Akoo, Duncan O. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2

Hunter, T. B. "Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism." Journal

of Strategic Security 2, no. 2 (2010): 1-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Hunter is portraying the “justification” of the western occupying regions of importance to them world over including the Middle East and taking out anyone who is an enemy to their ideologies and people. He differentiates “targeted killing,” from assassination saying, “The premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals,” is what targeted killing is.

Hunter also ties the relationship between targeted killing and international terrorism as it relates in today’s world with affected states mandate to protect their people. International terrorism after 9/11 has mainly been in the form of suicide bombing and operating in foreign soil results in decline in targeted killing especially in Middle East. Nations have been reluctant to formalize policies, resulting in limited literature relating to targeted killing. He concludes by saying that targeted killing is not ending anytime soon. If states see the need for self-defense, killing will be done. Since there is no formal legal document defining the issue, UN, Hague and other centers of international legal orders will remain at loggerheads.

Karimi, Y; Cimbura, A; and Loza, W. "Assessing the Prevalence of Middle Eastern

Ideologies among some Iranians. "Journal of Strategic Security12, no. 3 (2019): 157-169. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.3.1719 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss3/4

In their efforts to show that religion impacts extremism, Karimi, Ciumbura and Loza takes the survey avenue to sample Iranians and compare their results against previously gathered data from religious groups from other parts of the world. Similar, to previous results, the current results indicated that Iranian Muslims scored significantly higher than the sampled Christians and Atheists. However, the score of total ATRS and its subscale for Muslims of Iran was significantly less compared to Muslims from other parts of the world.

Extremism and violent acts motivated by religious beliefs are not a new phenomenon and are not restricted to one religion or one region of the world. Several scholars reported on the magnitude and extent of ideologically Based Terrorism post 9/11. For example, in 2006, it was estimated that over 1,000 terrorist organizations were active in more than one hundred countries.5 From 2001 to 2007 terrorists have attempted over thirty attacks against European Union countries.6 From 2002 to 2005, an average of four terrorist attacks occurred annually in different countries, killing an average of 214 people each year.7 In Canada, there were forty groups listed as terrorist entities in 2008.8 Further, it is estimated that since 9/11, terrorists having Middle Eastern religious ideologies are responsible for killing over 26,000 and wounding 50,000 in attacks in over fifty countries. 2006 indicated that 20 percent of British Muslims sympathized with the 7/7/2005 London bombers who participated in the killing of 52 and injuring hundreds, and thirtyone percent of younger British Muslims endorsed or excused these bombings. Jordanians, and 42 percent of Turks appear to endorse or sympathize with attacks on Americans. The third, a 2013 study, found that 16 percent of young Muslims in Belgium believed that state terrorism is acceptable, while 12 percent of young Muslims in Britain said that there were ways to justify suicide attacks against civilians in Britain. The fourth, Pew

Unfortunately, the prevalence of these ideologies may have contributed to the home-grown terrorism that we have seen of late on members of the Scale was designed to measure Middle Eastern attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies supportive of extremists/terrorists practice. The findings from different research locations confirm the reliability and validity of ATRS scale to measure Middle Eastern extremism. Several studies, where the ATRS was utilized were conducted by different scholars from different countries. Most of these scholars were university affiliated in the fields of psychiatry or psychology.

To conclude, Karimi points out that as hypothesized, the Iranian Muslims scored significantly higher than samples of Christians, and Atheists around the world, but not significantly different from samples of Muslims from other countries. Future research utilizing the ATRS on different countries that have Muslim majorities, or even countries that have minority Muslim populations, may add to our understanding of the prevalence of the extreme Middle Eastern ideologies around the world

Steinmetz, T. (2011). Mitigating the exploitation of U.S. borders by jihadists and criminal

organizations. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(3), 29-48. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3

Steinmetz addresses the United States of America’s (USA) immediate reaction to 9/11 attacks paying specific attention to, “Reducing the threat of terrorist infiltration at America's borders.” Densely populated areas and infrastructures of high economic values suddenly demanded immediate security attention. Ten years on, terrorism and organized crimes are still threats being addressed at our ports of entries? Steinmetz emphasizes on the terrorists acts at the northern borders while not leaving behind, the organized crimes at the southwestern border. He looks at the measures currently employed and provides an insight on what the future should look like if the borders are to be more secure.

Whereas the US employs foreign workers, fuelling the need for foreign immigrants especially from the south, Steinmetz say, “Mixed within this element are sophisticated intercontinental criminal networks comprised of drug cartels, human smugglers, and gangs that stretch from America's southern border to Central and South America to Africa and Europe.” Their presence poses severe risk not only to the US citizens, but also the security law enforcement officers working at the borders. The network formed of the foreign and local criminals’ points out that there is increase in Islamic terrorism in the western world and says of the existence of evidence suggesting anti-American Islamic groups presently operating in the Americas. Even though the southern border is notorious for organized crimes infiltrations, the northern border is not immune to dangerous activities. The existence of al-Qaida cells and grassroots extremists in Canada saw the crossing of these terrorist to either plot, recruit or fundraise in the USA. After 9/11, USA has stepped up her security at the borders especially with the CBP. However, checkpoints are not there yet. To achieve this, homeland security work force should continually develop; merge expertise with coordinated intelligence while employing sophisticated tools and technology.

In his conclusion, Steinmetz reminds us of the importance of technology employed at the borders. However, he cautions that there potential to fully serve the interest of the American security; the involvement of motivated agents is a must. Increase their numbers, train them and motivate them to achieve the goal.

Giermanski, J. Container Security: Is it working Logistics Management (2002); Framington

Vol. 48, Iss. 10, (2009).

The creation of Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 has since brought forth four distinct ‘check points’ all aimed at echoing the prevention is better than cure theory. The four checking measures are designed so that every step from the first to the fourth, feeds into the next level so that by the time the screening is done at local ports, the goods have “matured and safe” for consumption. Giermanski indicates the steps as, “1. doors-only security 2. door seals combined with satellite for tracking, 3. scanning security, and 4. chain-of-custody.

Due to the high volume of containers docking our ports daily, conducting manual inspections is not only tedious but time consuming. With that notion terrorists are watching silently but surely, and they may test another 9/11 by sending in cargo containers smuggling nuclear weapons, radiological materials, drugs, contraband, or humans into a country. US security must constantly think faster than the enemy and is employing scanning as form of cargo inspection. However, there are is a shortfall on this method in that there are some cargos that might not be detected by them alone and thus sniffers and agents experience beefing up the effort. Bear in mind that there are cargo coming to our ports via transshipment ports and anything can happen there.

Jizba, M, Cheu, L.C. Horak, T. 1 & Helena Binova, H. Analysis of screening checkpoint

operations for transatlantic container transportation, J Transp Secur (2015) 8:79–97 DOI 10.1007/s12198-015-0159-5

Jizba and his crew looks at the effects of taking cargo through screenings at ports of lading as was declared in the legislatives of 2006 and 2007 respectively. In their research, the cargo goes through three screening processes, “The risk-based approach, 100 % approach and hybrid approach,” and they simulate their actions at ports of Hamburg and Port of Houston, TX. They reveal that at some European ports that have put the same measures in place in the 100% approach, mixed results were reported where operational and technical issues were the main concern. Their efforts are restricted by the limited literature publicly available to their study.

Their approach causes delays in cargo transportation, posing threats to some cargo on transit and forces them to wonder what can be done to remedy the unacceptable delays caused by the methods that tend to pose risks to cargo that need not take too long on screening lines.

The 2006 SAFE Port Act, though voluntary, Section 205 establishes C-TPAT program aimed at not only the security of import containers but encompasses entire import supply chain. The EU and US operated on 1997 legislation before 9/11 but would later review it and adopted the new 2004 legislation. They conclude their research observing that the 100 % approach (NII and RPM) results in significant delay and queue length. An additional lane at NII station would solve this issue. The hybrid approach, seemed to be the best option screening only a portion of high-risk containers by NII, and the rest goes through RPM, resulting in even lesser delays and shorter queue lengths.

Bush, G. W. (2006, Oct 16). Statement on signing the SAFE port act. Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents, 42, 1817-1818. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/195208554?accountid=13713

Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, or the ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ Was signed into law on October 13, 2006 by President Bush, G.W. The President acknowledges his efforts in fighting terrorism saying of his actions as, “An act that strengthens the Government’s ability to protect the Nation’s seaports and maritime commerce from attack by terrorists”. This is a sequence of steps otherwise known to the ports agents as the ‘10 + 2’ that ensures checks and balances of cargo coming into the USA.

Congresswoman Hahn introduces legislation to increase security from terrorist attack at US

ports. (2014). (). Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from Political Science Database Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1561516380?accountid=13713

Congresswoman Hann brings it to the floor of congress that for USA to ensure security of cargo coming to our ports, their safety right from their ports of origin or at worse transitional ports must be ensured and no one will ensure that more that USA herself. Scan Containers Absolutely Now (SCAN) Act as she presents her case allows for USA to allocate two scanning machines at two world ports that are of high risk. Whereas this seems as a gesture of good hope to the host nation, it ensures that USA has eyes on cargo boarding ships for her ports, and ensuring that whenever there is need, those cargo containers deemed as unfit for US ports do not get anywhere near here. Congresswoman Hann reiterates the existence of the SAFE Act of 2007 and the Implementation Act of 2007, both aimed at ensuring that goods entering US ports undergo scanning at US ports. However, SCAN Act not only complements the SAFE and Implementation Acts of 2006 and 2007 respectively but ensures that USA’s eyes and approval of safety on cargo heading to their ports is at that port where they are loaded into ships.

Pinto, C. A., & Talley, W. K. (2006). The security incident cycle of ports. Maritime Economics

& Logistics, 8(3), 267-286.

doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100159

Pinto and Talley seeks to break port security into four phases: “prevention, detection, response and recovery”. In this article, they emphasize on the prevention and detection which amounts to the mitigation process at our ports and eventually looks at the recovery or rather how response has been addressed, USA trade on water constitutes 20% of world trade. With the 2 tons in cargo handled annually expected to double in 15 years, the surety of all the cargo receiving the necessary security attention becomes even harder by the day.

Using delay tactics like fences and locks on ports yards and tactical approach of cameras and sensors makes it a little harder for terrorists to execute their intents. As a prevention, created barriers deny terror plans and events. In detection, early apprehension is realized, while in response, mitigation and its impact addressed, and recovery addresses the quickest return to normalcy possible. By investigating how the ports have addressed prevention and detection, and reacted to response and recovery, Pinto and Talley looks at the hypothetical exercise carried out at the Port of Hampton Roads (Norfolk, Virginia) in August 2005 where an LPG tanker vessel is threatened. The Virginia Port Authority shuts down the port. However, the FBI being under pressure to finish its investigations faster to minimize further economic losses. As soon as normalcy is realized, the recovery phase marks the end of the exercise.

Zoubir, Bouzerzour (2014). Jihad as a source of terrorism a reality or propaganda. The Politics

and Religion Journal 8 (1):93-114.

This article is designed to deal with one of the allegations addressed against Islam by writers who misunderstood Islam or intentionally attempted to distort it. Whereas Muslims would give up anything in defense of their religion, these confused writers are saying “Jihad is a source of terrorism”. Throughout the ages, Islam has been misunderstood and surrounded by several false allegations. One of these allegations, contemporarily associates jihad with terrorism and violence and alleging the guilt of the belief to be the spread of the message of Islam through the sword. The author further stresses that, “It is therefore an imperative upon objective researchers to examine and scrutinize this allegation based on the true nature and the real teaching of Islam”. This research also examines opposing views regarding the concept of jihad, and how this concept has been misunderstood. This paper demonstrates the irony of constant squabbles when bottom line is that they support peace and condemning terror. Furthermore, this research explains that jihad bears a broad concept, revealing positive meanings and motives for achieving noble ends and objectives. Jihad has never been used as a ‘holy war’ and in the text of the Sharia. Jihad must be sought specifically to honor God alone and never man nor worldly ends.

House homeland security subcommittee on border and maritime hearing: "balancing maritime

security and trade facilitation: Protecting our ports, increasing commerce and securing the supply chain - part I.". (2012). (). Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from ProQuest Central Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/920280424?accountid=13713

After 9/11, CBP stepped up its methods and presently, security wise, RPMs 99% of all incoming containerized cargo arriving in the United States by water and 100% of all passenger and cargo vehicles entering the U.S. land ports. Since RPM program inception in 2002, CBP has scanned over 679 million conveyances for radiological contraband, resulting in more than 2.8 million alarms. The article also touches on how the global supply chain system is an interconnected multimodal system, encompassing foreign and domestic ports, transportation systems, conveyances and infrastructure. Ensuring its security, efficiency, and resilience requires a culture of mutual interest and shared responsibility among stakeholders throughout the world. It requires a balanced approach, dedication of resources, collaboration and whenever deemed necessary; compliance, verification and enforcement must be enforced to keep it alive. The partnering of SFI with the Department of Energy to deploy networks of radiation detection and imaging equipment at six overseas pilot ports remains a challenge that was worth taking. All in all, the pilot operations, apart from Qasim, Pakistan have ended, and those ports have reverted to the CSI protocols of risk-based targeting. The pilots encountered several serious challenges to implementing the 100% scanning mandate.

Walters, J., Feb, L. D., Dougherty, M., Grace Elletson Feb, & Kit Norton Feb. (2019, June 23).

Haviland Smith: The challenges of the Middle East. Retrieved February 8, 2020, from https://vtdigger.org/2019/06/23/haviland-smith-the-challenges-of-the-middle-east/

The crew of Walters, Feb, Dougherty, Grace and Kit brings out in this article the challenges from the Middle East while at the same time addressing the ever so interesting relationship between the Middle Easterners and United States. Haviland describes how dirty politicians from both isles; the United States and Iran would like to force a real confrontation between our two countries. Basically, our cultures are totally different.

Whereas Americans tend to assume that if something is good for us, it must be good for everyone else world over. The problem here is that the Middle East is perhaps the most politically, ethnically and religiously complicated geographic region on the face of the earth. It will not bend easily to amalgamation or regime change. The author concludes that All of this is sufficiently difficult in a predictable, consistent world, but when you are operating in a region where on-the-ground realities provide built-in conflict after conflict and, most importantly, where your own government’s policies are designed to be inconsistent, there is little hope for even the most rudimentary success, the avoidance of conflict remains an ever present monster staring at us every day. Under the scattered policies of the Trump administration, we are simply miles over our heads in the Middle East and might be far better off not to be involved at all.

Pare, Armand (2014). Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce. The Safe Port/Safe Berth

Warranty and Comparative Fault. Vol. 45, No. 2.

The Safe Port/Safe Berth Warranty and Comparative Fault

Armand portrays an idea that tackles the safety of ports and their security. This article is filled with different verticals that challenge safety and their authenticity. For example, a typical charter party, whether a voyage or time charter, contains a warranty by which a charterer warrants to the vessel owner that the vessel will be sent to “safe” ports and berths. Sometimes the warranty is stated in language in some detail and sometimes the parties simply recite that the vessel will trade to “safe” ports. With one important exception, the specific safe port language used in the charter is largely inconsequential because case law has generally ascribed a single common definition to the warranty. 1 There is one developing issue in safe port case law, 2 however, which has added potential confusion to determining whether there has been a breach of the warranty. The particular issue is whether there should be a comparative fault analysis in a safe port case where the facts show the existence of both an unsafe port condition and a lack of good seamanship or whether, instead, such a comparative fault analysis is inconsistent with the established approach to determining breach of the warranty. This article addresses that issue.

Holmes, J.L. "Global Logistics Management Software May Hold the Key” Coping with U.S

Customs Container Security Initiative

December 2003, the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection published the final rules requiring advance manifest information for screening. Considering that 90% of the world's cargo is container ferried, while 46% of all U.S. cargo being containerized. The CSI's advance screening requirements takes on truly staggering proportions. CSl initiative presents some significant business challenges, where companies enjoying compliance right could benefit from improved inventory control and reduced administration costs. Commercially available global logistics management software may hold the key. CSI proper is the specific port-to-port shipping element and C-TPAT is the Customs to-business bond. The 24-hour requirement has sent shockwaves through companies involved in global container shipping from shipping companies who have traditionally controlled the submission of documentation, to trading businesses who wonder how they will assemble the required information in such a tight timeframe. Once again, the integrity of the information submitted in documentation is critical. Some industry observers almost see a need for an independent party to observe the loading of each container to verify the documentation against what is loaded. The pre-screening of containers at the port of departure is intended to take place during the 'downtime' between arrival in port and loading onto a vessel. To enable container screening, companies must accumulate detailed information regarding each container, including the origins and details of the products.

These companies must also demonstrate consistency in their reporting, and they must have the ability to plan and audit back along the supply chain. This means that they will need to significantly improve and manage the flow of information. Once the information is assembled, the means must be found to transmit it to U.S. Customs in a timely manner. Should there be inquiries regarding the contents of a container, the means must be found to resolve those questions without delaying the shipment or impeding general business systems. Should inventory all resources lie tied up at the port of departure, the costs of compliance failure could cripple the shipper, the logistics operator, and the carrier. Retailer with considerable sourcing from oversees estimates that one day of inventory costs $l million. These solutions can enable a robust electronic system for compiling, submitting, and managing required information consistent with the C-TPAT process.

Casey, R. (2017). Transit: An analysis of networked criminal groups and criminal

Opportunities at transit ports. Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1) doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.130118

Casey tackles case study of Subhash Kapoor’s trafficking network to reference and support the idea that a port, as an interface in the global supply chain, is a critical site for analysis and understanding of international trafficking in cultural objects. customs, law enforcement, tariffs/taxes, licensing and certification, shipping and inspection, border control, purchase and sales records, audits, government accounting, and the courts are some of the measures available to law abiding legal traders and countries involved.

Taking this case as a benchmark, understanding the transit smuggling methods surrounding the Kapoor case can aid law enforcement in the United States and India in their on-going investigations targeting Kapoor and his list of clients. Furthermore, it can also help policy makers, lawyers, Customs, and criminologists create better systems to detect, uncover, and prosecute future crimes related to the trafficking of cultural heritage. Taking the charge of writing acceptable international policy is the challenge. Customs and port security in the Kapoor case reveals how vulnerable the setting is within the larger activities of criminal networks. Therefore, it is urged that more attention from international and national regulatory response agencies be focused upon transit ports as a site for intervention or disruption of smuggling.

Burns, M. G. (2018). Participatory operational & security assessment on homeland security risks:

An empirical research method for improving security beyond the borders through public/private partnerships. Journal of Transportation Security, 11(3-4), 85-100. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12198-018-0193-1

This paper demonstrates the development of a Participatory Operational Assessment instrument. Homeland security officials and industry stakeholders form a think-tank for resolving security and operational challenges on both sides of the border. This research also demonstrates the benefits of establishing a Public/Private Advisory Board in order to identify security threats on both sides of the border. This is a timely research, as border security risks impose serious threats for homeland security, with geopolitical, economic and trade hindrances. The DHS has introduced numerous noteworthy initiatives, platforms and programs, to include CSI, C-TPAT, and TWIC (just some) to act as screens for security. Globalization bore trade expansion and with that, economic prosperity. Freedom of trade and movement of cargo poses tremendous security risks, including cargo theft, human trafficking, illegitimate trade and travel, terrorist activities, money laundering and so on.

Bach, R. (2005). Transforming border security: Prevention first. Homeland Security Affairs, 1(1)

Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1265818402?accountid=13713

Whereas prevention; preemption and deterrence had been successful in some previous cases, none of these strategies neither singly nor together evolved into a comprehensive, prevention-oriented approach to border security. Achieving cooperation progress and changing U.S. reactive approaches requires, “Aligning border security with global strategy; forging a new foreign policy; making progress on cooperation; and changing U.S. reactive approaches.” (Bach, R. (2005).

Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/232098185?accountid=13713

Private sector was already working its way through technology in attempting to secure US ports long before the centralized security command center was unveiled. Besides just ensuring that security at the ports would support local employments and states earn revenue through tax collection.

Bergen, Peter L. 2019 September 11 attacks Encyclopædia Britannica, inc.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-45903314

https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-

508C.pdf

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/20/success/profit-sharing-delta/index.html

http://www.thebowenlawgroup.com/blog/the-most-challenging-security-issues-facing-the-port-

of-savannah

Akoo, Duncan: FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1265818402?accountid=13713

Black, J. R. (2009, 09). Port security gets smart. Security Technology Executive, 19, 38-41.

Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/232098185?accountid=13713Burns, M. G. (2018). Participatory operational & security assessment on homeland security risks: An empirical research method for improving security beyond the borders through public/private partnerships. Journal of Transportation Security, 11(3-4), 85-100. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12198-018-0193-1

Bush, G. W. (2006, Oct 16). Statement on signing the SAFE port act. Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents, 42, 1817-1818. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/195208554?accountid=13713

Casey, R. (2017). Transit: An analysis of networked criminal groups and criminal

Opportunities at transit ports. Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1) doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.130118

Congresswoman Hahn introduces legislation to increase security from terrorist attack at US

ports. (2014). (). Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from Political Science Database Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1561516380?accountid=13713

Giermanski, J. Container Security: Is it working Logistics Management (2002); Framington

Vol. 48, Iss. 10, (2009).

Holmes, J.L. "Global Logistics Management Software May Hold the Key” Coping with U.S

Customs Container Security Initiative

House homeland security subcommittee on border and maritime hearing: "balancing maritime

security and trade facilitation: Protecting our ports, increasing commerce and securing the supply chain - part I.". (2012). (). Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc. Retrieved from ProQuest Central Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/920280424?accountid=13713

Hunter, T. B. "Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism." Journal

of Strategic Security 2, no. 2 (2010): 1-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Jizba, M, Cheu, L.C. Horak, T. 1 & Helena Binova, H. Analysis of screening checkpoint

operations for transatlantic container transportation, J Transp Secur (2015) 8:79–97 DOI 10.1007/s12198-015-0159-5

Karimi, Y; Cimbura, A; and Loza, W. "Assessing the Prevalence of Middle Eastern

Ideologies among some Iranians. "Journal of Strategic Security12, no. 3 (2019): 157-169. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.3.1719 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss3/4

Leonard, T. J., Gallo, P., & Véronneau, S. (2015). Security challenges in united states seaports:

An overview. Journal of Transportation Security, 8(1-2), 41-49. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12198-015-0155-9

Pare, Armand (2014). Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce. The Safe Port/Safe Berth

Warranty and Comparative Fault. Vol. 45, No. 2.

Pinto, C. A., & Talley, W. K. (2006). The security incident cycle of ports. Maritime Economics

& Logistics, 8(3), 267-286. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100159

Steinmetz, T. (2011). Mitigating the exploitation of U.S. borders by jihadists and criminal

organizations. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(3), 29-48. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3

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maritime supply chains against WMD transfer and measuring subsequent WMD risk reduction. Homeland Security Affairs, Xi Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1728289850?accountid=13713

Walters, J., Feb, L. D., Dougherty, M., Grace Elletson Feb, & Kit Norton Feb. (2019, June 23).

Haviland Smith: The challenges of the Middle East. Retrieved February 8, 2020, from https://vtdigger.org/2019/06/23/haviland-smith-the-challenges-of-the-middle-east/

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the united states and europe (Order No. 1531100). Available from Political Science Database. (1268401312). Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1268401312?accountid=13713

Zoubir, Bouzerzour (2014). Jihad as a source of terrorism a reality or propaganda. The Politics

and Religion Journal 8 (1):93-114.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-45903314

https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Mar/FY-2016-CBP-PAR-

508C.pdf

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/20/success/profit-sharing-delta/index.html

http://www.thebowenlawgroup.com/blog/the-most-challenging-security-issues-facing-the-port-

of-savannah

https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2018

Bergen, Peter L. 2019 September 11 attacks Encyclopædia Britannica, inc.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk -45903314