of their low mass. For example, the wood-frame building shown in Figure 8a was adjacent to a col- lapsed reinforced concrete structure. Similarly, the one-story church shown in Figure 8b had a light-metal roof supported by masonry walls. Although it appeared to be constructed with materials of poorer quality than those used in a neighboring concrete bearing-wall house, the masonry church structure suffered less damage.
Figure 5. Residential concrete block slab construction.
DESROCHES ET AL.S10
PERFORMANCE OF LIFELINES
BRIDGES
There are very few bridges in Haiti, and most are short, single-span bridges or culverts. We did not learn of any bridge collapses attributable to the earthquake. Within Port-au- Prince, most of the crossings over streams were accommodated by box culverts, which did not appear to be damaged. Along the Route Nationale No. 2, small streams were also spanned by culverts. The culverts themselves were not damaged, but in at least one case, the approaches to the culvert settled relative to the culvert itself.
The main river crossings on Nationale No. 2 were spanned by bridges with precast gird- ers resting on cast-in-place reinforced concrete bents and supporting a cast-in-place deck. We observed damage to two such bridges. The bridge over the Momance River had minor pounding damage at one of the intermediate supports. In the Carrefour section of Port-au- Prince the external shear keys (Figure 9) of a similar bridge were damaged at both interme- diate supports. This failure was apparently caused by the lack of hook anchorage at the end of the top beam reinforcement.
WATER AND WASTEWATER
The main public water system in Port-au-Prince is supplied by a series of springs located in the nearby mountains. The water is chlorinated in the spring boxes and sent to the distribution system, which serves 1,000,000 people (Edwards 2010). Prior to the earth- quake, this supply was unreliable, and the water was not drinkable without further treat- ment. There were relatively few water main breaks, which is unusual for a system this large. Most of the breaks were repaired within one to two weeks of the earthquake.
There were no working wastewater treatment plants in Haiti. In the metropolitan areas, wastewater was discharged in open drainage channels and directed to Port-au-Prince Bay. Many of the drainage channels were blocked by debris and trash.
Figure 6. Turgeau hospital in downtown Port-au-Prince: (a) Before the earthquake (Simon Young CaribRM), and (b) collapsed structure after the earthquake.
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S11
Figure 7. Damage to two structures across the street from one another in Port-au-Prince: (a) Reinforced concrete frame with masonry infill, and (b) new Digicel building under construction appears to be nearly undamaged.
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Figure 8. Light buildings that were damaged but did not collapse: (a) Wood-frame building, and (b) church with masonry walls and light-metal roof.
Figure 9. Damage to shear key at intermediate support.
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S13
TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
The telecommunication system in Haiti is comprised of a single wireline carrier (Tel- eco), and three wireless mobile vendors (Edwards 2010). Teleco is a wireless-based utility providing service through a network similar to those operators throughout the United States. The earthquake caused the collapse of the Teleco building in Port-au-Prince. At several locations throughout the Port-au-Prince metropolitan region, the placement of COWS (Cells on Wheels or Mobile Cellular System and Telescoping Antenna Array) outside of several telephone central offices was a temporary solution to enable inter-exchange traffic.
Digicel, one of Haiti’s largest wireless cellular providers, had significant damage due to the collapse of buildings onto antennas. According to Digicel officials, it was estimated that 20% of the company’s network was damaged beyond repair and unable to return to service. By 27 January 2010, the company had restored 92% of radio frequency capability with the regulator’s grant of additional spectrum for a period of 12 months.
SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT
Researchers distinguish between emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes (Comerio 1998, Teirney 2008), and by all measures, the earthquake in Haiti can certainly be classified as a major catastrophe—perhaps the worst in modern history. Not only were the physical and social impacts extremely large relative to the population of the affected areas, but also relative to the country as a whole. Given the extent of the damage, the government was paralyzed and an international response faced massive challenges—with limited access to the damaged port and airport, and uncertainty over who could or should take charge. The United Nations (UN), which had a peacekeeping mission in Haiti prior to the earthquake, lost a significant number of their own staff, as did the numerous International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) that provided a wide variety of health care, housing assistance, training, and other social services. With every segment of civil society impacted—the government, schools, uni- versities, businesses, health clinics, orphanages, INGOs, and churches—it was often difficult to understand who could provide relief and assistance to the earthquake victims.
The U.S. Armed Forces initially took over airport operations. UN and World Bank rep- resentatives, in partnership with Haitian officials, became key leaders in managing relief services, damage data collection, and shelter planning. Meetings of various groups were coordinated daily at the Hotel Caribe (where the lobby and meeting rooms were undam- aged) and at the UN peacekeeping base near the airport. The initial weeks were driven by the dual purposes of providing food and shelter to victims on one hand, and collecting sound data for recovery planning on the other. At that time, it was already clear that the government of Haiti would not fully be in charge of the recovery, in part because the inter- national organizations would control the funding and in part because the already weak Hai- tian government was weakened further by the disaster, leaving a leadership vacuum. Of the US$1.8 billion in earthquake relief that has been sent to Haiti (as of July 2010), less than 2.9% has gone directly to the Haitian government (Farmer 2010).
Tents and tarps were provided by a variety of international groups, but many Haitians formed informal tent camps with materials salvaged from the rubble, as shown in Figure 10. Of the 1.3 million homeless, UN Habitat and USAID estimated that over 500,000 left Port-
DESROCHES ET AL.S14
au-Prince for outlying provinces: 163,000 to Artibonite, 91,000 to Centre, 120,000 to Grand Anse, and the remainder to the other six provinces (USAID 2010, see Figure 11). Haitian architect and planner Leslie Voltaire was involved in planning operations that argued for aid supply to the outlying provinces so that the displaced could stay in and be supported by those regions, thus limiting the need within Port-au-Prince.
An early return and resettlement plan by UN Habitat assumed that approximately 240,000 households needed resettlement and that ideally, it was best if people could return to a safe house in their community of origin, and only be settled elsewhere if that return was not possible. Transitional camps with temporary shelters were used for those with no other options (see Table 3) (UN Habitat 2010).
Almost one year after the disaster, this plan has been difficult to implement for a variety of complicated reasons. People remain fearful of returning to existing buildings and prefer to sleep in the tents. Although it has been documented that families do return to their homes in the daytime, they generally do not stay there overnight. The camps continue to be a source of free food, clean water, and sanitation facilities. In a testimony to the U.S. Con- gressional Black Caucus on 27 July 2010, Dr. Paul Farmer noted that diarrheal diseases dropped 12% after the earthquake because disaster aid agencies provided clean bottled water to the displaced population. He went on to acknowledge that while a burst of attention can make some improvements, the overall lack of food security, sanitation, clean water sources, jobs, education, health care, and other basic services are all critical issues which highlight the need for a functioning government public sector, not simply short-term aid from INGOs (Farmer 2010).
Nearly one year after the earthquake, there are hopeful signs that coordination is taking place between the Haitian government, INGOs, and religious organizations, and progress is being made on a number of fronts. The UN has been testing the concept of a humanitarian coordination hub. The leaders from all of the UN cluster groups convene to coordinate their own activities as well as those of the more than 10,000 NGOs that are working in Haiti. USAID has contributed one of its officers to assist with information sharing, which means that most of the major funders are well-represented in the coordination efforts.
Figure 10. (a) Salvaging materials from damaged buildings, and (b) tent camps created by earthquake victims.
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S15
Figure 11. Earthquake-affected areas and population movement in Haiti following 12 January 2010 earthquake.
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Some 220,000 temporary shelters are expected to be completed by August 2011, up from the original estimate of 125,000. This increase may be partially due to the ever- increasing number of people returning from the countryside. It is estimated that 40% of those who left Port-au-Prince after the earthquake have returned (as of October 2010). Two critical issues affect all the shelter efforts: rubble removal and land tenure. A year after the earthquake, piles of rubble still block Port-au-Prince’s traffic-choked streets. Clearing the debris is crucial for rebuilding, but rubble removal is not a priority for donors, so funds are not readily available for this primary task. Less than 5% of the rubble has been removed, and the disposal of the estimated 20 million cubic meters of rubble lacks a dumpsite and the equipment to move it. It seems that the UN could “tax” donors on new construction projects in order to allow this critical task to be completed.
The longstanding problem of ill-defined property ownership and the population influx to Port-au-Prince in recent years created squatter settlements in slum areas before the earth- quake. It is estimated that 60%–70% of the earthquake-displaced people were squatters and most have no funds for rent and thus will live in the camp settlements indefinitely. Less than 5% of Haiti’s land is officially registered in public land records; and there is no proper land registry system. A recent UN Habitat report noted that because of an informal land ten- ure system (with many titles being passed through oral tradition), large numbers of now- deceased landowners, contradictory laws, and weak institutions for enforcement, there is a profound lack of land tenure security, which will significantly impede rebuilding. The state of insecure property and land rights is also stifling local enterprise. Many Haitian business leaders are struggling to obtain bank loans because they are unable to prove that they own land. It is also causing potential foreign investors to be wary (D’Amico 2010).
CONCLUSIONS
The Mw 7.0 earthquake that struck the Republic of Haiti on 12 January 2010 was among the most devastating events in recent history. The death toll is estimated at 300,000; 1.3 mil- lion people remain homeless 10 months following the earthquake; and the estimated losses of US$7 to US$14 billion exceed the gross domestic product of the country. Many factors contributed to the scale of the catastrophe. Pre-earthquake socioeconomic conditions—Haiti lacks effective government and institutions and is the poorest country in the Western Hemi- sphere—increased vulnerability. The absence of significant seismic activity in Haiti since the 18th and 19th centuries contributed to a lack of earthquake awareness and preparedness. The proximity of the epicenter to the capital city of Port-au-Prince exposed a dense urban area to intense ground shaking. Geological and geotechnical conditions in the epicentral
Table 3. UN Habitat estimates of sheltering options
Shelter Options Percent No. Households
Return to Safe House 40% 96,000
Return to Safe PlotþTemp Shelter 20% 48,000 Resettlement in proximity: LotþT. Shelter 20% 48,000 Resettlement in new neighborhoodsþT. Shelter 10% 24,000 Host Family support 10% 24,000
OVERVIEW OF THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE S17
area include artificial fills, soft alluvial soils, and topographic features that caused ground- motion amplification and liquefaction-induced ground failures. The lack of an effective building code, inadequate seismic proportioning and detailing, inferior construction materi- als, and the lack of quality control all contributed to the poor performance of structures in the earthquake-affected area. Typical reinforced concrete frame buildings with concrete block infill had numerous vulnerabilities known to cause seismic damage, including slender columns and inadequate transverse reinforcement.
The earthquake demonstrated not only the weakness of Haiti’s physical infrastructure and environmental degradation, but also the more fundamental weakness of its institutions and government. This disaster, perhaps more than any other in recent history, illustrates the role of socio-vulnerability in a natural disaster. With every segment of civil society impacted—government, schools, universities, businesses, health clinics, orphanages, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and churches—it was often difficult to understand who could provide relief and assistance to the earthquake victims. One year after the earth- quake, however, there are hopeful signs of coordination between the Haitian government, NGOs, and religious organizations and progress is being made. Haiti’s long-term recovery depends on providing food security, sanitation, clean water, jobs, education, property and land rights, health care, and other basic services that require a functioning government pub- lic sector, not simply short-term aid from NGOs. Building capacity at all levels—technical, institutional, and governmental—will be required to put Haiti on a new path of economic growth and social justice.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation Rapid Grant, Nos. CMMI-1034793, and funding by the USGS, the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), the Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES), the Geo-Engineering Extreme Events Reconnaissance (GEER) Association, and the Applied Technology Council (ATC). The EERI contribution was funded by the EERI Learning from Earthquakes project under Award No. CMMI-0758529 from the US National Science Foundation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
The reconnaissance effort was made possible by the logistical support of the US South- ern Command and the officers, soldiers, marines, airmen, and civilians of Joint Task Force Haiti. The institutional support of the US Embassy and US Agency for International Devel- opment was also crucial. The authors also thank the various members of the Haitian com- munity that were helpful in supporting the reconnaissance effort.
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(Received 22 November 2010; accepted 23 January 2011)
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International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters March 2006, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 5-43
Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards: The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo Eruption and
the Aetas of the Philippines
Jean-Christophe Gaillard Laboratoire Territoires, UMR PACTE 5194 CNRS
Institut de Géographie Alpine 14 bis, avenue Marie Reynoard
38100 Grenoble France
This article explores the response of traditional societies in the face of natural hazards through the lens of the concept of resilience. Resilient societies are those able to overcome the damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazards, either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or through accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive. Citing the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines and its impact on the Aeta communities who have been living on the slopes of the volcano for centuries, it suggests that the capacity of resilience of traditional societies and the concurrent degree of cultural change rely on four factors, namely: the nature of the hazard, the pre-disaster socio- cultural context and capacity of resilience of the community, the geographical setting, and the rehabilitation policy set up by the authorities. These factors significantly vary in time and space, from one disaster to another. It is important to perceive their local variations to better anticipate the capability of traditional societies to overcome the damage brought by the occurrence of natural hazards and therefore predict eventual cultural change.
� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
Introduction
Natural hazards are those natural phenomena that pose a threat to people, structures and economic assets. Natural hazards include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, storms and cyclones, droughts, floods and storm surges among others. The response capacity of people in the face of natural hazards is defined by the concepts of vulnerability and resilience.
Early definitions of vulnerability mostly referred to the quantitative degree of potential loss in the event of the occurrence of a natural hazard (e.g., United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1992). The concept eventually evolved to encompass the wider social context in what is commonly called ‘social vulnerability’. Social vulnerability may be defined as the propensity of a society to suffer from damage in the event of the occurrence of a given hazard (D’Ercole 1994: 87-88). Vulnerability thus stresses the condition of a society which makes it possible for a hazard to become a disaster (Cannon 1994: 13). It basically depends on a large array of factors which interact in systemic (D’Ercole 1994) and causal directions (Watts and Bohle 1993; Wisner et al. 2004). These factors are demographic, social, cultural, economic and political in nature. It is further important to recognize that vulnerability reflects the daily conditions of society (Maskrey 1989; Wisner 1993). Disasters are therefore viewed as the extension of everyday hardships wherein the victims are marginalized in three ways: geographically because they live in marginal hazard- prone areas, socially because they are poor, and politically because their voice is disregarded (Wisner et al. 2004). Vulnerability further varies according to the nature of the hazard (Wisner 2004).
People’s capability of response in the face of natural hazards also relies on their capacity of resilience. This concept spread widely in the disaster literature in the 1990s and is still the object of a conceptual debate around its sense and application among social scientists (e.g., Klein et al. 2003). Pelling (2003: 48) views resilience as a component of vulnerability or the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress. In this regard, it basically includes the planned preparation and the spontaneous or premeditated adjustments undertaken in the face of natural hazards. Other scholars (Folke et al. 2002: 13) define resilience
�Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
as the “flip” (positive) side of vulnerability or the capacity to resist from damage and change in the event of the occurrence of a natural hazard. A third approach breaks away from the previous two to define resilience as the capacity of a system to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event (Timmermann 1981: 21). Dovers and Handmer (1992: 270) further distinguish three levels of societal resilience and differentiate 1/ resilience through resistance to change; 2/ resilience through incremental change at the margins and 3/ resilience through openness and adaptability. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2004) recently took over this differentiation in its definition of resilience as “the capacity of a system, community or society to resist or change in order that it may obtain an acceptable level of functioning and structure”. Following the same approach, Walker et al. (2004) differentiate four crucial aspects of resilience. The first aspect is the latitude or the maximum amount by which a system can be changed before losing its ability to recover. The next dimension is the resistance or the ease or difficulty of changing the system. The precariousness or how close the current state of the system is to a limit or “threshold” is also of importance. The final aspect is the panarchy or the cross-scale interactions and influences from states and dynamics at scales above and below.
Resilience differs from vulnerability by addressing the capability and the ways people deal with crises and disaster. On the other hand, vulnerability only encompasses the susceptibility of individuals to suffer from damage and thus to transform the occurrence of a natural hazard into a disaster. Both concepts may rely on the same factors (demographic, social, cultural, political, etc.) which may however vary on different scales. Resilient societies are able to overcome the damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazards, either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or through accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive. The concept of resilience is thus intimately linked to the concept of change. Post-disaster changes within the impacted society may be technological, economic, behavioral, social or cultural in nature. The latitude and resistance to change greatly depend on the type of society affected by the disaster. The following paragraphs explore the case of traditional societies.
� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
Traditional societies, sometimes called folk, tribal, or primitive societies, are those groups characterized by their pre-industrial self- sufficient ways of either hunting / gathering or extensive agriculture type. These societies are further identified by the intimate relationship they nurture with their immediate natural environment and the slow level of cultural change they usually experience (Kottak 2003).
Many researchers have addressed the capacity of industrial societies to overcome the havoc wrought by the occurrence of natural hazards with more or less change in the social fabric (see Drabek 1986; Bates and Peacock 1986; Nigg and Tierney 1993 and Passerini 2000 for syntheses). Fewer scholars discussed the capability of traditional societies to cope with natural hazards. A review of the scarce literature further denotes a lack of consensus among social scientists. Three different theoretical frameworks may be distinguished from the available corpus of research materials.
The first and dominant framework regards traditional environment-dependent societies as fragile and unable to cope on their own with large-scale fast-onset natural hazards. Destruction of the environment due to extreme natural phenomena deprives these societies of their main resources and pushes them to rely on external resources in order to recover. Natural hazards are therefore viewed as a powerful vector of socio-cultural change (Burton 1972; Burton, Kates, and White 1993; Dynes 1976; Kates 1971; Kates et al. 1973; Mileti, Drabek, and Haas 1975). Such an argument largely emanates from the “top-down” technocratic and western logic characterizing the dominant paradigm in the hazard and disaster literature. The proponents of this approach find justification for promoting a transfer of experience, knowledge and technology from industrialized countries to developing nations in the poor capacity of traditional societies to respond to natural hazards. This view takes advantage of the results of several studies conducted following the 1943 to 1952 eruption of Paricutín volcano in Mexico (Nolan 1979; Nolan and Nolan 1993), the 1951 eruption of Mt. Lamington in Papua New Guinea (Belshaw 1951; Keesing 1952; Ingleby 1966; Schwimmer 1977), the 1961-1962 eruption of the volcano of Tristan de Cunha,
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in the South Atlantic (Blair 1964; Munch 1964, 1970; Lewis, Roberts, and Edwards 1972), the 1968 eruption of the volcano of Nila in Maluku (Pannell 1999) and the 1994 eruption of Mt. Rabaul in Papua New Guinea (To Waninara 2000).
On the other hand, the second theoretical framework sees traditional societies as capable of recovering on their own from the impact of natural phenomena. The environmental modifications resulting from the occurrence of natural hazards forced these societies to make slight adjustments without modifying the fundamentals of their social organization (Sjoberg 1962; Torry 1978a, 1979). This framework emerged from the growing anthropological literature on hazards and disasters during the 1960s and 1970s (see Torry 1979 and Oliver-Smith 1996 for syntheses). The arguments of this approach have greatly contributed to challenging the aforementioned dominant and technocratic paradigm on disaster management by pointing out the perverse effects of emergency measures and other technological adjustments set up by western governments. For the proponents of this approach, if there is temporarily an incapacity of traditional societies to overcome the consequences of natural hazards occurrence, it is due to the foreign relief aid that disrupts indigenous resilience systems rather than to the intrinsic incapability of affected societies (Waddell 1975, 1983; Torry 1978b, Cijffers 1987, Ali 1992). The radical approach is fed by the work of Spillius (1957), eventually revisited by Torry (1978a) and Boehm (1996), on the small island of Tikopia (Solomon islands), which was devastated by two typhoons and a subsequent famine between 1952 and 1953; the documentation of Schneider (1957) on the island of Yap regularly swept by tropical storms; the monumental study of Oliver-Smith (1977, 1979a, b, c, 1992) about the Quechua Indians of Yungay following the total destruction of their town by a debris avalanche triggered by the 1970 Peruvian earthquake; the researches of Lewis (1981, 1999), Hurell (1984) and Rogers (1981) among the people of Tonga in the face of typhoons and following the restless activity of Niuafo’ou volcano in 1946; the comparative study of Holland and VanArsdale (1986) in Indonesia and Peru among communities affected by flash floods; and the investigation of Zaman (e.g. 1989, 1994, 1999; Haque and Zaman, 1994) among Bangladeshi
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communities recurrently affected by floods, and Cijffers (1987) in the Cook Islands regularly struck by hurricanes.
Finally, the third approach regarding the responses of traditional societies in the face of natural hazards defends an intermediate viewpoint. It argues that the occurrence of natural hazards rather acts as a catalyst for ongoing cultural changes among traditional societies increasingly pressured by the industrial world (Blong 1984; Bates and Peacock, 1986; Oliver-Smith 1996). This phenomenon has been observed among several Tarascan Indian communities following the eruption of Paricutín volcano in Mexico between 1943 and 1952 (Rees 1970; Nolan 1979; Nolan and Nolan 1993), among Guatemalan Mayas after the 1976 earthquake (Bates 1982; Cuny 1983; Hoover and Bates 1985), and among Yemeni highlanders following the 1982 earthquake (Leslie 1987).
The foregoing frameworks are all driven primarily by the concept of vulnerability or the susceptibility of traditional societies to experience disaster following the occurrence of natural hazards. They do not address cultural change as a way of coping with the havoc wrought by the disaster. In this paper, we aim to tackle the capacity of response of traditional societies in the face of natural hazard through the lens of the concept of resilience. Our discussion will be based on the case of the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo volcano in the Philippines and its impact on the Aeta communities. To assess the Aetas’ resilience will first require evaluating if the eruption brought about some changes in the folk culture. A critical review of the factors that affected resilience in the Mt. Pinatubo case will eventually lead to the advancing of an alternative approach to the response of traditional societies in the face of the occurrence of natural hazards.
The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo Eruption and the Aetas
The Aetas are one of the many ethnic minorities occupying the mountains of the Philippine islands. They are found on the flanks of Mt. Pinatubo which towers at the apex of the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales on the main island of Luzon (Figure 1). Considered by some as the direct descendants of the populations that first inhabited the archipelago during the Pleistocene
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Period (Headland and Reid 1989), the Aetas’ small height, very dark complexion, and curly hair easily distinguish them from the majority of Filipinos who are taller and are characterized by brown skin and straight hair. The approximately 50,000 Aetas counted on the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo in 1999 depend for their livelihood on cultivating root crops and other vegetables, hunting and fishing, and also on gathering plants and wild fruits that abound in their surroundings (Barrato and Benaning 1978; Garvan 1964; Reed 1904; Shimizu 1989). The following paragraphs particularly focus on the communities located within the 200km2-Pasig and Sacobia River Basins on the eastern flank of Mt. Pinatubo, in the immediate vicinity of the former Clark American facilities (Clark Air Base – CAB) (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Areas Affected by the 1991 Eruption of Mt Pinatubo and Location of the Study Area (After Data from PHIVOLCS
and Mount Pinatubo Commission).
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Isopachs (in cm) of airfall deposits
Active lahar channels
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Doña Josefa PInaltakan
Mabalacat Madapdap
Villa Maria
Aeta resettlement sites
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Figure 2: Spatial Redistribution of the Aeta Villages in the Pasig and Sacobia River Basins Subsequent to the
Eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991.
Mabubuteun
Pamatayan Calang
Kaging
Mataba
StaInes Sta Rosa
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San Martin
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Present upper limit of Aeta settlements
The Aetas were the first to feel the precursory signs of the volcano’s restlessness during the first days of April 1991; they responded by immediately warning the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) (Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales 1991; Tayag et al. 1996). This abnormal volcanic activity intensified until June 1991. The eruptive paroxysm materialized on June 12 and June 15. On these particular dates, the volcano spewed some 5 to 7 km3 of pyroclastic materials that buried many Aeta villages located on the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo. Since 15 June 1991, destructive lahars (volcanic debris flows), triggered by typhoon-associated downpours, tropical monsoon rains and lake break outs, have flowed down the flanks and foothills of the volcano affecting anew a large number of these Aeta settlements (Pinatubo Volcano Observatory 1991; Umbal 1997; Wolfe 1992).
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In April 1991, with the initial signs of restlessness by the volcano, almost all of the Aeta communities were already evacuated (Banzon- Bautista and Tadem 1993). However, an unknown number of Aetas who refused to leave their homes perished during the eruption. According to oral accounts, a score of Aetas found shelter in caves that had eventually been buried by pyroclastic flows (Shimizu 2001). At first, the Aetas who chose to evacuate were relocated in some major surrounding towns (Tarlac City, Capas, Bamban, Mabalacat, Angeles City, Porac, etc.). Eventually, with the paroxysm of the eruption on June 15 that affected even the town inhabitants, the authorities had to once again transfer many Aeta families toward evacuation centers that were much farther (e.g., provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija and Manila) from their villages. Inside overcrowded school buildings, gymnasiums, churches or tent camps, nutrition problems and diseases (pneumonia, measles…) quickly spread and left a heavy death toll among Aeta children (Lapitan 1992; Magpantay 1992; Magpantay et al. 1992; Sawada 1992).
Faced with the impossibility of sending the Aetas back to their former villages which had already been buried under meters of volcanic deposits, the Philippine government had to plan a permanent resettlement program. By June 1991, the authorities created the Task Force Mt. Pinatubo, which was replaced in 1992 by the Mount Pinatubo Commission (MPC), an intergovernmental structure under the authority of the President of the Philippines. The task force then had created eleven upland resettlement centers intended primarily for the Aetas (Task Force Mount Pinatubo 1991). The Aetas from the Pasig and Sacobia river basins were mainly distributed on four sites (Villa Maria, Kalangitan, Dueg, and Maynang). Dueg, the most remote, is about 100km away from the native villages. In each of the centers, a lot measuring 150m² together with traditional housing materials (bamboo, palm leaves…) was allocated for each family. In 1995, more solid building materials (‘GI sheets’, lumber…) were provided (Tariman 1999). Some Aetas of the Clark Air Base vicinity were resettled in a lowland relocation site, Madapdap (municipality of Mabalacat), with 7,000 lowland families from the neighboring ‘Kapampangan’ ethno-linguistic group who were affected by the lahars from the Pasig-Potrero and Sacobia Rivers. Each family was
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awarded a 94m² lot with a concrete house equipped with sanitary installations (Tariman 1999). There were also two resettlement centers (Doña Josefa and Pinaltakan) implemented by NGOs at Palayan City (province of Nueva Ecija) where the Pinatubo Aetas rubbed shoulders with other upland ethno-linguistic groups (Dumagats and Bagos) from the Sierra Madre mountain range. Other resettlement attempts in more remote places such as the island of Palawan failed because of unsuitable conditions that pushed the Aetas back to Central Luzon (Gaillard and Leone 2000).
Methodology
The following discussion relies on extensive field work conducted in the basin of the Pasig and Sacobia rivers between July 1999 and June 2000 and completed by additional field explorations between June and September 2001. The lack of reliable census data for the study area compelled the researcher to abandon the sampling survey and instead opt for open interviews with selected key informants. Sixteen villages were visited. Only three occupied settlements were avoided: one because of security concerns and the two others because of their inaccessibility. The four neighboring resettlement sites (Villa Maria, Kalangitan, Maynang and Madapdap) were also part of the study. Key informants were not limited to community leaders and included other members (both men and women) of the communities visited. Interviews were conducted in the Kapampangan language spoken by almost all the Aetas. Local guides sometimes served as interpreters in the local Aeta Mag-Aantsi dialect. Questions sought to assess the pre-eruption lifestyle, the response of the victims to the disaster, notably their journey up to their present settlement, and the present way of life. Community leaders further provided approximate population figures for their village. All the respondents were cooperative and were willing to share their experience.
In addition to the survey among the Aeta settlements, interviews were conducted with stakeholders of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster management. Those include the Mt. Pinatubo Commission (MPC), other government agencies (National Commission for Indigenous People, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department
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of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of Education), local government units (LGUs) and non- government organizations (NGOs). These interviews were aimed at assessing the role of the authorities in the shaping of the observations made on the field. A large amount of useful primary written documents was also collected from these visits to institutions.
Field work was completed by the collection of secondary written documents such as journal publications, conference proceedings, and relevant press clippings from regional and national newspapers. Both primary and secondary written materials provided information mostly on the disaster management policy. Very few sources discussed the response of the populations.
From Uplands to Foothills: The Inevitable Redistribution of the Population
In 1990, about 1,200 to 1,300 Aeta families (approximately 7,000 individuals) were occupying the Pasig and Sacobia basins on both the upper slopes and the lower foothills of Mt. Pinatubo (National Statistics Office 1990; Tadem 1993). After the awakening of the volcano in 1991, both the unsuitability of the upper flanks of the mountain and the resettlement policy implemented by the Philippine government led to a general redistribution of the Aeta population of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins. Figure 2 shows that the present upper limit of Aeta settlements matches the lower limit of the 1991 pyroclastic deposits and the 20cm-isopach of ash fall. All the Aeta communities located on the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo prior to the eruption had to abandon their small villages which had been buried under these thick and hot pyroclastic and ashfall deposits preventing the immediate reoccupation of the settlements. Most of these Aetas have been relocated in the government resettlement sites, either on the lower slopes of the volcano or on the foothills (Figures 1 and 2). Today, these resettlement sites are the biggest Aeta settlements. Kalangitan, the biggest relocation center is inhabited by 385 families. These resettlement sites host Aeta communities from both the upper and lower flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. The lack of land suitable for cultivation
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and the inadequate housing in resettlement sites has however led many Aeta families native to the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo to return to their old villages and till their abandoned fields (Gaillard and Leone 2000; Macatol 1998, 2000; Macatol and Reser 1999-2000; Seitz 1998, 2000; Shimizu 1992). With the exception of Villa Maria, the population of other resettlement centers, like Maynang and Palayan City, has greatly decreased during the last few years. Other Aetas native to the upper slopes of Mt. Pinatubo and who chose to leave the resettlement sites have tried to rebuild their villages on more suitable sites (e.g., Calapi, San Martin, Burug) or near the relocation centers (e.g., Inararo). Worth noting is that other Aetas maintain residences in resettlement sites and at the same time tend their fields near their former villages. This practice is very prevalent in Villa Maria. It is now also being practiced in Maynang, prompting the service of daily or weekly shuttles to and from their original villages. Finally, ten years after the eruption, several families still live in evacuation centers that were intended for temporary purposes. At Planas, for example, tents have been replaced by bamboo huts and other sturdier structures.
All the Aeta settlements are nowadays concentrated on the lower flanks of Mt. Pinatubo in the immediate proximity of lowland villages and towns occupied by Kapampangan people, the dominant ethnic group of the southwestern part of the Central Plain of Luzon (Figure 2). Henceforth, there are no more Aeta communities left isolated on the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. All have established regular contacts with lowlanders.
Increasing Interactions with Lowlanders
The closer geographic proximity between Aeta people and their lowland neighbors, induced by the downhill redistribution of the population following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, has increased the interactions between the two communities. These interactions are economic and social, as well as political.
Until Mt. Pinatubo erupted in 1991, regular economic interactions between Aetas and lowlanders were limited to the communities located on the lower slopes of the volcano. Many Aetas of the villages situated near the former Clark Air Base were both agriculturists and employed
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by the US Air Force as watchmen, jungle survival instructors, and janitors while others earned their living by scavenging the garbage of the US servicemen in the area or by gathering scrap materials left by the Americans during their training (Cunanan 1982-83; Gaabucayan 1978; Simbulan 1983). The Aetas living in villages farther away from Clark Air Base used to sell or swap their products for rice, coffee, or sugar in the public markets of the surrounding towns at least once a week. Aeta communities living on the highest slopes of Mt. Pinatubo lived almost exclusively on tilling different rootcrops, hunting, fishing and gathering tropical fruits without regular contact with lowlanders and other ethno-linguistic groups. Noteworthy is that despite these significant differences in their way of life, upland and lowland communities can still be regarded as a single ethnic group on the basis of their common physical features, language, traditional beliefs and inter-individual relationship based on a great sense of ‘communalness’ (Barrato and Benaning 1978; Brosius 1983; Fox 1952; Shimizu 1989). The downhill redistribution of the population following the 1991 eruption has deeply modified the economic landscape by making all the Aetas dependent on the lowland market to earn their living. Interviews conducted in the Pasig and Sacobia river basins in 1999 and 2000 show that, at present, there are no more isolated communities and all the Aetas have thus learnt to sell their produce directly in the public markets of surrounding towns without being deceived by Kapampangans who used to act as middlemen. Besides the traditional public markets, the former Clark Air Base converted into a vast industrial, tourist and commercial complex, Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), has become another fruitful commercial outlet for the Aetas. The Aetas are now all selling fruits (bananas, papayas…), vegetables (banana tree hearts…), rootcrops (taro, cassava…) and souvenir items (flutes, bows, blowpipes…) to local and foreign tourists visiting the Duty-Free shops of Clark Special Economic Zone. These economic interactions between Aetas and their surrounding communities, especially with Kapampangans, now take place on an almost daily basis and hence concern all the Aeta people.
Social interactions between Aetas and their lowland neighbors began as soon as they rubbed shoulders together inside the overcrowded evacuation centers that hosted the victims of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in June 1991. Most of the Aetas interviewed who never
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previously lived beyond the domains of their respective communities on the upper flanks of the volcano discovered for the first time the socio-cultural way of life of the lowlands. Aetas also admitted that they experienced cohabitation difficulties and discrimination from non-Aetas who had to scamper for the much needed attention of the authorities. This situation inside the evacuation centers lasted only for a few months. Nonetheless social contacts between Aetas and lowland neighbors continued. The redistribution of the population downhill and the subsequent closer geographic proximity have resulted in permanent social interactions. For example, the closer distance to school facilities and the support of government and non- government organizations have led many young Aetas to now share school benches with lowland children. Moreover, these interactions are daily and long-lasting, and concern the young generation that is supposed to be the most permeable to cultural change. Data from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) show that the literacy rate among the Aeta people has thus risen from 4 per cent of the population in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2000. Presently, most of the youth study until they reach the age of 12 (elementary school). Moreover, literacy programs for adults are being provided by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and other NGOs, especially within the resettlement centers.
Finally, there are increasing political interactions between Aetas and surrounding lowland communities. Most of these contacts have been conveyed by the increasing density of population on the lower slopes of the volcano as a result of the coming-in of former uphill communities. The competition for land has become intense, involving long-time downhill Aeta communities, former uphill Aetas, lowland Kapampangans whose high population growth rate pushes them toward the lower slopes of the mountain, and the developers of Clark Special Economic Zone who try to expand the area intended for economic development. The numerous territorial conflicts which have emerged following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo are symptomatic of the increasing pressure put on the land (Gaillard 2002). These conflicts have pressed the Aetas to engage in delicate political negotiations with their lowland neighbors as well as with government administrations. The Aetas coming from the upper slopes
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of the volcano who were interviewed as part of this study admitted that they were unused to such transactions. They further claimed that numerous Kapampangans took advantage of the ignorance of some Aetas on the real land-valuations, managing to buy lands from the latter at very low prices and use unjust leases.
Non-Aeta Socio-Cultural Inputs in the Aeta Culture (see Table 1)
The redistribution of the population on the lower slopes of the mountain and the following increasing economical, social and political interactions between Aetas and non-Aetas had some socio-cultural implications. These interactions progressively compelled the Aetas to adopt cultural elements from their lowland neighbors. Differentiation has yet to be made between the communities coming from the upper flanks of the volcano and those which have been on the foothills of the mountain for a long time. Among the latter, acculturation was already ongoing long before the eruption. The communities which were located around the former Clark Air Base, in Angeles or Mabalacat, have been deeply influenced by their daily contacts with the Americans (Dale 1985). Those located farther away from the base, in Porac or Bamban, were less acculturated though not spared by their weekly contact with their lowland neighbors (Mendoza 1982). Therefore, the input of non-Aeta cultural elements due indirectly to the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption is more apparent among the communities formerly settled on the upper slopes of the volcano.
The first cultural change concerns the settlement pattern. Before the eruption, Rice (1973: 256) and Brosius (1983: 134) described clusters of two-three to five-fifteen houses as typical settlements of the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. On the lower slopes, settlements were larger, especially for the villages in the vicinity of Clark Air Base (Sapang Bato, Marcos Village). The redistribution of the population downhill subsequent to the eruption and the concurrent increasing density of population have led to a generalization of large settlements. This is evident in the resettlement sites but also in most of the villages located in the basins of the Pasig and Sacobia rivers visited during field work conducted as part of this study. Today, most of the Aetas coming from uphill live in settlements which number several tens of houses.
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1990 2000
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The second element of cultural change is the religious beliefs of the Aetas. Before the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, Aetas, especially those who used to live uphill, traditionally believed in a number of supernatural beings called ‘Anito’ (good spirit) or ‘Kamana’ (malicious spirit). The universal creator, or ‘Apo Namalyari’, was supposed to live at the heart of Mt. Pinatubo (Fox 1952; Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales 1991; Shimizu 1989). On the lower slopes of the mountain, the number of Aetas getting Christianized by Catholic or Protestant missions was increasing long before the eruption but most of them still kept Apo Namalyari and the Anitos at the core of their beliefs. Due to their redeployment on easily accessible foothills following the eruption, all the Aetas eventually became easy prey to a number of religious organizations and sects that mushroomed in their present villages and used disaster relief as a facade for evangelization. The ‘kindness’ of the missionaries served as a powerful argument to lead a large number of Aetas from the Pasig and Sacobia river basins to become active members of mainstream religions. At present, key informants acknowledge that Apo Namalyari is assimilated to Jesus Christ or the representative of God on earth. In the same way, the Anitos are compared to the Holy Spirit.
Since 1991, there have been modifications in their traditional medicine as well. These have been brought about both by the redistribution of the population as well as the extinction of many plant species following the eruption (Madulid 1992). Indeed, Aetas were recognized for their expertise in the chemical properties of plants (Fox 1952). They were also known for their traditional way of curing sicknesses through ‘manganito’ séances where they used to seek assistance from the spirits (Shimizu 1983, 1989). Only in the vicinity of Clark Air Base did the Aetas benefit from free health care offered by the US Air Force in exchange for the former’s services in improving their GI’s jungle survival skills. New religious beliefs and the depletion of many natural drugs pushed the Aetas to adopt modern medical treatments provided by the government and other civic- oriented groups (Ignacio and Perlas 1994; Alvarez-Castillo 1997) which benefit from the easier access to the Aeta settlements. Moreover, there are now only a few Aetas who still practice manganitos séances which were once intended to cure the most serious sicknesses.
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This integration of the two (animist and non-Aeta or lowland) cultures is also very much visible in the novel social references of the Aetas. The village chieftain of the Aetas at present is much different from those of the communities before the eruption, who then had the appellate ‘Apo’ because of his seniority (Jocano 1998). The researcher’s interviews indicate that for a chieftain of the clan to be able to retain a moral influence on the community (especially at Porac), the ‘captain’ or ‘tribal chieftain’, is usually chosen on the strength of his political influence exogenously, rather than because of his age. This exerts a new administrative role. It is indeed viewed as the representative of the State within the village and, thus, is in contact with the different local authorities (mayor, governor, congressman/woman…) and the main institutions. The provincial government of Tarlac has even established a parallel consultative political system for the Aetas. This includes a ‘Tribal Chieftain’ at the level of the village, a ‘Tribal Mayor’ at the municipal level, and a ‘Tribal Governor’ at the provincial level. This hierarchy was largely shaped by concerns about dealing with political matters. Before the eruption, Brosius (1983: 136) furthermore asserted that uphill Aeta communities did not claim discrete and bounded territories. Only near Clark Air Base and the Sacobia river basin, where former First Lady Imelda Marcos implemented an integrated development project, were Aetas used to western land ownership rights (Sacobia Development Authority 1985; Tadem 1993). The demographic pressure induced by the redistribution of the population and the continual encroachment of non-Aetas on their lands pushed all the Aetas to noticeably modify their relation to their territory and to now claim their own territorial units (‘barangays’—the smallest Philippine administrative unit—or ‘ancestral domains’—established as part of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997), to be administered exclusively by and for themselves (Gaillard 2002).
The next non-Aeta cultural input in the Aeta culture is the language of the lowlanders. Before 1991, the Aetas of the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo interviewed for this study used to communicate exclusively using their native tongue Aeta Mag-Aantsi, an Aeta dialect close to the Sambal language. Usage of the Kapampangan lowland language was limited to the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo where regular contacts
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occurred between Aetas and Kapampangans. Today it is widespread among all the Aetas of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins. Following their relocation downhill and their subsequent schooling, the young Aetas had to speak the language of the lowlanders to communicate with their classmates. It is thus common nowadays to hear Aeta Mag-Aantsi children speaking Kapampangan when playing in their backyards. The Kapampangan language also spread among the adults. Those interviewed admitted that they use the Kapampangan language due to the increasing political and economic interactions with Kapampangan people who do not speak Aeta Mag-Aantsi.
Observations during field work and interviews with key informants show that the western material culture has now also penetrated communities that would have been most unlikely prior to 1991, owing to their remoteness from the lowland populations. Lowland house materials are now rapidly spreading among the Aeta settlements. The ready-to-use diagonal-oriented ‘sawaling (light wall material made of waived bamboo) Tagalog’ (from the dominant ethno-linguistic group of the Philippines) and other modern construction materials (cement, ‘GI-sheet’…) are gaining ground on the traditional and robust square- oriented ‘sawaling Aeta’. Canned and ‘fast foods’, which former uphill villagers discovered for the first time in the evacuation centers in 1991, are also quickly becoming the favorite delicacies of most of the Aetas in lieu of tubers and fruits. The traditional ‘lubay’ (G- strings) and other native dresses, which uphill Aetas were regularly wearing before 1991, are progressively being replaced by pants with international labels. Drinking (notably gin) has now also become prevalent among all Aetas. Influenced by the new commercial markets, traditional craftworks and utensils (bows and arrows, blowguns, flutes, baskets…) are now being transformed into folkloric items for sale to tourists visiting Clark Special Economic Zone. For the Aetas from the vicinity of the former American military facilities who were used to western clothing and food regularly distributed by the servicemen, changes were much less radical and limited to a larger proportion of western housing material.
Another consequence of the increasing social contacts with lowland neighbors is the Aeta children’s quest for little Christmas cash gifts (Aguinaldo) during the month of December, a widespread
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custom among non-Aeta children in the Philippines. For that reason, Aeta children now roam the streets of Porac, Angeles City and San Fernando in the hopes of receiving a small Christmas donation from lowlanders (Sicat 2001).
Other fundamentals of the Aeta social organization have however undergone less change. The most important is the ‘communalness’ of the Aetas recognized long before 1991 and considered as the center of the social and economic life (Barrato and Benaning 1978; Brosius 1983; Fox 1952; Shimizu 1989). Indeed, the Aetas are, among all the other Negritos of the Philippines, the only group to focus towards a core which is the grouping of two to five families. In this regard, it is particularly important to note that this peculiarity has survived the eruption. Interviews with key informants indeed indicate that groups of two to three Aeta households still co-exploit swiddens, share food and journey together to the public markets for economic transactions. Similarly, Aeta families are still nucleated around a husband, his wife and their children as they were before the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (Brosius 1983; Shimizu 1989). Furthermore, the survey conducted in the Pasig and Sacobia river basins indicate that the Aetas have retained the strong identity attachment to their village mentioned by Shimizu (1989). It is very evident in the gathering of families from the same villages inside the resettlement sites. These clusters are always named in respect to the community of origin.
The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption brought undeniable but differentiated changes in the Aeta society. On the other hand, there are some fundamentals of the Aeta social system which have survived the consequences of the disasters. Is it sufficient to assert that the Aetas have been resilient in the face of the occurrence of a powerful natural hazard?
Aeta Resilience in the Face of the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption
Changes in the Aeta society following the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo have been brought by the increasing interactions with lowland neighbors brought by the spatial redistribution of the population on the foothills of the volcano. Changes have therefore concerned the components of the Aeta social fabric exposed to these interactions. On
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the other hand, some of the fundamentals pertaining to relationships within the society, notably the sense of ‘communalness’, have been less affected and have survived the eruption and its consequences. Henceforth, the Aeta social system has not disappeared following the disaster. It has rather adapted to new environmental, social, economic and political environments while maintaining a stable core. This viewpoint is further reinforced by the perseverance of the Aetas to claim their own ethnic identity, as manifested by their massive abandon of the resettlement centers. Thus, if resilient societies are those that are able to overcome the damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazards, either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or through accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive, then the Mt. Pinabuto Aetas of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins have been resilient. However, a distinction has to be made between pre-1991 uphill and downhill communities. It is quite evident that the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and the subsequent redistribution of the population brought major and abrupt changes in the way of life of former uphill Aeta communities. Increased interactions with Kapampangan people progressively led these communities to adopt lowland cultural references. They also reoriented their economic activities toward the market demand in the lowlands and no longer rely exclusively on environmental resources (Table 1). Aetas from the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo thus became resilient through openness and adaptability. The latitude of the social fabric was wide and permeable enough to easily accept large changes but did not allow the loss of some fundamentals of the Aeta society such as the sense of ‘communalness’. Indeed, the system was already in a state of precariousness induced by increasing pressure from lowland groups.
On the other hand, the communities formerly situated at the foothills of the mountain and near the old Clark Air Base underwent fewer changes. Among these communities, acculturation was already ongoing before the eruption, which acted as an accelerator of the trend through further cultural adjustments and diversification of economic activities (Table 1). Therefore, Aeta communities from the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo have been resilient through incremental and marginal change due to a narrower gap or latitude between lowland and upland cultures.
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The differential capacity of responses of the Aeta communities and the amplitude of the cultural change did not lie exclusively in the pre-disaster social fabric. It has been influenced by the context of the disaster. For the past two decades, considerable attention has been given to this question in the hazard and disaster literature (e.g., Wisner et al. 2004; Cannon 1994; Hewitt 1983, 1997; Lavell 1997; Maskrey 1993; Susman, O’Keefe, and Wisner 1983). Natural hazards such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, typhoons or floods have different inherent characteristics such as diverse speed of onset, temporal spacing and magnitude. Moreover, they occur in very different geographical, social, political and cultural contexts that contribute to shape the responses and adjustments of the victims. It is therefore important to break away from universal patterns of response to natural hazards as those mentioned in the first section of this paper. It rather seems that the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in the face of natural hazards and related cultural changes are commanded by an intricate interrelation of several factors that vary in time and space, from one event to another. These factors are physical, socio-cultural, geographical and political in nature. The following section illustrates each of them as a new approach to the capability of traditional societies to overcome the damage brought by the occurrence of natural hazards. Worth mentioning is that this framework only applies to fast-onset and contemporary events like the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption and thus excludes prehistoric and slow-onset hazards phenomena like droughts and climatic changes.
Factors of Resilience of Traditional Societies in Facing the Occurrence of Natural Hazards
Based on the Aetas’ experience following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, it is possible to identify several interdependent factors that affect the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in the face of the occurrence of natural hazards. These factors may be gathered into four groups (Figure 3).
First is the nature of the hazard. The magnitude and the temporal spacing of the event played a great role in shaping the long-term consequences of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption on the Aeta communities.
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In the Philippines, several authors have demonstrated the ability of environment-dependent ethnic groups to cope with natural hazards in a quite efficient way (Blolong 1996; Heijmans 2001; Insauriga 1999; Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology et al. 1998). However, most of the indigenous adaptations are in dealing with recurrent, usually seasonal, events like typhoons and floods. The magnitude of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption was far greater. Moreover, despite the vague existence of an oral memory of a previous eruption (Gaillard et al. 2005), the Aetas had to deal with a phenomenon they did not know.
Figure 3: Factors of Resilience among Traditional Societies in Facing the Occurrence of Natural Hazards.
The extent of damage also played a crucial role in the acculturation of uphill Aeta communities following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Most of the Aeta villages were buried under several meters of hot pyroclastic and ash fall deposits preventing the immediate reoccupation of the upper slopes of the volcano. This is another major difference from phenomena like typhoons or floods that allow post-disaster reoccupation of the stricken area. Relocation downhill following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was a must and no other alternatives were left for the Aetas.
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The second factor affecting the capacity of resilience of traditional societies is the intrinsic social condition of the particular group exposed to a given hazard. It seems that the capability of traditional societies to overcome disasters particularly depends on the pre- disaster level of acculturation, the relationships between the affected group and its neighbors, the diversity of pre-disaster livelihood, the cultural attachment to the devastated site, the size of the community affected and the age and the conservatism of the traditional leaders. It is obvious that the deepest socio-cultural changes occurred among those communities which were the least acculturated before the eruption, whereas the most acculturated communities in 1990 only made small adjustments to the new environmental and socio- economic contexts. The capacity of resilience therefore seems to be directly linked to the pre-disaster level of acculturation. The more traditional the community before the occurrence of the hazard, the more prone it is to cultural change.
Closely related is the amplitude of pre-disaster socio-cultural differences between the affected ethnic group and its neighbors, as well as the intensity of inter-group interactions. It seems that the larger the gap and the slighter the interactions, the more permeable is the community and the deeper the cultural changes. Aetas from the upper slopes of the volcano, who discovered the way of life of the lowlanders during their stay in the evacuation centers, were the most prone to cultural change. Conversely, changes were much slighter among the communities from the foothills of the mountain which had long been interacting with neighboring groups.
This study also confirmed that the communities which were most prone to cultural changes were those with no diversification of livelihoods. Uphill communities exclusively dependent on agriculture for their living were rendered helpless by the destruction of their fields by volumes of pyroclastic deposits. On the other hand, the communities situated near the former Clark Air Base which used to rely on several sources of livelihood turned out to be more capable of further diversifying their activities after the disaster.
The extent to which a community is affected seems to have a direct link with the capacity of resilience and post-disaster cultural change as well. If the whole community is hit by a natural hazard,
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resistance to cultural changes seems unlikely. The Mt. Pinatubo eruption spared no Aeta community. All were affected and all the Aetas experienced life in the evacuation and resettlement centers, where contacts with the lowlanders first took place for those from the uphill communities. The absence of intact villages, which would have taken care of the Aeta traditions, did not allow a retreat to a preserved socio-cultural environment.
In the Mt. Pinatubo case, preservation of socio-cultural references was also hindered by the critical shift in leadership that followed the eruption. The “Apo” or old wise man lost his prerogatives in preserving and transmitting the indigenous traditions because of his incapacity to deal with the new issues the Aetas had to cope with after their relocation downhill. Younger leaders are now emerging from among the different communities due to their ability to communicate with lowlanders. This phenomenon has been reinforced by the greater access of the youth to the educational system. This process is viewed as a needed evolution in the Aeta society. Nowadays, this has even compelled some communities to adopt young educated women as their leaders. The age and conservatism of the traditional leader before the disaster has thus shown to be a significant element affecting the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in the face of the occurrence of natural hazards.
The third factor is the geographic setting which is directly linked to the two previous points. The lack of space in a homeland-like environment for relocation without encroachment on other ethnic groups and cultures is of critical importance. The existence of available space is directly connected to the magnitude of the event and the extent of damage brought among the affected communities. In the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, there was certainly no space available in a homeland-like environment for spontaneous relocation. The resettlement sites selected by the government encroached on lowlander territories and favored contacts between Aetas and their neighbors. Foothill sites where other Aeta communities spontaneously resettled also trespass on lowlanders’ lands. Moreover, attempts of the authorities to resettle Aetas in similar but not identical physical milieu (Palawan and the Sierra Madre of Luzon) have failed (Gaillard and Leone 2000).
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The fourth and last factor affecting the capacity of resilience and cultural change among the Aeta communities is the post-disaster rehabilitation policy set up by the authorities. Some authors mentioned the insensitivity of disaster managers and their lack of cultural knowledge about the Aetas (Güss and Pangan 2004: 46). Others (e.g., Bennagen 1996: 60 and also Shimizu 1992: 2) have reported that some government officials were boasting of trying to ‘civilize’ the Aeta through the rehabilitation programs initiated in response to the disaster, especially through the resettlement policy and social programs (education, health…). This may be challenged. Major cultural changes among the Aeta communities did not occur by direct inputs of the government but rather as a progressive process due to geographic proximity which led to increasing interactions with external lowland culture. However, it is true that education within the resettlement centers contributed to enlarge the cultural references of the youth. The fact that many Aeta families are going back to the mountain further questions the role of the government in the acculturation process that has occurred among former uphill communities. It clearly demonstrates that the Aetas tend to meet their own needs without any assistance from the government or other NGOs (Bennagen 1996; Estacio Jr. 1996; Seitz 1998). Yet, if the authorities did not directly input lowland cultural references, they greatly participated in the relocation of the victims downhill and conditioned the redistribution of the population that occurred after the eruption. The close proximity at present between Aeta communities and their lowland neighbors greatly favor contacts of all sorts.
Furthermore, the fate of the Aeta communities cannot be detached from the national government policy toward ethnic and cultural minorities. At the time of the eruption, there were no specific governmental guidelines to protect and defend ethnic minority rights in the Philippines. It was only in 1997 that the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA 8371) was legislated (Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1997). Therefore, it was most unlikely that the Philippine government took appropriate measures for the preservation of the Aeta culture in 1991.
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Conclusions
The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo has implied a massive redeployment of the Aeta communities of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins toward the foothills of the volcano. This demographic redistribution has increased the geographic proximity between Aeta communities and their lowland neighbors and concurrently heightened the political and socio-economical relationships between Aetas and non-Aetas. More than ten years after the eruption, the level of cultural change induced by these increasing interactions has not been uniform. The less acculturated communities before the event are those who have undergone the highest level of cultural transformation. On the other hand, the eruption only acted as an accelerator of an on-going trend among the most acculturated communities before the eruption. Both uphill and foothill communities have however retained some fundamentals of the Aeta society, notably their sense of ‘communalness’. An increasing number of families further try to recover their pre-eruption way of life by leaving the resettlement centers or by going back to the upper slopes of the volcano when possible. Hence, Aeta communities have turned out to be resilient in the face of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. Resiliency required a certain level of cultural change and adaptation to the new environmental, social, economic and political context. Former uphill Aetas resorted to larger changes in their social system than their counterparts long living on the lower slopes of the volcano who recovered through marginal changes.
This flexibility of the Aeta society in the face of changing contexts had already been noticed before the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (e.g., Brosius 1983; Shimizu 1989). For instance, Shimizu (1989: 78) asserted that “the dynamism of Aeta social life hinges on the flexibility and durability of the Aeta social system”. Indeed, during their long history which may date back to the Pleistocene period, the Aetas have had to cope with major environmental and cultural disturbances, including several powerful eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo and earthquakes, climate changes, the arrival of the ‘Austronesian’ agriculturists, the coming of the Spaniards, and finally the establishment of American military bases on their territory. Yet, they have managed to retain
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specific cultural traits that still distinguish them from the majority of the Philippine ethno-linguistic groups today.
The capacity of resilience of the Aetas and the level of culture change that their society has undergone following the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo have been commanded by a complex set of interacting factors. These factors include the nature and magnitude of the hazard, the pre-disaster socio-cultural context, the geographical context and the rehabilitation policy set up by the authorities. It is evident that these factors vary somewhat in time and space, from one disaster to another. Even at the scale of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the Aeta people, conclusions drawn from the case study of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins can barely be generalized and extended to other flanks of the volcano (e.g., Seitz 2004). Given the great diversity of natural hazards and the multiplicity of their local geographical context of occurrence, the quest for a unique and universal theoretical framework assessing the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in facing the occurrence of natural hazards becomes secondary. More important is to perceive the local variations of the factors detailed in this paper to better anticipate the capability of traditional societies to overcome the damage brought by the occurrence of natural hazards and therefore predict eventual cultural change. This framework is in line with the new approach of hazards and disaster management programs which enhances a local consideration of the problems rather than being limited to a transfer of technology from industrialized to developing countries.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Greg Bankoff, Norma Bulaclac, Jessie Candules, Nestor Castro, Lino Dizon, Rene Estremera, Cyrene Gaillard, Guy Hilbero, Frédéric Leone, Catherine Liamzon, Emmanuel Maceda, Joel Mallari, Michael Pangilinan, Wesley Platon, Lanie Quemada-Dioniso, Tony Sibal and William Tolentino for their contribution.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in June 1991
Emmanuel M. de Guzman Consultant (Philippines)
The Pinatubo eruption of June 1991: The nature and impact of the disaster Nature of the disaster Reawakened after more than 500 years of slumber, Mount Pinatubo in the island of Luzon in the Philippines showed signs of imminent eruption early April 1991. On 12 June 1991 (Philippine Independence Day), its intermittent eruptions began. Three days after, on 15 June 1991, its most powerful eruption happened. Mount Pinatubo ejected massive volcanic materials of more than one cubic mile and created an enormous cloud of volcanic ash that rose as high as 22 miles into the air and grew to more than 300 miles across, turning day into night over Central Luzon. At lower altitude, the ash was blown in all direction by intense winds of a coincidental typhoon. At higher altitudes, the ash was blown southwestward. Volcanic ash and frothy pebbles blanketed the countryside. Fine ash fell as far as the Indian Ocean and satellites tracked the ash clouds several times around the globe. Nearly 20 million tons of sulfur dioxide were injected into the stratosphere and dispersed around the world causing global temperature to drop temporarily by 1*F from 1991 through 1993. Mount Pinatubo’s eruption was considered the largest volcanic eruption of the century to affect a densely populated area. After the explosive eruptions, posing a more serious and lingering threat to life, property and environment were the onslaught of lahars. Within hours after the eruption, heavy rains began to wash deposits of volcanic ash and debris from the slopes down into the surrounding lowlands in giant, fast-moving mudflows. Containing 40% (by weight) volcanic ash and rock, lahars flow faster than clear- water streams. These steaming mudflows cascade as fast as 40 miles per hour and can travel more than 50 miles. With 90% volcanic debris, lahars move fastest and are most destructive. When they reach the lowlands, they have speeds of more than 20 miles per hour and are as much as 30 feet thick and 300 feet wide. They can transport more than 35,000 cubic feet of debris and mud per second. For years, lahars continued to flow down the major river systems around the volcano and out into densely populated, adjoining lowlands. They destroyed and buried everything along their path: people and animals, farm and forest lands, bridges and natural waterways, houses and cars. They also rampage with terrifying rumbling sounds. By 1997, lahars had deposited more than 0.7 cubic miles (about 300 million dump-truck loads) of debris onto the lowlands, burying hundreds of square miles of land and causing greater destruction than
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
the eruption itself. With the volume of volcanic debris deposited on the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo, the threat of lahars is expected to continue until year 2010. The disaster brought about by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo had assumed a unique nature in view of the following: the widespread devastation that impacts on society and economy, the continuing threat of lahars and flooding, the destruction of endemic species of flora and fauna, the alteration of landscapes and land uses, and its impact on the global environment. Extent of damage and socio-economic impact The Mount Pinatubo eruptions and their aftereffects, particularly lahars during rainy seasons, not only have taken the lives of many but also have wrought havoc to the infrastructure and to economic activities of Central Luzon. Damage to crops, infrastructure, and personal property totaled at least P10.1 billion ($US 374 million) in 1991, and an additional P1.9 billion ($US 69 million) in 1992. In addition, an estimated P454 million ($US 17 million) of business was foregone in 1991, and an additional P37 million ($US 1.4 million) in 1992. Lahars continue to threaten lives and property in many towns in the provinces of Tarlac, Pampanga, and Zambales.
The actual destruction, coupled with the continuing threat of lahars and ash fall, had disrupted the otherwise flourishing economy of Central Luzon, slowing the region's growth momentum and altering key development activities and priorities. Major resources had been diverted to relief, recovery, and prevention of further damage.
The cost of caring for evacuees, including construction of evacuation camps and relocation centers, was at least P2.5 billion ($US 93 million) in 1991-1992, and an additional P4.2 billion ($US 154 million) was spent during the same period on dikes and dams to control lahars.
The longevity and impact of the calamity is so great that the public and private response must go beyond traditional relief and recovery. Return to pre-eruption conditions is impossible. Instead, responses must create an attractive climate for new investments, provide new livelihood and employment alternatives, promote growth in areas that are safe from future lahars and flooding, and provide an infrastructure that is tough enough to survive future disasters.
Areas and populations affected During the eruption of 15 June 1991, heavy ash falls had caused widespread damage in the provinces adjacent to Mount Pinatubo, as they covered large tracts of land and caused the roofs of houses, buildings and public facilities to collapse. These provinces were Zambales, Pampanga and Tarlac.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The regional office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) had reported a total of 657 persons dead, 184 injured and 23 missing as of 29 September 1991. The casualties were mostly victims of collapsing structures, drowning due to flooding, and diseases in the evacuation center. The provinces of Zambales and Pampanga accounted for most of the victims.
Moreover, from June 1991 to November 1992, the means of livelihood, houses, or both were partially or wholly lost in 364 barangays or villages. Per 1990 census, about 329,000 families (2.1 million people) or one-third of the region's population lived in these villages.
Table 1. Total number of barangays affected as of November 17, 1992 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992). ["Affected" refers to a situation where means of livelihood, houses, or both are lost or partially or completely destroyed]
Province Affected barangays No. of families Zambales 96 30,115 Pampanga 173 239,131 Tarlac 88 44,367 Angeles City 5 14,197 Nueva Ecija 2 1,331
Total 364 329,141
In 1991, 4,979 houses were totally destroyed and 70,257 houses were partially damaged. The number decreased in 1992, when 3,281 houses were wholly destroyed and 3,137 units were partially damaged (Table 2).
Table 2. Total number of houses damaged (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; Department of Social Welfare and Development, unpublished data, 1992). [Partial damage refers to any degree of physical destruction attributed to the disaster. Total destruction is the condition when the house is no longer livable]
Extent of damage 1991 1992 Total Totally destroyed houses 4,979 3,281 8,260 Partially damaged houses 70,257 3,137 73,394
Total 75,236 6,418 81,654
Of the 329,000 families (2.1 million persons) affected, 7,840 families (35,120 persons) were of the Aeta cultural minority (Office for Northern Cultural Communities, unpub. data, August 14, 1991). Although constituting less than 2 percent of the total affected population, these cultural minorities had received significant attention.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Impact on natural resources Moreover, the eruption had caused massive damage to natural resources. It had buried about 18,000 hectares of forest land in ash falls of about 25 centimeters. The series of heavy rains following the eruption had induced lahars to flow down to some 8,968 hectares of low-lying areas. At least eight major river systems have been clogged up by lahar, namely Balin-Baquero Bacao, Santo Tomas, Gumain, Porac, Pasig-Potrero, Abacan, Bamban and Tarlac Rivers.
Reforestation activities had been seriously setback in the mountain range of Zambales. About 19,799 hectares of new plantations were destroyed ash falls and some P125 million worth of seedlings were lost. Damage to natural forest covers and old plantations extended to around 43,801 hectares. About 10,206 hectares of agro-forestry farms under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Natural Resources had been destroyed.
Impact on agriculture Agricultural land area seriously affected by the ash fall reached some 96,200 hectares. Damage to crops, livestock and fisheries was valued at P1.4 billion. As of 17 November 1992, damage from s, flooding, and salutation was reported to be P1.4 billion, with crops and fisheries as most affected.
Table 3. Existing damage to agricultural commodities (in million pesos; Department of Agriculture, Region III, unpub. data, 1991; National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992). [Damage cost = total area damaged x expected yield per hectare. Expected yield is computed by referring to pre-calamity yield. Post-calamity yield is derived by referring to pre-calamity yield and subjecting the damaged crops to recovery chances/percentages. The value of the crops with negative chances/percentages is derived by multiplying them by the prevailing market prices of the crops. This value then becomes the damage cost.]
Commodity 1991 1992 Total Crops (hectares) 987.2 546.8 1,534.0 Livestock (heads) 203.2 9.8 213.0 Fisheries (hectares) 284.1 164.9 449.0 Sugarcane (hectares) 56.9 56.9
Total 1,474.5 778.4 2,252.9
Impact on trade and industry
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The trade and industry sector was also severely affected, especially the manufacturing and exporting sub-sectors, affecting 599 firms with total assets of P851 million. Foregone production losses were reported at 45% of potential sales for the year 1991 or P454 million while capital investments of the 306 affected firms surveyed destroyed stood at a total of P425 million. The hardest hit in the manufacturing sub-sector was the furniture industry with a total of P156.5 million in estimated damage with 108 firms affected. Impact on social services Health. Morbidity and mortality rates increased mainly in evacuation centers. The leading diseases were acute respiratory infections (ARI), diarrhea, and measles (Department of Health, unpublished data, 1991). The death rate (Aetas and lowlanders combined) was 7 per 10,000 per week during 1991; that for Aetas in 1991 reached as high as 26 per 10,000 per week, and averaged 16 per 10,000 per week (Department of Health, 1992), and was especially high among Aeta children.
Social welfare. -The continuing threat of s had required that relief - food, clothing, shelter, and other help - be provided far beyond the period that is normal for typhoons and other calamities. As of October 28, 1993, approximately 1,309,000 people were being served outside evacuation centers. As of the same date, 159 evacuation centers were being maintained by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) throughout Region III, housing some 11,455 families or 54,880 persons and providing them with food- for-work or cash-for-work assistance.
Education. About 700 school buildings with 4,700 classrooms were destroyed displacing an estimated 236,700 pupils and 7,009 teachers. Damage to school buildings was estimated to be P747 million as of August 1991 an amount that is growing with continuing lahar activity. Disruption of schooling was compounded by the use of undamaged school buildings as evacuation centers, which forced delays in the opening of classes and caused other disruptions of the school calendar. Initial damage to instructional materials, furniture, equipment, and other school supplies was estimated at P93 million pesos (Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, unpublished data, 1991).
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Table 4. Estimated cost of damage to school buildings by province or city as of August 12, 1991 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, Region III, unpublished data, 1991). [Ash fall is the major cause for this type of damage]
Province/City Cost (x1000Pesos) Zambales 410,000 Bataan 34,000 Olongapo City 140,000 Pampanga 130,000 Tarlac 13,000 Angeles City 12,000 Bulacan 5,050 Nueva Ecija 3,200
Total 747,250 Impact on public infrastructure In its damage assessment report as of August 23, 1991, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Regional Office III estimated damage to public infrastructure amounting to P3.8 billion. The gravest destruction was on irrigation and flood control systems, roads and bridges, and school buildings. Additional damage of at least 1 billion pesos was done to roads and bridges by lahars of 1992 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992).
Table 5. Total cost of damage to infrastructure as of August 23, 1991 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; Department of Public Works and Highways, Region III, unpub. data, 1991). [The prevailing foreign exchange rate during this period was $1 = 27.07 pesos]
Infrastructure subsector/Facility Damage Cost (x1000Pesos) Transportation 1,149,908 Communication 13,215 Power and electrification 54,918 Water resources 1,568,642 Social infrastructure 1,045,708
Total 3,832,391
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Overall impact on sectors As a whole, damage and production losses resulting from the eruption and subsequent lahars were about P10.5 billion in 1991 and P1.9 billion in 1992. These values include only damage and losses that were readily quantifiable. Additional losses, not included in these estimates, include human life, social fabric of communities, children's schooling, and other social aspects.
Table 6. Existing sectoral damage and production losses, 1991-92 (in millions of pesos) (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; National Economic Development Authority, unpublished data, 1991, 1992).
Sector 1991 1992 Total 1991-92 Public infrastructure 3,830 454 4,284 Agriculture 1,474 1,422 2,896 Military facilities 3,842 0 3,842 Trade and industry 851 0 851 Natural resources 125 0 125 Foregone income (trade and industry). 454 37 491
Total 10,576 1,913 12,489
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Overview of the disaster management by the Philippine Government
Laws, policies and organization In view of the magnitude and socio-economic impact of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, the Philippine Government had initiated and ensured an organized and integrated response to the calamity and the ensuing crises. In particular, the Philippine Congress and the Office of the President had passed and promulgated a series of laws and regulations that governed the country’s comprehensive response. The relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts by the government, including those supported by donor governments, nongovernmental and international organizations, were coordinated and implemented within the overall disaster management plan and development strategy pursued by the government. On 26 June 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino, through Memorandum Order No. 369, had created the Presidential Task Force on the Rehabilitation of Areas Affected by the Eruption of Mount Pinatubo or Task Force Mt. Pinatubo. It was mandated to guide and coordinate all rehabilitation efforts of the government, including those participated in by the private sector and the international community. After a year, the Mount Pinatubo Assistance, Resettlement and Development Commission succeeded the Task Force by virtue of a law, Republic Act 7637, passed by the Philippine Congress and signed by President Fidel V. Ramos on 24 September 1992. With a term of six years, the Commission was mandated, among others, to formulate policies and plans, to coordinate the implementation of programs and projects, and to administer the initial 10-billion peso fund appropriated for the “aid, relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and livelihood services as well as infrastructure support for the victims.” Specifically, the Commission was tasked to (1) provide additional funds for the immediate relief of victims, (2) establish resettlement centers and home sites, (3) provide livelihood and employment opportunities, (4) repair, reconstruct or replace infrastructure damaged or destroyed, and (5) construct new infrastructure facilities needed by the affected communities. In pursuit of these tasks, the Commission, through relevant government agencies, implemented projects and activities on four major program areas: resettlement, livelihood, social services and infrastructure. Pursuant to law, President Ramos extended the term of the Commission to December 2000 by virtue of Presidential Proclamation 1201 issued on 19 March 1998. The Commission pursued a comprehensive program that aimed to alleviate the sufferings of the victims, to protect them from further destruction, to help them rebuild their homes, and to gain a means of livelihood. In view of the limited term of the Commission and the necessity to sustain rehabilitation and development efforts, all government agencies concerned with the implementation of related works had been directed to include in their respective annual budget the necessary funding requirements (National Budget
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Memorandum Circular 74). This ensured the continuity and sustainability of critical rehabilitation programs beyond the Commission’s extended term. Moreover, as early as 1996, government agencies and local government units concerned had began integrating into their regular programs the delivery of basic social services to the affected communities, including school, health and welfare services. Similarly, the Department of Public Works and Highways had assumed the implementation, monitoring and improvement of engineering intervention works and lahar mitigation activities since 1997. Before the Commission expired, President Joseph E. Estrada transferred its chairmanship to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and directed the preparation of a winding up program (Executive Order No. 269 issued on 19 July 2000). Upon her assumption to office in 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued a series of directives to ensure the continuity, integration and sustainability of the Commission’s work. Executive Order No. 4, issued on 5 March 2001, created an ad hoc body to complete the wind up activities of the Commission. Executive Order No. 5, issued on 5 March 2001, transferred the administration of upland Pinatubo resettlement communities from the Commission to the concerned local government units. Executive Order No. 6, issued on 20 March 2001, transferred 14 existing lowland Pinatubo resettlement sites under the supervision of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). Also, it created under the Council the Pinatubo Project Management Office (PPMO) to manage the resettlement areas. Eventually, under Executive Order No. 54, the PMMO assumed the assets, records, funds, personnel, liabilities and all related functions, tasks and responsibilities from the defunct Commission.
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Disaster response
Early warning and evacuation Evacuation of the population at risk had been the concern of local authorities as early as April 1991 when the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) declared a 6-mile-radius danger zone around the volcano. PHIVOLCS, jointly with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), had conducted intensive studies and monitoring of the volcano’s activity from which it forecast and declared an imminent eruption and issued early warnings to the communities at risk. Among the first to have evacuated were the indigenous Aeta highlanders who had lived on the slopes of the volcano. About 20,000 in population, the Aetas had been safely evacuated before the eruption. People from the lowlands heeded also the warnings and fled to safer distance from the volcano. Also, more than 15,000 American servicemen and their dependents had evacuated from Clark Air Base before the eruption. Immediate response In the immediate aftermath of the eruption, the National Disaster Coordinating Council mobilized civilian and military resources to respond to the evacuation, rescue and relief requirements of the affected populations. Government agencies mobilized their respective facilities (hospitals, schools, etc.) and personnel (medical, social workers, teachers, etc.) to provide the necessary basic services in designated evacuation centers. The Department of Social Welfare and Development was in the forefront of providing emergency relief assistance to displaced families and victims in evacuation centers. The Department of Health led in the provision of medical care and public health services at evacuation centers, including disease surveillance. Heath advisories were also issued and broadcast to guide the public in coping with the ashfall as health hazard since the fine volcanic particles could cause sore eyes or trigger asthma. Later on, a host of countries extended humanitarian relief assistance to the Philippine Government and its support NGOs, including the Philippine National Red Cross. These countries included Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, U.K., and U.S.A. International organizations such as WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDRO and WFP also extended humanitarian relief assistance. The relief assistance was in the form of cash donations or relief items such as food packs, medicines, and shelter materials.
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Recovery and reconstruction plan
Development planning concerns The government’s recovery and rehabilitation plan was guided by a development principle that rehabilitation and reconstruction should not be limited to restoration of destroyed or damages areas, facilities and systems to their original conditions but should address the vulnerabilities and deficiencies of previously existing conditions and mitigate any future disaster impact. With the magnitude and extent of the destruction wrought by the eruption, development planners and policy-makers were confronted by the following concerns, which required immediate action as well as long-term solutions. 1) Resettlement. There was need to resettle people whose places of residence
had been devastated and were beyond immediate reconstruction or had been damaged or affected and deemed unsafe for habitation. There were two target beneficiaries for resettlement: the indigenous Aeta highlanders and the displaced lowlanders. The resettlement strategy for the two groups had to differ to consider the variation in socio-cultural orientation and socio- economic activities of the Aetas and the lowlanders.
2) Livelihood. Government had to address the pressing concern of providing
immediate and long-term, livelihood opportunities to displaced farmers and workers. Many farmlands had been unsuitable for agriculture and caused disruption of production of agriculture-based industries. The closure of Clark Air Base also presented the need for short-gestating livelihood opportunities and for alternative uses of base lands to cushion the effect of the massive displacement of workers.
3) Social Services. The continuing nature of the calamity had put pressure on
social services sector to provide continued social services in terms of health, social welfare and education. Health and psycho-social services had to be extended to victims both in and outside the evacuation centers. The immediate opening of the classes and the extension of the school calendar had to be considered by the government at the same time that it was providing relief services to evacuees in school facilities. Social services would have to be extended in resettlement areas in order to prepare the resettlers for final resettlement.
4) Infrastructure. The eruption had caused massive destruction to the region’s
roads and bridges, public buildings and facilities, communication, utilities and river and flood control structures. There was also need to institute disaster mitigation measures in view of the continuing threat of lahars and flashfloods.
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5) Land use and environmental management. The effects of the eruption, especially lahar, continue to destroy farmlands, forest lands and watersheds and had caused damages to the river systems and overall environment of the region. This required careful physical land use re-planning of the region.
6) Science and Technology. The need to undertake scientific studies and
formulate corresponding studies and policies was an evident concern and challenge for science and technology. The development of alternative uses of ash fall for commercial or industrial was an important concern for both government and the private sector.
In response to the above-mentioned concerns, the government vigorously pursued the following specific development objectives:
・ To mitigate further the destruction brought about by the adverse effects of the eruption, especially the lahars;
・ To normalize and accelerate economic recovery including the creation of an alternative investment climate;
・ To provide adequate livelihood and employment alternatives, especially for displaced farmers and workers;
・ To promote growth and development in resettlement and new settlement areas serving as alternatives to permanently damaged/ high-risk areas;
・ To ensure the continuous flow of goods and services, especially during relief operations when calamity strikes (lahars had made many areas inaccessible);
・ To strengthen institutional structures, arrangements, and mechanisms for disaster preparedness/ responsiveness and raise public awareness on disaster mitigation and reduction;
・ To reduce susceptibility of vertical and horizontal infrastructures to damages due to lahars and other disasters; and
・ To prevent further degradation of the environment and rehabilitate damaged ecosystems.
Development strategy As key feature of its development strategy, the government adopted team work or “kabisig” in the pursuit of rehabilitation and reconstruction programs and projects. As an overall approach, the government emphasized cooperation and coordination among national and local government agencies, private sector, including NGOs and the victims themselves to prevent duplication of efforts. The government also ensured that these programs and projects were consistent with the broader regional development framework. The overall spatial development strategy for Central Luzon envisioned the region as the transit lane between the resource-based areas of the Northern Luzon and the highly populated and industrialized areas of the National capital region. As such the region shall continue to serve as the catchment area for population and industry spillover from Metro Manila and assume the provide the requirements of the
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Northern Luzon provinces in terms of processing and manufacturing of goods and their distribution. Moreover, the government developed specific strategies, programs and projects that address the concerns earlier mentioned, i.e. in areas of resettlement, livelihood, social services, infrastructure, science and technology, and land use and environmental management. These were made in consultation with local government officials, community leaders and the beneficiaries themselves. Programs and projects In accordance with the development strategy, the government established programs for the following:
・ Resettlements for the Aetas highlanders (P349 million) and the lowlanders (P1.689 billion).
・ Livelihood programs focused on agriculture and industry, providing quick-generating income opportunities to affected families: Bamboo Development Project (P80 million), Agricultural Rehabilitation Program (P197.4 million); Agricultural Development Program ((P615 million); Productivity Centers (P1.12 billion), Integrated Cattle Fattening program ( (P120 million), Integrated Poultry Livelihood Program ( (P40 million), Deep Sea Fishing ( (P58 million), Financing Programs (P3.718 billion), Common Service Facilities (P50 million).
・ Delivery of basic social services: relief services (P370.5 million), health and nutrition service ((P367 million).
・ Infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction: River Systems Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (P2.9 billion), Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Roads and Bridges (P1.5 billion), Development of Alternate Routes in Capas-Botolan Road (P537 million) San Fernando- Dinalupihan Road (P1.4 billion), and in Angeles-Porac-Floridablanca- Dinalupihan Road ( (P169 million), Rehabilitation of Damaged Schools and Public Buildings (P982 million), Mobile Health Facilities (P40 million), Repair and Rehabilitation of Damaged National and Communal Irrigation Systems (P228.6 million), Rehabilitation of Railway Facilities (P70 million).
With the assumption by the national government agencies of certain programs and projects, the National Disaster Coordinating Council and the National Economic Development Authority are currently consolidating and assessing the status, outcome and impact of critical rehabilitation and reconstruction programs and projects. In general, the government had acted in dispatch in implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction programs and projects, including the construction of infrastructures for lahar and flood mitigation. For example, for the protection and rehabilitation of lahar-threatened areas in Central Luzon, the DEPWH had completed in just four (4) months the construction of the 24-kilometer Pasig-
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Potrero Outer Dike or “Megadike”in Bacolor, Pampanga. The megadike served as a defense of the vulnerable areas against rampaging lahars during the 1996 rainy season. Moreover, the participation and support of the private sector, including the NGOs, had hastened and enhanced the delivery of basic services to the affected populations and had ensured that the necessary services, where ever and whenever government was seen to be deficient, were present and responsive to the needs of victims.
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Significance of international assistance With the magnitude of rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in Central Luzon, the government was able to pursue its recovery and rehabilitation plan more efficiently and effectively with the support and assistance of other governments and international funding institutions. Most of the foreign assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction came in the form of grants, loans, and technical assistance packages. Among the countries that had extended assistance included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and U.S.A. World Bank and Asian Development Bank had also extended support and loan facilities. Some specific projects under the auspices of the DPWH, which were made possible by foreign assistance, included:
・ ADB-funded Mt. Pinatubo Damage Rehabilitation Project ・ German Bank for Reconstruction-funded Mt. Pinatubo Emergency Aide
Project ・ Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)-funded Mt. Pinatubo
Relief and Rehab Project ・ USAID-funded United States Army Corps of Engineers' Mt. Pinatubo
Recovery Action ・ Dutch-funded dredging of the Pasac- Guagua-San Fernando Waterway ・ Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)-funded Pinatubo Hazard
Urgent Mitigation Project ・ German Centrum for International Migration (CIM)-funded Technical
Assistance for Mount Pinatubo Emergency-PMO ・ JICA-funded Grant Aid for Water Supply in Mt. Pinatubo Resettlement
Areas and Study on Flood and Mudflow control for Sacobia- Bamban/Abacan Rivers
・ IBRD-funded Technical Assistance for Mt. Pinatubo and Rehabilitation Works
・ Swiss Disaster Relief-funded Technical Assistance for Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation
・ JBIC Yen Loan Package-funded Pinatubo hazard Urgent Mitigation Project
Based on the Philippine experience in responding to and coping with the impact and lingering effects of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, inter-agency coordination and multi-sectoral and multilateral cooperation are vital in achieving short-term and long-term goals for recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. With the accomplishment of urgent development projects, the affected communities were able to recover quickly from the disasters and government was able to institute necessary disaster mitigation measures.
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The application and use of good practices and experiences made available through technical assistance extended by other governments and international organizations facilitated the development and implementation of critical development programs and projects and the early recovery and rehabilitation of the affected areas.
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Promoting cooperation and coordination of international assistance
In view of the beneficial impact of international assistance on recovery and rehabilitation, the promotion of cooperation and coordination in this area is worthwhile if not an imperative to ensure early recovery from disasters. Disaster-stricken countries or communities should have ready access to international assistance, or, at least, to bodies of information on best practices on recovery and rehabilitation. This access could be established and realized if there is an efficient and effective mechanism for sharing information and coordinating or facilitating international assistance. An efficient information system on local damage and needs and the available external resources, including funds and expertise, plays a critical role in the coordination or facilitation of any international assistance. Moreover, on one hand, the national or local disaster coordinating body or focal point agency is a critical enabling mechanism whose initiative and involvement in accessing, securing and availing an international assistance has to be ensured. On the other hand, international bodies or organizations that may assume the role of facilitator or coordinator in matching local appeals with external assistance should possess an efficient system for information sharing and communication among the national and local focal points and the potential donors in the international community. However, while its significance in ensuring early recovery and rehabilitation is appreciated, the establishment of a truly efficient and effective coordinating body or organizational function at the international level may only be achieved through a process of consultation and consensus-building (especially on procedures and protocols) among the critical stakeholders, including governments (decision-makers), national focal points, donor agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
References
・ Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program for Mt. Pinatubo-Affected
Areas, Task Force Mt. Pinatubo 1992
・ Socioeconomic Impacts of the Mount Pinatubo Eruption, Mercado, R., Lacsamana, J, and Pineda , G. 1999
・ National Disaster Coordinating Council, unpublished document and
report compilations, 1991-2004
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: lahars of Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 114-97
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: The Cataclysmic 1991 Eruption
of Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 113- 97
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: Benefits of volcano monitoring
far outweigh costs – The case of Mount Pinatubo, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 115-97
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