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Chapter 2

Deception

Cyber Attacks

Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.

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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Introduction

  • Deception is deliberately misleading an adversary by creating a system component that looks real but is in reality a trap
  • Sometimes called a honey pot
  • Deception helps accomplish the following security objectives
  • Attention
  • Energy
  • Uncertainty
  • Analysis

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Chapter 2 – Deception

  • If adversaries are aware that perceived vulnerabilities may, in fact, be a trap, deception may defuse actual vulnerabilities that security mangers know nothing about.

Introduction

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Fig. 2.1 – Use of deception in computing

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Chapter 2 – Deception

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Introduction

  • Four distinct attack stages:
  • Scanning
  • Discovery
  • Exploitation
  • Exposing

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.2 – Stages of deception for national infrastructure protection

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  • Adversary is scanning for exploitation points
  • May include both online and offline scanning
  • Deceptive design goal: Design an interface with the following components
  • Authorized services
  • Real vulnerabilities
  • Bogus vulnerabilities
  • Data can be collected in real-time when adversary attacks honey pot

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Scanning Stage

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.3 – National asset service interface with deception

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  • Deliberately inserting an open service port on an Internet-facing server is the most straightforward deceptive computing practice
  • Adversaries face three views
  • Valid open ports
  • Inadvertently open ports
  • Deliberately open ports connected to honey pots
  • Must take care the real assets aren’t put at risk by bogus ports

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Deliberately Open Ports

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.4 – Use of deceptive bogus ports to bogus assets

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.5 – Embedding a honey pot server into a normal server complex

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  • The discovery stage is when an adversary finds and accepts security bait embedded in the trap
  • Make adversary believe real assets are bogus
  • Sponsored research
  • Published case studies
  • Open solicitations
  • Make adversary believe bogus assets are real
  • Technique of duplication is often used for honey pot design

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Discovery Stage

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.6 – Duplication in honey pot design

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  • Creation and special placement of deceptive documents can be used to trick an adversary (Especially useful for detecting a malicious insider)
  • Only works when content is convincing and
  • Protections appear real

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Deceptive Documents

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.7 – Planting a bogus document in protected enclaves

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  • This stage is when an adversary exploits a discovered vulnerability
  • Early activity called low radar actions
  • When detected called indications and warnings
  • Key requirement: Any exploitation of a bogus asset must not cause disclosure, integrity, theft, or availability problems with any real asset

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Exploitation Stage

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.8 – Pre- and post-attack stages at the exploitation stage

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  • Related issue: Intrusion detection and incident response teams might be fooled into believing trap functionality is real. False alarms can be avoided by
  • Process coordination
  • Trap isolation
  • Back-end insiders
  • Process allowance

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Exploitation Stage

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  • Understand adversary behavior by comparing it in different environments.
  • The procurement lifecycle is one of the most underestimated components in national infrastructure protection (from an attack perspective)

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Procurement Tricks

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.9 – Using deception against malicious suppliers

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  • The deception lifecycle ends with the adversary exposing behavior to the deception operator
  • Therefore, deception must allow a window for observing that behavior
  • Sufficient detail
  • Hidden probes
  • Real-time observation

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Exposing Stage

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.10 – Adversary exposing stage during deception

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Interfaces Between
Humans and Computers

  • Gathering of forensic evidence relies on understanding how systems, protocols, and services interact
  • Human-to-human
  • Human-to-computer
  • Computer-to-human
  • Computer-to-computer
  • Real-time forensic analysis not possible for every scenario

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Chapter 2 – Deception

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Chapter 2 – Deception

Fig. 2.11 – Deceptively exploiting the human-to-human interface

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  • Programs for national deception would be better designed based on the following assumptions:
  • Selective infrastructure use
  • Sharing of results and insights
  • Reuse of tools and methods
  • An objection to deception that remains is that it is not effective against botnet attacks
  • Though a tarpit might degrade the effectiveness of a botnet

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Chapter 2 – Deception

National Deception Program

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Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer

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