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Jean-Pierre Dupuy

Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Volume 10, Spring 2003, pp. 23-39 (Article)

Published by Michigan State University Press DOI: 10.1353/ctn.2003.0011

For additional information about this article

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ctn/summary/v010/10.dupuy.html

ON THE RATIONALITY OF SACRIFICE1

Jean-Pierre Dupuy Ecolepolytechnique, Paris, andStanford University

i;"came to be interested in John Rawls'sy4 TheoryofJustice—an active.interest which led me to become the publisher ofthe French version ofthat book—in part for the following, apparently anecdotal reason: 1)On the one hand, as early as the first lines ofhis book, Rawls makes

it clear that his major target is the critique ofutilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the defendant, charged with vindicating sacrifice. As everyone knows, "justice does not allowthat the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum ofadvantages enjoyed bymany (...) it denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others (Theory 3-4; my emphasis). 2)On the other hand, although the term "sacrifice" pops up again and

again throughout the book, you may look up the index: it doesn't figure there. "Sacrifice" is not granted the dignity ofa concept.

I found that shocking and my curiosity was aroused. My own research is driven by a few anthropological convictions (see Dupuy, Le Sacrifice et l'envie). I am going to list them here, for the sake of clarity and honesty, without trying to vindicate them. The arguments I am going to present do not depend in the least on whether these convictions are valid or not; they should be assessed on their own merits.

a) AU non-modern social and cultural institutions are rooted in the sacred.

1 I should like to thank John Rawls and the late Robert Nozick for their remarks on earlier versions of this paper.

24Jean-Pierre Dupuy

b)Of the three dimensions of the sacred: myths, rituals, and prohibitions, the most fundamental is the ritual. c)The most primitive and fundamental ritual form is sacrifice. d)Sacrifice is the reenactment bythe social group ofaprimordial event

which took place spontaneously: a process of collective victimage which resulted in the murder ofa member ofthe community. This elimination of a victim reestablished peace and order. There lies the origin of the sacred. The victim is taken to be the cause or the active principle both of the violent crisis and its violent resolution. It unites within itself opposite predicates: it is at the same time infinitely good and infinitely evil. It can only be ofa divine nature. e)Christ's death on the cross is just one more occurrence of the

primordial event. As far as facts are concerned, there is no difference between primitive religions and Christianity. The difference lies in inter- pretation. For the first time in the history ofhumankind, the story is told from the victim's viewpoint, not the persecutors.' The story (the Gospel) takes side with the victim and proclaims its innocence. When, in our modern languages, we say that the victim was scapegoated, we just say as much. f)Modern institutions embody a tension between two contradictory

drives. On the one hand, the drive to resort to more of the same: the drive to scapegoating. On the other, the anti-sacrificial drive set in motion by the Christian Revelation.

In totality or only partially, these points have been made by several anthropological traditions, in particular the French sociological school, with the works of Fustel de Coulanges, Durkheim and Mauss; and the British anthropological school, with Frazer and Robertson-Smith. Freud and the Belgo-British anthropologist Hocart gave them a new momentum and, more recently, René Girardhasproduced an impressive synthesis.2 As is well known, Nietzsche's philosophy relies on point e), for which the author of The Gay Science ("there are no facts, only interpretations") felt justified in bringing a radical indictment against Christianity, taken to be the morality ofthe slaves.

In this light, Kantianism appears to be a secularized form of Chris- tianity. Thequestion Iwantto raise is: towhatextent is this trueofRawlsianism?

2 See, in particular, his Violence and the Sacred, and also The Scapegoat.

On the Rationality ofSacrifice25

It might be retorted: these references to anthropology are irrelevant to modern political philosophy, and, at any rate, the word "sacrifice" has now acquired ameaningaltogetherdisconnected from its allegedreligious roots. I do not think the burden ofthe proof is on my side, all the more so since, as we are going to observe, most authors who participate in the debate about the rationality of sacrifice choose their examples within a very limited range, whose importance for anthropology is crucial: the scapegoating mechanism.

1. A few sacrificial case studies. Consider the fictional (and fictitious) situation imagined by William

Styron in his novel Sophie's Choice. It has the same structure as the story made up by Bernard Williams in his indictment of utilitarianism ("Jim's choice" in "A Critique"). The Nazi officer orders Sophie to choose which of her two children will be sent to the gas chamber, the other one then being saved. Should she refuse to choose, both ofthem would die. What is it rational and/ormoral for Sophie to do, ifthat terminology can be used at all in such a nightmarish context? It seems that utilitarianism (and, more generally, consequentialism) would have it that Sophie abide by the Nazi's command and choose to sacrifice one ofher children: at least the other one will live. In this light, utilitarian ethics would appear to be guilty of justifying a sacrificial choice which most ofus find appalling.

Take now the fairly different structure imagined by Robert Nozick. "Utilitarianism doesn't, it is said, properly take rights and their non- violation into account; it instead leaves them a derivative status. Many of the counterexample cases to utilitarianism fit under this objection; for example, punishing an innocent man to save a neighborhood from a vengeful rampage (...) A mob rampaging through apartoftown killing and burning will violate the rights of those living there. Therefore, someone might try to justify his punishing another he knows to be innocent of a crime that enraged a mob, on the grounds that punishing this innocent person would help to avoid even greater violations ofrights by others, and so would lead to a minimum weighted score for rights violations in the society."3 It will be noted, in passing, that Nozick avoids carefully giving

3 R Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 28-29. Reminder- Rawl's two principles ofjustice read as follows: "First Principle- "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." Second Principle: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both

26Jean-Pierre Dupuy

this structure its true, original name: Caiaphas's choice—probably the paradigmatic case, ifone is to accept the anthropological tenets stated at the beginning. Caiaphas, addressing the ChiefPriests and the Pharisees, says in effect: "You know nothing whatever; you do not use your judgment; it is more toyour interest that one man should die for thepeople, than that the whole nation should be destroyed" (John 11. 49-50).

It is my contention that it would be extremely unfair to charge utilitarianism alone with that crime—if, indeed, vindicating sacrifice is a crime. Our whole conception ofrationality is a party to it. Most analytical moral philosophers, I guess, alongwithnormative economists, consider the Pareto principle, known also as the principle of efficiency, to be a self- evident axiom which any consistent moral doctrine should adopt. If a transformation, virtual or actual, makes some people better off without making the others worse off, how could anyone complain about it? In my following remarks, I shall call the Pareto principle the principle of unanimity. Returning to Sophie's and Caiaphas's choices, it is easy to understand that it is not only utilitarianism that concludes in favor of the rationalityofsacrifice in those cases, butmore fundamentally the principle ofunanimity and, as a consequence, all criteriacompatiblewith it. And this is so becauseofa feature that these sacrificial situations share. Whether the victim is sacrificed or not, its physical well-being remains the same: it is killed or eliminated all the same. As far asfacts are concerned, the victim's fate does not depend on whether it is sacrificed or not (the child Sophie chooses to be sent to the gas chamberwould have died all the same had she

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged [that is to so-called difference principle], and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under all conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Theory 302) What may be most original about these principles are the rules specifying their priority: the first takes precedence over the second, and within the second, the clause concerning the fairness ofequality ofopportunity has priority over the difference principle. Moreover, these priorities take the form that logicians call the lexicographical or lexical order—that is the ordering ofwords in a dictionary (also called leximin), maybe the anti-sacrificial too par excellence The words having the different first letters are listed in the order ofthe first letters, no matter what the other letters in the words may be. The first letter ofa word, then, is lexically first in relation to the others, in the sense that ifwe replace this letter by another one that comes later in the alphabet, achoice ofother letters could possibly compensate for the change. There is no possible substitution, and it is as if the order ofthe first letter had an infinite weight. Yet at the same time, the order of the other letters has a positive weight, for it two words begin with the same letter, then the following letters decide the word's place in the dictionary. A lexical order manages to give all ofthe elements of a totality a positive role, without making them all substitutable for each other. Now, the very basis of the sacrificial principles is the substitutabihty of the elements within the totality

On the Rationality ofSacrifice27

refused to choose; Jesus is part of the Jewish nation: were he not to be sacrificed he would perish all the same). What makes the victim's fate a sacrifice, then, is not its death: it is the meaning thereof. The sacrificial victim dies in order for the others to live on.

To put it in more philosophical terms: the concept ofsacrifice, here, is not defined counterfactually. Ifthe victim were not sacrificed, her level of well-being would remain the same. The sacrifice has to do with the actual causal connection between her level ofwell-being (she is put to death, or expelled, or her rights are denied) and the others'. When she is sacrificed, the others are saved, or safe. And someone, possibly the victim herself, intentionally activated that causal connection in order to achieve a higher end, such as the maximization of the welfare of the community (or the satisfaction of some divinity's needs).

Let me precisely call a unanimity-sacrificial situation any social context such as Sophie's or Caiaphas's choices in which the principle of unanimity suffices to conclude in favor of the rationality of sacrifice. Inasmuch as Rawls's principles ofjustice are by their very form compatible with the principle of unanimity—which Rawls holds to be the case—it seems appropriate to assert the following: If they could be abstracted or extruded from the theory of justice in which they are embedded, and applied to aunanimity-sacrificial situation, Rawls's principlesofjustice, by their very form, would favor the sacrificial choice.

It is important to make two technical remarks at this stage: First, when I contend that Rawls's principles ofjustice are compatible

with the principle of unanimity (or efficiency), I am not referring only to the difference principle. This should be made perfectly clear, since it is only in reference to the latterthatRawls asserts explicitly this compatibility (Theory 79). IfI were actually referring to the difference principle in order to support my contention that the principles ofjustice favor the sacrificial choice in a unanimity-sacrificial situation such as Sophie's or Caiaphas's choices, one might immediately object that I am missing a fundamental tenet of the theory of justice, namely, that the difference principle is hierarchically and "lexicographically" ranked lower than the principles on equal liberties andequal opportunities; in other terms, onemightobject that welfare, even the welfare of the worst-off, cannot be paid for in terms of unequal liberties. However, please note that in the sacrificial situations I have been considering, there is no such trade-off between basic liberties and economic and social gains. All the values at stake in the choice

28Jean-Pierre Dupuy

situation belong to the same category: fundamental liberties, lives, etc. Those are the values governed by the first principle ofjustice.

Now, in its broader version, the first principle takes on the same form as the difference principle: that of a lexical ordering between the in- dividuals ranked according to the way they fare on the values in question. For instance, Theory states: "All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit ofall" (62); and, later we read, "...liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.. .a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty" (250).

From these statements, one is justified in inferring that the first principle has the form ofa leximin ordering, like the difference principle, and therefore is compatible with the principle ofunanimity.

However—and this is my second technical remark—it could be argued that it is still an open question whether or not Rawls's principles are actually compatible with the Pareto condition. It should be noted first that for my contention to be true—namely, that these principles favor the sacrificial choice in a unanimity-sacrificial situation—they have to be compatible with the Pareto condition in its stronger version. It is sufficient that some people are made better offby a given transformation, the others' lots remaining the same, for this stronger principle to approve of that transformation. Now a large number of authors have interpreted the difference principle in a way that renders it incompatible with the strong Pareto condition. Thus, Nozick: "With regard to envy, the difference principle, applied to the choice between either A having 10 and B having 5, or A having 8 and B having 5, would favor the latter. Thus, despite Rawls'sview, the difference principle is inefficient in that it sometimeswill favor a status quo against a Pareto-better but more unequal distribution (Anarchy 229).

It is because these commentators interpret the difference principle in this way that they feel justified in accusing it ofbeing a mere expression of envy. It is my contention that this interpretation is unwarranted and should be dismissed. It contradicts the maxim Rawls hammers home all the time: injustice is inequalities thatarenottoeveryone's advantage—everyone, that is the better-offas well as the others. The difference principle, then, favors a transformation that betters the condition of the better-off without

On the Rationality ofSacrifice29

bettering—nordamaging—theconditionoftheworse-off.The sameapplies to the first principle in its broader version.

Nozick might reply: "Rawls's maxim that injustice is inequalities that are not to everyone's advantage, leaves open the possibility that "everyone" means everyone, and "advantage" does not mean merely "non-dis- advantage" but in fact means advantage, that is improvement. In this case the difference principle would favor (8, 5) over (10, 5).4 However, this results from a confusion between a constraint on inequalities and a constraint on a social transformation. IfRawls'smaximdid apply to a social transformation, it would rule out any transformation that did not meet the weak Pareto criterion. It would then favor (10, 5) over (10, 6), which is clearly absurd. Nozick may well want to restrict his interpretation of Rawls's maxim to those transformations that increase the degree of inequalities. But then, (8, 8, 5) would be preferred to, say, (16, 8, 6), which is no less absurd. Ifwe now take "inequalities that are not to everyone's advantage" to

mean inequalities that are not to everyone's advantage, it becomesclear that Leximin is the form of Rawls's principles of justice. Suppose 5 is the maximum the worse-offcan get, and the better-offcan get as much as 10. It is appropriate to say, then, that the inequality corresponding to (8, 5) is less "to everyone's advantage" than the inequality corresponding to (10, 5)—sincetheworse-offare, in either state, treatedmore favorably than they would in any other state, and the better-off are treated in the former less favorably than they could, given this constraint.

I deemed it necessary to make all ofthese points in order to uphold my contention that theform ofRawls's principles ofjustice is favorable to the sacrificial choice in sacrificial situations, whichmayhave sound somewhat provocative, since the Theory ofJustice itselfmay be read as a powerful anti-sacrificial scheme.

2. Rawls and utilitarianism on sacrifice. I want now to generalize the previous point and defend the following

thesis. The most important cases of social transformations which it is legitimate to dub "sacrificial" are such that both the utilitarianprinciple and Rawls'sprinciplesvindicate them. This is so because theweakest normative principle thatjustifies them is weaker than both the utilitarianprinciple and Rawls's principles.

4 Robert Nozick, personal communication.

30Jean-Pierre Dupuy

If this is correct, and ifwe are opposed to sacrifice, it follows that by and large, utilitarianism doesn't fare worse than Rawls's principles of justice as to the vindication of sacrifice.

This is shocking. Isn't one of the major accusations leveled at utilitarianism the fact that itmay allow for serious infractions ofliberty for the sake ofgreater benefits for others? When, on the first page ofhis book, Rawls contends that "each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override," with what is he contrasting his conception of justice, if not with utilitarian ethics? What ifwe showed thatwhenever utilitarianismjustifies sacrifice, Rawls's principles are likely to do the same?

A remark, first, which cannot serve as a demonstration, to be sure, but which is puzzling nevertheless. Whenever an author belonging to the analytical tradition has to exemplify the assertion that utilitarianism favors sacrifice, he or she seems compelled to resort to a single class of instances, a class that happens to be a sub-class of the class ofunanimity-sacrificial situations: the scapegoating mechanism. We saw an example of that in Nozick and it would be tedious to quote from other philosophers, such as Sandel, Larmore, Williams, etc. Normative economists are no exception to the rule. Thus, E. J. Mishan: "There is much that might increase total utility, or thatmight realize Pareto improvements, that is nonetheless quite unacceptable to civilized societies and can, therefore, become no part of their agenda. However much the aggregate utility enjoyed by a hysterical mob in kicking a man into insensibility exceeds the disutility ofthe victim, society would feel justified in intervening" (971).

Is it inevitable for the critics ofutilitarianism to appeal almost uniquely to the scapegoating mechanism? Logical analysis in itselfdoes not impose such limitation. The fact that utilitarianism is likely to favor the sacrifice ofsome for a greater good shared by others results, we are told, from two major factors. First, it is a ideological doctrine that gives priority to the advancement of some independently defined overall social good over the right. Secondly, since it defines that overall good as an aggregate in which the various individual conceptions of the good are melted, as it were, it does not take seriously the "plurality and distinctiveness of individuals" (Rawls); it does not sufficiently respect the fact that each one "is a separate person, that his is the only life he has" (Nozick). From these two characteristics, it seems to followthat the ills caused to some may be made right by a greater good enjoyed by others. However, the task ofthe critics ofutilitarianism is not yet complete. They still have to exhibit contexts in

On the Rationality ofSacrifice3 1

which someone's being seriously wronged brings about a greater good for others. And this is where theweightofour cultural heritage, I submit, over- rides the constraints ofsheer logical analysis.

Ofcourse you can appeal as much as you like to fantastic, exotic, odd orqueer psychologies, for example thatofa sadist fiend. You canpostulate, as the fancy takes you, that my sleeping on my stomach, or my eating frogs and snails, causes such intolerable pain to agreat number ofpeople around the world as to justify, from a utilitarian stance, the violation of my in- alienable rights to sleep and eat as I like. I must sadly confide that it is the frequent recourse to examples ofthis kind that is too often responsible for the fact thatwhatwe call "Anglo-Saxon" moral and political philosophy is not taken as seriously as it should by "continental" philosophers. On the other hand, the latter may have too tragic and heavy a sense ofhistory, and lack a certain sense ofhumor.

Let me put it this way: we are more readily satisfied with sociological, historical or anthropological accounts than with psychological ones.

Let me then restate my question as follows. Can the critics of utilitarianism come up with a plausible and non-trivial social context in which, from a utilitarian stance, a serious loss for some would be made right by a greater good for others—apart from a unanimity-sacrificial situation?

One might argue as follows. Let us consider a situation in which the interests of different individuals are not in agreement and any choice of action will benefit some at the expense ofothers. Suppose that in the name ofa certain conception ofthe social good an action is taken that is held to further the general welfare. One might be tempted to say that the decision to carry it out entails the sacrifice ofthose who are opposed to it. Accord- ing to this interpretation, the mere fact ofpositing an overall social good would amount to sacrificing victims on the altar of the general will.

However, this line ofreasoning is hardly acceptable. At that rate, any- one could complain that she is sacrificed in any social state that maximizes a given social welfare function, be it utilitarian or not. She wouldjust have to point to the state that maximizes her own utility function or her own interest, taking it as a benchmark. For instance,Rawls's difference principle could be said to sacrifice the interests of all but the worst-off (a critique that has actually been leveled at Rawls by his right-wing or libertarian opponents). Any definition of sacrifice in counterfactual terms ("I, a rich person, would be better off if the income tax system were proportional rather than progressive; therefore I am entitled to declare myself a sacrifi-

32Jean-Pierre Dupuy

cial victim") is bound to wash its meaning out. That is why it is so important to emphasize that no such counterfactual characterization of sacrifice applies to the religious or anthropological roots of the notion.

However, Rawls himself provides an answer to our question. I am referring to the case of religious (and, derivatively, philosophical, moral, political or racial) prejudice and persecution which proves to be ofpara- mount importance for a correctunderstandingofA TheoryofJustice. Since the publication of his book, Rawls has made it very clear that a major purpose ofhis theory is "to spell out the implications of the principle of [religious] toleration" such as arose historically after the Reformation and the subsequent wars of religion. From then on, citizens of democratic nations have been aware of the impossibility of organizing social co- operation as before, through a public agreement on a single and common definition ofthe good. The political problem has become that ofachieving social unity "in a society marked by deep divisions between opposing and incommensurable conceptions of the good" (Rawls, "Justice as Fairness" 22). It is out of the question for its solution to depend on a general moral, philosophical, let alone religious conception, for the latterwouldbebutone ofthe many coexisting in society.5

"Justice as Fairness," and the absolute priority it gives to the principle of equal liberty of conscience, is the solution, according to Rawls. Now, even if he does not state this explicitly, it does not seem untrue to his thought to say that the principle ofutility is to a traditional, religious, in- tolerant society as justice as fairness is to the "public culture of a con- stitutional democracy." The former may vindicate intolerance whereas the latterembodies the spirit oftoleration. For in a society regulated by a single conceptionofthe good, thosewho do not adhere to it mayhave their liberty repressed for the majority's sake.

On what ground is utilitarianism supposed to make this right? Apparently we are not dealing with a unanimity-sacrificial situation as I defined it. For the latter requires that the well-being of those who are sacrificed would have been the same had they not been sacrificed (a necessary condition for the strong Pareto condition to apply). This condition obviously is not met in the present context, for in one case the minority is the victim of intolerance, and in the other it benefits from the liberty ofconscience.

3 In his Political Liberalism, Rawls fleshes out the broad implications of pluralism and respect for others' conception ofthe good for his theory ofjustice.

On the Rationality ofSacrifice33

Nothing can be added to this evidence as long as one is content with a psychological account. Thus, one could suppose that the majority's psychology is such that they feel uncomfortable or upset with the others' not sharing their beliefs. However, as I said, we must go beyond this stage.

Anthropology teaches us that there is a strong connection between unanimity and the religious mind. You can thinkofDurkheim's contention that the ideas of divinity, society and totality are one and the same: the sacred corresponds to the reification ofsociety in its entirety. You can think of the thesis advocated by the tradition of thinkers I mentioned at the beginning, namely that sacrificial ritual is the original keystoneofreligious society: one ofthe main features ofsacrifice as a ritual is that it gathers the whole community around a center, the sacrificial altar. You can thinkofthe secularized versions of this: Rousseau's conception of democracy as re- quiring the direct participation ofall, without any exception whatever; or the Moscow and Prague trials whose craving for unanimity was so strong as to require the defendants' self-criticism.

In all of those social contexts, social order depends critically on the attainment ofunanimity. Short ofthis, social chaos breaks out. Let us take the standpoint ofa utilitarian judge: in the sacrificial case, the rights ofthe sacrificial victims are violated, but order is maintained; in the non- sacrificial case, the unanimity condition is not met, chaos takes over, and the rights of all become a dead letter. The condition for a unanimity- sacrificial situation to obtain is satisfied. By itself, the principle of unanimity concludes in favor ofthe rationality of sacrifice.

It can be objected that this reasoning is contingent upon a false belief: namely that a breach ofunanimity causes the disruption ofthe social order. (In his discussion ofthe limitations imposed on libertyofconscience by the common interest in public order and security, Rawls insists strongly on the necessity ofassessing correctly the likelihood ofdamage to public order: see Theory 213-16). But in a religious or quasi-religious setting, "false" beliefs may actually turn out to be true by the simple fact that when people act on them, they become true. The sacred is the realm of self-fulfilling prophecies. Ifmen believe that the social order will collapse ifthey cease to feed their gods with victims, that will certainly be the case.

If the foregoing is correct, it seems that the major social contexts in which the principle ofutility favors the sacrifice ofthe fundamental rights of some for the sake of society as a whole are such that the principle of unanimity alone permits to reach the same conclusion. Insofar as they are compatible with the latter, Rawls's principles ofjustice do just the same.

34Jean-Pierre Dupuy

Before broaching the next and last step ofmy argument, I want to do justice to an obvious objection. What if the sacrificial victim does not belong to the social group we are considering? Then, ifthe potential victim were not sacrificed, it would not be the case that her lot would remain the same. From an anthropological standpoint, the possibility of this con- figuration should be held with some suspicion. It is precisely one of the deluding effects ofthe scapegoatingmechanism to make the victim appear external or alien to the group (after all, her sacralization through sacrifice accomplishes just that). The persecutors' interpretation is that she was eliminated because she was different, whereas the truth is that her difference stems from the fact that she was singled out for elimination. From a logical point ofview, however, that possibility cannot be ruled out.

Consider the following fancy story. N people are dying because one of their vital organs has turned dysfunctional. Each ofthem might be saved if only they could benefit from a transplant: a heart for one, a lung for another, a liver for the last. The question is: should we put Alter to death, Alter being ayoung and healthy fellow, and give his heart, lungs, liver, etc. to the dying ones?6

Obviously, the sacrificial and non-sacrificial cases are no longer Pareto-comparable. However, a concept introduced by Serge-Christophe KoIm can be brought to bear on this situation: fundamental dominance (105). A state "fundamentally dominates" another state ifand only ifthere are permutations of the payoffs distributions that result in the first state Pareto-dominating the second. One verifies immediately, in the situation at hand, that although the sacrificial case does not Pareto-dominate the non- sacrificial case, the former fundamentally-dominates the latter.

Fundamental dominance does not have the same self-evidence as the principle ofunanimity since it is stronger than the latter. However, it is very much in keeping with Rawls's principles ofjustice, inasmuch as their form is that ofLeximin. Indeed, fundamental dominance as a partial ordering is compatible with Leximin as a total ordering: whenever the former says something, the latter concurs. It is likewise compatible with the principle ofutility.

Leximin and fundamental dominance are identity-neutral (as is the principle ofutility): they are indifferentto the identity ofpersons. The only

6 This example has appeared many times in the ethics literature, in writings of Judith Thomson, Francis Kamm, John Ferejohn, etc. I should like to thank Robert Nozick for pointing that out to me.

On the Rationality ofSacrifice35

thing both principles care about is how payoffs are distributed across populations. It is true that Leximin sides with the potential victim. However, who is the victim? It is not a person with a name, as in: "You are Peter." It is an anonymous position in a structure. When it takes the form ofLeximin, the secularization ofthe Christian drive to side with thevictim is inevitably corrupted. This is ultimately, I submit, the reason whyRawls's principles ofjustice end up by their very form justifying sacrifice in the whole category ofsacrificial situations I have examined.

The fact that most of the important cases of sacrificial choices are amenable to strong-Pareto improvements does not entail that every strong- Pareto improvement is necessarily sacrificial, and thereby runs counter to our deep-seated anti-sacrificial bias. A fire is destroying an apartment building. I, a fireman, can, given the limitation ofmy resources, rescue ten people out ofthe fifteen whose lives are threatened. Should I refrain to do so on the ground that the other five would then be "sacrificed" to the others or to the whole community? Here the strong Pareto optimal choices are obviously the rational, efficient andjust ones, and no "sacrificial" element seems to be involved

However, a strong-Pareto improvement can easilybecome the locus of a sacrificial choice. Recall that what makes avictim a sacrificial one is not its physical state, it is the meaningascribed to this state. Is the victim to die in order for the others to live on? Suppose I am about to rescue this woman when she says to me: "Go and save my son, his life is more dear to me than my own." The meaning of her death will have dramatically changed. If sacrifice, rather than self-sacrifice, is inimical to us, we may be tempted to try and eliminate as far as possible all meaning from the decision-making process. The "modern," logical solution, it seems, would be here the recourse to chance—until we realize that most primitive sacrificial rituals, as well as Christ's passion, had, as one of their key elements, the drawing of lots. The difference, though, is that in a religious setting, there is no "chance event" (etymologically speaking, the cast of a dice) without meaning.

What I have been trying to do, so far, is to drive a wedge between the spirit of the theory ofjustice, which is anti-sacrificial, and the letter, or rather the form of its principles, which is such as to justify sacrifice in a whole class of sacrificial situations. However, this inner contradiction, as I see it, should not be blamed on Rawls's incoherence. The sacrificial element in the principles of justice results from their meeting a basic constraint of rationality. Insofar as the theory purports to be, not only

36Jean-Pierre Dupuy reasonable, but also rational, its compatibility with such a minimum principle ofrationality as the principle ofunanimity, or even fundamental dominance, appears to be an indispensable requirement.

3. There is no reflective equilibrium about the rationality ofsacrifice. On the one hand, justice as fairness purports to be a political

conception ofjustice suitable for a public culture shaped by the principle of toleration, which is the anti-sacrificial principlepar excellence; on the other, the principles to which it leads favor, by their very form, sacrifice after the fashion of utilitarianism in most of the important cases of sacrificial situations. The apparent contradiction dissolves when one realizes that Rawls's principles ofjustice do not apply, and are not meant to apply, to sacrificial situations.

Some may think it would have saved me much toil ifI had started with this proposition. But things are more intricate than they seemprimafacie.

It might be said that Rawls's principles ofjustice are not meant to be principles which we appeal to in determining whether an action is just or not, since they are meant only to apply to the basic social and political institutions of a society. Now sacrificial choices concern actions, not the design of institutional arrangements. However, this distinction between action and institution becomes invalid if we take the anthropological standpoint that has been ours throughout this essay, and take accountofthe well-documented fact that at theoriginofmost, ifnot all social institutions, we find a sacrificial choice made in a sacrificial situation, such as Caiaphas's choice.

The true reason why Rawls's principles of justice do not apply to sacrificial situations is that they belong to the ideal conception ofjustice (or "ideal theory"). They are meant to regulate a well-ordered and even perfectly just society "under favorable circumstances" (Theory 351). Apparently a sacrificial situation is altogether alien to this description.

The method ofcomparison between the principle ofutility and Rawls's principles of justice may then seem extremely unfair. Utilitarianism is accused offavoring sacrifice in contexts that are excluded from the scope ofJustice as Fairness—and in which, were this exclusion to be revoked, the latterwouldn't fare differently from the former. All this on the ground that, contrary to Justice as Fairness, utilitarianism purports to be of universal application.

It is too easy for utilitarians to counter-attack by using the same kind of strategy as Justice as Fairness. A possibility is Harsanyi's decision to

On the Rationality ofSacrifice31

exclude all "antisocial preferences" from the utilitarian calculus (56). Anotherpossibility is to restrict the scopeofutilitarianism to thatpermitted and defined by the original position and the features of a well-ordered society and/or the public culture of a democratic society. Anything re- sembling a sacrificial situation will be automatically ruled out.

My aim is not to criticize the idea ofJustice as Fairness, but to under- stand and circumscribe its meaning. I submit the following.

A caricatured presentation of the foregoing would be to say: Rawls's principles ofjustice are meant to apply to a society already governedby the very same principles ofjustice. However, as Paul Ricoeur has shown ("Le cercle de la démonstration), this circularity is not vicious: it is both inevitable and productive. The aim is not one of foundation but of disclosure. The philosopher's task is to organize the basic ideas and principles already implicitly existing in our considered judgments and convictions about justice and injustice into a coherent conception. Hence the concept of "reflective equilibrium."

Seen in this light, the great merit of Rawls's Theory ofJustice is to reveal that the ethos of "democratic societies" rests on an exclusion: the exclusion of those sacrificial situations which the Theory precisely excludes from its field ofapplication. What the Theory excludes from its field ofapplication is in fact constitutive ofthe Theory. The latter tells us at least as much by what it rejects as by what it affirms.

To put this another way: a fundamental result ofA Theory ofJustice is not that Rawls's principles should be preferred to the principle of utility. The main effect brought about by the Theory, its staging of the original position, the veil ofignorance, etc., is «of that it leads the parties to rankthe principle oftoleration above theprincipleofsacrifice. It is that it makes the latter inconceivable, impossible. It excludes it altogether.

Let us take the example of the scapegoating mechanism, the para- digmatic case of all sacrificial situations. For it to function and be productive, the following conditions must be met, among others: • The individuals must fall prey to violent and contagious

passions—envy, jealousy, hatred, spite, etc.—so that they attribute all the evils ofthe community to one individual whose elimination restores peace and order. • The individuals must be unaware ofwhat is actually going on, they

must believe in the guilt of the victim. If someone is to manipulate the mechanism, he must see thatwhich remains concealed from the others: the innocence and arbitrariness of the victim.

38Jean-Pierre Dupuy

• If the story of what happened is to be told, it must be from the vantage point of the persecutors, not from the victim's.

On each one of these three points, the setting ofthe original position makes it impossible for these conditions to be met: • The people know that they live in a well-ordered and just society,

that they have a sense ofjustice, all of which results in the confining of disruptive passions to a harmless level. • Thepublicity condition deprives the scapegoatingmechanismofany

efficiency whatsoever. • The original position is entirely devised to give the worst-off—i. e.,

the potential victims—a privileged position. When Rawls resorts to the concept ofreflective equilibrium, there are

two possibilities he does not envisage: multiplicity and non-existence. As far as sacrifice is concerned (the major stake in the Rawls versus utilitarianism debate), I submit that there is no fixed point. What we have instead, in our deep-seated convictions as well as in the Theory, is an unresolved tension between two opposite drives. One is sacrificial: it is reflected in the Theory by the form taken by the principles. The other is anti-sacrificial: it is made manifest in the spirit and the goals ofthe Theory.

Quite unwittingly, the Theory reflects our moral predicament, as expressed by Thomas Nagel: "the world can present us with situations in which there is no honorable or moral course for a human being to take, no course free ofguilt and responsibility for evil" ("War and Massacre). This is, I guess, what the Christians mean when they invoke the existence ofan original sin.

WORKS CITED

Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. 1992. Le Sacrifice et l'envie. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Girard, René. 1979. Violence and the Sacred. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP. ------. The Scapegoat. 1986. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP. Harsanyi, John C. 1982. "Morality and the Theory ofRational Behavior. In

Utilitarianism andBeyond. Eds. A. Sen and B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

KoIm, S.-C. 1972. Justice et équité. Paris: CNRS. Mishan, E.J. 1972. "The Futility ofPareto-Efficient Distributions." TheAmerican

Economic Review 62:971-76. Nagel, Thomas. 1979. "War and Massacre." In Mortal Questions. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP.

On the Rationality ofSacrifice39

Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory ofJustice. Oxford: Oxford UP. ------. 1987. Théorie de la Justice. Paris: Seuil. ------. 1985. "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical." Philosophy and

Public Affairs 14. ------. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia UP. Ricoeur, Paul. 1988. "Lecerclede ladémonstration." In IndividuetJusticesociale.

AutourdeJohnRawls. Eds. C. Audard, J.-P. Dupuy, and R. Sève. Paris: Seuil. Styron. William. 1979. Sophie's Choice. New York: Random House. Williams, Bernard. 1973. "ACritiqueofUtilitarianism." In Utilitarianism Forand

Against. Eds.J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

EA 140 Fi a Take-h e E a (30% f he C e G ade)

Dead i e: 5 P.M. Ma ch 19, 2020

A hardcopy of your essay should be submitted at the instructor’s office (HIB 472) before the deadline. If you prefer to submit your paper much earlier than the deadline, you can also drop it in the instructor’s mailbox in the main office of the East Asian Studies Department (HIB 443) [the department main office closes around 4:30 P.M].

The length of the essay should be eight to ten pages (Times New Roman 12, double-spaced). The title of the work you are referencing and the corresponding page number should be given in parentheses in the main text [example: (“On the Rationality of Sacrifice,” 16)]. You are expected to write a carefully reasoned, clearly argued essay that reflects a firm grasp of the reading materials. In the introduction of your essay, you should clearly state what your main argument is. Note that you are required not to simply summarize the reading materials but to discuss them in regard to the topic.

The course materials you are required to engage with in your final take-home exam include Søren Kierkegaard’s Fea a d T e bli g, Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s “On the Rationality of Sacrifice,” the third chapter of Jacques Derrida’s The Gif f Dea h, the movie M he , “Sonata Appasionata” and “The Red Hills” by Kim Tongin, “Seopyeonje” by Yi Ch’ ngjun, and “Pagoda” by Hwang Suk-young.

Paper Topic:

By drawing on the ideas of Kierkegaard, Dupy, and Derrida on sacrifice we have discussed in class, write an essay about the ways in which the theme of sacrifice is manifested in M he , “Sonata Appasionata,” “The Red Hills,” “Seopyeonje,” and “Pagoda.”

The movie M he and the four short stories pivot on the theme of sacrifice. M he deals with the intensity and perversion of a mother’s devotion to her son that leads her to sacrifice others for him. “Sonata Appasionata” and “Seopyeonje,” in a similar way, raise questions about the legitimacy of sacrifice that results from one’s devotion to art. On the other hand, “The Red Hills” interestingly shows how sacrifice for one’s community instantly redeems an individual from his despicable past and elevates him to the status of a martyr. In contrast, “Pagoda” portrays a sacrificial situation at war and exposes the futility of such sacrifice despite the cunning calculation behind strategic reasoning that demands sacrifice.

The works on sacrifice by Kierkeggard, Dupuy, and Derrida all address the issue of sacrifice in relation to the problem of decision-making and one’s commitment to her or his decision. Kierkegaard insists that we can make a genuine decision only on our own and nobody can make a decision for us if it is genuine. He furthermore suggests that once making a decision, we should unconditionally commit ourselves to it no matter how irrational it might look. On the other hand, Dupuy argues against the conventional criticism of utilitarianism by critiquing John Rawls’s theory of justice, which, in his view, denounces utilitarianism’s alleged condoning of sacrifice. Dupuy contends that John Rawls’s theory of justice is premised on an ideal society by excluding sacrificial situations which are abundantly found in the real world. He further argues that any rational decision in fact entails sacrifice because our rational calculation for the best outcome inevitably rules out conditions for different outcomes. Derrida agrees with Dupuy that we live in

a world full of sacrificial situations. In contrast to Dupuy, Derrida however argues that a decision is made on the basis of non-knowledge and thus irrationally. By building on Kierkegaard, he states that we should commit ourselves to the genuine decisions of ours in order to be responsible. He further reminds his readers that our decisions have consequences that impact others. In order to be absolutely responsible to one other, we cannot but be irresponsible to other others. Put differently, no matter how rationally we try to justify our decision to absolutely commit ourselves to the relationship with one other, we should not be in good conscience because we unavoidably end up being irresponsible to other others that our decision inevitably sacrifices in order to be responsible to one other. Therefore, by relating decision-making to the problem of responsibility, he suggests that whenever we make a decision and commit ourselves to it, we cannot help sacrificing other possibilities, which our decision leaves out, and we should be held responsible for irresponsibility implicated in our unconditional commitment to our decisions.

With the above overview in mind, you are required to address the following issues in your essay: faith, teleological suspension of the ethical, singular individual v.s. community, utilitarianism, the rationality of sacrifice, the sacrificial situation, absolute responsibility v.s. responsibility in general, the wholly other, the paradox of responsibility, “the every other (one) is every (bit) other,” the unavoidability of sacrifice.