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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved
Chapter 2
Deception
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 2 – Deception
Introduction
- Deception is deliberately misleading an adversary by creating a system component that looks real but is in reality a trap
- Sometimes called a honey pot
- Deception helps accomplish the following security objectives
- Attention
- Energy
- Uncertainty
- Analysis
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
- If adversaries are aware that perceived vulnerabilities may, in fact, be a trap, deception may defuse actual vulnerabilities that security mangers know nothing about.
Introduction
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Fig. 2.1 – Use of deception in computing
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Chapter 2 – Deception
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Introduction
- Four distinct attack stages:
- Scanning
- Discovery
- Exploitation
- Exposing
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.2 – Stages of deception for national infrastructure protection
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- Adversary is scanning for exploitation points
- May include both online and offline scanning
- Deceptive design goal: Design an interface with the following components
- Authorized services
- Real vulnerabilities
- Bogus vulnerabilities
- Data can be collected in real-time when adversary attacks honey pot
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Scanning Stage
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.3 – National asset service interface with deception
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- Deliberately inserting an open service port on an Internet-facing server is the most straightforward deceptive computing practice
- Adversaries face three views
- Valid open ports
- Inadvertently open ports
- Deliberately open ports connected to honey pots
- Must take care the real assets aren’t put at risk by bogus ports
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Deliberately Open Ports
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.4 – Use of deceptive bogus ports to bogus assets
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.5 – Embedding a honey pot server into a normal server complex
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- The discovery stage is when an adversary finds and accepts security bait embedded in the trap
- Make adversary believe real assets are bogus
- Sponsored research
- Published case studies
- Open solicitations
- Make adversary believe bogus assets are real
- Technique of duplication is often used for honey pot design
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Discovery Stage
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.6 – Duplication in honey pot design
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- Creation and special placement of deceptive documents can be used to trick an adversary (Especially useful for detecting a malicious insider)
- Only works when content is convincing and
- Protections appear real
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Deceptive Documents
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.7 – Planting a bogus document in protected enclaves
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- This stage is when an adversary exploits a discovered vulnerability
- Early activity called low radar actions
- When detected called indications and warnings
- Key requirement: Any exploitation of a bogus asset must not cause disclosure, integrity, theft, or availability problems with any real asset
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Exploitation Stage
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.8 – Pre- and post-attack stages at the exploitation stage
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- Related issue: Intrusion detection and incident response teams might be fooled into believing trap functionality is real. False alarms can be avoided by
- Process coordination
- Trap isolation
- Back-end insiders
- Process allowance
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Exploitation Stage
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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- Understand adversary behavior by comparing it in different environments.
- The procurement lifecycle is one of the most underestimated components in national infrastructure protection (from an attack perspective)
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Procurement Tricks
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.9 – Using deception against malicious suppliers
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- The deception lifecycle ends with the adversary exposing behavior to the deception operator
- Therefore, deception must allow a window for observing that behavior
- Sufficient detail
- Hidden probes
- Real-time observation
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Exposing Stage
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.10 – Adversary exposing stage during deception
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Interfaces Between
Humans and Computers
- Gathering of forensic evidence relies on understanding how systems, protocols, and services interact
- Human-to-human
- Human-to-computer
- Computer-to-human
- Computer-to-computer
- Real-time forensic analysis not possible for every scenario
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Chapter 2 – Deception
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The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 – Deception
Fig. 2.11 – Deceptively exploiting the human-to-human interface
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- Programs for national deception would be better designed based on the following assumptions:
- Selective infrastructure use
- Sharing of results and insights
- Reuse of tools and methods
- An objection to deception that remains is that it is not effective against botnet attacks
- Though a tarpit might degrade the effectiveness of a botnet
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Chapter 2 – Deception
National Deception Program
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer

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