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12 | Briefings on Hospital Safety July 2018

These workers, says OSHA, must be trained by a qualified person to correctly identify and minimize fall hazards; use personal fall protection systems and rope descent systems; and maintain, inspect, and store equipment or systems used for fall protection.

When there is a change in workplace operations or equipment, “or the employer believes that a worker would benefit from additional training based on a lack of knowledge or skill, then the worker must be retrained,” states OSHA materials. The training must be provided in a language and vocabulary that workers understand.

Remember to include falls safety when hiring a con- tractor to do work at your facility. Under OSHA’s multi-employer citation policy, it is possible for your

hospital as well as the contractor or subcontractor to be cited for an unsafe workplace or incident in which someone is injured or killed.

When dealing with a contractor, OSHA will expect a hospital to create a site-specific safety program, supervise and enforce the safety protocols for that project, and maintain authority to correct safety hazards, Salmasi says. Have regular safety meetings with contractors and subcontractors, document those meetings, and do regular inspections on-site, he recommends. H

EDITOR’S NOTE:

A version of this story first appeared in Environment of Care Leader,

a DecisionHealth newsletter.

HEALTHCARE SECURITY ALERT

Active shooters

Five key steps for creating, implementing an active shooter plan at your healthcare facility The threat of an active shooter roaming the hallways is one of the biggest worries among safety professionals and C-suite executives in the health- care industry.

Preparedness for active shooter situations is also on the minds of accrediting organizations and agencies such as CMS, The Joint Commission, NFPA, and OSHA, who have all recently called for better protection of healthcare workers from workplace violence or are currently considering new standards.

Steve Wilder, BA, CHSP, STS, has spent more than three decades in healthcare safety, security, and risk management, including stints as a hospital

risk manager and corporate director of safety and security for a health system. He has consulted with hundreds of clients, including hospitals, clinics, and physician practices, and has trained thousands of workers in workplace safety and security.

In addition to his regular contributions to health- care magazines, Wilder co-authored the book The Essentials of Aggression Management in Healthcare: From Talkdown to Takedown.

During a December 2017 webinar organized by HCPro, Wilder explained how to comply with the revised CMS rule for emergency preparedness and prepare your staff for any situation. He also helped attendees understand the key parts of an active

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HEALTHCARE SECURITY ALERT

shooter plan, went over how staff can improve deci- sion-making skills, and provided tips on controlling staff anxiety and stress during emergency situations.

In this 90-minute webinar—which can be viewed on demand through HCMarketplace.com—he shared his five key components for an active shooter plan. The following is a summary of that portion of Wilder’s presentation.

Step 1: Conduct a vulnerability assessment

Wilder believes the first key component of an active shooter plan is determining threats. Who might pose internal or external threats to your building or campus? How can you assess vulnerabilities that “are the chinks in the armor that allow an opportu- nity for a bad guy to strike”? Then you should consider the potential outcomes if an active shooter were to barge into your healthcare facility.

As a consultant, Wilder routinely does vulnerabil- ity assessments for healthcare organizations.

“We come in from the outside and see the things you see every day to the point where you stop seeing them,” he said. “I tell my clients, ‘We’re good guys that get paid to look like bad guys.’ ”

Wilder said that for an active shooter event to occur, three critical factors must be present.

“First of all, there has to be a bad guy. The bad guy is always going to be a part of our society. There’s nothing we can do to get rid of him. We can put one in jail and there will be 10 more stepping up to take his place,” said Wilder. “Secondly, the bad guy has to have a motive. I can’t do anything about the motive. That comes from inside his heart or inside his head.”

He continued: “And thirdly, he has to have an opportunity. … The only thing we can do is take away his opportunity to strike at our place, whether it’s a burglar or an active shooter or an

arsonist, a predator, whatever the case may be. The only thing we can do is take away his opportunity, and that’s what the security vulnerability assess- ment is designed to do.”

After identifying all the opportunities “for the bad guys to strike,” steps can then be taken to put programs in place “to minimize the vulnerabili- ties,” which, said Wilder, is “a great step.”

Step 2: Develop an emergency response plan

Wilder said an active shooter emergency response plan must keep in mind everyone who could come through your doors—including but not limited to patients, employees, residents, visitors, and ven- dors. “We’ve got to incorporate all those people in, because when we’ve got an active shooter in the building, we become responsible for all those people,” he said.

Wilder notes that writing an active shooter emer- gency response plan “is much more challenging in our buildings than it is in any other industry because a lot of our doors” can’t have locks.

And, he said, that plan “has to be realistic to the threat,” whether the shooter is looking for a specific person such as an ex-spouse, or whether the situa- tion is like “in San Bernardino a couple of years ago where the individual just wanted to spray bullets and he doesn’t care how many people he takes out.”

Regardless of a shooter’s motive, the plan should be written “with a survival mindset.”

“This is the one emergency code that is not going to involve a response team,” said Wilder. “When you have an active shooter, you’re not going to have a code team responding. People need to be run- ning the other way. If you’re involved in this scenario, that puts you in a position of having to rely on yourself for survival—ergo relying on your training for survival.”

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14 | Briefings on Hospital Safety July 2018

Wilder added, “We can be sitting ducks if we don’t have a plan.”

Whoever is writing your active shooter emergency response plan should be thinking of the answers to critical questions such as “Where are the exits?” and “Where are my hiding places?” as well as “Where are my weapons of opportunity to protect myself if I have to fight back?”

Wilder teaches a model called the “Four Outs,” which he called “ ‘Run, Hide, Fight’ on steroids,” and he discussed it in detail during the webinar. But perhaps the biggest difference between “Four Outs” and the “Run, Hide, Fight” model, which was developed by the Department of Homeland Secu- rity, is that the former considers options for setting up barricades in rooms with doors that don’t lock.

Step 3: Develop an active shooter training program

Once the written plan is completed, then you can develop your training program, said Wilder. Plan and program must be consistent, he stressed, because “catastrophic outcomes will result” if your written plan tells your employees to do one thing and the training program says something different.

He cautioned against buying a prewritten active shooter emergency response plan and training program online because they will not be tailored for your individual facility.

“Every one of you has different points of access. Every one of you has different hours that your perimeter doors are locked and unlocked. Every one of you has different visitor standards. Every one of you is different,” he said. “Why would you want to try to buy a generic plan that’s written one size fits all? It doesn’t work. You have to write your plan specific to your facility.”

HEALTHCARE SECURITY ALERT

Wilder recommends a four-step approach to training, starting with awareness, then preparedness “where we actually train on the content of our plan,” then exercises and drills. Last but not least, the fourth step is evaluating your plans and looking for ways to improve them.

“At the end of every exercise, we need to look in the mirror and say, ‘How did we do?’ ” said Wilder. “We’ve got to improve. This is a continuous quality improvement process.”

He added that training must be “all-inclusive”—yes, administrators and C-suite executives, too. And that’s not just because surveyors will hit you with a major citation if they discover executives skipped the training.

“Number one, just because you’re in the C-suite, you’re not immune to training,” he said. “Number two, as part of the chief executive branch, people are looking to you for leadership, and if you are not trained in the same program that your people are trained in, you’re going to be telling them to do one thing when your plan says something else —in the worst possible situation.”

Step 4: Train staff how to respond to an active shooter

After finishing an active shooter training plan that fits seamlessly with the emergency response plan, it’s time to actually start using it to train your employ- ees. Wilder said that all new employees should go through a facilitywide program as well as depart- ment-specific training.

Wilder believes employees should be trained to pick the best course of action from a range of options, so they can make the safest decision as quickly as possible. “And we want to make sure that they know how to apply those choices and when to make [each] choice,” he said.

He said that in a real-life active shooter situation, the first responses for everyone, including a trained

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HEALTHCARE SECURITY ALERT

that to prepare me so that in the event of an emergency

situation—when my adrenaline is skyrocketing, and

my pulse is racing and I’m hyperventilating probably,

I’m not thinking clearly and my mind isn’t working

properly—they want those responses to become

second nature.”

Step 5: Plan for the response after an emergency

In the aftermath of an active shooter event, you

must quickly initiate a facility crisis management

plan to return to a normal—and safer—state of

affairs as quickly as possible. Among the many

needs at that time may be a liaison to the media,

additional security, and crisis counseling.

The hours and days after this kind of emergency

will be chaotic, so plan ahead, said Wilder.

“At 1 o’clock in the morning when the shooting has

taken place is not the time for me, with shaking

hands and total anxiety, to be flipping through the

yellow pages looking for a crisis counselor or

additional security or whatever I need,” said

Wilder. “I need to do my planning in advance.”

safety and security professional like himself, would be “startle and fear.”

“And that’s OK,” he said. “Guys, this is scary. It’s OK to be scared, even if you’re well-trained.”

But what happens next, Wilder said, usually depends on an individual’s level of training.

“All that training is going to come back to the forefront of your head, and your response is going to be exactly what you were trained to do,” he said. “It’s amazing. I’ve seen it over and over and over. Your training kicks in. You might have forgotten everything about that training program, but your brain—that big hard drive in your head—all of the sudden brings it back to active memory.”

And if staff haven’t been trained? “They’re going to have a meltdown on you. They’re going to be useless. They’re going to be a liability to you and they’re going to get you hurt or killed.”

That’s why he scoffed at the thought of “people being scared to do these exercises.”

Wilder compared it to monotonous pre-flight instruc- tions from flight attendants, saying, “They’re doing

Security

Use new NFPA 3000 to improve community planning for mass casualty response Use a new NFPA standard to review your over- all preparedness for responding to mass casualty events and improve your coordination with other healthcare providers, first responders, and commu- nity emergency organizations.

Spurred by coordination problems identified after several recent mass shootings, NFPA 3000, a Stan- dard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response

(ASHER), is designed to help communities prepare for multiple casualties. It was released May 1.

There is no current mandate for hospitals to embrace the standards set out in NFPA 3000, which was fast-tracked as a provisional standard in the aftermath of the mass shooting at an Orlando, Fla., nightclub in June 2016 (ECL 5/7/18). However, both CMS and The Joint Commission have noted

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Mental Health Organizations Module 12

Resource Mission

• Practitioners

• Educators

• Students

• Clients

• Families

Advocacy Education

Research

American Psychological Association (APA)

All Psychology Topics

• Abortion

• Addictions

• ADHD

• Aging

• Alzheimer's

• Anger

• Anxiety

• Autism

• Bipolar disorder

• Bullying

• Children

• COVID-19

• Death and dying

• Depression

• Disability

• Disasters

• Eating disorders

• Education

• Emotional health

• Environment

• Ethics

• Hate crimes

• Health disparities

• HIV and AIDS

• Human rights

• Hypnosis

• Immigration

• Intelligence

• Kids and the media

• Law and psychology

• Learning and memory

• Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender

• Marriage and divorce

• Military

• Money

• Obesity

• Pain

• Parenting

• Personality

• Posttraumatic stress disorder

• Racism, bias, and discrimination

• Safety and design

• Schizophrenia

• Sex

• Sexual abuse

• Shyness

• Sleep

• Socioeconomic status

• Sport and exercise

• Stress

• Suicide

• Teens

• Testing issues

• Therapy

• Trauma

• Violence

• Women and men

• Workplace issues

American Psychiatric Association

National Institute on Mental Illness (NIMH)

National Institute on Mental Illness (NIMH) – Part 2

National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI)

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)

Things to consider:

Create a resource listCreate

Contact referral sources

(psychiatrist, psychologist, therapist, social workers, drug treatment programs, etc. ) Contact

Identify contacts in local offices of national organizations (NIH, APA, NAMI, etc)Identify

End of Presentation

CHAPTER 12

Mental Health Organizations

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American Psychological Association (APA) (1 of 4)

Website: https://www.apa.org/

Founded:1892

Current membership: 118,000 members.

The American Psychological Association is a membership-based national professional organization of psychologists with the aims of advancing the creation, communication and application of psychological knowledge to benefit society and improve people’s lives.

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2

American Psychological Association (APA) (2 of 4)

Mission: “To promote the advancement, communication, and application of psychological science and knowledge to benefit society and improve lives.”

The organization accomplishes this mission by:

Utilizing psychology to make a positive impact on critical societal issues

Elevating the public’s understanding of, regard for, and use of psychology

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3

American Psychological Association (APA) (3 of 4)

Mission (continued):

Preparing the discipline and profession of psychology for the future

Strengthening APA’s standing as an authoritative voice for psychology

Vision: “a strong, diverse, and unified psychology that enhances knowledge and improves the human condition.”

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4

American Psychological Association (APA) (4 of 4)

Organizational structure

At the top of the organization is the president.

The president is elected by the entire membership.

The president chairs the board of directors and the council of representatives.

The board of directors consists of six members-at-large and six officers. The six officers are (1) the president-elect, (2) the president, (3) the past president, (4) the treasurer, (5) the recording secretary, and (6) the chief executive officer (CEO).

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Related Organizations of APA (1 of 3)

1. APA Services, Inc., which was established in 2018 as an expansion of the previous APA Practice Organization and is a 501 (c)(6) organization that focuses on advocating for the profession of psychology

2. American Professional Agency, Inc., which provides professional liability insurance

3. American Psychological Foundation, which provides financial support for research projects

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Related Organizations of APA (2 of 3)

4. International Psychological Organizations, which maintains a directory of international psychology organizations

5. Ethnic Minority Psychological Associations, which supports ethnic minority psychologists that include Native Americans, Asian Americans, African Americans, and Latinas and Latinos

6. Education Advocacy Trust, which promotes education and training of psychologists through fundraising and other political activities

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Related Organizations of APA (3 of 3)

7. Psi Chi, the national honor society in psychology that provides academic recognition to students who meet academic criteria

8. Psi Beta, the national honor society in psychology for community and junior colleges, which recognizes excellence in scholarship, leadership, research, and community service

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American Psychiatric Association (1 of 4)

Website: https://www.psychiatry.org/

Founded: 1844

Current membership: 38,500 U.S. and international member physicians, residents and students

The American Psychiatric Association is a membership-based national professional organization of psychiatrists with the aims of promoting the highest quality care for individuals with mental disorders and their families, promoting psychiatric education and research, advancing and representing the profession of psychiatry, and serving the professional needs of its membership.

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American Psychiatric Association (2 of 4)

Mission

Promote the highest quality care for individuals with mental illness, including substance use disorders, and their families

Promote psychiatric education and research

Advance and represent the profession of psychiatry

Serve the professional needs of its membership

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American Psychiatric Association (3 of 4)

Vision: “The American Psychiatric Association is an organization of psychiatrists working together to ensure humane care and effective treatment for all persons with mental illness, including substance use disorders. It is the voice and conscience of modern psychiatry. Its vision is a society that has available, accessible quality psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.”

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American Psychiatric Association (4 of 4)

Organizational structure

The organization includes as members only those medical specialists who are either qualified or in the process of being qualified as psychiatrists.

The structure of the American Psychiatric Association includes (1) a legislative branch of elected representatives, called the Assembly; (2) a group of appointed experts in a particular area, called the components (councils and committees); and (3) the executive branch, called the board of trustees.

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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (1 of 4)

Website: https://www.nimh.nih.gov/index.shtml

Founded: 1949

The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is a federal organization with the aim of preventing and treating mental illnesses through basic and clinical research.

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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (2 of 4)

Mission: “The mission of NIMH is to transform the understanding and treatment of mental illnesses through basic and clinical research, paving the way for prevention, recovery and cure.”

Vision: “NIMH envisions a world in which mental illnesses are prevented and cured.”

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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (3 of 4)

Organizational structure

NIMH funds the research of scientists spread all over the country and also houses approximately 500 scientists at its office.

The organization has seven divisions, along with the office of the director:

Division of Neuroscience and Basic Behavioral Science (DNBBS)

Division of Translational Research (DTR)

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National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (4 of 4)

Division of AIDS Research (DAR)

Division of Services and Intervention Research (DSIR)

Division of Extramural Activities (DEA)

Division of Intramural Research Programs (DIRP)

Center for Global Mental Health Research (CGMHR), which coordinates efforts to improve the lives of people living with mental illnesses in low-resource settings around the world

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National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (1 of 4)

Website: https://www.nami.org/

Founded: 1979

Current membership: Approximately 200,000 members

The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) is a grassroots membership-based organization devoted to improving the lives of individuals and families affected by mental illnesses.

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National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (2 of 4)

Mission: NAMI has a four-pronged mission that focuses on (1) listening, (2) education, (3) advocacy related to mental illnesses, and (4) leading.

Vision: The vision of NAMI is to improve the lives of individuals and families affected by mental illness.

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National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (3 of 4)

Organizational structure

NAMI is a 501(c)3 nonprofit membership organization governed by a board of directors elected by the membership. There are two ways to become a part of NAMI: (1) By creating a free NAMI.org account to start connecting with NAMI and to get all the latest updates; (2) by becoming a NAMI member at all three levels of the organization—national, state, and local with following rates for all three levels: (a) $60 per year for a household membership that includes all members of a household living at the same address; (b) $40 per year for a regular membership, which is an individual membership for one person; (c) $5 per year for an open door membership for an individual member with limited financial resources.

The members elect a 16-member board of directors to provide strategic guidance to accomplish the mission of the organization.

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National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) (4 of 4)

Organizational structure (continued)

The organization has four councils:

1. Peer Leadership Council of people who have a mental illness

2. State Presidents’ Council, which comprises the current state president of each state organization

3. NAMI Service Members, Veterans, and Their Families Council, which comprises veterans and their families

4. Executive Director’s Council, which provides advice to the Executive Director’s office

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World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) (1 of 3)

Website: https://wfmh.global/

Founded: 1948

The World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) is an international membership-based organization composed of members all over the world to prevent mental disorders, ensure proper treatment of mental disorders, and promote mental health.

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World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) (2 of 3)

Mission: The mission of WFMH is “to promote the advancement of mental health awareness, prevention of mental disorders, advocacy, and best practice recovery focused interventions worldwide.”

Vision: The vision of WFMH is “a world in which mental health is a priority for all people. Public policies and programs reflect the crucial importance of mental health in the lives of individuals.”

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World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) (3 of 3)

Organizational structure

The organization has an executive committee that is elected every 2 years and consists of the president, past president, president-elect, treasurer, secretary, vice-president of constituency development, and vice-president of program development.

The organization has seven regional vice-presidents in the regions of Africa, Asia Pacific, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania.

WFMH has its secretariat in Occoquan, Virginia.

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American Academy of Psychotherapists (AAP)

Website: https://www.aapweb.com/

Founded: 1955

The American Academy of Psychotherapists (AAP) is a membership-based national professional organization of psychotherapists with the aims of enhancing psychotherapists, challenging experienced practitioners to professional excellence, and exploring the relationship of person and process to psychotherapy.

Mission: To invigorate the psychotherapist’s quest for growth and excellence through authentic interpersonal engagement.

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American Public Health Association (APHA): Mental Health Section (1 of 2)

Website: http://www.apha.org

Founded:1872 (The mental health section was founded over 50 years ago.)

The American Public Health Association (APHA) is a membership-based national professional organization of individuals interested in public health. The mental health section of this organization promotes public health policy and educational programs aimed at enhancing the mental health of all people and improving the quality of health care for the mentally ill.

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American Public Health Association (APHA): Mental Health Section (2 of 2)

Mission: The mission of the overall organization is to “improve the health of the public and achieve equity in health status.” The mission of the mental health section is to develop, promote, and advocate for research, policy, and practice that support the mental health, physical health, and well-being of all people including diverse and vulnerable populations.

Vision: “Create the healthiest nation in one generation”

Membership is open to health professionals, other career workers in the health field, and any person interested in public health.

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Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (1 of 3)

Website: https://www.samhsa.gov/

Founded: 1992

Mission: The SAMHSA is the agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) that is responsible for directing public health efforts to promote the behavioral health of the country. Its mission is “to reduce the impact of substance abuse and mental illness on America’s communities”

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Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (2 of 3)

Vision: “To provide leadership and resources—programs, policies, information and data, funding, and personnel—advance mental and substance use disorder prevention, treatment, and recovery services in order to improve individual, community, and public health.”

Organizational Structure:

SAMHSA is led by the Assistant Secretary and a team of Directors and Regional Administrators.

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Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (3 of 3)

Organizational structure (continued):

SAMHSA has nine offices and centers:

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Mental Health and Substance Use;

National Mental Health and Substance Use Policy Laboratory;

Office of Financial Resources;

Office of Management, Technology, and Operations;

Office of Communications;

Center for Mental Health Services;

Center for Substance Abuse Prevention;

Center for Substance Abuse Treatment; and

Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality.

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Other Organizations in Mental Health (1 of 3)

American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry (http://www.aapdp.org/)

American Association of Suicidology (https://www.suicidology.org/)

American Counseling Association (https://www.counseling.org/ )

American College Counseling Association (http://www.collegecounseling.org/)

American Mental Health Counselors Association (https://www.amhca.org/about)

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Other Organizations in Mental Health (2 of 3)

American Psychiatric Nurses Association (https://www.apna.org/)

American Psychoanalytic Association (http://www.apsa.org/)

Anxiety and Depression Association of America (https://adaa.org/)

Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance (https://www.dbsalliance.org/)

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Other Organizations in Mental Health (3 of 3)

International Psychoanalytical Association (http://www.ipa.world/)

International Society for Mental Health Online (https://ismho.org/)

Mental Health America (http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net)

National Association of Behavioral Healthcare (NABH) (https://nabh.org/)

Parity Implementation Coalition (PAC) (https://parityispersonal.org/coalition)

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Michael is a freshman computer science major taking 15 credit hours at a Mid-Western Public University.  A good student in high school, he was competitively selected by the University with a small circle of friends from high school that he frequently socializes.  Michael lives in the dorm, first time away from home, and enjoys his freedom.  Eating all meals at the university cafeteria, he has gained some weight since starting school, a development he does not like.  Michael took midterm exams last week and did not do well on them.  He barely passed three courses and marginally failed two others.  He is worried about assignments, final exams, and grades this semester. 

Training for the Unthinkable: Examining Message Characteristics on Motivations to Engage in an Active-Shooter Response Video Jessica L. Ford & Seth S. Frei

Campus safety is becoming an increasing concern for academic institutions due to numerous recent tragedies. To prepare students, staff, and faculty for these events, schools are beginning to use active shooter response training videos such as Run, Hide, Fight—a 5-minute video created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Framed in protection motivation theory, this study employs a 3 x 2 factorial design to test the influence of message medium (email, text, or tweet) and frame (direct or fear- based message) on students' completion of the safety training video. The findings suggest that the combination of message frame and message medium influence training com- pletion. Additionally, the video itself led to a significant increase in participants’ self- efficacy, safety knowledge, and campus safety salience.

Keywords: Campus Safety; Protection Motivation; Safety Training; School Schootings

Unthinkable tragedies are occurring on our nation’s campuses at a frightening frequency (Midlarsky & Klain, 2005). The rise in school shootings in America has sparked a particular focus on protecting and planning for these events (Kingshott & McKenzie, 2013). In fact, according to the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (20 U.S.C. § 1092(f), 1999), all higher education institutions actively accepting government funds are required to put in place emergency response plans. An integral part of preparing for these events

Jessica L. Ford is an Assistant Professor in the School of Communication Studies at Ohio University. Seth S. Frei is a Lecturer in the Department of Communication Studies at Texas State University. Correspondence: Jessica L. Ford, School of Communication Studies, Ohio University, 400 Schoonover Center, 20 E. Union, Athens, OH 45701, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Communication Studies Vol. 67, No. 4, September–October 2016, pp. 438–454

ISSN 1051-0974 (print)/ISSN 1745-1035 (online) © 2016 Central States Communication Association DOI: 10.1080/10510974.2016.1196381

from a safety-personnel perspective is the training of civilians to react effectively to these emergencies (Kingshott & McKenzie, 2013). Despite the considerable need to train our schools’ students, staff, and faculty for these events, few studies have examined the effectiveness of organizational training initiatives (see Sattler, Kirsch, Shipley, Cocke, & Stegmeier, 2014 for a notable exception).

In many cases, campuses simply offer information about how to respond to an active-shooter situation through a Web site, brochure, video, or e-mail. Thus, under- standing proper emergency response behavior is placed on the individual’s motivation to learn this vital information on his or her own time (Sattler et al., 2014). Clearly, there are inherent problems with this design. For instance, if those on campus are unaware of these training materials, the influence of this information is limited. Besides the need to effectively promote active-shooter response-training programs, campuses must work against the dominant belief that the likelihood of these events occurring is slim-to-none. Time and again, this is the overwhelming response from those affected by school shootings (Oksanen, Räsänen, Nurmi, & Lindström, 2010).

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Recognizing that schools must prepare their students, faculty, and staff for potential active-shooter emergencies, the present study focuses on the effectiveness of messages prompting the completion of a safety training video. The first goal of this study is to understand which media—e-mail, text, or Twitter—and which message frame—fear- based or direct information—are most effective on messages designed to promote participation in an active-shooter response-training initiative. The second objective of this study is to test the impact of this training video on participants’ (a) safety knowledge, (b) safety self-efficacy, and (c) personal campus safety salience. We define personal campus safety salience as an individual’s active concern for their safety at school. For instance, someone who has a high level of personal campus safety salience may avoid areas of campus due to safety reasons, or even worry about an active shooter event happening at his or her school. Taken together, understanding the effectiveness of different media used to promote participation in training, as well as the impact of these videos, carries important implications for all academic institutions plagued by the fear of these potential events. The following sections describe the guiding theoretical framework in detail and provide a review of literature on message characteristics, threat appraisal, and coping appraisal.

PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY AND ACTIVE-SHOOTER RESPONSE TRAINING

Protection motivation theory (PMT) helps explain why people respond to similar threats differently (Rogers, 1975). The extensive use of PMT as a framework in health studies for assessing how individuals decide to make behavioral modifications to either promote or suppress their well-being (e.g., Gaston & Prapavessis, 2012) lends

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itself well to studying safety-related messages. As such, this framework is especially useful in understanding the cognitive process that mediates the response to fear-based messages, where individuals assess the severity of a threat and their ability to cope with it. Rogers (1975) offers three phases of protection motivation, where individuals (a) evaluate the information they know about the threat, (b) appraise the severity and their ability to cope with the threat and (c) decide to either respond in an effective or ineffective manner (see Figure 1). All three of these processes are important in assessing how the same fear-based stimuli can produce vastly different responses.

The first component of PMT is the assessment of both environmental and intra- personal factors that relate to the threat (Rogers, 1975). The environmental factors include what someone hears from others about the likelihood of the event as well as their observations of potential hazards or threats (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). In relation to protection motivation against school shootings, students may hear others (i.e., faculty, parents, or peers) talk about national events and subsequently have concern for their campus. Students may also observe an increase in safety-related features around campus (e.g., blue-light warning systems, emergency-siren installa- tion, and availability of mental-health services) in response to the rise in school shootings. Beyond environmental considerations, PMT states that intrapersonal fac- tors, such an individual’s personality and prior experience with the threat, affect the cognitive-mediating processes for protection motivation (Rogers, 1975). Referring to school safety, students may have prior experience with an active shooter on campus or know someone that has been affected by a similar event (Floyd et al., 2000).

In the PMT model, the environmental and interpersonal factors are the primary sources of information used to assess the credibility of the threat. This makes sense given that this model is nearly 40 years old. In light of the myriad media and sources available today, we consider two additional message characteristics in assessing the credibility of a threat. In particular, we focus on how the message medium (e.g., e-mail, text, or Twitter), and message frame (e.g., fear-based or direct information) of announcements encouraging participation in such training initiatives impact safety- training completion. In addition, we examine how the video itself affects participants’ safety knowledge, safety self-efficacy, and personal campus safety salience.

Figure 1 Rogers (1975) original model of protection motivation

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The threat and coping appraisal involves three components that Rogers (1975) believes happen simultaneously. According the theory, an individual will assess the perceived magnitude of the threat, the probability the event will occur if no preventa- tive action is taken, and the extent of an individual’s response efficacy at the same time. Floyd and colleagues (2000) describe response efficacy as “the belief that the adaptive response will work, that taking the protective action will be effective in protecting the self or others” (p. 411). As the mediating processes that impact an individual’s coping response, these items each play an important role in the appraisal stage. Though each aspect of the appraisal is important, when applied to active- shooter response training, we believe individuals will assess the perceived severity and likelihood of an active-shooter event on their campus before evaluating their perceived ability to respond effectively.

The final phase of protection motivation theory is the decision to adapt to the situation either through an effective or ineffective behavioral change (Rogers, 1975). For instance, in relation to the present study, an effective reaction to the message promoting the active-shooter response training is the completion of the training video. Additionally, an effective response is measured by an increase in one’s (a) safety knowledge, (b) safety self-efficacy, and (c) personal campus safety salience. Contrarily, participants who stop watching the video early, or choose to click past it altogether, constitute an ineffective response to the initial message.

The validity of PMT as a framework for research is demonstrated through its extensive use in studies addressing health-based threats and responses (see Frisby, Veil, & Sellnow, 2014; Lwin, Stanaland, & Chan, 2010, for notable examples). Thus, using PMT to guide research on the effectiveness of fear-based messages promoting active-shooter response training preserves both the integrity of the theory and our research. The present study employs PMT as a framework for understanding why individuals decide to complete this training while others do not. Using PMT, we first discuss the importance of message characteristics in evaluating threat credibility.

Message Characteristics

The reason why individuals may respond differently to messages that encourage them to participate in training for an active shooter may be due, in part, to the message characteristics. Previous research on safety-message characteristics advances the idea that source credibility and message framing are integral aspects of a message’s persuasive capacity (Sattler et al., 2014). For instance, Sutton and colleagues (2015) found that Tweets during the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing were most likely to be passed along to others if they contained emotional, evaluative, or prescriptive content. In relation to the present context, research on campus safety finds that effective message placement, speed, and character- istics are essential for effective postevent notifications (Lachlan, McIntyre, & Spence, 2016; Lachlan & Spence, 2014). While prior research advances our understanding of the role message characteristics play during emergency

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situations, less is known about the influence of message frames and media on promoting the completion of safety-training initiatives prior to an emergency. As such, we extend the present literature by focusing on the impact of source credibility and message framing on training completion, campus safety salience, safety knowledge, and self-efficacy.

Source credibility Source credibility is defined as the “judgments made by a perceiver concerning the believably of a communicator” (O’ Keefe, 2002, p. 181). While the study of credibility has shaped the development of the academy since ancient Greece (Aristotle, 1954), the proliferation of sources now available at our fingertips calls for a reexamination of this construct (Rains & Karmikel, 2009). Recent research indicates that social-media platforms (i.e., Twitter) produce higher levels of infor- mation trust due to the nature of the shared network (Crowe, 2011). As a result, many organizations use social media as a way to connect and communicate with their stake holders in order to build trust. In fact, the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency has an active Twitter account and uses it to communicate urgent information (Wukich & Steinberg, 2013).

Yet, more traditional forms of distributing training-related information to organi- zational constituents are still relevant. Although social-media platforms can have a wide reach (Vieweg, Hughes, Starbird, & Palen, 2010), they require individuals to sign up and have been attributed with spreading false information, which may decrease the credibility of this medium (Mendoza, Poblete, & Castillo, 2010). In addition, not all organizational members may be active users of these tools. Thus, the use of organiza- tion-wide e-mails and text messages are still used for distributing information about emergency training programs. In addition to source credibility, the frame contributes to the characteristics of the message.

Message Framing When an individual sends a message to someone, the words and descriptions they use help frame the idea. Research on the effectiveness of fear-based appeals on subsequent behavior is inconsistent. On one hand, fear-based appeals are shown to encourage healthy behaviors (Nan, Xie, & Madden, 2012). Contrarily, some scho- lars indicate that fearful frames on health-related messages have the opposite intended effect (Brennan & Binney, 2010). Considering the potential implications of active-shooter response-training videos on improving campus safety, we manip- ulate message framing in our experimental design in order to see if it impacts the completion of the training video. Beyond looking at the message framing, there are additional factors that may alter an individual’s motivation to complete the training for an active-shooter emergency. According to PMT, the two components of the cognitive-mediating process, threat and coping appraisal, are important considerations.

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Threat and Coping Appraisal

The reasons why individuals decide not to evacuate in a flood (Dash & Gladwin, 2007) may be similar to the reasons why some individuals may not complete a potentially life-saving training video on responding to an active shooter. According to PMT, individuals will assess the threat and their ability to cope with it before altering their behavior (Rogers, 1975). For the present study, the threat appraisal is measured by an individual’s personal campus safety salience. This is an individual’s active concern for their safety on campus. The trend of school-shooting assailants employing public media to broadcast their justification for their attacks perpetuates a national preoccupation with fear (Altheide, 2009). For instance, both the Virginia Tech and University of California Santa Barbara shooters created a YouTube video that warned of their attacks just minutes before they began their killing rampage (Lindgren, 2011). Few researchers have sought to measure the impact of school shootings on student fear, but recent research after Virginia Tech indicates that this event produced an increase in student fear (Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010). This heightened level of fear, which we refer to as personal campus safety salience, may motivate the participants in this study to complete the active- shooter response-training video.

Another factor to consider when examining how an individual perceives the threat of an active shooter on campus is their prior experience with a similar event. Whereas some researchers have found that prior victimization has no significant effect on one’s level of fear on campus (Jennings, Gover, & Pudzynska, 2007), others have found that the type of victimization (e.g., robbery versus sexual assault) does impact one’s perception of fear on campus (Wilcox, Jordan, & Pritchard, 2007). If an individual has experienced an active-shooter emergency, knows someone who has, or perhaps attends a school where there was a threat of an active-shooter event, he or she may have a heightened sense of fear toward these types of crimes. With this in mind, the present study controls for individuals’ prior experience in order to assess the true impact of the training video on personal campus safety salience, safety knowledge, and safety self-efficacy.

Lastly, the concept of self-efficacy has received considerable attention as a predictor of health-related behavioral change (Nabi & Thomas, 2013). Self-efficacy is generally defined as the perceived capacity to handle or cope with a given situation. In the present study, we refer to an individual’s judgment of their ability to have an adaptive response to a school shooting as safety self-efficacy. Research shows that resources (e.g., brochures, videos, Web sites) addressing the preparation for a school shooting help promote a sense of safety self-efficacy (Benight & Harper, 2002). However, scant research has addressed whether there is a particular type of media and frame that produces greater safety self-efficacy. Applying the literature of self-efficacy and source credibility, the present study begins to fill this research gap. Specifically, we offer several research questions directed toward examining the impact of the medium and frame used in promoting active-shooter safety-training initiatives.

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Bearing in mind the implications of completing these potentially life-saving training videos, it is crucial for communication scholars to investigate how individuals interpret and respond to these messages. Framed in terms of PMT, the present study is concerned with the influence of media (i.e., e-mail, text, or Twitter) and message frame (i.e., fear-based or direct information) on the completion of an active-shooter response-training video. Furthermore, this study assesses the impact of the training video on participants’ (a) safety knowledge, (b) safety self-efficacy, and (c) personal campus safety salience. Previous research indicates that higher levels of fear arousal are more persuasive in motivating individuals to respond effectively (Rogers, 1975). We expect this finding to extend to the context of fear- based messages in this study, which encourage individuals to complete the active- shooter response-training video. However, the way a message is delivered though a particular medium may influence whether or not individuals decide to complete the training video. Additionally, the message frame and medium used may produce varying levels of change in all of our variables of interest. Based on the exploratory nature of this experiment, the following research questions are proposed:

RQ1: Which combination of message frame (fear-based or direct information) and message medium (e-mail, text, or Tweet) influences individuals to complete the training video?

RQ2: Which combination of message frame (fear-based or direct information) and message medium (e-mail, text, or Tweet) produces the greatest change in (a) personal campus safety salience, (b) safety knowledge, and (c) safety self- efficacy after individuals view the training video?

RQ3: Controlling for (a) prior campus safety experience, (b) having watched the video before the experiment, and (c) the treatment condition, does watching the training video change individuals’ safety salience, safety knowledge, or safety self-efficacy?

METHOD

To test the proposed research questions, we ran an experiment using a 3 x 2 factorial design. In the experimental conditions, we altered the message medium (e-mail, text, or Twitter), and frame (fear-based or direct information) in prompts encouraging students to watch a safety-training video. Regardless of the type of message the participants received, there was a pretest and posttest that measured their change in personal campus safety salience, safety knowledge, and safety self-efficacy. Addition- ally, we measured prior campus safety experience, prior viewing of the video, and extent of video completion. The following reviews the experimental conditions and participant pool in detail.

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Participants

The sample for this study consisted of 242 undergraduate college students recruited from a large public university in the Southwest United States. Participants consisted of 14.5% (n = 35) males and 84.7% (n = 205) females with 0.4% (n = 1) choosing not to reveal their gender. The age of participants ranged from 18–34 (M = 20.3) and they represented all class levels at the university with 11.6% (n = 28) freshman, 18.2% (n = 44) sopho- mores, 40.5% (n = 98) juniors, 28.5% (n = 69) seniors, 0.4 % (n = 1) graduate students, and 0.4 % (n = 1) choosing not to answer. The video used in the experiment is available through the school’s campus safety and security Web site, but only 14.0% (n = 34) of the sample had seen it before, representing a small portion of the sample size.

Experimental Conditions

Each of the experimental conditions were created by the authors to replicate actual messages that a student could receive from the university. The first manipulation was the message media, which varied among the following three options: a formal university e-mail, text message, or an official university Tweet. All three of the conditions mirrored the university’s format and design to replicate the types of messages students actually receive. The second manipulation in the experiment was the frame of the message, which was either fear based or direct information. The frame was manipulated by adjusting the tone of the message. The direct-information e-mail condition read:

The university is dedicated to the safety and well-being of its students, faculty, and staff. Should an emergency occur on campus, we hope that you will take the appropriate protocol. Please watch the following 5-minute video, using the link below to prepare yourself in case of an active-shooter emergency on campus.

The frame of the second e-mail condition conveyed the same information but used a fear-based frame. The message stated:

In the past year, 68 school shootings have taken place on America’s schools and universities, leaving 65 dead, and dozens more injured. No one expects these incidents to happen at their school, but we must prepare for the unexpected. Please watch the following 5-minute video, using the following link to prepare yourself in case of an active-shooter emergency on campus.

Similar to the manipulation of the message frame for the e-mail, the Twitter messages were created using a fear-based or a direct-information frame, but these messages used less than 140 characters. The direct information Tweet stated, “Stay up to date on the universities safety protocol for an active-shooter emergency. Watch the following 5- minute training video.” The second Tweet conveyed the same information but used a fear-based frame and read “Since Sandy Hook, there have been 68 school shootings— leaving 65 dead and dozens injured. Prepare yourself for the unthinkable by watching the following 5-minute training video.” In addition to exploring the influence of the manipu- lated experimental conditions, we were also interested in examining the impact of the video intervention on campus safety salience, safety knowledge, and safety self-efficacy.

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Video-Training Intervention

Run, Hide, Fight, is a training video for active-shooter response (Ready Houston, 2012). The video was produced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the City of Houston Mayor’s Office of Public Safety in 2012. The video is 5-minutes long and contains high-intensity action training for individuals that might possibly be victims in active-shooter scenarios. The video follows the story of a typical office building that is overtaken by an active shooter. Throughout the video, viewers see at least three victims directly shot by the active shooter and they hear multiple other shots, presumably at other victims. Throughout the video, viewers are reminded of the three response actions to take if they encounter an active shooter: run, hide, or fight. This is reinforced through demonstrations of these response actions by the actors in the video and by the narrative voiceover. To date, there is no available research on the effectiveness of this video in preparing individuals for an active-shooter emergency. To assess the experimental conditions, an appropriate instrument was created and administered to participants.

Instrumentation

Before and after viewing an experimental condition, each participant was asked to respond to three measures focusing on their safety self-efficacy, perceived personal campus safety salience, and their safety knowledge. Following the video, the posttest also included items to assess whether participants had any prior experience with a school shooting. Demographic information was requested in the last section of the questionnaire. Correlations of all scales are presented in Table 1.

Safety self-efficacy

To assess safety self-efficacy, we adapted two items from the general self-efficacy scale from Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) to focus specifically on campus safety. Partici- pants used a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree) to respond to the items such as “I am confident in my ability to handle an emergency on campus” and “I feel prepared to manage my safety during an active-shooter emer- gency on campus.” Cronbach’s alpha for the scale of safety self-efficacy in the pretest was .73 (M = 3.14, SD = 0.88). The scale reliability of safety self-efficacy in the posttest was .76 (M = 3.51, SD = 0.75).

Campus safety salience

This scale was created by the researchers for this study based off of items from multiple safety-climate surveys. In the pretest and in the posttest participants used a four-item scale. Items included prompts like “In general, I feel safe as a student at this university” and “I typically don’t think about my safety on campus.” Participants responded using a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).

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Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the pretest was .70 (M = 3.43, SD = 0.72), and, for the four-item posttest, it was .68 (M = 3.42, SD = 0.68).

Safety knowledge

To determine the participant’s knowledge of appropriate response behaviors in an active-shooter emergency, a test was created based on the information in the video. The researchers created an eight-item quiz that participants took before and after viewing the intervention based directly on information conveyed through the video. There were seven true/false prompts and one multiple-choice question. For instance, some of the true/false statements read: “Even if others insist on staying in the building, you should try and get out” and “Never fight with an active shooter.” A paired- samples t test was calculated to compare the mean pretest score to the mean posttest score. The mean on the pretest was 4.09 (SD = 1.17), and the mean on the posttest was 5.81 (SD = 1.90). A significant increase from the pretest to the posttest was found, t (240) = 12.95, p < .001.

Procedure

Participants were informed about the opportunity to participate in this study through a Web-administered extra-credit system within the Department of Communication Studies at a large Southwestern university in the United States. After accepting the informed consent, participants completed the questions in the pretest. Next, they were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions where they read a message encouraging participation in the training and were subsequently given a link to view the video. Participants made the decision of how long they wanted to watch the 5-minute video, if they chose to watch it at all. Following the posttest, they were asked approximately how many minutes of the video they watched. Finally, they

Table 1 Correlations of Scales

Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Safety Self-Efficacy (Pre) 3.17 0.42

2. Safety Self-Efficacy (Post) 3.10 0.44 .67**

3. Safety Self-Efficacy (Change) −.07 0.35 −.34** .48**

4. Campus Safety Salience (Pre) 3.43 0.72 .12 .15* .04

5. Campus Safety Salience (Post) 3.42 0.68 .10 .14* .05 .78**

6. Campus Safety Salience (Change) −.01 0.47 −.04 −.03 .00 −.41** .25**

7. Knowledge (Pre) 4.10 1.17 .05 .13 .12 −00 .00 .01

8. Knowledge (Post) 5.81 1.90 −.01 −.04 −.02 .07 −.08 −.22** .15*

9. Knowledge (Change) 1.73 2.07 −.03 −.09 −.06 .06 −.09 −.21** −.43** .83**

10. Prior Experience 1.57 0.50 −.01 .02 .04 .10 .09 −.03 .06 −.02 −.06

*p < .05. **p < .001.

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completed a posttest that measured changes in the variables of interest, as well as asked for demographic information. Names and personal information were collected only by the extra-credit system. Thus, the participants remained anonymous to the researchers.

Manipulation Check

To find whether the experimental manipulations were effective, a chi-square test of independence was performed. For message medium, participants were asked, “What type of message did you receive when you were told about the safety video?” and selected (a) e-mail, (b) Tweet, or (c) text message. The chi-square indicated that the manipulations for message medium were successful. There was a meaningful difference between participants’ perception of the medium and those who received the message via e-mail, Tweet, and text message, X2 (4) = 252.34, p < .001.

For the message frame, participants were asked to respond to an item that assessed their affective response to the message. The item measuring participant’s affective response to the condition read, “The message I received about the safety video (i.e., e-mail, text, or Tweet) creates a feeling of fear in me.” This item was answered using a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). Although there was a difference between the means in the fear-based message (M = 3.24, SD = 0.96) and the direct message (M = 3.08, SD = 1.03), the t test did not result in a significant difference, t(236) = −1.28, p = .202.

RESULTS

Research Question 1 asked which combination of message frame (fear-based or direct information) and message medium (e-mail, text, or Tweet) influenced individuals to complete the training video. To answer this research question, we used a 3 x 2 between-subjects factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing the completion of the training video based on message frame (fear-based or direct information) and message medium (e-mail, text, or Tweet). The main effect for message frame was not significant, F(1, 239) = 0.33, p > .05. The main effect for message medium was significant, F(2, 238) = 3.82, p < .05. Post hoc analysis revealed that those receiving the email (M = 1.56, SD = 0.50) were more likely to complete the video than those in the text-message condition (M = 1.36, SD = 0.48). Further, a significant interaction effect was found, F(5, 235) = 2.76, p < .05. This means that the combination of message frame and message medium influenced the completion of the training video. Specifically, an e-mail with a fear-based frame was more likely to lead to video completion than a Tweet with a fear-based message (Mdn = 0.35, SE = 0.11, p < .05). This was the only significant difference among the experimental conditions and video completion. The effect size for this analysis (r2 = .06) indicated a small-to- medium effect size.

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Research Question 2 asked which combination message frame (fear-based or direct information) and message medium (e-mail or Tweet) produced the greatest change in (a) personal campus safety salience, (b) safety knowledge, and (c) safety self-efficacy. To answer this research question, we used a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) to examine the combination of fear-based frames and message medium in the outcome measures. In the analysis, we controlled for prior campus safety experience, having watched the video before, and completion of the entire training video. No significant effect was found, λ(12, 426) = 0.94, p > .05. Follow-up univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAS) indicated that neither personal campus safety salience, safety knowledge, nor safety self-efficacy were influenced by the combination of fear appeals and media. In other words, there are no significant differences between the outcome measures based on the various message frames presented.

The final research question asked if the single predictor variable of watching the training video changed the three target variables (individuals’ safety salience, knowledge, or safety self-efficacy), while controlling for the three variables (prior campus safety experience, watching the video before the experiment, and the treatment condition). To answer this question, we used three separate simple linear regressions. The first regression was significant, F(4, 230) = 3.86, p < .01, R2 = .06. Thus, completing the training video (β = 1.48, p < .05) was a significant predictor of change in personal campus safety salience. The second regression was signifi- cant, F(4, 233) = 32.96, p < .001, R2 = .36. This indicates that watching the training video (β = 1.34, p < .001) was a significant predictor of change in safety knowledge. The third regression was also significant, F(4, 227) = 2.55, p < .05, R2 = .04. Thus, the training video was a significant predictor of change in safety self-efficacy. This means that individuals who watch the training video increase their knowledge of appropriate active-shooter response behaviors, increase their awareness of safety on campus and feel more proficient in their ability to respond to these events effectively.

DISCUSSION

This experiment extends the literature on safety-training interventions by consider- ing whether the frame and medium of the initial message promoting training participation has a role in training completion. This applied research aids campus safety managers and police personnel tasked with preparing the staff, faculty, and students of U.S. campuses to appropriately respond to an active-shooter emergency. The following offers several practical and theoretical implications based on the findings from this study. In particular, we address how our findings resonate with the extant scholarship on protection motivation, message characteristics, and safety self-efficacy. Toward this end, we begin with a discussion of the practical implications.

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Practical Implications

As active-shooter scenarios become more commonplace in campuses and schools across the country, efforts to train responders are increasing (Kingshott & McKenzie, 2013). Through videos like the one used in this study, campus administrators are preparing their members to respond appropriately to these events. This study focuses on the characteristics of messages promoting video-based safety training. Based on our findings, the message frame and medium do not affect an individual’s motivation to protect themselves and others in a campus safety context. The findings indicate that e-mails with fear-based frames compared to fear-based Tweets led more individuals to complete the training video, but that fear-based messages alone are not responsible for increasing personal campus safety salience, safety knowledge, or safety self-efficacy. Consequently, safety practitioners ought to use this information to better disseminate safety messages using a variety of mediums.

In addition to the message frame and medium, we were also interested in how the training video affected various outcomes related to protection motivation—personal campus safety salience, safety knowledge, and safety self-efficacy. We found that the video led to a positive change in all three of these outcomes. This is encouraging information for administrators considering using Run, Hide, Fight as an active- shooter response-training video. Regardless of the message used to promote the video, it appears that when students completed the video, they became more knowl- edgeable of what to do in emergency situations, felt more confident in their abilities to respond and became more aware of safety on campus. Taken as a whole, these findings carry enormous implications for campuses tasked with the responsibility of preparing organizational members for these events. Giving active-shooter response training videos more widespread attention could help better prepare schools for these unthinkable events. In fact, campuses ought to consider ways to make viewing these videos mandatory (e.g., during student orientation, employee training, or on the first day of class) considering the improved safety knowledge, efficacy, and awareness of safety on campus. Beyond offering practical implications for individuals tasked with managing campus safety, the present study encourages scholars interested in safety- training initiatives to consider the utility of protection motivation theory.

Theoretical Implications

Protection motivation theory posits that individuals must deal with the noxious feelings fear causes by either responding effectively or ineffectively (Rogers, 1975). This decision is mediated by an individual’s cognitive assessment of the threat and their ability to effectively handle the situation (see Figure 1). Despite using PMT to guide our experiment, the results did not consistently support this model. Whereas PMT advances the idea that fear-based frames will have the most impact on partici- pants’ completion of this training video, this was only true for fear-based messages sent via e-mail when compared to fear-based messages sent via text or Twitter. Yet, when each fear-based message medium was assessed individually, no single medium

450 J. L. Ford & S. S. Frei

led to a significant effect on the completion of the safety-training video. Considering the message medium alone, this study supports the use of e-mail messages over text messages to encourage individuals to watch a training video on active-shooter responses. Though previous research indicates that Twitter is an effective medium for sending emergency messages (Crowe, 2011), this study does not replicate the usefulness of this medium. In fact, there was no significant difference between this medium and the two other media tested on video completion.

In light of the discrepancies between the study’s findings and PMT, we offer several explanations. First, it is conceivable that any message referencing a potential school shooting, regardless of the type of frame, will induce fear. Thus, including a fear-based frame on messages encouraging participation in active-shooter response training is redundant. Bearing in mind that the prevalence of school shootings has produced a heighted sense of fear among college students (Kaminski et al., 2010), it may be difficult to divorce the effects of fear-based messages from the fear induced by the thought of such events.

Second, the results of this study expose a problem with the midpoint of Rogers’ (1975) model when used in this context. The original model suggests that message characteristics should have led participants to a more heightened assessment of their personal campus safety salience. Yet, there was a nonsignificant relationship between these variables. A closer look at the cognitive mediating variables in this model reveals that personal safety salience is significantly related to perceived safety self-efficacy. Accordingly, individuals who are actively concerned about their safety on campus feel more confident in their ability to manage potential safety situations. Surprisingly, an individual’s prior experience with a campus emergency does not produce higher safety self-efficacy. Perhaps facing the uncertainty of a similar crisis does not make one feel more prepared for another campus emergency. Future research, especially studies guided by PMT, should investigate the relationship between prior experience and self- efficacy.

Limitations

This experiment was designed to capture whether the nuances of message character- istics affect individuals’ protection motivation. Despite the intent of the experiment, we recognize that there are inherent limitations to its design. First, the nonsignificant manipulation check for fear-based messages limits our ability to draw conclusions from these conditions. Seeing as the results reported in this study are from the second attempt at data collection because of a previous ineffective manipulation check, it is evident that there is an inability to effectively manipulate fear-based messages around the topic of school shootings. Thus, messages about school shootings may produce fear regardless of the message frame. Second, the sample in this study was over- whelmingly female, which was also seen in the previous data collection. Perhaps females are more concerned about their safety on campus than males, leading them to participate in this safety study. This is an area ripe for future research.

Message Characteristics and Protection Motivation 451

Third, the data were collected from a single institution that has experienced an active shooter within the past 4 years. This may have influenced some of the results and skewed perceptions of safety self-efficacy and personal campus safety salience. It is important to consider such broad environmental factors when replicating this experiment in future studies.

Future Directions

To better understand how to train the staff, faculty, and students at our nation’s schools to respond to active-shooter emergencies, future research should consider how an individual’s perceptions of organizational preparedness affects protection motiva- tion. In other words, when schools make observable efforts to prepare and equip their members for a potential school shooting, does this diminish the safety information- seeking efforts of individuals? Additionally, considering the pervasiveness of message overload within our personal and organizational lives, future research should continue to investigate the effects of message overload on an individual’s attention to safety- related information (Stephens, Barrett, & Mahometa, 2013). If message overload limits our attention to these messages, it is imperative to investigate ways to reach these individuals with this potentially life-saving information.

Another area for future research is to assess participants’ motivation for training as a possible control in this experiment. Motivation for training has been studied extensively in organizational settings, though often within corporations and nonprofit organizations (Beier & Kanfer, 2010). Research indicates that there is a relationship between self-efficacy and motivation for training (Lim & Morris, 2006), leading us to reason that safety self-efficacy in this experiment may be moderated by an individual’s motivation to learn. Taken together, a further examination of the relationship between self-efficacy, motivation to learn, and the motivation to share information learned with others has serious implications for campus safety officials.

The impetus for creating safer, more active-shooter-prepared schools has never been greater. This study represents an effort toward producing safer schools by expanding our understanding of protection motivation theory to a new context. In addition, this research broadens future use of this theory by incorporating the relationship between message characteristics and subsequent protection motivation actions. The evidence in this study provides a compelling argument for shifting our previous ways of conceptua- lizing fear-based frames as a material characteristic to an event-based characteristic. The context of a school shooting may already produce enough fear to influence individuals to prepare for these unthinkable events. The current study demonstrates the value in exploring how more granular factors, like message characteristics and personal campus safety salience, influence the completion of these training initiatives.

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Article

The Mental Health Consequences of Mass Shootings

Sarah R. Lowe1 and Sandro Galea2

Abstract Mass shooting episodes have increased over recent decades and received substantial media coverage. Despite the potentially widespread and increasing mental health impact of mass shootings, no efforts to our knowledge have been made to review the empirical literature on this topic. We identified 49 peer-reviewed articles, comprised of 27 independent samples in the aftermath of 15 mass shooting incidents. Based on our review, we concluded that mass shootings are associated with a variety of adverse psychological outcomes in survivors and members of affected communities. Less is known about the psychological effects of mass shootings on indirectly exposed populations; however, there is evidence that such events lead to at least short-term increases in fears and declines in perceived safety. A variety of risk factors for adverse psychological outcomes have been identified, including demographic and pre-incident characteristics (e.g., female gender and pre-incident psychological symptoms), event exposure (e.g., greater proximity to the attack and acquaintance with the deceased), and fewer psychosocial resources (e.g., emotion regulation difficulties and lower social support). Further research that draws on pre-incident and longitudinal data will yield important insights into the processes that exacerbate or sustain post-incident psychological symptoms over time and provide important information for crisis preparedness and post-incident mental health interventions.

Keywords mass shootings, school shootings, mass trauma, posttraumatic stress, major depression, psychosocial resources, risk and protective factors

Over the past few decades, mass shooting episodes—defined

as events involving one or more persons attempting to kill

multiple people, and at least one unrelated person, in an area

occupied by multiple unrelated persons (Blair & Martaindale,

2013)—have received substantial media coverage and captured

public attention. Recent investigations have suggested that mass

shooting episodes are becoming more frequent. For example, a

report by researchers at the Texas State University identified

84 episodes in the United States between 2000 and 2010 and

noted a trend toward increasing frequency of time (Blair &

Martaindale, 2013). An investigation by the Mother Jones

news organization, using a slightly different definition of mass

shootings (events that were ‘‘senseless, random, or at least public

in nature’’), identified 70 episodes occurring between 1982 and

2012 and noted a recent surge in these events, with nearly half

occurring since 2006.

In addition to the increasing frequency of mass shootings

episodes, key events over the past decade have had unusually

large numbers of fatalities and injuries—for example, 33 fatal-

ities and 23 injuries in the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, 12

fatalities and 58 injuries in the 2012 Aurora, Colorado theater

shooting, and 28 fatalities and 2 injuries in the Sandy Hook ele-

mentary school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut (Follman,

Aronsen, & Pan, 2014). In an epidemiological review of school

shootings, Shultz, Cohen, Muschert, and Flores de Apodaca,

(2013) noted that just three events (Columbine, Sandy Hook,

and Virginia Tech) accounted for over half of the fatalities in

the 215 incidents between 1990 and 2012.

Research indicates that exposure to assaultive violence, or

learning that a close friend or loved one has faced such expo-

sure, is associated with an increased incidence of a range of

negative mental health outcomes, among them posttraumatic

stress disorder (PTSD) and major depression (MD; e.g.,

Breslau et al., 1996; Lowe, Blachman-Forshay, & Koenen,

2015). It is therefore likely that mass shootings exert a psycho-

logical toll on their direct victims and members of the commu-

nities in which they took place. Moreover, media coverage of

mass shootings and their aftermath reaches far beyond affected

communities to the entire nation and beyond. As shown in the

1 Department of Epidemiology, Columbia University, Mailman School of Public

Health, New York, NY, USA 2 Department of Epidemiology, Boston University School of Public Health,

Boston, MA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Sarah R. Lowe, Department of Epidemiology, Columbia University, Mailman

School of Public Health, 722 West 168th Street, Room 720-F, New York, NY

10032, USA.

Email: [email protected]

TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 2017, Vol. 18(1) 62-82 ª The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1524838015591572 journals.sagepub.com/home/tva

aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11), such

indirect exposure can have mental health consequences (Hen-

ricksen, Bolton, & Sareen, 2010). For example, in the National

Epidemiologic Survey of Alcohol and Related Conditions,

indirect exposure to 9/11 through the media was associated

with increased risk for mood, anxiety and substance use disor-

ders, and PTSD, relative to no reported 9/11 exposure (Hen-

ricksen et al., 2010).

Despite the potentially widespread and increasing mental

health impact of mass shooting episodes, no efforts to our

knowledge have been made to synthesize the extant literature

on this topic. In this article, we therefore aim to conduct a

review of empirical investigations on the mental health conse-

quences of mass shootings. We provide an overview of this

body of research, including the prevalence and predictors of

various mental health outcomes. Based on this review, we

make recommendations for future research and post-incident

interventions.

Method

We conducted a literature search in PsycInfo and PubMed data-

bases, using both general terms (e.g., shooting, tragedy), and

names of specific events (e.g., Columbine, Sandy Hook) com-

piled from comprehensive lists of mass shootings (Follman,

Aronsen, Pan, & Caldwell, 2013; Henriques, 2013; Shultz

et al., 2013). In our review, we used the aforementioned defini-

tion of mass shootings: events involving one or more persons

attempting to kill multiple people, and at least one unrelated

person, in an area occupied by multiple unrelated persons

(Blair & Martaindale, 2013). We included events that took

place in any country in the world. We limited our search to arti-

cles in peer-reviewed, English language journals that included

quantitative indices of post-event mental health, including

symptoms of psychiatric disorders (e.g., PTSD and MD) and

general symptoms that cut across disorders (e.g., psychological

distress and fear). We therefore excluded qualitative studies,

and quantitative studies that focused solely on other outcomes

(e.g., perceptions of social solidarity and coping strategies). In

addition to studies identified through database searches, refer-

ence lists of articles on this topic were reviewed to identify

additional studies.

The coding processes consisted of two main steps. First, we

coded for study characteristics. We recorded the mass shooting

event that was the focus of each study, including the year, loca-

tion, context, demographic characteristics of the perpetrator, and

numbers of injuries and fatalities during the incident, and

whether the study focused on more than one event. We noted

instances in which data from the same sample were used across

different analyses to determine how many independent samples

were there across the studies. In addition, we noted whether the

sample was affected (defined as direct victims of the shooting or

members of the community in which the shooting took place) or

remote (defined as consisting primarily of members outside of

the affected community, e.g., national samples or students at a

university in a difficult region), basic characteristics of the

sample (e.g., whether participants were students or emergency

personnel), sample sizes, and timing of assessments.

Second, we coded the prevalence estimates and predictors of

mental health outcomes in each study. We recorded the mental

health outcomes assessed, the measures and diagnostic classifi-

cation systems used, and the prevalence of psychiatric disor-

ders. We then listed significant predictors of mental health

outcomes and, in doing so, specified the mental outcome

included in the analysis (e.g., diagnosis or symptom severity

score, change in symptoms over time) and timing of assess-

ment. Finally, we noted results that went beyond prevalence

estimates and predictors, such as those focused on mechanisms

leading to mental health outcomes.

Both authors formulated the article selection process, inclu-

sion criteria, and coding scheme. The first author conducted the

literature search, coded selected articles, and checked and

rechecked coding for accuracy, and the second author oversaw

the review process and provided regular feedback.

Study Characteristics

We identified a total of 49 studies on 15 different mass shoot-

ing incidents that took place from 1984 to 2008. Three of the

studies focused on two different events combined. Table 1 pro-

vides basic information on each event (e.g., location, number of

injuries, and fatalities) in chronological order. Thirteen events

took place in the United States, and two took place in Finland.

The majority of events (n ¼ 9) were in a secondary school or university context, whereas the remainder took place in other

locations (e.g., local businesses). In total, there were 27 inde-

pendent samples (three from studies focusing on two different

events combined). Of the 27 independent samples, 22 were

classified as affected samples and 5 as remote samples (two

affected and one remote from the studies focusing on two dif-

ferent events combined).

Post-Shooting Mental Health Outcomes

Table 2 denotes the mental health outcomes included in each

study, as well as the measures used to assess them and the clas-

sification system used to determine prevalence estimates if this

information was available.

Psychiatric Disorders and Prevalence Estimates

PTSD. Posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) were reported in the majority of studies—36 studies from 18 independent sam-

ples. Eighteen of these studies (from 14 independent samples)

included a prevalence estimate of PTSD. The lowest PTSD pre-

valence reported was 3% among parents of children exposed to an elementary school shooting 6–14 months post-incident,

determined using conservative Diagnostic and Statistical Man-

ual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R)

criteria with the PTSD–Reaction Index (PTSD-RI; Schwarz

& Kowalski, 1991a). The highest prevalence reported was

91% among children in the same study, using liberal

Lowe and Galea 63

(proposed) DSM-IV criteria and the children’s version of the

PTSD-RI (Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991b).

Major depression. The second most commonly assessed psychia- tric disorder was MD. MD symptoms were assessed in 16 stud-

ies using 10 independent samples, and the prevalence of MD

was estimated in 8 studies using 7 independent samples. The

lowest prevalence of MD was 4.9% among survivors of the 1991 cafeteria shooting in Killeen, TX, assessed 1 year after

the event using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for DSM-

III-R (North, Smith, & Spitznagel, 1997). The highest preva-

lence was 71%, detected in a combined sample of Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University (NIU) students 2 weeks

after the attacks at their respective campuses, assessed using

the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Short Depression Scale

(Vicary & Fraley, 2010).

Other psychiatric disorders. In addition to PTSD and MD, preva- lence estimates were provided for the following psychiatric dis-

orders: generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; three studies and

three independent samples): range: 0.0–0.9%; acute stress disor- der (one study): 33%; alcohol-related conditions (e.g., alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence, alcoholism; four studies, four inde-

pendent samples) range: 0–9%; drug use disorder (one study): range: 0–0.7%; panic disorder (two studies and two independent samples) range: 1–2.4%; adjustment disorder (one study): 9.1%; social phobia (one study): 3%; and antisocial personality

disorder (one study): 0–0.8% (Classen, Koopman, Hales, & Spiegel, 1998; Johnson, North, & Smith, 2002; North, Smith,

McCool, & McShea, 1989; North et al., 1997; Séguin et al.,

2013; Trappler & Friednman, 1996).

Comparing Prevalence Estimates

There are at least four issues to consider when comparing the

prevalence estimates of mental health outcomes across the

studies in our review. First, variation in sample characteristics

that, as discussed in more detail later, could influence post-

event mental health, including variation in demographic char-

acteristics and exposure to the incident. Second, there is wide

variation in the timing of assessments, spanning from approx-

imately 1 week to 32 months post-incident. As shown in studies

with multiple waves (e.g., Nader, Pynoos, Fairbanks, & Freder-

ick, 1990; North et al., 1997), the prevalence of psychiatric dis-

orders tends to decrease over time, limiting the extent to which

estimates at varying time points after different events can be

compared. Third, different measures and diagnostic criteria

were used across the studies, which could certainly affect pre-

valence rates. The influence of diagnostic criteria on preva-

lence rates was most clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of

the 1988 elementary school shooting, wherein the prevalence

of PTSD among child survivors at 6–14 months post-incident

ranged from 8% to 91% and among their parents from 3% to 54% using conservative DSM-III-R criteria and liberal

Table 1. Summary of Mass Shooting Incidents and Characteristics of Peer-Reviewed Studies.

Year Location Context Perpetrator Fatalities Injuries

Peer- Reviewed Articles

Samples (Affected, Remote)

1984 Los Angeles, CA Elementary school Adult African American male

3 14 2 1 (1, 0)

1984 San Ysidro, CA Fast food restaurant Adult White male 21 15 1 1 (1, 0) 1987 Russellville, AR Four local businesses Adult White male 2 4 1 1 (1, 0) 1988 Winnetka, IL Elementary school Adult White female 2 5 6 3 (3, 0) 1991 Killeen, TX Cafeteria-style restaurant Adult White male 24 20 5 2 (2, 0) 1992 St. Louis, MO Courthouse Adult White male 1 5 1 1 (1, 0) 1993 San Francisco, CA Office building Adult White male 6 14 1 1 (1, 0) 1994 Brooklyn, NY Brooklyn Bridge Adult Lebanese-born

immigrant male 1 3 1 1 (1, 0)

1999 Columbine, CO High school Two adolescent White males

15 21 3 3 (0, 3)

2006 Montreal, Quebec, Canada

University (Dawson College) Adult Indo-Canadian male

2 17 1 1 (1, 0)

2007 Tuusula, Finland High school (Jokela High School) Adolescent White male 9 19 3 1 (1, 0) 2007 Blacksburg, VA University (Virginia Polytechnic Institute

and State University) Adult South Korean

male 33 25 11 4 (3, 1)

2008 DeKalb, IL University (Northern Illinois University) Adult White male 6 18 8 2 (2, 0) 2008 Conway, AR University (University of Central

Arkansas) Four adult African

American males 2 1 1 1 (1, 0)

2008 Kauhajoki, Finland University (Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences)

Adult White male 11 1 1 1 (1, 0)

Note. Affected samples included participants who lived in the communities in which the incident occurred; participants did not have to be directly exposed to the event. Remote samples included members of other communities and nationally representative samples. Table does not include three studies that each focused on two different events (two affected samples, one remote sample).

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vi ct

im ; G

ri e f:

gr e at

e r

ac q u ai

n ta

n ce

w it h

th e

d e ce

as e d

1 9 8 4 —

F as

t- fo

o d

re st

au ra

n t

in S an

Y si

d ro

, C

A (1

) H

o u gh

e t

al .

(1 9 9 0 )

3 0 3

M id

d le

-a ge

d M

e x ic

an A

m e ri

ca n

w o m

e n

fr o m

th e

co m

m u n it y,

b u t

w h o

w e re

n o t

d ir

e ct

ly in

vo lv

e d

in th

e in

ci d e n t

(a ff ec

te d )

6 – 9

m o n th

s P T

S D

(s ca

le d e ri

ve d

fo r

th e

st u d y,

b as

e d

o n

th e

D IS

; D

S M

-I II );

M D

(C E S -D

)

P T

S D

, p o st

-i n ci

d e n t:

1 2 .6

% ;

P T

S D

, p as

t- m

o n th

: 6 .8

% S e ve

re P T

S D

(s ig

n ifi

ca n ce

of tr

en d s n ot

te st

ed ):

w id

o w

e d , se

p ar

at e d

o r

d iv

o rc

e d

st at

u s,

o ld

e r

ag e , n o

ch ild

re n

at h o m

e , lo

w e r

in co

m e , u n e m

p lo

ym e n t,

h av

in g

fr ie

n d s/

re la

ti ve

s in

vo lv

e d

in e ve

n t,

fa ir

– p o o r

p h ys

ic al

h e al

th , h ig

h e r

M D

sy m

p to

m s.

M ild

P T

S D

(s ig

n ifi

ca n ce

of tr

en d s n ot

te st

ed ):

m id

d le

-a ge

,h av

in g

th re

e o r

m o re

ch ild

re n

at h o m

e , m

id d le

in co

m e , h av

in g

fr ie

n d s/

re la

ti ve

s in

vo lv

e d

in th

e e ve

n t,

fa ir

– p o o r

p h ys

ic al

h e al

th

1 9 8 7 —

F o u r

lo ca

l b u si

n e ss

e s

in R

u ss

e llv

ill e , A

R (1

) N

o rt

h , S m

it h ,

M cC

o o l,

an d

S h e a

(1 9 8 9 )

1 8

E m

p lo

ye e s

at tw

o o f th

e fo

u r

lo ca

l b u si

n e ss

e s

w h o

w e re

e it h e r

at w

o rk

d u ri

n g

th e

sh o o ti n g

(n ¼

1 5 ) o r

ab se

n t

(n ¼

1 1 ; a ff ec

te d )

4 – 6

w e e k s

P T

S D

, M

D , G

A D

, A

lc o h o lis

m (D

IS /D

is as

te r

S u p p le

m e n t,

D S M

-I II )

P T

S D

: 5 .6

% ; M

D : 1 6 .7

% ;

G A

D : 0 .0

% ; A

lc o h o lis

m :

0 .0

%

1 9 8 8 —

E le

m e n ta

ry sc

h o o l in

W in

n e tk

a, IL

(1 a)

S ch

w ar

z an

d K

o w

al sk

i (1

9 9 1 a)

1 3 0

E le

m e n ta

ry sc

h o o l st

u d e n ts

(n ¼

6 4 )

an d

th e ir

p ar

e n ts

(n ¼

6 6 ; a ff ec

te d )

6 – 1 4

m o n th

s P T

S D

(P T

S D

-R I,

D S M

-I II -R

, lib

e ra

l m

o d e ra

te an

d co

n se

rv at

iv e

cr it e ri

a)

P T

S D

, ch

ild re

n , D

S M

-I II -R

: 5 0 %

, (l ib

e ra

l) , 4 1 %

(m o d e ra

te ),

8 %

(c o n se

rv at

iv e );

P T

S D

, p ar

e n ts

, D

S M

-I II -R

, p ro

p o se

d : 3 9 %

(l ib

e ra

l) ,

2 4 %

(m o d e ra

te ),

3 %

(c o n se

rv at

iv e )

P T

S D

, ch

ild re

n (p

re d ic

to rs

o f d ia

gn o si s

b a se

d o n

lib er

a l,

m o d er

a te

, o r

co n se

rv a ti ve

cr it er

ia ):

p e rc

e p ti o n

th at

h e

o r

sh e

w o u ld

ge t

sh o t

o r

w as

in d an

ge r

d u ri

n g

e ve

n t,

in cr

e as

e d

p h ys

ic al

sy m

p to

m s,

in cr

e as

e d

vi si

ts to

sc h o o l n u rs

e , in

cr e as

e d

o r

n e w

fe ar

s, gu

ilt . P T

S D

, p ar

e n ts

(p re

d ic

to rs

o f

d ia

gn o si s

b a se

d o n

lib er

a l,

m o d er

a te

, o r

co n se

rv a ti ve

cr it er

ia ):

fe lt

n u m

b ,s

ca re

d ,o

r fe

ar fu

l th

at th

e al

le ge

d p e rp

e tr

at o r

w as

st ill

o n

th e

lo o se

(c o n ti n u ed

)

65

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

(1 b )

S ch

w ar

z an

d K

o w

al sk

i (1

9 9 1 b )

1 3 0

a 6 – 1 4

m o n th

s P T

S D

(P T

S D

-R I;

D S M

-I II ,

D S M

-I II -R

[s am

e p re

va le

n ce

s as

S ch

w ar

z &

K o w

al sk

i, 1 9 9 1 a]

, p ro

p o se

d D

S M

-I V

, lib

e ra

l, m

o d e ra

te , an

d co

n se

rv at

iv e

cr it e ri

a)

P T

S D

, ch

ild re

n , D

S M

-I II ,

p ro

p o se

d D

S M

-I V

: 9 1 %

, 4 1 %

(l ib

e ra

l) , 6 1 %

, 4 1 %

(m o d e ra

te ),

1 6 %

, 9 %

(c o n se

rv at

iv e );

P T

S D

, p ar

e n ts

, D

S M

-I II , p ro

p o se

d D

S M

-I V

: 5 2 %

, 5 4 %

(l ib

e ra

l) ,

1 6 %

, 2 4 %

(m o d e ra

te ),

4 %

, 6 %

(c o n se

rv at

iv e )

(2 a)

S ch

w ar

z an

d K

o w

al sk

i (1

9 9 2 a)

2 4

S ch

o o l p e rs

o n n e l (a

ff ec

te d )

6 m

o n th

s P T

S D

(P T

S D

-R I;

D S M

-I II )

— P T

S S : p e rs

o n al

it y

tr ai

ts —

gu ilt

an d

re se

n tm

e n t,

in se

cu ri

ty , an

d p sy

ch as

th e n ia

(2 b )

S ch

w ar

z an

d K

o w

al sk

i (1

9 9 2 b )

2 4

S u b sa

m p le

co m

p le

te d

2 w

av e s

(n ¼

1 3 ; a ff ec

te d )a

6 m

o n th

s, 1 8

m o n th

s P T

S D

(P T

S D

-R I;

D S M

-I II );

M D

(B D

I) ; G

A D

(S T

A I)

— P T

S S , 6

m o n th

s: lo

ss to

fo llo

w -u

p

(2 c)

S ch

w ar

z, K

o w

al sk

i, an

d M

cN al

ly (1

9 9 3 )

2 4

S u b sa

m p le

co m

p le

te d

2 w

av e s

(n ¼

1 2 ; a ff ec

te d )a

6 m

o n th

s, 1 8

m o n th

s P T

S D

(P T

S D

-R I;

D S M

-I II );

M D

(B D

I) ; G

A D

(S T

A I)

— P T

S S , 6

m o n th

s: e n la

rg e m

e n t

o f re

ca ll

o f

e m

o ti o n al

e x p e ri

e n ce

s (h

yp e ra

ro u sa

l) ,

lif e

th re

at e x p e ri

e n ce

s (h

yp e ra

ro u sa

l) ,

an d

se n so

ry e x p e ri

e n ce

s (a

vo id

an ce

, h yp

e ra

ro u sa

l, to

ta l P T

S S ),

la ck

o f

d im

in is

h m

e n t

in re

ca ll

o f e m

o ti o n al

e x p e ri

e n ce

s (i n tr

u si

o n );

P T

S S , 1 8

m o n th

s: e n la

rg e m

e n t

in re

ca ll

o f se

n so

ry e x p e ri

e n ce

s (h

yp e ra

ro u sa

l) ; M

D sy

m p to

m s,

1 8

m o n th

s: la

ck o f

d im

in is

h m

e n t

in re

ca ll,

p e rc

e iv

e d

ab ili

ty to

h an

d le

st re

ss ;G

A D

sy m

p to

m s:

la ck

o f

d im

in is

h m

e n t

in re

ca ll

o f e m

o ti o n al

e x p e ri

e n ce

s (3

) S lo

an ,

R o ze

n sk

y, K

ap la

n ,

an d

S an

d e rs

(1 9 9 4 )

1 4 0

E m

e rg

e n cy

re sp

o n d e rs

(a ff ec

te d )

6 m

o n th

s P T

S D

(I E S

In tr

u si

o n

an d

A vo

id an

ce )

— P T

S S :f

iv e

in d ic

at o rs

o f jo

b st

re ss

d u ri

n g

th e

e ve

n t—

e x p o su

re to

tr au

m at

ic st

im u li,

ad ve

rs e

w o rk

e n vi

ro n m

e n t,

ti m

e p re

ss u re

, q u an

ti ta

ti ve

w o rk

lo ad

, an

d q u al

it at

iv e

w o rk

lo ad

(i n tr

u si

o n

an d

av o id

an ce

)

1 9 9 1 —

C af

e te

ri a-

st yl

e re

st au

ra n t

in K

ill e e n , T

X (1

a) N

o rt

h , S m

it h ,

an d

S p it zn

ag e l

(1 9 9 4 )

1 3 6

S u rv

iv o rs

(e .g

., re

st au

ra n t

p at

ro n s

an d

e m

p lo

ye e s,

e m

e rg

e n cy

re sp

o n d e rs

; a ff ec

te d )

1 – 2

m o n th

s P T

S D

, M

D , P D

, G

A D

, A

A /

A D

, D

A /D

D , A

S P D

(D IS

; D

S M

-I II -R

)

A t

1 – 2

m o n th

s— P T

S D

: 2 8 .6

% P T

S D

, 1 – 2

m o n th

s: fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

p re

- in

ci d e n t

M D

(a m

o n g

fe m

al e

p ar

ti ci

p an

ts o n ly

), an

y p re

-i n ci

d e n t

p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d ia

gn o si

s (a

m o n g

fe m

al e

p ar

ti ci

p an

ts o n ly

), p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

M D

, an

y p o st

- in

ci d e n t

p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r

(a m

o n g

fe m

al e

p ar

ti ci

p an

ts o n ly

), se

e in

g a

d o ct

o r

o r

co u n se

lo r,

ta k in

g m

e d ic

at io

n (c o n ti n u ed

)

66

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

(1 b )

N o rt

h , S m

it h ,

an d

S p it zn

ag e l

(1 9 9 7 )

1 2 4

a 1 – 2

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

P T

S D

, M

D , P D

, G

A D

, A

A /

A D

, D

A /D

D , A

S P D

(D IS

; D

S M

-I II -R

)

A t

1 – 2

m o n th

s— M

D : 1 0 .3

% ,

P D

: 2 .3

% , G

A D

: 0 .7

% , A

A /

A D

: 7 .5

% , D

A /D

D : 0 .0

% ,

A S P D

: 0 .0

% ; A

t 1

ye ar

— P T

S D

: 1 7 .7

% , M

D : 4 .9

% ,

P D

: 2 .4

% , G

A D

: 0 .9

% , A

A /

A D

: 5 .7

% , D

A /D

D : 0 .8

% ,

A S P D

: 0 .7

%

P T

S D

, e it

h e r/

b o th

1 – 2

m o n th

s an

d 1

ye ar

: fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

an y

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

p sy

c h ia

tr ic

d ia

g n o

si s

(a m

o n g

fe m

al e

p a rt

ic ip

an ts

o n ly

), an

y o th

e r

p o

st -

in c id

e n t

p sy

c h ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r,

an y

o th

e r

li fe

ti m

e p sy

c h ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r,

p re

- in

c id

e n t

M D

, M

D at

1 – 2

m o n th

s, li fe

ti m

e M

D (1

c) N

o rt

h ,

S p it zn

ag e l,

an d

S m

it h

(2 0 0 1 )

1 3 6

a 1 – 2

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

, 3

ye ar

s P T

S D

, M

D , P D

, G

A D

, A

A /

A D

, D

A /D

D , A

S P D

(D IS

; D

S M

-I II -R

)

— P T

S D

, 1 – 2

m o

n th

s: lo

w e r

ac ti

v e

o u tr

e ac

h an

d in

fo rm

e d

p ra

g m

at is

m co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o n th

s; P T

S D

, 1

ye ar

: lo

w e r

in fo

rm e d

p ra

g m

a ti

sm co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o n th

s; P T

S D

, 3

ye ar

s: lo

w e r

in fo

rm e d

p ra

g m

at is

m co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o n th

s; M

D ,

1 – 2

m o

n th

s: lo

w e r

in fo

rm e d

p ra

g m

at is

m co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o n th

s; M

D ,

3 ye

ar s:

lo w

e r

ac ti

ve o u tr

e ac

h co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o

n th

s; A

n y

d is

o rd

e r,

1 – 2

m o

n th

s: lo

w e r

ac ti

ve o u tr

e ac

h an

d in

fo rm

e d

p ra

g m

at is

m co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o

n th

s; A

n y

d is

o rd

e r,

1 ye

ar :

lo w

e r

in fo

rm e d

p ra

g m

at is

m co

p in

g at

1 – 2

m o

n th

s; A

n y

d is

o rd

e r,

3 ye

ar s:

lo w

e r

in fo

rm e d

p ra

g m

at is

m an

d re

c o n ci

li at

io n

ac c e p ta

n c e

co p in

g at

1 – 2

m o n th

s (1

d )

N o rt

h ,

M cC

u tc

h e o n ,

S p it zn

ag e l,

an d

S m

it h

(2 0 0 2 )

1 1 6

a 1 – 2

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

, 3

ye ar

s P T

S D

, M

D , P D

, G

A D

, A

A /

A D

, D

A /D

D , A

S P D

(D IS

; D

S M

-I II -R

)

A t

3 ye

ar s—

P T

S D

: 1 8 %

, M

D : 1 0 %

N o

n re

c o

v e ry

fr o

m P T

S D

, 3

y e ar

s: fu

n c ti

o n a l

in te

rf e re

n c e

d u e

to sy

m p to

m s,

h a v in

g se

e n

a m

e n ta

l h e a lt

h p ro

fe ss

io n a l

a t

1 – 2

m o

n th

s; n o

n re

c o

v e ry

fr o

m M

D ,

3 y e a rs

: fa

m il y

h is

to ry

o f

d e p re

ss io

n ,

p ar

e n ta

l h is

to ry

o f

tr e a tm

e n t

fo r

d ri

n k in

g p ro

b le

m s

(2 )

S e w

e ll

(1 9 9 6 )

9 2

P e rs

o n s

e it

h e r

d ir

e c tl

y e x p o

se d

(e .g

., re

st a u ra

n t

p a tr

o n s)

o r

in d ir

e c tl

y e x p o

se d

(e .g

., re

la ti

v e s

o f

d ir

e c tl

y e x p o

se d ;

a ff

e ct

e d )

1 w

e e k , 3

m o n th

s P T

S D

(m o d u le

fr o m

th e

P D

I, D

S M

-I V

) P T

S D

, 1

w e e k : 3 8 .7

% P T

S D

, 1

w e e k : P re

-i n ci

d e n t

P T

S D

; P T

S D

n o n re

co ve

ry , 3

m o n th

s: L o w

e r

tr au

m a-

re la

te d

co n st

ru ct

e la

b o ra

ti o n

(c o n ti n u ed

)

67

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

1 9 9 2 —

C o u rt

h o u se

in S t.

L o u is

, M

is so

u ri

(1 )

Jo h n so

n , N

o rt

h ,

an d

S m

it h

(2 0 0 2 )

8 0

E m

p lo

ye e s

at co

u rt

h o u se

an d

o ff ic

e s

o f in

vo lv

e d

in d iv

id u al

s; su

b sa

m p le

co m

p le

te d

2 w

av e s

(n ¼

7 7 ;

a ff ec

te d )

6 – 8

w e e k s,

1 ye

ar ,

3 ye

ar s

P T

S D

, M

D , P D

, G

A D

, A

U D

, D

U D

(D IS

/D is

as te

r su

p p le

m e n t)

A t

6 – 8

w e e k s—

P T

S D

: 5 %

, M

D : 4 %

; P D

: 1 %

; G

A D

: 0 %

; A

U D

: 9 %

; D

U D

: 0 %

; A

t e it h e r

6 – 8

w e e k s,

1 ye

ar ,

o r

3 ye

ar s—

P T

S D

: 1 0 %

P T

S S , 6 – 8

w e e k s:

yo u n ge

r ag

e , b e in

g m

ar ri

e d ,l

o w

e r

e d u ca

ti o n ,f

e e lin

g lik

e th

e in

ci d e n t

h ad

ca u se

d th

e m

a gr

e at

d e al

o f

h ar

m (t

o ta

l P T

S S , re

e x p e ri

e n ci

n g)

, re

p o rt

in g

th at

th e

in ci

d e n t

w as

ve ry

u p se

tt in

g (a

vo id

an ce

), p e rc

e iv

e d

la ck

o f

re co

ve ry

(a vo

id an

ce ),

m e n ta

l h e al

th se

rv ic

e u ti liz

at io

n (r

e e x p e ri

e n ci

n g,

av o id

an ce

, an

d h yp

e ra

ro u sa

l)

1 9 9 3 —

O ff ic

e b u ild

in g

in S an

F ra

n ci

sc o , C

A (1

) C

la ss

e n ,

K o o p m

an , H

al e s,

an d

S p ie

ge l(

1 9 9 8 )

3 6

O ff ic

e e m

p lo

ye e s;

su b sa

m p le

co m

p le

te d

2 w

av e s

(n ¼

3 2 ;

a ff ec

te d )

1 w

e e k , 7 – 1 0

m o n th

s P T

S D

(I E S , D

T S , D

S M

-I II -R

); A

S D

(S A

S R

Q )

A t

1 w

e e k —

A S D

: 3 3 .3

% P T

S D

, 7 – 1 0

m o n th

s: A

S D

sy m

p to

m s

(D T

S to

ta l,

IE S -R

in tr

u si

o n , an

d IE

S -R

av o id

an ce

)

1 9 9 4 —

B ro

o k ly

n B ri

d ge

in B ro

o k ly

n , N

Y (1

) T

ra p p le

r an

d F ri

e d n m

an (1

9 9 6 )

2 2

Y o u th

w h o

w e re

in th

e va

n th

at w

as ta

rg e t

o f sh

o o ti n g

(s u rv

iv o rs

); 1 1

st u d e n ts

, ag

e -m

at ch

e d

an d

fr o m

th e

sa m

e co

m m

u n it y

(c o m

p ar

is o n ; a ff ec

te d )

8 w

e e k s

P T

S D

(D S M

-I V

; P T

S D

sy m

p to

m sc

al e , IE

S -R

, cl

in ic

al in

fo rm

at io

n );

M D

(B D

I, cl

in ic

al in

fo rm

at io

n ),

G A

D sy

m p to

m s

(B A

I, cl

in ic

al in

fo rm

at io

n )

A m

o n g

su rv

iv o rs

— P T

S D

: 3 6 .4

% ; M

D : 4 5 .5

% ;

A d ju

st m

e n t

D is

o rd

e r

w it h

an x ie

ty : 9 .1

% ; A

d ju

st m

e n t

d is

o rd

e r

w it h

m ix

e d

an x ie

ty an

d d e p re

ss e d

m o o d : 9 .1

%

P T

S S : b e in

g a

su rv

iv o r

(v s.

m e m

b e r

o f

co m

p ar

is o n

gr o u p ; in

tr u si

o n

an d

av o id

an ce

); M

D sy

m p to

m s:

b e in

g a

su rv

iv o r

(v s.

m e m

b e r

o f co

m p ar

is o n

gr o u p );

G A

D sy

m p to

m s:

b e in

g a

su rv

iv o r

(v s.

m e m

b e r

o f co

m p ar

is o n

gr o u p )

1 9 9 9 —

H ig

h sc

h o o l in

C o lu

m b in

e , C

O (1

) S tr

e te

sk y

an d

H o ga

n (2

0 0 1 )

1 2 2

F e m

al e

co lle

ge st

u d e n t

at R

o ch

e st

e r

In st

it u te

o f

T e ch

n o lo

gy , as

se ss

e d

p re

- in

ci d e n t

(n ¼

2 0 )

an d

p o st

- in

ci d e n t

(n ¼

1 0 2 ; re

m o te

)

(v ar

ie d )

P e rc

e iv

e d

sa fe

ty (6

it e m

s) —

P e rc

e iv

e d

sa fe

ty : p re

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

(v s.

p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

), b e in

g in

th e

F in

e A

rt s

o r

L an

gu ag

e an

d L it e ra

tu re

d e p ar

tm e n ts

(v s.

th e

S o ci

o lo

gy d e p ar

tm e n t)

(2 )

B re

n e r,

S im

o n ,

A n d e rs

o n ,

B ar

ri o s,

an d

S m

al l

(2 0 0 2 )

1 5 ,3

4 9

P ar

ti ci

p an

ts in

th e

1 9 9 9

n at

io n al

sc h o o l- b as

e d

Y o u th

R is

k B e h av

io r

S u rv

e y,

as se

ss e d

p re

- in

ci d e n t

(n ¼

1 2 .0

4 9 )

an d

p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

(n ¼

3 ,3

0 0 ;

re m

o te

)

(v ar

ie d )

In te

rp e rs

o n al

vi o le

n ce

(8 it e m

s) , S u ic

id e

(5 it e m

s) —

It e m

‘‘f e lt

to o

u n sa

fe to

go to

sc h o o l’’

: p o st

- in

ci d e n t

sa m

p le

(v s.

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

), e ff e ct

st ro

n ge

r in

ru ra

l (v

s. su

b u rb

an an

d u rb

an )

ar e as

. It

e m

‘‘c o n si

d e re

d su

ic id

e ’’:

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

(v s.

p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

), e ff e ct

o n ly

in su

b u rb

an an

d ru

ra l ar

e as

. It

e m

‘‘m ad

e a

su ic

id e

p la

n ’’:

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

(v s.

p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

), e ff e ct

o n ly

in su

b u rb

an an

d ru

ra l ar

e as (c o n ti n u ed

)

68

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

(3 )

A d d in

gt o n

(2 0 0 3 )

8 ,3

9 7

P ar

ti ci

p an

ts in

th e

1 9 9 9

S ch

o o l

C ri

m e

S u p p le

m e n t

to th

e N

at io

n al

C ri

m e

V ic

ti m

iz at

io n

S u rv

e y,

as se

ss e d

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

(n ¼

5 ,6

2 0 )

an d

p o st

- in

ci d e n t

(n ¼

2 ,7

7 7 ; re

m ot

e)

(v ar

ie d )

A vo

id an

ce (7

it e m

s) , F e ar

o f

vi ct

im iz

at io

n (2

it e m

s) —

It e m

‘‘h o w

o ft

e n

ar e

yo u

af ra

id th

at so

m e o n e

w ill

at ta

ck o r

h ar

m yo

u at

sc h o o l? ’’:

p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

sa m

p le

(v s.

p re

- in

ci d e n t

sa m

p le

)

2 0 0 6 —

D aw

so n

C o lle

ge (D

C )

in M

o n tr

e al

, Q

u e b e c

(1 )

S é gu

in e t

al .

(2 0 1 3 )

9 4 8

D C

st u d e n ts

an d

e m

p lo

ye e s

(a ff ec

te d )

1 8

m o n th

s L if e ti m

e an

d p o st

-i n ci

d e n t

p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e rs

(m e as

u re

s ad

ap te

d fr

o m

th e

2 0 0 2

C an

ad ia

n C

o m

m u n it y

H e al

th S u rv

e y)

P re

va le

n ce

o f an

y p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r:

3 0 %

; P o st

- in

ci d e n t

in ci

d en

ce ra

te s—

P T

S D

: 1 .8

% ; M

D : 5 %

; A

lc o h o l d e p e n d e n cy

: 5 %

; S o ci

al p h o b ia

: 3 %

; A

n y

p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r

at p o st

-i n ci

d e n t,

w it h

p re

- in

ci d e n t

o n se

t: 1 2 %

In ci

d e n ce

o f an

y p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

o rd

e r:

G re

at e r

an d

cl o se

r e x p o su

re (s

ta ti st

ic s

n o t

re p o rt

ed )

2 0 0 7 —

H ig

h sc

h o o l in

Jo k e la

, F in

la n d

(1 a)

H ar

av u o ri

, S u o m

al ai

n e n ,

B e rg

, K

iv ir

u u su

, an

d M

ar tt

u n e n

(2 0 1 1 )

2 3 1

a 4

m o n th

s P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

(I E S );

P T

S D

(I E S );

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

(G H

Q )

— P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

: b e in

g ap

p ro

ac h e d

o r

in te

rv ie

w e d

b y

jo u rn

al is

ts ; P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

: h ig

h e r

m e d ia

e x p o su

re

(1 b )

S u o m

al ai

n e n ,

H ar

av u o ri

, B e rg

, K

iv ir

u u su

, an

d M

ar tt

u n e n

(2 0 1 1 )

2 3 1

Jo k e la

H ig

h S ch

o o l st

u d e n ts

. U

n e x p o se

d co

m p ar

is o n

gr o u p

o f st

u d e n ts

fr o m

a d if fe

re n t

h ig

h sc

h o o l in

F in

la n d

(n ¼

5 2 6 ; a ff ec

te d )

4 m

o n th

s P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

(I E S );

P T

S D

(I E S );

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

(G H

Q );

C h an

ge s

in su

b st

an ce

ab u se

d u ri

n g

p as

t 6

m o n th

s (1

it e m

)

A m

o n g

e x p o se

d —

P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

: 4 2 .8

% ; P T

S D

: 1 9 .2

% ;

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

: 3 1 .7

% ; In

cr e as

e in

su b st

an ce

ab u se

d u ri

n g

p as

t 6

m o n th

s: 1 3 .3

%

P o

st tr

au m

at ic

d is

tr e ss

: E x p o

se d

(v s.

u n e x p o se

d );

P T

S D

: fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

e x p o se

d (v

s. u n e x p o se

d ),

se ve

re o r

e x tr

e m

e e x p o

su re

(v s.

m il d

to si

gn if ic

an t

e x p o su

re ),

lo w

e r

p e rc

e iv

e d

su p p o rt

fr o m

fa m

il y

an d

fr ie

n d s;

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

a n c e : o ld

e r

ag e , fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

li vi

n g

w it

h o n e

b io

lo g ic

al p a re

n t

o r

o th

e rw

is e

(v s.

li vi

n g

w it

h b o

th b io

lo g ic

al p a re

n ts

), e x p o se

d (v

s. u n e x p o

se d ),

lo w

e r

p e rc

e iv

e d

so c ia

l su

p p o

rt fr

o m

fa m

il y,

p re

v io

u s

m e n ta

l su

p p o

rt fr

o m

a n o

n gu

a rd

ia n

ad u lt

(1 c)

M u rt

o n e n ,

S u o m

al ai

n e n ,

H ar

av u o ri

, an

d M

ar tt

u n e n

(2 0 1 2 )

Jo k e la

H ig

h S ch

o o l st

u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

4 m

o n th

s P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

(I E S );

P T

S D

(I E S );

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

(G H

Q )

— P o st

tr au

m at

ic d is

tr e ss

: h av

in g

b e e n

o ff e re

d cr

is is

su p p o rt

; P T

S D

: n o t

p e rc

e iv

in g

cr is

is su

p p o rt

as h e lp

fu l;

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

d is

tu rb

an ce

: h av

in g

b e e n

o ff e re

d cr

is is

su p p o rt

, n o t

p e rc

e iv

in g

cr is

is su

p p o rt

as h e lp

fu l

(c o n ti n u ed

)

69

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

2 0 0 7 —

V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

(V T

) in

B la

ck sb

u rg

, V

A (1

a) F al

la h i an

d L e si

k (2

0 0 9 )

3 1 2

S tu

d e n ts

fr o m

C e n tr

al C

o n n e ct

ic u t

S ta

te U

n iv

e rs

it y

(r em

o te

)

3 w

e e k s

A S D

(1 3 -i te

m s,

D S M

-I V

) —

A S D

sy m

p to

m s:

o ld

e r

ag e

(n ig

h tm

ar e s)

, fe

m al

e ge

n d e r

(f e ar

), ra

ci al

/e th

n ic

m in

o ri

ty st

at u s

(s u ic

id al

id e at

io n ,

re p la

yi n g

th e

e ve

n t)

, m

o re

h o u rs

o f T

V w

at ch

in g

(i n tr

u si

ve th

o u gh

ts , sl

e e p

d is

tu rb

an ce

s, d is

tr ac

ti o n , fe

ar , st

o m

ac h

u p se

t, d e p re

ss io

n , d is

o rg

an iz

at io

n ,

re p la

yi n g

o f th

e e ve

n t,

an d

an ge

r) (1

b )

F al

la h i,

A u st

ad ,

F al

lo n , an

d L e is

h m

an (2

0 0 9 )

3 1 2

a 3

w e e k s

P sy

ch ia

tr ic

sy m

p to

m s

(u n sp

e ci

fi e d )

— P sy

ch ia

tr ic

sy m

p to

m s:

fe ar

s o f b e in

g p e rs

o n al

ly h ar

m e d

o n

ca m

p u s,

fe ar

s th

at a

si m

ila r

in ci

d e n t co

u ld

o cc

u r

o n

ca m

p u s,

gr e at

e r

e x p o su

re to

n e w

s m

e d ia

,g re

at e r

ti m

e d is

cu ss

in g

th e

in ci

d e n t

w it h

fa m

ily ,

gr e at

e r

ti m

e d is

cu ss

in g

th e

in ci

d e n t

w it h

fr ie

n d s

(2 a)

L it tl e to

n ,

A x so

m , an

d G

ri lls

-T aq

u e ch

e l

(2 0 0 9 )

1 9 3

F e m

al e

V T

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 m

o n th

s, 6

m o n th

s

M D

(C E S -D

); G

A D

(F D

A S )

— P sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l d is

tr e ss

(l at

e n t

va ri

ab le

o f

M D

an d

G A

D sy

m p to

m su

b sc

al e s)

, 6

m o n th

s: h ig

h e r

re so

u rc

e lo

ss at

2 an

d 6

m o n th

s, lo

w e r

re so

u rc

e ga

in at

2 an

d 6

m o n th

s (2

b ) L it tl e to

n , G

ri lls

- T

aq u e ch

e l,

an d

A x so

m (2

0 0 9 )

2 9 3

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 m

o n th

s, 6

m o n th

s

P T

S D

(D S M

-I V

; P S S -S

R )

A t

2 m

o n th

s— P T

S D

: 3 0 %

; A

t 6

m o n th

s— P T

S D

: 2 3 %

P T

S S , 2

m o n th

s: H

ig h e r

re so

u rc

e lo

ss at

2 m

o n th

s p o st

-i n ci

d e n t.

P T

S S , 6

m o n th

s: h ig

h e r

re so

u rc

e lo

ss at

2 an

d 6

m o n th

s (2

c) G

ri lls

- T

aq u e ch

e l,

L it tl e to

n , an

d A

x so

m (2

0 1 1 )

2 9 8

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 m

o n th

s, 6

m o n th

s

G A

D (F

D A

S );

Q u al

it y

o f L if e

(W H

O -Q

O L )

— G

A D

sy m

p to

m s,

2 m

o n th

s (e

m o ti o n al

, p h ys

io lo

gi ca

l, co

gn it iv

e , an

d b e h av

io ra

l su

b sc

al e s)

: h ig

h e r

p re

-s h o o ti n g

G A

D sy

m p to

m s

(a ll

su b sc

al e s)

, h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re (b

e h av

io ra

l) , lo

w e r

se lf -w

o rt

h (a

ll su

b sc

al e s)

, h ig

h e r

se n se

o f

ra n d o m

n e ss

(e m

o ti o n al

), lo

w e r

fa m

ily su

p p o rt

(e m

o ti o n al

, p h ys

io lo

gi ca

l, co

gn it iv

e );

Q u al

it y

o f L if e , 2

m o n th

s (p

h ys

ic al

, p sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l, so

ci al

, an

d e n vi

ro n m

e n t

su b sc

al e s)

: lo

w e r

e x p o su

re (p

h ys

ic al

), h ig

h e r

se lf -w

o rt

h (a

ll su

b sc

al e s)

, lo

w e r

se n se

o f ra

n d o m

n e ss

(p h ys

ic al

, p sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l) , h ig

h e r

fa m

ily su

p p o rt

(a ll

su b sc

al e s)

, h ig

h e r

fr ie

n d

su p p o rt

(e n vi

ro n m

e n t)

(c o n ti n u ed

)

70

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

(2 d )

L it tl e to

n ,

A x so

m , an

d G

ri lls

-T aq

u e ch

e l

(2 0 1 1 )

3 6 8

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 m

o n th

s, 6

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

P T

S D

(D S M

-I V

; P S S -S

R );

M D

(C E S -D

); G

A D

(F D

A S )

A t

2 m

o n th

s— M

D : 1 9 %

; A

t 6

m o n th

s— M

D : 2 2 %

; A

t 1

ye ar

— P T

S D

: 2 7 %

, M

D :

2 4 %

P T

S S , 6

m o n th

s: P T

S S

at 2

m o n th

s, m

al ad

ap ti ve

co p in

g at

2 m

o n th

s; P T

S S , 1

ye ar

: P T

SS an

d m

al ad

ap ti ve

co p in

g at

6 m

o n th

s; P sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l d is

tr e ss

(l at

e n t

va ri

ab le

o f M

D an

d G

A D

sy m

p to

m su

b sc

al e s)

, 2

m o n th

s: p re

-i n ci

d e n t

d is

tr e ss

; P sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l d is

tr e ss

, 6

m o n th

s: P sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l d is

tr e ss

an d

m al

ad ap

ti ve

co p in

g at

2 m

o n th

s; P sy

ch o lo

gi ca

l d is

tr e ss

,1 ye

ar :P

sy ch

o lo

gi ca

ld is

tr e ss

an d

m al

ad ap

ti ve

co p in

g at

6 m

o n th

s (2

e ) L it tl e to

n , G

ri lls

- T

aq u e ch

e l,

A x so

m , B ye

, an

d B u ck

(2 0 1 2 )

2 1 5

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 m

o n th

s, 6

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

P T

S D

(D S M

-I V

; P S S -S

R );

M D

(C E S -D

) —

P T

S S , 1

ye ar

: p re

-i n ci

d e n t

se x u al

vi ct

im iz

at io

n , lo

w e r

b e n e vo

le n ce

b e lie

fs at

2 m

o n th

s, lo

w e r

fa m

ily su

p p o rt

at 2

m o n th

s; M

D sy

m p to

m s,

1 ye

ar : p re

- in

ci d e n t

se x u al

vi ct

im iz

at io

n , lo

w e r

b e n e vo

le n ce

b e lie

fs at

2 m

o n th

s, lo

w e r

fa m

ily su

p p o rt

at 2

m o n th

s (3

a) H

u gh

e s

e t

al .

(2 0 1 1 )

4 ,6

3 9

V T

st u d e n ts

(a ff e ct

e d )

3 – 4

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

P T

S D

(T S Q

, D

S M

-I V

) P T

S D

: 1 5 .4

% P T

S D

: fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re to

fi rs

t in

ci d e n t

o f at

ta ck

, in

ab ili

ty to

co n ta

ct cl

o se

fr ie

n d s

d u ri

n g

in ci

d e n t,

d e at

h o f a

cl o se

fr ie

n d , d e at

h o f a

fr ie

n d

o f ac

q u ai

n ta

n ce

(3 b )

S m

it h , A

b e yt

a, H

u gh

e s,

an d

Jo n e s

(2 0 1 4 )

2 4 5

S u b sa

m p le

o f b e re

av e d

p ar

ti ci

p an

ts w

h o

co m

p le

te d

fo llo

w -u

p as

se ss

m e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )a

3 – 4

m o n th

s, 1

ye ar

P T

S D

(T S Q

, D

S M

-I V

); G

ri e f

(8 -i te

m m

e as

u re

) —

G ri

e f se

ve ri

ty : h ig

h e r

P T

S S

at 3 – 4

m o n th

s, lo

w e r

se lf -e

ff ic

ac y,

gr e at

e r

d is

ru p te

d w

o rl

d vi

e w

(4 a)

H aw

d o n

an d

R ya

n (2

0 1 1 )

3 6 3

V T

st u d e n ts

an d

fa cu

lt y

(a ff ec

te d )

5 m

o n th

s, 9

m o n th

s, an

d 1 3

m o n th

s

E m

o ti o n al

an d

b e h av

io ra

l w

e ll-

b e in

g (C

D C

d e p re

ss io

n sc

re e n e r,

W A

I, it e m

as se

ss in

g p ro

d u ct

iv it y)

— L o w

e r

e m

o ti o n al

an d

b e h av

io ra

l w

e ll-

b e in

g, 5

m o n th

s, 9

m o n th

s, an

d 1 3

m o n th

s: lo

w e r

so ci

al so

lid ar

it y

at 5

m o n th

s, 9

m o n th

s, an

d 1 3

m o n th

s

(4 b )

H aw

d o n

an d

R ya

n (2

0 1 2 )

5 4 3

V T

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

5 m

o n th

s E m

o ti o n al

an d

b e h av

io ra

l w

e ll-

b e in

g (C

D C

d e p re

ss io

n sc

re e n e r,

W A

I, it e m

as se

ss in

g p ro

d u ct

iv it y)

— L o w

e r

e m

o ti o n al

an d

b e h av

io ra

l w

e ll-

b e in

g: fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

k n o w

in g

a vi

ct im

o f

th e

in ci

d e n t,

lo w

e r

o ve

ra ll

so ci

al su

p p o rt

, la

ck o f p ar

ti ci

p at

io n

o n

a co

m m

u n it y

te am

, h av

in g

se e n

a p ro

fe ss

io n al

co u n se

lo r

af te

r th

e in

ci d e n t,

fe w

e r

in -p

e rs

o n

co n ve

rs at

io n s

w it h

fa m

ily , fe

w e r

vi rt

u al

co n ve

rs at

io n s

w it h

fa m

ily , fe

w e r

vi rt

u al

co n ve

rs at

io n s

w it h

fr ie

n d s,

an d

lo w

e r

so ci

al so

lid ar

it y

(c o n ti n u ed

)

71

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

2 0 0 8 —

N o rt

h e rn

Il lin

o is

U n iv

e rs

it y

(N IU

) in

D e K

al b , IL

(1 a)

S te

p h e n so

n ,

V al

e n ti n e r,

K u m

p u la

, an

d O

rc u tt

(2 0 0 9 )

6 9 1

F e m

al e

N IU

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

) —

P T

S S , 2 – 4

w e e k s:

h ig

h e r

an x ie

ty se

n si

ti vi

ty (p

h ys

ic al

an d

co gn

it iv

e co

n ce

rn s)

, h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re

(1 b )

F e rg

u s,

R ab

e n h o rs

t, O

rc u tt

, an

d V

al e n ti n e r

(2 0 1 1 )

5 8

S u b sa

m p le

o f p ar

ti ci

p an

ts w

it h

h ig

h e st

an d

lo w

e st

le ve

ls o f e x p o su

re p ar

ti ci

p at

e d

in a

la b o ra

to ry

e x p e ri

m e n t

(a ff ec

te d )a

6 w

e e k s

P T

SD (D

E Q

, D

SM -I V

); M

D (D

A SS

-2 1 );

G A

D (D

A SS

-2 1 )

— P T

S S , 6

w e e k s:

H ig

h e r

n e ga

ti ve

af fe

ct w

h ile

w ri

ti n g

an d

re ad

in g

ab o u t

e ve

n t;

M D

sy m

p to

m s,

6 w

e e k s:

H ig

h e r

n e ga

ti ve

af fe

ct w

h ile

re ad

in g

ab o u t

th e

in ci

d e n t;

G A

D sy

m p to

m s,

6 w

e e k s:

H ig

h e r

n e ga

ti ve

af fe

ct w

h ile

w ri

ti n g

an d

re ad

in g

ab o u t

th e

in ci

d e n t

(1 c)

K u m

p u la

, O

rc u tt

, B ar

d e e n ,

an d

V ar

k o vi

tz k y

(2 0 1 1 )

5 3 2

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s,

8 m

o n th

s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

) P re

-i n ci

d e n t—

S ig

n if ic

an t

P T

S S : 2 0 .8

% ; A

t 2 – 4

w e e k s—

S ig

n if ic

an t

P T

S S :

4 9 .4

% ; A

t 8

m o n th

s— S ig

n if ic

an t

P T

S S : 1 1 .4

%

P T

S S ,

2 – 4

w e e k s:

n o

n -W

h it

e ra

ce /

e th

n ic

it y

(a vo

id an

c e

an d

h y p e ra

ro u sa

l) ,

h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

tr au

m a

e x p o

su re

, h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

e x p e ri

e n ti

a l

av o id

a n c e ,

h ig

h e r

p e ri

tr a u m

at ic

d is

so c ia

ti o

n ;

P T

S S ,

8 m

o n th

s: h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re ,

h ig

h e r

P T

S S

at 2 – 4

w e e k s,

h ig

h e r

e x p e ri

e n ti

a l

av o id

an c e

at 2 – 4

w e e k s

(1 d )

L it tl e to

n ,

K u m

p u la

, an

d O

rc u tt

(2 0 1 1 )

6 9 1

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s,

8 m

o n th

s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

— P T

S S ,

2 – 4

w e e k s:

n o

n -A

fr ic

a n

A m

e ri

ca n

ra ce

/e th

n ic

it y ,

h ig

h e r

p re

-i n c id

e n t

tr au

m a

e x p o

su re

, h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

st re

ss ,

h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re ;

P T

S S ,

8 m

o n th

s: A

si a n

A m

e ri

c an

ra ce

/e th

n ic

it y,

h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

tr au

m a

e x p o

su re

, h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

G A

D sy

m p to

m s,

h ig

h e r

e x p o

su re

, h ig

h e r

P T

S S

at 2 – 4

w e e k s,

h ig

h e r

re so

u rc

e lo

ss (1

e )

M e rc

e r

e t

al .

(2 0 1 2 )

2 3 5

S u b sa

m p le

o f p ar

ti ci

p an

ts w

h o

p ro

vi d e d

D N

A sa

m p le

s (a

ff ec

te d )a

P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

) —

P T

S S ,

ch an

ge in

sy m

p to

m s

fr o m

p re

- in

ci d e n t

to 2 – 4

w e e k s:

rs 2 5 5 3 1

A /A

ge n o

ty p e , 5 -H

T T

L P R

m u lt

im ar

k e r

lo w

- e x p re

ss in

g ge

n o

ty p e s

(c o n ti n u ed

)

72

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

(1 f)

B ar

d e e n ,

K u m

p u la

, an

d O

rc u tt

(2 0 1 3 )

6 9 1

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s,

8 m

o n th

s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

); M

D (D

A S S -2

1 );

G A

D (D

A S S -

2 1 );

S tr

e ss

(D A

S S -2

1 )

P T

S S ,

2 – 4

w e e k s:

h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

p o

st tr

au m

at ic

st re

ss ,

h ig

h e r

e x p o

su re

, h ig

h e r

e m

o ti

o n

re gu

la ti

o n

d if fi cu

lt ie

s at

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

an d

2 – 4

w e e k s;

P T

S S ,

h ig

h e r

e m

o ti

o n

re gu

la ti

o n

d if fi cu

lt ie

s at

2 – 4

w e e k s

an d

8 m

o n th

s; G

e n e ra

l D

is tr

e ss

(l at

e n t

co n st

ru c t

o f

M D

, G

A D

, an

d st

re ss

), 2 – 4

w e e k s:

p re

- in

ci d e n t

ge n e ra

l d is

tr e ss

, h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re ,

h ig

h e r

e m

o ti

o n

re gu

la ti

o n

d if fi c u lt

ie s

at 2 – 4

w e e k s;

G e n e ra

l d is

tr e ss

(l at

e n t

co n st

ru c t

o f

M D

, G

A D

, an

d st

re ss

), 8

m o n th

s: h ig

h e r

e m

o ti

o n

re gu

la ti

o n

d if fi cu

lt ie

s at

2 – 4

m o

n th

s an

d 8

m o n th

s (1

g) O

rc u tt

, B o n an

n o , H

an n a,

an d

M ir

o n

(2 0 1 4 )

6 6 0

a P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 4

w e e k s,

8 m

o n th

s, 1 4

m o n th

s, 2 0

m o n th

s, 2 6

m o n th

s, an

d 3 2

m o n th

s

P T

S D

(D E Q

, D

S M

-I V

) —

P o st

tr au

m at

ic st

re ss

, ch

ro n ic

d ys

fu n ct

io n

tr aj

e ct

o ry

: P re

-i n ci

d e n t

tr au

m a

e x p o su

re , h ig

h e r

p re

-i n ci

d e n t

e x p e ri

e n ti al

av o id

an ce

, h ig

h e r

e x p o su

re ,

h ig

h e r

e m

o ti o n

re gu

la ti o n

d if fi cu

lt ie

s (l im

it e d

ac ce

ss to

st ra

te gi

e s,

la ck

o f

e m

o ti o n al

cl ar

it y)

at 8

m o n th

s (2

) H

ar tn

e tt

an d

S k o w

ro n sk

i (2

0 1 0 )

5 5

N IU

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

P re

-i n ci

d e n t,

2 – 3

w e e k s

M o o d

(P o M

S )

— —

2 0 0 8 —

C e n tr

al A

rk an

sa s

U n iv

e rs

it y

(C A

U )

in C

o n w

ay , A

R (1

) M

cI n ty

re ,

S p e n ce

, an

d L ac

h la

n (2

0 1 1 )

5 6 9

C A

U st

u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

1 w

e e k

E m

o ti o n al

R e ac

ti o n s

(7 -i te

m sc

al e )

— E m

o ti o n al

re ac

ti o n s:

fe m

al e

ge n d e r

(c o n fu

si o n , fe

ar , sa

d n e ss

, la

ck o f

ca lm

n e ss

, an

d p an

ic )

2 0 0 8 —

S e in

äj o k i U

n iv

e rs

it y

o f A

p p lie

d S ci

e n ce

s (S

U A

S )

in K

au h aj

o k i,

F in

la n d

(1 )

T u ru

n e n ,

H ar

av u o ri

, P u n am

äk i,

S u o m

al ai

n e n , an

d M

ar tt

u n e n

(2 0 1 4 )

1 3 7

S U

A S

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

4 m

o n th

s, 1 6

m o n th

s, an

d 2 8

m o n th

s

P T

S D

(I E S );

D is

so ci

at iv

e sy

m p to

m s

(A -D

E S ),

P T

G (P

T G

I)

— P T

S S , 4

m o n th

s: p re

o c cu

p ie

d at

ta ch

m e n t

st y le

(t o ta

l P T

S S , av

o id

an c e

su b sc

a le

); D

is so

c ia

ti ve

sy m

p to

m s,

4 m

o n th

s: n o

n se

c u re

at ta

ch m

e n t

st y le

s; D

is so

c ia

ti ve

sy m

p to

m s,

1 6

m o

n th

s: n o

n se

c u re

at ta

ch m

e n t

st y le

s; L o

w e r

P T

G , 1 6

m o

n th

s: av

o id

an t

at ta

c h m

e n t

st y le

(r e la

ti n g

to o th

e rs

su b sc

al e );

L o

w e r

P T

G , 2 8

m o

n th

s: av

o id

an t

at ta

ch m

e n t

st yl

e (r

e la

ti n g

to o th

e rs

su b sc

al e )

(c o n ti n u ed

)

73

T a b

le 2 .

(c o n ti n u e d )

A u th

o r

(Y e ar

) N

S am

p le

T im

in g

M e n ta

l H

e al

th O

u tc

o m

e s

(M e as

u re

; C

la ss

if ic

at io

n S ys

te m

) P re

va le

n ce

P re

d ic

to rs

2 0 0 7

an d

2 0 0 8 —

S ch

o o ls

in Jo

le k a

an d

K au

h aj

o k i,

F in

la n d

(c o m

b in

e d )

(1 )

V u o ri

, H

aw d o n ,

A tt

e , an

d R

äs än

e n

(2 0 1 3 )

6 4 9

R an

d o m

sa m

p le

o f re

si d e n ts

in Jo

le k a

(n ¼

3 3 0 )

an d

K au

h aj

o k i (n ¼

3 9 1 ;

a ff ec

te d )

6 – 7

m o n th

s W

o rr

y (3

it e m

s) —

W o rr

y (a

b o u t

te rr

o ri

sm , lo

ca l cr

im e , an

d sc

h o o l sh

o o ti n gs

): L o w

e r

so ci

al so

lid ar

it y,

m o re

p u n it iv

e at

ti tu

d e s

to w

ar d

cr im

e

2 0 0 7

an d

2 0 0 8 —

V T

an d

N IU

(c o m

b in

e d )

(1 )

K am

in sk

i, K

o o n s-

W it t,

T h o m

p so

n , an

d W

e is

s (2

0 1 0 )

1 ,9

5 2

C o lle

ge st

u d e n ts

fr o m

th e

U n iv

e rs

it y

o f S o u th

C ar

o lin

a (r

em o te

)

P re

-V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

, p o st

-V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

, p re

-N IU

, p o st

-N IU

(1 ti m

e p o in

t p e r

p ar

ti ci

p an

t)

F e ar

(5 it e m

s) —

F e ar

o f w

al k in

g al

o n e

d u ri

n g

th e

d ay

: p o st

- V

ir gi

n ia

T e ch

as se

ss m

e n t,

p re

-N IU

as se

ss m

e n t,

n o n -W

h it e

ra ce

/e th

n ic

it y,

re si

d e n ce

o n

ca m

p u s;

F e ar

o f w

al k in

g al

o n e

af te

r d ar

k : as

se ss

m e n t

af te

r V

ir gi

n ia

T e ch

, yo

u n ge

r ag

e , fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

re si

d e n ce

o n

ca m

p u s;

F e ar

o f

cr im

e : p o st

-V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

as se

ss m

e n t,

yo u n ge

r ag

e , fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

re si

d e n ce

o n

ca m

p u s;

F e ar

o f m

u rd

e r:

p o st

-V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

as se

ss m

e n t,

p o st

-N IU

as se

ss m

e n t,

yo u n ge

r ag

e , fe

m al

e ge

n d e r,

n o n -W

h it e

ra ce

/e th

n ic

it y,

re si

d e n ce

o n

ca m

p u s;

F e ar

o f w

e ap

o n

at ta

ck : p o st

-V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

as se

ss m

e n t,

p o st

-N IU

as se

ss m

e n t,

yo u n ge

r ag

e , fe

m al

e ge

n d e r

(2 )

V ic

ar y

an d

F ra

le y

(2 0 1 0 )

2 8 4

V T

(n ¼

1 2 4 )

an d

N IU

(n ¼

1 6 0 )

st u d e n ts

(a ff ec

te d )

2 w

e e k s

an d

8 w

e e k s

P T

S D

(P S S -S

R ),

M D

(C E S D

-1 0 )

A t

2 w

e e k s—

P T

S D

: 6 4 %

; M

D : 7 1 %

; A

t 8

w e e k s—

P T

S D

: 2 2 %

; M

D : 3 0 %

P T

S D

, 2

w e e k s:

F e m

al e

ge n d e r,

k n o w

in g

o n e

o f th

e vi

ct im

s; M

D sy

m p to

m s,

2 w

e e k s:

F e m

al e

ge n d e r,

k n o w

in g

o n e

o f

th e

vi ct

im s

N o te

.U n d e r

e ac

h e ve

n t,

n u m

b e ri

n g

is u se

d to

d e n o te

w h e n

st u d ie

s u se

d d at

a fr

o m

th e

sa m

e sa

m p le

,w it h

st u d ie

s p re

se n te

d in

ch ro

n o lo

gi ca

lo rd

e r

b y

p u b lic

at io

n d at

e .F

o r

e x am

p le

,f o r

th e

1 9 8 4

e le

m e n ta

ry sc

h o o ls

h o o ti n g

in L o s

A n ge

le s,

C A

, tw

o st

u d ie

s fr

o m

th e

sa m

e sa

m p le

ar e

lis te

d an

d la

b e le

d ac

co rd

in gl

y: (1

a) P yn

o o s

e t

al . (1

9 8 7 )

an d

(1 b )

N ad

e r,

P yn

o o s,

F ai

rb an

k s,

an d

F re

d e ri

ck (1

9 9 0 ).

W h e n

th e re

w e re

m u lt ip

le sa

m p le

s u n d e r

e ac

h e ve

n t,

th e

sa m

p le

s w

e re

o rd

e re

d ch

ro n o lo

gi ca

lly b y

p u b lic

at io

n d at

e o f th

e fi rs

t st

u d y

w it h in

e ac

h sa

m p le

. T

h e

ta b le

lis ts

b iv

ar ia

te as

so ci

at io

n s

o n ly

if m

u lt iv

ar ia

te re

su lt s

w e re

u n av

ai la

b le

; if

p re

va le

n ce

w as

re p o rt

e d

in m

u lt ip

le p u b lic

at io

n s

fo r

th e

sa m

e sa

m p le

,t h e

fi gu

re th

at in

cl u d e d

a h ig

h e r

# o f p ar

ti ci

p an

ts is

in cl

u d e d . A

A /A

D ¼

al co

h o l ab

u se

o r

d e p e n d e n ce

; A

S D ¼

ac u te

st re

ss d is

o rd

e r;

A S P D ¼

an ti so

ci al

p e rs

o n al

it y

d is

o rd

e r;

A U

D ¼

al co

h o l u se

d is

o rd

e r;

B A

I ¼

B e ck

A n x ie

ty In

ve n to

ry ; B D

I ¼

B e ck

D e p re

ss io

n In

ve n to

ry ; C

D C ¼

C e n te

rs fo

r D

is e as

e C

o n tr

o l;

C E S -D ¼

1 0 -i te

m C

e n te

r fo

r E p id

e m

io lo

gi c

S tu

d ie

s S h o rt

D e p re

ss io

n S ca

le ; D

A S S -2

1 ¼

D e p re

ss io

n an

d A

n x ie

ty S tr

e ss

S ca

le s-

2 1

it e m

ve rs

io n ; D

A /D

D ¼

d ru

g ab

u se

o r

d e p e n d e n ce

; D

E Q ¼

D is

tr e ss

in g

E ve

n ts

Q u e st

io n n ai

re ; D

IS ¼

d ia

gn o st

ic in

te rv

ie w

sc h e d u le

; D

T S ¼

D av

id so

n T

ra u m

a S ca

le ; D

U D ¼

d ru

g u se

d is

o rd

e r;

F D

A S ¼

F o u r

D im

e n si

o n al

A n x ie

ty S ca

le ; G

A D ¼

ge n e ra

liz e d

an x ie

ty d is

o rd

e r;

G H

Q ¼

G e n e ra

l H

e al

th Q

u e st

io n n ai

re ; IE

S ¼

Im p ac

t o f

E ve

n ts

S ca

le ; M

D ¼

m aj

o r

d e p re

ss io

n ; N

IU ¼

N o rt

h e rn

Il lin

o is

U n iv

e rs

it y;

P D ¼

p an

ic d is

o rd

e r;

P D

I ¼

p sy

ch ia

tr ic

d ia

gn o st

ic in

te rv

ie w

; P o M

S ¼

P ro

fi le

o f M

o o d

S ta

te s;

P T

G I ¼

P o st

tr au

m at

ic G

ro w

th In

ve n to

ry ; P S S -S

R ¼

P T

S D

S ym

p to

m S ca

le -S

e lf

R e p o rt

; P T

S D ¼

p o st

tr au

m at

ic st

re ss

d is

o rd

e r;

P T

S D

-R I ¼

; P o st

tr au

m at

ic S tr

e ss

-R e ac

ti o n

In d e x ; P T

S S ¼

p o st

tr au

m at

ic st

re ss

sy m

p to

m s/

se ve

ri ty

; S A

S R

Q ¼

S ta

n fo

rd A

cu te

S tr

e ss

R e ac

ti o n

Q u e st

io n n ai

re ; S T

A I ¼

S ta

te T

ra it

A n x ie

ty In

ve n to

ry ; T

S Q ¼

T ra

u m

a S cr

e e n in

g Q

u e st

io n n ai

re ; V

T ¼

V ir

gi n ia

T e ch

; W

A I ¼

W e in

b e rg

e r

A d ju

st m

e n t

In ve

n to

ry ; W

H O

-Q O

L ¼

W o rl

d H

e al

th O

rg an

iz at

io n

Q u al

it y

o f L if e

S ca

le – B ri

e f.

a S am

e sa

m p le

d e sc

ri p ti o n

as th

e p re

ce d in

g st

u d y.

74

(proposed) DSM-IV criteria, respectively (Schwarz & Kowalski,

1991a, 1991b).

Other Mental Health Outcomes

Although most studies in our review reported on symptoms and

prevalence estimates of psychiatric disorders, others included

mental health outcomes that were not specific to any disorder.

Fourteen studies (12 independent samples) utilized inventories

or items assessing constructs that cut across disorders, includ-

ing psychiatric disturbance, stress, grief, mood, emotional reac-

tions, worry, and fear (e.g., McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan,

2011; Suomalainen, Haravuorti, Berg, Kiviruusu, & Marttunen,

2011; Vuori, Hawdon, Atte, & Räsänen, 2013). Four studies

(three independent samples) included positive indices of men-

tal health—emotional and behavioral well-being, quality of

life, and posttraumatic growth (Grills-Taquechel, Littleton,

& Axsom, 2011; Hawdon & Ryan, 2011, 2012; Turunen, Har-

avuori, Punamäki, Suomalainen, & Marttunen, 2014). Finally,

one study (Orcutt, Bonanno, Hanna, & Miron, 2014) utilized

trajectory analysis of PTSS over seven waves to (one pre- and

six post-incident) in the context of the NIU campus shooting.

The majority of participants (60.9%) were in a minimal impact resilience trajectory, reporting low levels of symptoms

at each wave and a small elevation in symptoms at the first

post-incident wave only.

Assessing the Mental Health Impact of Mass Shootings

In reviewing the studies, we noted how investigators assessed

whether participants’ symptoms reflected the impact of the mass

shooting, versus ongoing mental health difficulties that might

have been present before the incident took place. Certainly, per-

sonality disorders, which are conceptualized as enduring and

pervasive phenomenon, are unlikely to be the result of a single

event. Symptoms that were asked without reference to the mass

shooting episode, including MD and GAD symptoms, also might

have been present prior to the shooting incident. Although other

outcomes were directly in reference to the mass shooting inci-

dent, including PTSD and acute stress disorder, they too could

be influenced by preexisting psychopathology.

Three methods were used to address this issue. First, three

independent samples included both pre- and post-incident data.

The significance of pre- to post-incident changes in mental

health reached was assessed in one of these samples (Hartnett

& Skowronski, 2010). The investigators found that students’ rat-

ings of four negative moods states (depression, tension, fatigue,

and confusion) did not significantly differ between pre- and post-

incident assessment; however, they reported significantly higher

anger at the post-incident assessment. In the two other samples,

significance of changes in mental health from pre- to post-

incident was not assessed. However, descriptive data suggested

short-term increases in depression and PTSS (e.g., Littleton,

Axsom, & Grill-Taquechel, 2009; Orcutt et al., 2014).

Second, two studies assessed mental health impacts through

comparison of samples who faced different levels of exposure,

with results indicating higher symptomatology in directly

exposed subsamples. Students at Joleka High School in Fin-

land, where a shooting took place, had significantly higher

posttraumatic distress and psychiatric disturbance than students

in another city in Finland (Suomalainen et al., 2011). In the

aftermath of the 1994 Brooklyn Bridge shooting, levels of

PTSS, depression, and anxiety were higher in youth who

directly experienced the attack than an age-matched compari-

son group of youth in the same community who were not

directly exposed (Trappler & Friednman, 1996).

Finally, three studies drew on data from ongoing investiga-

tions of remote samples to assess the mental health impact of mass

shootings, as well as their broader effects on indirectly exposed

populations. For example, in the aftermath of the 1999 Columbine

massacre, researchers drew on national school-based surveys

with assessments spanning from pre- to post-incident in 1999 and

found that students’ perceptions of safety at school declined after

the attack (Addington, 2003; Brener, Simon, Anderson, Barrios,

& Small, 2002). Interestingly, students’ reports of suicidal idea-

tion and plans also significantly decreased after Columbine, per-

haps indicative some form of widespread posttraumatic growth

(e.g., increased appreciation of life), although this finding was

limited to students living in rural and suburban areas (Brener

et al., 2002). Two other investigations of remote college student

samples have shown increased fears (e.g., of walking alone, of

crime) and decreased perceived safety from pre- to post-

incident (Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010;

Stretesky & Hogan, 2001).

Predictors of Adverse Mental Health Outcomes

Table 2 also includes significant predictors of adverse mental

health outcomes in each of the study. These predictors can be

divided roughly into three categories: (1) demographics and

pre-incident characteristics, (2) incident exposure, and (3)

post-incident functioning and psychosocial resources.

Demographic and Pre-Incident Characteristics

Demographic characteristics have frequently been included as

predictors of mental health. Most consistently, female gender

has been shown to be a predictor of post-incident psychological

adversity, associated with increased odds of PTSD (e.g., North,

Smith & Spitznagel, 1994; Suomalainen et al., 2011), higher

levels of fear (Fallahi & Lesik, 2009), and lower levels of emo-

tional and behavioral well-being (Hawdon & Ryan, 2012) in

affected samples, and higher fear in a remote sample (Vicary

& Fraley, 2010). One proposed explanation for this difference

is that women are more likely to employ a ruminative coping

style, increasing the severity and chronicity of their symptoms

(e.g., McIntyre et al., 2011; Palus, Fang, & Prawitz, 2012).

Indicators of socioeconomic disadvantage, although less

often included in post-incident studies, have also been consis-

tently associated with poor mental health. For example, in the

aftermath of the 1984 shooting at a fast food restaurant in

Lowe and Galea 75

California, higher prevalences of severe PTSD were documen-

ted among community members with lower income or who

were unemployed, relative to their counterparts (Hough et al.,

1990). Lower education was also associated with higher PTSS

among survivors of the 1992 St. Louis courthouse shooting

(Johnson et al., 2002). Among an adolescent sample, not living

with two biological parents was associated with higher psy-

chiatric disturbance (Suomalainen et al., 2011).

Other demographic characteristics have been less consis-

tently associated with post-incident mental health outcomes.

For example, younger and older age have each been associated

with adverse outcomes in both community and college student

samples (Fallahi & Lesik, 2009; Hough et al., 1990; Johnson

et al., 2002; Kaminski et al., 2010). Racial/ethnic minority

status has also been inconsistently associated with outcomes.

Two studies have found non-White race to be associated with

more severe post-incident symptoms (Fallahi & Lesik, 2009;

Kaminski et al., 2010). In contrast, among female NIU stu-

dents, African American ethnicity was associated with lower

PTSS at 2–4 weeks post-incident, whereas Asian ethnicity was

associated with higher PTSS at 8 months post-incident (Littleton,

Kumpula, & Orcutt, 2011).

Few studies have investigated whether marital and parent

status affect risk for post-incident adversity. Hough and col-

leagues (1990) found higher prevalences of severe PTSD

among widowed, divorced, or separated persons (relative to

married and single persons) and among adults with no children

at home (relative to those with 1–3 or more children); however,

the significance of these trends was not assessed. In contrast,

Johnson, North, and Smith (2002) found that being married,

relative to single or divorced, widowed, or separated, was asso-

ciated with higher PTSS.

Only one study to our knowledge has investigated the role of

genetic risk variants in predicting post-incident outcomes.

Among a subsample of NIU female students who provided

DNA samples, variants within the serotonin transporter gene

were associated with significantly greater increases in PTSS

from pre-incident to 2–4 weeks post-incident (Mercer et al.,

2012). An additional finding showing that family history of

mental illness predicted lack of recovery in MD at 3 years after

the 1991 Killeen, TX, restaurant shooting also suggests a

potential genetic contribution to post-incident responses

(North, McCutcheon, Spitznagel, & Smith, 2002).

Similarly, the results of several investigations have shown

that pre-incident psychological functioning is a strong predictor

of post-incident functioning. A retrospective assessment of

PTSD was found to predict post-incident PTSD among survivors

of the 1991 Texas restaurant shooting (Sewell, 1996). In the

aftermath of the same incident, reports of pre-incident psychia-

tric diagnosis were also associated with increased risk for PTSD

among female survivors (North et al., 1994, 1997). Among ado-

lescents exposed to the Joleka High School shooting, previous

‘‘mental support’’ from a nonguardian adult, a proxy for pre-

event functioning, was associated with increased risk for psy-

chiatric disturbance (Suomalainen et al., 2011). More recent

studies in the aftermath of college shootings have drawn on

pre-incident data and found significant associations between pre-

and post-incident assessments of mental health (e.g., Grills-

Taquechel et al., 2011; Littleton, Kumpula, et al., 2011).

A related set of findings has found that prior trauma expo-

sure increases risk for psychological adversity in the aftermath

of shooting incidents. For example, in the study of female Vir-

ginia Tech survivors, those who had experienced sexual victi-

mization prior to the event were at increased risk of PTSS

and depression 1 year after the shooting (Littleton, Grills-

Taquechel, Axsom, Bye, & Buck, 2012). Among the NIU

student sample, higher pre-incident trauma exposure was pre-

dictive of higher PTSS at two post-incident time points (Lit-

tleton, Kumpula, et al., 2011), as well as increased odds of

a nonresilient trajectory of PTSS over time (Orcutt et al.,

2014).

Incident Exposure

Indices of greater incident exposure, including proximity to an

attack, acquaintance with the deceased, and higher scores on

exposure inventories (with items assessing, e.g., seeing or hear-

ing the events and physical injuries), have consistently been

associated with more severe psychological reactions (e.g.,

Hawdon & Ryan, 2012; Littleton, Kumpula, et al., 2011;

Pynoos et al., 1987). There is some evidence that the impact

of milder forms of exposure on mental health decreases over

time. For example, in the aftermath of the NIU shooting,

moderate, severe, and extreme exposure (relative to no direct

exposure) were associated with higher PTSS 2–4 weeks post-

incident, whereas only extreme exposure was associated with

higher PTSS at 8 months post-incident (Littleton, Kumpula

et al., 2011).

In addition, emotional reactions during and after the incident

have been found to predict later psychological responses. For

example, students’ perceptions that they would be shot or were

in danger during the 1988 Illinois elementary school shooting

increased risk for PTSD (Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991a). Kum-

pula, Orcutt, Bardeen, and Varkovitzky (2011) assessed NIU

students’ experiences of peritraumatic dissociation—altered

awareness and depersonalization or derealization—during the

event and found them to be predictive of higher PTSS 2–4

weeks post-incident. Other investigators have drawn on longi-

tudinal data to show that earlier post-incident symptoms are

positively associated with symptoms at later time points (e.g.,

Bardeen, Kumpula, & Orcutt, 2013; Smith, Abeyta, Hughes,

& Jones, 2014). For example, acute stress disorder symptoms

1 week after the 1993 San Francisco office building shooting

were associated with increased odds for PTSD 7–10 months

post-incident. Being offered post-incident crisis support and

early post-incident use of mental health services have also

served as proxies of adverse initial responses, and have been

predictive of higher psychiatric symptoms later on (e.g., Mur-

tonen, Suomalainen, Haravuori, & Marttunen, 2012; North

et al., 2002). Interestingly, Murtonen, Suomalainen, Haravuori,

and Marttunen (2012) found that students’ perceptions that

early crisis support was unhelpful was also associated with

76 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 18(1)

more severe symptoms, suggesting that survivors who do not

benefit from early interventions might be at particular risk of

long-term mental health problems.

How events are perceived and remembered have also been

found to predict mental health outcomes. For example, after the

1992 St. Louis courthouse shooting, survivors’ perception that

the incident had caused them a great deal of harm, that it was

very upsetting, and that they had not recovered were each asso-

ciated with higher PTSS (Johnson et al., 2002). A small study

of school personnel in the aftermath of the 1988 Illinois ele-

mentary school shooting assessed participants’ changes in

reports of emotional, life threat, and sensory experiences dur-

ing the attack, and found that those whose reports became more

intense over time (enlargement of recall) or did not become less

intense over time (lack of diminishment of recall) tended to

have more severe symptoms (Schwarz, Kowalski, & McNally,

1993).

Other investigations have focused on indirect exposure to

events in affected and remote samples. For example, Joleka

High School students who reported higher media exposure

were at increased risk of post-incident psychiatric disturbance

(Haravuori, Suomalainen, Berg, Kiviruusu, & Marttunen,

2011). In a remote college student sample, greater exposure

to news media after the Virginia Tech shooting was associated

with significantly higher psychiatric symptoms (Fallahi, Aus-

tad, Fallon, & Leishman, 2009). Significantly higher symptoms

were also found among students who reported more time dis-

cussing the incident with family and friends, indicating that

informal conversations may serve as an additional form of indi-

rect exposure (Fallahi et al., 2009). Associations between indirect

exposure and mental health could be due in part to self-selection

and reverse causation, such that participants with more severe

symptoms might be more likely to seek out media exposure and

initiate conversations on the event. Further research employing

longitudinal and experimental designs could address these

considerations.

Post-Incident Functioning and Psychosocial Resources

As noted previously, early post-incident mental health

responses have been found to prospectively predict later post-

incident mental health responses (e.g., Bardeen et al., 2013).

In a similar vein, different classes of psychiatric symptoms

have been positively associated in cross-sectional assessments.

For example, among female survivors of the 1991 Texas res-

taurant shooting, a diagnosis of any other psychiatric disorder

was associated with increased odds of PTSD (North et al.,

1994); among the full sample, there was also significant con-

cordance between post-incident MD and PTSD. Studies have

also documented associations between post-incident fears and

PTSS in affected and remote samples (Fallahi & Lesik, 2009;

Schwarz & Kowalski, 1991a).

Research has further suggested interrelations between men-

tal and physical health problems. Higher prevalences of both

mild and severe PTSD were observed in affected community

members with fair or poor physical health, versus those with

good or excellent physical health, in the aftermath of the

1984 California fast-food restaurant shooting. Among children

directly exposed to the 1988 Illinois elementary school shoot-

ing, increased physical symptoms and visits to the school nurse

were associated with increased risk of PTSD (Schwarz &

Kowalski, 1991a). In the absence of longitudinal research, the

direction of the relationship between post-incident mental and

physical health remains unclear. Additional considerations are

whether physical health symptoms are manifestations of poor

mental health or whether preexisting physical health symptoms

or pre- to post-incident changes in physical health account for

significant associations.

In terms of psychosocial resources, research has focused on

personality characteristics, beliefs and attitudes, coping styles,

and social relationships as predictors of mental health out-

comes. Personality characteristics that have been associated

with adverse outcomes include guilt and resentment, insecur-

ity, and anxiety sensitivity (Schwarz & Kowalski, 1992a;

Stephenson, Valentiner, Kumpula, & Orcutt, 2009). Beliefs

that events are random and uncontrollable, and punitive atti-

tudes toward crime have also been associated with adverse

outcomes, whereas greater self-efficacy, sense of meaning,

spirituality and perceived benevolence of others have shown

to be protective factors (Littleton et al., 2012; Smith et al.,

2014; Vuori, Hawdon, Atte, & Räsänen, 2013).

Coping styles have been differentially associated with out-

comes. Forms of coping that involve taking action, cognitive

processing of the incident, and acceptance have been associ-

ated with lower levels of symptoms (e.g., North, Spitznagel,

& Smith, 2001; Sewell, 1996), whereas ruminative and avoi-

dant coping styles have been found to increase risk (e.g.,

Littleton et al., 2012). To some extent, means of coping in the

aftermath of an incident could represent more pervasive diffi-

culties and ways of approaching one’s experiences. In this

vein, studies drawing on pre-incident data have found those

emotion regulation difficulties and experiential avoidance,

or the tendency to disengage from difficult emotions, sensa-

tions, thoughts, and memories, to be prospective predictors

of post-incident symptoms (e.g., Bardeen et al., 2013; Kum-

pula, Orcutt, Bardeen, & Varkovitzky, 2011).

Similarly, indicators of fewer social resources (e.g., lower

perceived social support and lower social solidarity) have been

consistently associated with adverse post-incident outcomes

(e.g., Hawdon & Ryan, 2012; Littleton et al., 2012; Suomalai-

nen et al., 2011), and these differences could be driven in part

by stable personality characteristics. For example, nonsecure

attachment styles were significantly associated with higher

PTSS and lower posttraumatic growth in relationships with

others among students after a college campus shooting in Fin-

land (Turunen, Haravuori, Punamäki, Suomalainen, & Marttu-

nen, 2014).

On the other hand, researchers have been informed by Con-

servation of Resources (COR) theory (Hobfoll, 1989), which

suggests that change in psychosocial resources, rather than sta-

bility, increases risk for adverse psychological outcomes. Sup-

porting COR theory, Littleton and colleagues found that

Lowe and Galea 77

survivors’ reports of loss of life direction and pride, optimism,

and interpersonal resources (e.g., companionship) were associ-

ated with higher PTSS and psychological distress (Littleton

Axsom, et al., 2009; Littleton, Grills-Taquechel, & Axsom,

2009; Littleton, Kumpula, et al., 2011). Lower levels of

resource gain, however, were significantly associated with

higher psychological distress, suggesting that only negative

changes in resources are associated with adverse outcomes.

Processes Leading to Adverse Mental Health Outcomes

In our review, we noted findings that went beyond documenting

prevalence estimates and predictors by exploring the mechan-

isms contributing to mental health outcomes over time. A total

of seven studies (from three independent samples) did so, all

conducted within the past decade. In general, two types of

mechanisms were explored across these studies. First, studies

assessed pathways from pre-incident risk factors to post-

incident mental health through post-incident risk factors. One

example is a study in the aftermath of the NIU shooting showing

that students’ pre-incident experiential avoidance was positively

associated with their post-incident reports of peritraumatic disso-

ciative experiences, which in turn were positively associated

with PTSS (Kumpula et al., 2011). Another study of student sur-

vivors of the Virginia Tech attack found that prior sexual victi-

mization was indirectly associated with PTSS and depression

through lower self-worth, benevolence beliefs, and social sup-

port (Littleton et al., 2012).

Second, studies explored the ways in which risk factors

and mental health influence each other over time through

cross-lagged models. For example, a longitudinal study in

the aftermath of the Virginia Tech shooting found reciprocal

relationships between psychological distress and maladap-

tive coping from 2 months to 6 months, and 6 months to

1 year post-incident, suggesting that psychological distress

could perpetuate itself by undermining coping mechanisms

(Littleton, Axsom et al., 2011). This was not the case for the

model containing PTSS, wherein the paths from PTSS to

maladaptive coping reached statistical significance, but

those from maladaptive coping to PTSS did not (Littleton

et al., 2011). Another study employed cross-lagged model-

ing and found significant bidirectional relationships between

emotion regulation difficulties and PTSS from pre-incident

to 2–4 weeks after the NIU shooting, whereas only the path

from emotion regulation difficulties to PTSS was significant

from 2-4 weeks to 8 months post-incident (Bardeen et al.,

2013). For the model containing general distress, only the

path from distress to emotion regulation difficulties was sig-

nificant from pre-incident to 2—4 weeks post-incident,

whereas only the path from emotion regulation difficulties

to distress was significant from 2-4 weeks to 8 months

post-incident (Bardeen et al., 2013).

Taken together, the few studies in our review that investi-

gated mechanisms contributing to post-incident mental health

suggest a complex interplay between risk factors and outcomes

that depend in part on the timing of assessment and outcome

assessed. Further research exploring these processes will help

to establish conceptual models of pathways to post-shooting

mental health.

Discussion

The purpose of this review has been to review the extant liter-

ature on mental health in the aftermath of mass shootings. The

research to date provides evidence that these events can have

mental health consequences for victims and members of

affected communities, leading to increases in PTSS, depres-

sion, and other psychological symptoms. The few studies on

remote samples further suggest that these events can have at

least short-term psychological effects, for example, increased

fears and declines in perceived safety, on persons living far out-

side of the affected communities. These effects are not distrib-

uted equally, however, and research has identified several risk

factors for adverse outcomes, including demographic charac-

teristics (e.g., female gender and lower socioeconomic status),

higher pre-event trauma exposure and psychological symp-

toms, greater direct and indirect event exposure, and lack of

psychosocial resources (e.g., emotional regulation difficulties,

experiential avoidance, and low social support).

Although the extant body of research offers some conclu-

sions about the mental health effects of mass shootings, more

research is needed to better understand the mechanisms

through which risk and protective factors contribute to longer

term outcomes. There is a particular need for studies in the

aftermath of high-impact events. For example, we identified

no studies of affected samples in two recent events with unu-

sually high numbers of casualties—the 2012 shootings at the

Aurora movie theater and Sandy Hook elementary school.

Researchers and institutional review boards might be hesitant

to conduct studies in the aftermath of such events due to con-

cerns about retraumatizing or otherwise taking advantage of

victims. Notably, however, the majority (85%) of NIU students who completed a post-incident experimental study reported

that they would participate in the study again (Fergus, Raben-

horst, Orcutt, & Valentiner, 2011). Although a single data

source, these results suggest some evidence that study partici-

pation might not have adverse effects. Research in the after-

math of other traumatic events suggests that some persons

who have experienced trauma may actually derive benefits

from research participation (e.g., Griffin, Resick, Waldorp, &

Mechanic, 2003).

Further studies that draw on pre-incident data from ongoing

investigations would provide greater insight into the role of

pre-event functioning and trauma exposure on psychological

responses. In a similar vein, studies that include multiple waves

of follow-up data would allow for an enhanced understanding

of longitudinal patterns of responses and the processes that lead

to chronic symptoms. The research could also be enriched by

further studies that include positive outcomes (e.g., resilience

and posttraumatic growth) and incorporate additional sources

of data, including genetic variants and information on commu-

nity characteristics and resources. In addition to further

78 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 18(1)

research on affected samples, more investigations are needed to

understand the broader impact of mass shootings on unaffected

communities. It was notable that only 5 of the 28 identified

samples focused on remote populations; as such, our conclu-

sions regarding the widespread mental health effects of mass

shootings are tentative at best.

Additional research would also inform interventions to pre-

vent and treat post-incident mental health problems. The first

step in prevention would be to decrease the likelihood that mass

shooting events occur in the first place. The rarity of these

events precludes the use of statistical modeling to predict their

occurrence (Swanson, 2011). Researchers have accordingly

advised against the use of risk profiles, which have the poten-

tial for false positives bias, and stigmatization (Reddy et al.,

2001). Instead, a deductive threat assessment approach in

which a team of professionals gathers information about a par-

ticular case to assess the likelihood that a violent episode will

occur, and formulates a response based on that assessment,

have been proposed (e.g., Cornell & Allen, 2011; Reddy

et al., 2011). Others have suggested the need for promoting

positive school climates in which there is open dialogue

between students, teachers, and administrators to reduce the

likelihood of school shootings (Mulvey & Cauffman, 2001),

and efforts to improve access to and continuity of high-

quality mental health services for people with serious mental

illness to prevent violent behaviors among this group (Swanson,

2011). Finally, others have noted the high rates of gun ownership

and firearm mortalities in the United States compared to those in

other developed countries as evidence of the need for a range of

efforts to reduce gun access (e.g., Shultz, Cohen, Muschert, &

Flores de Apodaca, 2013). An observational study showing

declines in firearm-related deaths, suicides and homicides, and

a complete absence of mass shooting episodes, in Australia a

decade after gun law reforms aiming to limit civilian access

to semiautomatic and pump-action shotguns and rifles pro-

vides support for such efforts (Chapman, Alpers, Agho, &

Jones, 2006).

In addition to preventing mass shootings, it would be impor-

tant to develop interventions to address mental health problems

in their wake. Trained crisis response teams that establish

safety, evaluate the psychological needs of victims, connect

survivors with a range of services to meet their needs, and eval-

uate response efforts have been proposed to mitigate the effects

of school violence (Crepeau-Hobson, Sievering, Armstrong, &

Stonis, 2012). Hobfoll and colleagues (2007) have also identi-

fied five empirically supported principles for mental health

responses to mass trauma—promoting a sense of safety, calm-

ing, a sense of self- and community-efficacy, connectedness,

and hope.

The empirical research also lends support for approaches

that identify survivors most at risk of adverse outcomes, includ-

ing women, persons of lower socioeconomic status, those who

faced higher levels of exposure, and persons lacking strong

social support networks. Furthermore, extant studies suggest

interventions that enhance emotion regulation and active cop-

ing skills and that encourage engagement with and acceptance

of emotions, thoughts, memories, and sensory experiences

(e.g., Metz et al., 2013). These skill-building interventions

could be part of the standard curriculum and could promote

resilience after a range of traumatic events and stressors.

The recommendations for future research, policy, and prac-

tice are made with caution, given the limitations of this review.

For example, although our efforts to identify studies meeting

our inclusion criteria were exhaustive, we did not track such

data as the total number of articles identified across all of

our searches, and the number that were dropped based on

each criterion. In addition, although the first author checked

and rechecked coding for accuracy, articles were not double-

coded, and a system for establishing the reliability of the article

screening and coding process was not developed and applied.

Taken together, these limitations suggest a need for a more sys-

tematic review, particularly as additional literature on this topic

is published. Further reviews could also apply broader inclu-

sion criteria, for example, to provide insight into the influence

of direct and indirect exposure to mass shootings on other

domains of functioning (e.g., physical health and social func-

tioning). Inclusion of non-English language articles could shed

additional light on the influence of mass shootings on mental

health cross-culturally. Qualitative studies could also be inte-

grated to provide a richer sense of the patterns and predictors

of mental health in the aftermath of shootings. Our review of

predictors also focused on factors that account for significant

variation in post-shooting mental health within each study, and

we did not attend to potential between-study sources of varia-

tion, such as differences in samples (e.g., age-group and extent

of exposure), procedures (e.g., timing of assessment), and event

characteristics (e.g., single vs. multiple shooters, number of

injuries and fatalities). Future research could examine within- and

between-study variability simultaneously using meta-analytic

techniques. Finally, we did not compare the prevalence esti-

mates and predictors of mental health outcomes in the after-

math of mass shootings to those in the aftermath of other

traumatic events. Inclusion of mass shootings on trauma inven-

tories in future epidemiological studies would provide insight

into this issue.

In summary, the limited research suggests that mass shoot-

ing incidents can lead to an array of mental health problems in

survivors and members of affected communities. Furthermore,

they have been associated with increased fears and decreased

perceptions of safety in indirectly exposed populations. A vari-

ety of risk and protective factors have been identified, includ-

ing demographic characteristics, pre-event trauma exposure

and functioning, event exposure, and psychosocial resources.

Further research that explores the processes contributing to

long-term psychological responses will yield important impli-

cations for post-incident interventions to reduce mental health

impacts.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect

to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Lowe and Galea 79

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-

ship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biographies

Sarah R. Lowe, PhD, is an associate research scientist in the Depart-

ment of Epidemiology at the Columbia University Mailman School of

Public Health. Her research centers on long-term psychological

responses to traumatic events and the roles of secondary stressors and

social conditions in shaping outcomes. She is currently working on

projects exploring such relationships among survivors of Hurricane

Sandy in New York City, cleanup workers from the 2010 Deepwater

Horizon oil spill, and trauma-exposed residents of Detroit, Michigan,

and Atlanta, Georgia. She received her PhD in clinical psychology

from the University of Massachusetts, Boston, in 2012, and completed

her clinical internship at New York Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Med-

ical Center. Her dissertation on trajectories of psychological distress

among low-income female survivors of Hurricane Katrina was

awarded the Chancellor’s Distinguished Dissertation Award at Uni-

versity of Massachusetts Boston, as well as the Best Dissertation on

a Topic Relevant to Community Psychology Award from the Society

for Community Research in Action (American Psychological Associ-

ation Division 27). She will be joining the Department of Psychology

at Montclair State University as assistant professor in September 2015.

Sandro Galea is a physician and an epidemiologist. He is the dean and

a professor at the Boston University School of Public Health. Prior to

his appointment at Boston University, he served as the Anna Cheskis

Gelman and Murray Charles Gelman Professor and Chair of the

Department of Epidemiology at the Columbia University Mailman

School of Public Health where he launched several new educational

initiatives and substantially increased its focus on six core areas:

chronic, infectious, injury, life course, psychiatric/neurological, and

social epidemiology. He previously held academic and leadership

positions at the University of Michigan and at the New York Academy

of Medicine. In his own scholarship, he is centrally interested in the

social production of health of urban populations, with a focus on the

causes of brain disorders, particularly common mood-anxiety disor-

ders, and substance abuse. He has long had a particular interest in the

consequences of mass trauma and conflict worldwide, including as a

result of the September 11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, conflicts in

sub-Saharan Africa, and the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This work has been principally funded by the National Institutes of

Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and several foun-

dations. He has published over 500 scientific journal articles, 50 chap-

ters and commentaries, and nine books, and his research has been

featured extensively in current periodicals and newspapers. His latest

book, coauthored with Dr. Katherine Keyes, is an epidemiology text-

book, Epidemiology Matters: A New Introduction to Methodological

Foundations. He has a medical degree from the University of Toronto

and graduate degrees from Harvard University and Columbia Uni-

versity. He was named one of TIME magazine’s epidemiology inno-

vators in 2006. He is the past president of the Society for

Epidemiologic Research and an elected member of the American

Epidemiological Society and of the Institute of Medicine of the

National Academies of Science. He serves frequently on advisory

groups to national and international organizations. He has formerly

served as chair of the New York City Department of Health and Men-

tal Hygiene’s Community Services Board and as member of its

Health Board.

82 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 18(1)

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Continuing Education Objectives After reading this article, you will be able to:

• Identify the five missions an organization has during an ac-

tive shooter event

• Describe considerations when building a plan for an active

shooter scenario

• Discuss statistics that staff can be educated about to iden-

tify potential active shooter situations

• Discuss the concept of Run, Hide, Fight

Editor’s note: Elizabeth Di Giacomo-Geffers, RN, MPH, CSHA, is a healthcare consultant in Trabuco Canyon, California, and a former Joint Commission surveyor. Special thanks to Brad Keyes, CHSP, for his assistance with clarifying emergency management requirements in this article.

It feels as if not a day goes by without talking about the need for active shooter planning in pub- lic spaces, including hospitals. This plays into the ongoing need for hospitals to address Emergency Management, Environment of Care, and other safety- related standards and regulations. But where do we look for advice on preparing for what we hope is an incident we will never have to deal with? The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response,

Active shooter preparation Training for before, during, and after an emerging event

in conjunction with the FBI and the departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Justice, released a report in December 2014 address- ing just that, titled “Incorporating Active Shooter Incident Planning into Healthcare Facility Emergency Operations Plans.”

Active shooter incidents are defined as those in which an individual is “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area,” according to the Department of Homeland Security.

Healthcare facilities “are faced with planning for emergencies of all kinds, ranging from active shoot- ers, hostage situations, and other similar security challenges, as well as treats from fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and pandemics of infectious diseases,” the report states. “Many of these emergencies occur with little to no warning; therefore, it is critical for healthcare facilities to plan in advance to help secure the safety, security, and general welfare of all members of the healthcare community.”

So while active shooter incidents can be pooled under the same category as other dramatic incidents of dan- ger, they have their own unique challenges that need to be anticipated (as do all disaster issues). Hospitals need to have plans and procedures for these events, and those plans must be living documents: They must

behavioral health disorder,” says Cooke. “So we know that, at least minimally, a third of the patients we’re treating have a comorbidity.”

In the end, care providers are not just treating a person with diabetes whose eyesight has begun to be affected, or whose legs are in pain. Providers must focus on the emotional and behavioral aspects of care as well as the physical characteristics.

“How do we shift the culture? Through a lot of educa- tion,” says Cooke. “It also takes a serious effort to con- vince politicians that we need to bring back behavioral

health resources and provide improved parity.” Some organizations are starting to establish inte-

grated care models that work to manage both the physical and behavioral needs of the patient. They surely will have better outcomes in the long run.

“We need to get over the denial, ignorance, stigma that surrounds substance abuse and behavioral health disorders,” says Cooke. “We as healthcare providers need to understand and accept the immensity of this issue and how the lack of treatment is affecting our everyday lives and our communities.” H

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be routinely reviewed and consider all types of hazards, including the possibility of an active shooter or a terror- ist event, FEMA writes.

Law enforcement is perpetually learning about the best way to respond to these events. Hospitals should take cues from such lessons and build those best prac- tices into their own plans.

Disaster planning, for active shooters or otherwise, is a holistic endeavor. It’s not just safety and security personnel who should be involved. Staff, patients, and visitors must also be provided with the education they need to prepare. In addition, special care should be taken to address the following categories of people: • Children • Older adults • Pregnant women • Individuals with disabilities • Individuals who live in institutional settings • Individuals from diverse cultures • Individuals with language proficiency challenges • Individuals without easy access to transportation • Homeless individuals • Patients with chronic medical conditions • Patients with pharmacological dependencies

According to national preparedness efforts, there are five mission areas in readying for a potential active shooter incident: • Prevention: The capabilities necessary to avoid,

deter, or stop an imminent threat. Prevention is the action healthcare facilities take to keep a threat or actual incident from occurring.

• Protection: The capabilities to secure healthcare facilities against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing ac- tions that protect patients, staff, visitors, networks, and property from threats or hazards.

• Mitigation: The capabilities necessary to elimi- nate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. For our purposes in reviewing the FEMA report, we should also consider mitigation to mean re- ducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.

• Response: The capabilities needed to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened, restore

and reestablish a safe and secure environment, save lives, prevent the destruction of property, and facil- itate the transition to recovery.

• Recovery: The capabilities needed to assist healthcare facilities experiencing an event or emer- gency in restoring the treatment or therapeutic en- vironment as soon as possible.

These missions align with three temporal frame- works: pre-incident, incident, and post-incident. Most prevention, protection, and mitigation happens before an incident, or consists of modifications made after an event has taken place.

So what are some of the challenges organizations face when preparing for active shooter scenarios? Geography, environment, governance, and population served all factor into this planning. As well, the size of the institution, its setting (e.g., urban, rural, suburban), and specific details about the organization itself (e.g., residential versus non-residential, academic, public, or private) all come into play. Each organization has its own unique environmental and cultural factors it must consider to fully develop its processes.

An effective plan for an active shooter incident includes: • Proactive steps, including training, that can be tak-

en by employees to identify individuals “who may be on a trajectory to commit a violent crime”

• A method for reporting active shooter incidents, such as informing everyone at the facility and any- one who may enter it

• An evacuation policy and procedure • Emergency escape procedures and route

assignments • Lockdown procedures (e.g., units, offices,

buildings) • Integration with the facility incident commander

and external incident commander • Available information about local emergency re-

sponse agencies and hospitals The planning team should consider the following:

• How to evacuate, shelter in place, or lock down pa- tients, visitors, and staff

• How and where to evacuate when the primary routes are unavailable

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• How to select effective locations to shelter in place • Training staff in psychological first aid

In addition to the above considerations, healthcare organizations need a security management plan that accomplishes the following: • Provides indications of workplace violence and how

to take immediate remedial actions • Requires employees, medical staff, students, volun-

teers, and contractors to display identification • Creates a culture of vigilance and safety by empow-

ering employees to report unusual, dangerous, or suspicious activity

• Empowers employees who come into contact with individuals who seem lost or unfamiliar with their surroundings to offer assistance

• Provides safe rooms within the setting • Explains how communication occurs when there is

an active shooter in the facility, and when the situa- tion is all clear

• Develops an emergency notification system

Who is an active shooter? There is no singular definition of who fits the profile

of an active shooter. But there are signs and indications that staff can be trained to watch for. Let’s take a look at some key points on pre-attack behavior described in a report compiled by the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Education, and the FBI titled “Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education,” which examined situations involv- ing lethal or attempted lethal attacks on U.S. universi- ties and colleges: • In 31% of cases, concerning behaviors were ob-

served by friends, family, colleagues, etc. These behaviors included paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality, suicidal ide- ation, “odd” behavior, and many more noticeable traits.

• In only 13% of cases were verbal or written threats made.

• In 19% of the cases examined, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack.

• In only 10% of cases did the subject engage in phys- ically aggressive acts toward the targets (e.g., men- acing actions or physical assault).

The FBI has identified behavioral indicators that should be followed up with further investigation by the healthcare facility and by law enforcement. These include: • A developing personal grievance • Inappropriate acquisition of multiple weapons • Recent escalation of target practice or weapons

training • New interest in explosives • Intense interest in previous shootings or mass

attacks • Experience of a significant real or perceived per-

sonal loss leading up to the attack

Run, Hide, Fight Regardless of training or directions, human beings

will react as their instincts tell them to in most danger- ous situations. What hospitals can do, however, is help prepare staff better for an active shooter situation by providing training and letting staff know they should trust that the hospital will make the best decision they can at the time.

“There is no singular definition of who fits the profile of an active shooter. But there

are signs and indications that staff can be trained to watch for.”

—Elizabeth Di Giacomo-Geffers

One danger is that staff or patients will at first deny that an active shooter scenario is happening. This can lead to a delayed response. Train staff to overcome denial and respond immediately. Those who do will be able to call for assistance and lead others with slower reaction times to a safer environment.

Because active shooter incidents are unpredictable and change quickly, staff should be trained in more than one type of response in the Run, Hide, Fight continuum. The goal is maximum survival for all. Let’s take a look at recommendations for staff train- ing in all three of these potential responses to an active shooter.

• Run. Staff should be trained to: – Leave personal belongings behind – Visualize possible escape routes

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– Avoid escalators and elevators – Take others with them, but don’t stay behind for the sake of others who are refusing to go

– Call 911 when it is safe to

• Hide: If running isn’t an option, staff should be trained to hide in a safe place with thicker walls and fewer windows. This may be the only option for patients lacking mobility, FEMA writes. The report includes the following additional recommended training:

– Barricade the doors with heavy furniture – Specialty care units should secure doors by any means necessary

– Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows

– Turn off lights – Silence electronic devices – Remain silent – Look for other avenues of escape – Identify ad-hoc weapons – Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders when it is safe to

– Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of view of the hallway

– Remain in place until given the all clear by law enforcement

– Barricade areas where patients, visitors, or staff are located

– Transport patients in wheelchairs or stretchers to safe locations

– Identify locations before an incident occurs where patients and staff can be sheltered

The advice provided within the FEMA report does not mention special requirements for healthcare organizations that specifically prevent the locking of doors (standards actually dictate that the doors remain unlockable). When educating your staff, make sure not to simply import recommendations over from a non-healthcare checklist of suggestions— take into consideration specific rules for the health- care setting, particularly around barring or locking doors.

• Fight: Fighting should be a last resort in an active shooter situation. Research shows, according

to the FEMA report, that strength in numbers can be beneficial—studies have shown that potential victims themselves have disrupted 17 of 51 active shooter incidents before law enforcement arrived. That being said, attempting to engage the shooter is never rec- ommended. As the FEMA report states, “to be clear, confronting an active shooter should never be a requirement of any healthcare provider’s job; how each individual chooses to respond if directly confronted by an active shooter is up to him or her.”

Follow-up We have looked at both what to do before an active

shooter incident occurs and what the options are dur- ing such an event. Let’s take a moment to talk about what happens after the shooter is incapacitated and is no longer a threat. Post-event activities can include the following: • A head count to make sure no one is missing and

potentially injured • Working with responders to account for anyone not

evacuated • Determining the best method to inform families of

the event and any associated consequences • Making sure victims have the resources they

need, including care for mental health, following the incident (this includes those who have spe- cial needs, such as those with hearing or sight challenges)

• Planning and activating a family reunification plan and communicating this plan to staff and patients

• Identifying and addressing any key personnel or operational gaps resulting from the active shooter incident

• Determining when to resume full services

All of these items can and should be addressed in your Emergency Operations Plan. H

References: Adashi, E., Gao, H., & Cohen, J. “Hospital-Based Active Shooter Inci- dents: Sanctuary Under Fire.” Journal of the American Medical Associa- tion, Vol. 313, No. 12, March 2015.

Incorporating Active Shooter Incident Planning into Health Care Facil- ity Emergency Operations Plans, 2014. http://www.phe.gov/prepared- ness/planning/Documents/active-shooter-planning-eop2014.pdf

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COMMENTARY–INVITED

“Run, Hide, Fight,” or “Secure, Preserve, Fight”: How Should Health Care Professionals and Facilities Respond to Active Shooter Incidents?

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definesan active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.”1 A study of newspaper articles and press releases identified 154 active shooter incidents (ASIs) in hospitals in the United States in the 12-year period 2000 through 2011.2 ASIs were more common in larger hospitals, with 29% taking place in the emergency department (ED) and 19% in patient rooms. In 50% of the ASIs in an ED, the per- petrator used a security officer’s gun.2

Current federal law enforcement guidelines recom- mend “Run, Hide, Fight” as a stepwise response to ASIs.3 A 2014 report issued jointly by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Home- land Security, and Justice; the FBI; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency explicitly endorses the “run, hide, fight” model for health care facilities.4

According to this strategy, one should first “run,” that is, rapidly leave the area under attack and keep mov- ing until one is in a safe location. If one cannot run away, the next best option is to “hide” in as safe a place as one can. This may include locking and barri- cading doors and windows and remaining silent. In the event one cannot run or hide, one should “fight” when confronted, that is use force to disrupt or inca- pacitate the shooter. Law enforcement agencies endorse the “run, hide,

fight” strategy because research shows that it is the most effective sequence of responses to protect individ- uals during ASIs.5 Self-protection is certainly an understandable and permissible reason for choosing a

particular action, but it is only one among a variety of actions and reasons. Should the value of self-protec- tion persuade health care facilities and individual health care professionals to implement the “run, hide, fight” response to ASIs? In a 2018 article in the New England Journal of

Medicine, Inaba et al.6 agree that health care profes- sionals, staff, patients, and visitors should follow the “run, hide, fight” strategy in ASIs, provided that all are able to take those actions. In other situations, how- ever, these authors propose that health care facilities and professionals consider a different response to ASIs that they refer to as “secure, preserve, fight.” They describe these specific health care situations and their proposed response as follows: “for professionals providing essential medical care to patients who can- not run, hide, or fight owing to their medical condi- tion or ongoing life-sustaining therapy, a different set of responses should be considered—secure the loca- tion immediately, preserve the life of the patient and oneself [by continuing care that is required to preserve life], and fight only if necessary.”6

Inaba et al. offer several reasons for their proposed alternative response to ASIs. They point out that most U.S. hospitals are designed vertically, with heavy reli- ance on elevators and often narrow stairwells for inter- nal movement. These architectural features are likely to impede access to escape routes when an active shoo- ter is present and so interfere with the primary instruc- tion to run away. They also point out that many hospital units caring for incapacitated patients, most notably EDs and intensive care units (ICUs), typically

The authors have no relevant financial information or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.

252 ISSN 1553-2712 © 2019 by the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine

doi: 10.1111/acem.13912

have open designs that maximize visibility, but greatly limit the ability of patients and staff to hide from a shooter. Finally, they assert, without further elabora- tion, that “health-care professionals have a moral and ethical duty not to abandon their patients, which directly conflict with the primary directive to run.”6

Do Inaba et al. provide morally compelling reasons for adoption of the “secure, preserve, fight” strategy they propose? The strength of their proposal depends heavily on assessment of the scope and limits of the moral responsibilities of health care professionals and facilities to their patients. Health care professionals have widely recognized, central responsibilities to bene- fit their patients and to protect them from harm.7

They carry out these responsibilities primarily by pro- viding medical care to prevent and treat illness and injury, but also by keeping patients safe during their stays in health care facilities. Prominent professional codes of ethics assert that patient welfare is a primary responsibility, and this implies that professionals have a duty to accept risks to themselves to care for their patients.8–10 Codes and commentators also, however, recognize that the duty to benefit patients is not abso- lute.11,12 It is, for example, limited by the availability of resources and by legitimate professional interests in personal integrity, autonomy, and self-protection. How, then, does the basic responsibility to benefit

patients bear on the health care professional and facil- ity response(s) to ASIs? Recent discussion of care for patients who present to health care facilities with sus- pected Ebola virus disease (EVD) offers an instructive, if not perfect, analogy here. Patients with EVD are highly infectious, and they rapidly develop critical ill- ness. They require intensive treatment to survive, and many, if not most, will succumb to the disease even if that treatment is provided.13 Must health care profes- sionals at these facilities treat these patients, or may they decline to do so? With other commentators, we contend that health care professionals have a responsi- bility to accept significant, but not disproportionate, risk in their efforts to benefit their patients.14,15 There is no single, bright-line border between these two cate- gories of risk, but services that expose professionals to highly infectious and lethal diseases often require sacri- fice of the professionals’ life or health, and that risk seems clearly disproportionate. In the case of EVD, therefore, asserting a duty of care requires that risks to caregivers can be and are reduced to an acceptable level. Risk mitigation is typically beyond the capacity of individual professionals; it requires that facilities

implement effective control measures. For care of patients with EVD, necessary measures include provi- sion of adequate personal protective equipment to caregivers and the development, training, and imple- mentation of proven infection control protocols, including infectious waste disposal systems.16

Health care professional and facility responses to ASIs are similar to care for patients with EVD in several morally significant ways. Without substantial measures to protect themselves and their patients, professionals’ attempts to shield vulnerable patients from active shoot- ers are very likely to be ineffective and self-sacrificial. Recognition of a professional duty to protect patients from active shooters, therefore, depends on a reciprocal duty of health care facilities to develop and implement reasonable measures to help professionals keep patients and themselves safe from such attacks. Inaba et al. rec- ognize that this is a joint responsibility, and they then identify multiple actions that facilities can take to maxi- mize protection from active shooters. Among the mea- sures they describe are:

1. Security screening, including metal detectors, at facility entrances;

2. Development and dissemination of an active shoo- ter response plan;

3. Internally activated locking systems to secure the doors to hospital units with vulnerable patients, including EDs, ICUs, operating suites, and labor and delivery units;

4. Active shooter alert systems for immediate notifica- tion to all staff of ASIs; and

5. Initial and periodic training for staff on their roles in ASIs.6

Implementation of measures like these can bolster the confidence and resolve of staff and help counteract the fear they are likely to feel in these dangerous situa- tions.17 In addition to the above preventive and pro- tective measures, Inaba et al. recommend several other response strategies, including staff training in hemor- rhage control measures for gunshot victims and psy- chological first aid for patients, visitors, and caregivers who experience an ASI. There is no foolproof technique to prevent a deter-

mined shooter from targeting a health care facility, but a combination of the above measures can significantly reduce the risks to patients who cannot run or hide and to the professionals who remain with those patients to protect them and to provide continuing life-sustaining treatment for them. Facilities that

ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE • March 2020, Vol. 27, No. 3 • www.aemj.org 253

implement these measures can ask their medical and clinical staff members to carry out the “secure, pre- serve, fight” option to protect their most vulnerable patients in ASIs. When health care facilities embrace their responsibility to provide effective protection against active shooters, health care professionals can also fulfill their fundamental responsibility to act for the benefit of their patients.

Al O. Giwa, MD, MBA1

([email protected]) Andrew Milsten, MD, MS2

Dorice L. Vieira, MLS, MA, MPH3

Chinwe Ogedegbe, MD, MPH4

Kristen M. Kelly, MD1

Abraham P. Schwab, PhD5

John C. Moskop, PhD6 1Department of Emergency Medicine

Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY

2Department of Emergency Medicine University of Massachusetts Medical School

UMass Memorial Medical Center, Worcester, MA 3NYU Health Sciences Library

NYU School of Medicine, New York, NY

4Emergency Medicine, Hackensack Meridian School of Medicine @ Seton Hall

University, Hackensack University Medical Center Emergency and Trauma Center

Hackensack, NJ 5Purdue University Fort Wayne

Fort Wayne, IN 6Wallace and Mona Wu Chair in Biomedical Ethics

Wake Forest University School of Medicine Winston-Salem, NC

Supervising Editor: Zachary F. Meisel, MD, MPH, MSc

References

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