Twenty Years of European Business Ethics

– Past Developments and Future Concerns Luc van Liedekerke

Wim Dubbink

ABSTRACT. Over the past 20 years business ethics in

Europe witnessed a remarkable growth. Today business

ethics is faced with two challenges. The first comes from

the social sciences and consultants who have both

reclaimed the topics of business ethics, regretfully often at

the loss of the proper ethical perspective. The second

comes from the remarkable rise of corporate social

responsibility which has pushed aside the mainstream

business ethics methodology with its emphasis on moral

deliberation by the individual. These challenges can be

tackled by an institutional transformation in business

ethics that links up to the long-standing European tradi-

tion of institutional analysis of the market. The second

remedy is an enlargement of the research agenda in

business ethics by coming closer to other parts of applied

ethics where the business ethics view is at this moment

grossly neglected.

KEY WORDS: business ethics, corporate social respon-

sibility, Europe

From Europe to America and back:

the invention of business ethics

Both the greatest critics and the greatest advocates of

the free market often point out that the ‘‘moral

viewpoint in business’’ is an oxymoron. Morality does

not, should not or cannot have any business in busi-

ness because man is greedy beyond redeem or because

systemic pressure is relentless. Only strong (govern-

ment) regulation can and should curtail business in

order to safeguard our fundamental rights. Any

business ethicist, who was confronted with this type

of remarks, knows how to rebut these comments as a

mantra learned by heart. Even if man has fundamental

rights, these rights do not overrule morality, but

presuppose it. And if the last 50 years have given us

any macro-sociological truth, it is that ‘the state’ or

‘the system’ is not going to save us – at least not

without humans helping them and helping them-

selves. What is more, systemic power is not com-

pletely beyond societal control and not so relentless

that the actor perspective becomes completely trivial,

as man cannot be reduced to greediness, even if self-

interest can become at times quite dominant.

As much as business can never do without ethics,

‘‘business ethics’’ as an academic discipline is a rare

breed. It is in a sense surprising that it could develop

in Europe at all (van Luijk, 2006, p. 7). In the 60s and

70s many people were quite critical of ‘‘the corporate

interest’’ and the ‘‘profit motive’’ as such. Societal

problems such as pollution, structural poverty and

over-consumption were squarely blamed on business

but ‘‘business ethics’’ was not seen as part of the

solution by these critics. On the contrary, it was

perceived as a cover up meant to lure the public into

believing that the market and the businessman could

add something positive to society. Conversely,

business people were themselves quite suspicious of

this new breed of ‘‘business ethicists’’. What did these

academics know about practice, anyway? And, was

there any difference between them and the critics

who blamed the businessman for all the problems of

the world? But perhaps the most destructive scepti-

cism and hard opposition came from colleagues in

fundamental philosophy in the philosophy depart-

ment. For them, the core of ethics lay in meta-ethical

issues. Practice was irrelevant. Many of them lacked

the faculty of being open-minded about applied

ethics in the first place and so could only experience

downright hostility towards business ethics. Because

of its relation with money, it was the worst form in

which applied ethics could materialise. Business

ethics was – and for many of them still is – misguided,

trivial and superficial at best. The only reason to

tolerate it in the department is the promise it holds of

Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 82:273–280 � Springer 2008 DOI 10.1007/s10551-008-9886-x

some money-making project that could save the

departmental budget, next to the fact that – regret-

fully – too many students are interested in it. Add to

this the rising tide of liberalism in the 80s, the

apparent triumph of the free market in the 90s and

the overall rise of ethical relativism and you find

yourself in a quite hostile surrounding for business

ethics as an academic discipline.

And, yet the take off of business ethics as an

academic discipline came remarkably fast. The

development of EBEN over the past 20 years is

testimony to this. Started out in 1987 with a small

group of academics, it turned into an organisation

with 1200 members spread out over 40 countries

and the growth is clearly not finished. But will there

still be business ethics in Europe in – say – another

20 years? If the question simply is whether there will

be moral reflection on the free market economy, the

answer can only be affirmative. Ever since its rise in

Europe in the late Middle Ages, the free market has

elicited or even commanded moral reflection.

Medieval monks criticised the imperfectness and

injustice of the markets of their times and the im-

moral consequences thereof (Tawney, 1926/1979).

In later centuries there were others, such as Simonde

de Sismondi, Heinrich Pesch, Oswald von Nell

Breunung and of course, John Stuart Mill and Karl

Marx. All of them reflected on and often criticised

the profit motive as such, certain abuses of the sys-

tem and the system itself. It seems safe to assume that

these reflections and criticisms will continue to arise

in the future. The basic reason is that the concept of

a free market is often at odds with some deep-seated

moral intuitions and considerations. The profit

motive itself stands in need of an explanation,

especially if it ousts other concerns, motives and

reasons. What is more, particular aspects or conse-

quences of the market will always need an expla-

nation (and/or political repair), for example the

environmental degradation that is associated with it,

the inequality that it gives rise to or the sometimes

problematic effect on man’s moral development

(Mill, 1848).

Europe’s rich historical tradition on market-

reflection reached America and its many business

schools where it was eagerly taken over before

transforming itself during the 70s into what we now

know as business ethics. The early business ethicists

clearly wanted something more practical, closer to

the firm and closer to the businessperson. This had

an immediate appeal not only to students but also

outside of the faculties. Part of their success

undoubtedly was that they asked new questions and

put forward a new theoretical framework. The

typical question raised by the American academic

was whether a specified actor in a given context

morally could or could not do a particular act.

The theoretical frame of the pioneer American

business ethicists focused on the micro-level in

which concrete individuals are caught up in choice

situations. The method was case based in order to

make students feel close to the real thing. The

dominant view was that individuals are the primary

locus of both (moral) responsibility and the principal

motor behind processes of societal change. Good-

paster’s (2007) recent and highly praised Conscience

and Corporate Culture is a contribution to business

ethics, exemplary of this American tradition. Inter-

estingly, the book opens with the almost Marxist

claim that ‘‘capitalism is in crisis’’ (Goodpaster, 2007,

p. 5). But instead of fixating on the many structural

factors causing this crisis, it forcefully puts the indi-

vidual in the centre of moral discourse. According to

Goodpaster capitalism is in crisis because it suffers

from ‘‘teleopathy’’. Teleopathy is an illness that

typically befalls on individuals and consists in an

unbalanced pursuit of ends. In the business context

this often means a fixation on profit maximisation by

the individual. Curing capitalism from this illness

first and foremost calls for moral leadership, i.e.

action by (special) individuals.

When American business ethics reached Europe

in the 80s the action-oriented and case-based

structure was – and to a certain extent still is – a

relief. It showed and articulated the fact that (the

quality of) human actions and human decisions in

the market do matter. During the 1960s and 70s the

normative study of the market was still dominated by

an institutional analysis in which Marxist thinking

loomed large. The Marxist analysis shared with

Goodpaster the idea that ‘‘capitalism is in crisis’’ but

Marxism did not relate this crisis to the actions of

individuals. In terms of its underlying framework, it

fully concentrated on the system level. That pro-

vided fascinating analytical insights as to how human

conduct is structured by institutional forces. But it

allowed for little practical prescriptions at actor level

at all. Politics – radical politics – was the only way to

274 Luc van Liedekerke and Wim Dubbink

change anything in the market. The institutional

analysis still inspires many continental philosophers

today. Hidden under the flagship ‘globalisation’

comes an analysis in which markets are essentially

beyond control and individuals the victims of an

unremitting system that pushes the lives of millions

into consumption disaster. Looked upon from this

point of view American business ethics is a relief; it

saves the individual and places morality in the

limelight once again. Virtues matter, duty is real,

care is not superfluous. It is the ideal cure for an

institutional analysis that trivialised the individual.

But despite the success of Goodpasters book not

all is well with this classical form of business ethics.

At least two challenges need to be mentioned. The

first one is a clear professionalisation of business

ethics. The issues that were raised by business ethi-

cists were gradually taken up by social sciences. We

need only take a look at the content of this journal;

over the past years the philosophical contributions

have clearly been marginalised by their more

empirical counterparts. In a sense we can only hail

this development; it is clear that developing, e.g. a

proper psychological theory about what drives

people into bribery – a theory that can be experi-

mentally tested – will in the end give us much more

insight into the problem of corruption then any

philosophical reflection will ever do. The profes-

sionalisation of business ethics along academic lines,

and from another angle along consulting lines has

enlarged the range of business ethics and raised its

public as well as scientific status. But the philosopher

is left standing at the sideline. Like so many times

before in the long history of philosophy, philoso-

phers started the research field but the subjects at

hand are gradually taken over by their colleagues in

the business faculties and social science department.

One should not mourn this development too much,

as indicated above it is a natural development,

indicating that the field is maturing. The only danger

that needs to be mentioned is a marginalisation of

the normative stance. Consultants know very well

that customers do not like to be lectured in a nor-

mative way and science clearly presupposes neu-

trality, not condemnation. However, a quick

consultation of the newspapers teaches us that the

normative issues are today as burning as ever. The

ethicist has a duty to continue to speak out, science

can deepen our judgement, consultants help us

translate it into a message that can be understood by

business but it is clear that one should keep talking

about duty, virtue, justice and care. The normative

approach that started the field of business ethics in

the first place remains essential to the discipline.

CSR in Europe

A second challenge to mainstream business ethics is

the rise of ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ (CSR) as a

dominant discourse partly ousting and partly replac-

ing business ethics. It is probably fair to say that the

sudden rise and persistence of CSR as a discourse on

corporate morality has taken many business ethicists

certainly in Europe by surprise. At the start one was

inclined either not to take CSR serious or to dismiss it

as an American fad that would soon disappear and

could never gain ground on the European continent.

The sceptics were proven wrong. By now CSR re-

search is a prominent topic in the field of business

ethics and paradoxically enough seems to flourish

even better in Europe than in the US. We will give

some tentative explanation for this hereafter.

The history of corporate social responsibility goes

back at least as long as the history of business ethics,

but it is only recently that corporate social respon-

sibility was turned into the popular CSR label. 1

CSR is visibly a cluster concept overlapping with

such diverse notions as business ethics, corporate

responsibility, corporate citizenship, sustainability,

environmental responsibility and corporate philan-

thropy. Like business ethics the CSR movement

clearly originated from the Anglo-Saxon world with

Continental Europe and Japan following much la-

ter. 2

According to Matten and Moon (2004) there is

a natural explanation for this. With its liberal tradi-

tion of self-help, individualism, strong markets and

limited or indirect government there is a larger scope

for discretionary action by companies in the US than

in Europe. European countries with their much

more heavy handed regulatory structures limit the

voluntary action field of companies. In order to

capture this institutional difference Matten and

Moon introduce the by now quite common dis-

tinction between implicit and explicit CSR. Explicit

CSR describes the American practice, implicit CSR

the European. This explanation also seems to suggest

that American companies should be the natural

Twenty Years of European Business Ethics 275

leaders when it comes to explicit, voluntary CSR

action, with Europe and the rest of the world lagging

behind. However, as we indicate below this is far

from evident.

Empirical research on this matter is scant and

seems at first sight to confirm the idea of American

dominance in CSR. Maignan and Ralston (2002)

find that 53% of American companies mention CSR

explicitly on their website, while only 29% of the

French and 25% of the Dutch do. In a US–UK

comparison Brammer and Pavelin (2005) found that

the value of corporate community contributions (a

long-standing area of CSR) was more than 10 times

greater in the US than in the UK. The figures would

be even more startling if one would compare the US

to continental Europe. In this issue Sotorrı́o and

Fernández Sanchez (2008) seem to confirm this

observation when they report higher scores for

American companies in five of the 12 indicators for

community responsibility.

However, these data are flatly denied by a number

of other observations. Studies looking at companies’

sustainability reporting consistently find that

reporting rates are highest in Europe, followed by

Japan, and with the US showing the lowest rates of

reporting among comparable companies (Kolk,

2003, 2006; KPMG, 2005; Welford, 2005). Kolk’s

most recent study shows that 90% of European

companies in the Fortune Global 250 publish sus-

tainability reports, followed by 83% of Japanese

companies, as contrasted with 35% of American

companies. Kolk suggests that this dramatic differ-

ential between Europe and the US reflects European

leadership in CSR (Kolk, 2006: 6). There might be

an alternative explanation – also recognised by Kolk

– American disclosure patterns and lack of verifica-

tion may reflect the greater concern with litigation

in the United States, and the difficulties of a purely

voluntary approach to expanded sustainability dis-

closure in such a context. In Europe by contrast

more and more governments require some form of

social and environmental reporting, albeit without

being specific about the format. But then again, the

fact that Europe requires some aspects of sustain-

ability reporting can also be understood as evidence

of its leadership on CSR.

Differences also emerge in external verification of

sustainability reports, with 45% of European reports

being externally verified, as contrasted with 24% of

Japanese reports and 3% of American reports (Kolk,

2006, Table 3). Here again the differences are

astonishing. Kolk’s impression that Europeans lead

the CSR movement is corroborated by Welford

(2005) who states that in general CSR is more active

in (Middle and Northern) Europe than in the Uni-

ted States or Canada. Accountability’s National

Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI) puts

European countries systematically at the top of its

ranking and in this issue this opinion is further

supported by Sotorrı́o and Fernández Sanchez

(2008). In their study European companies score

systematically better for all indicators of responsi-

bility to customers and employees and on all but one

indicator for environmental responsibility. American

companies can in the end only point towards phi-

lanthropy as the field in which they clearly take the

lead. 3

At first sight this seems a counterintuitive result.

European companies living in highly regulated

countries where CSR is a relatively recent phe-

nomenon take up CSR much more easily and in

bigger numbers than their American counterparts.

What is going on?

The answer takes us back to the institutional

tradition in Europe, mentioned above. The societal

role of the economy and business in particular has

always been an important topic in the European

intellectual tradition. From the start the political role

of the corporation was never reduced to its eco-

nomic responsibility. That corporations posses obli-

gations outside the law could only be considered a

novelty in an American tradition characterised by

individualism and a large scope for discretionary

actions. In Europe, by contrast the societal respon-

sibilities of corporations were deemed so important

that we developed an extensive legal framework

around the corporation in order to make sure that

these responsibilities were taken serious. No room

for Friedman type liberalism in this world. The CSR

movement simply steps into this long tradition. It is

in this sense not surprising that the notion ‘corporate

citizenship’ as one way to understand CSR is so

popular in German-speaking countries, as it comes

close to the long tradition of institutional reflection

on the democratic role of corporations. Finally, it is

important to realise that for the larger part of

(Western) Europe it holds that this tradition is

understood not only by academics, but also by

276 Luc van Liedekerke and Wim Dubbink

consumers, investors and business people alike.

What Matten and Moon describe as implicit CSR is

in the end a generalised, culturally entrenched

concern with the societal responsibilities of business

which justifies the CSR efforts of the European

Commission and fuels the European CSR move-

ment fast forward.

Again this is a development we should rather

applaud. It brings many issues that are central to

business ethics closer to politics and the general

public. However, from the side of business ethics a

sceptical attitude towards CSR has always been

present. The criticism goes many ways but one

important point is that CSR seems to suggest that

the ethical responsibilities of the corporation are

situated outside its proper economic activities; it is

an extra coming on top of its core business. This

goes flatly against for instance a strategic stakeholder

model that places the ethical responsibilities of

companies inside the core business. Recently, the

interpretation of CSR has moved into a strategic

direction bringing CSR much closer to the core

activities, but even this Drucker style CSR has in-

vited serious criticism from business ethics. This

strategic form of CSR is exposed as a pure instru-

mentalisation of ethics, something that is generally

condemned by ethicists as spelling the dead of ethics.

While this criticism of CSR is certainly warranted

and needed, we believe that the CSR movement

basically invites business ethics to look for a way to

integrate the CSR idea within business ethics. The

answer can only come from a reconsideration of the

institutional dimension in business ethics.

The institutional transformation

of business ethics

Upon its introduction in Europe the action-oriented

and case-based structure of American business ethics

was certainly a relief but the approach has its one-

sidedness and limitations as well, especially in a

European context. European culture believes in

institutions more than it believes in free acting

individuals as motor of social change. It does not

believe that an individual can structurally act and

accomplish things if she acts against institutional

logic. In the market context this institutional logic is

determined by market forces and geared towards

individual profit maximisation. Besides, it will also

deny the moral reasonableness of actions that go

against this logic. It is overdemanding for the indi-

vidual concerned and its efficacy will necessary be

low. European culture is also state minded, in the

sense that there is a strong belief that some questions

are by their nature collective and thus cannot be

solved outside of the state (which is not the same as

to say that collective issues can only and exclusively

be handled by the state).

The institutional ‘‘hang up’’ of Europe means that

business ethics as an academic discipline will not be

taken serious as long as it simply copies the indi-

vidualist American framework. It will not be taken

serious by the ‘‘realist’’ public, NGOs, unions and

other stakeholders of corporations. They will ques-

tion the reach of individualist market morality in the

face of competitive forces. It will also not be taken

serious by European academics, experienced as they

are in the theories of Althusser, Habermas and

Luhmann. It will not even be taken serious by

European businesspeople who are quick to point out

that anything is possible in the market context, as

long as there is a ‘‘level playing field’’.

This implies that business ethics in Europe can

only be able to celebrate its 40th birthday if it goes

through an institutional transformation. The

founding fathers of European business ethics, such as

Horst Steinmann in Germany, Peter Ulrich in

Switzerland and Henk van Luijk in the Netherlands

already were well aware of this. They also have made

a significant start with this transformation and are still

working on it. Nevertheless, as we see it, the insti-

tutional transformation is not yet sufficiently carried

through. It is not only that too often business ethics

still simply ignores the institutional dimension. More

importantly, there does not seem to be a theory on

the market that is able to combine the institutional

dimension and the actor dimension. Such a theory

should be able to map the institutional constraints

facing actors in the market context but still be able to

describe and explain the actor perspective in a

morally appealing way.

As we see it, the institutional transformation in

business ethics must take shape at three levels. It

should provide us with a political theory of the

market, thus explaining why business ethics is

important in a liberal free market, normatively

speaking. It should also position business ethics given

Twenty Years of European Business Ethics 277

a macro-sociological account of the market system

and – last but not least – it should position business

ethics at the meso-sociological level of the corpo-

ration. With regard to this last level one of the most

interesting questions for the coming years will be:

what can and must we morally require of the insti-

tutional design of the corporation in view of our

knowledge of common pattern of human behav-

iour? We are the first to admit that with regard to all

these three levels important developments have al-

ready been started. With regard to the first two levels

we can for example think of the work of Peter

Ulrich (1997) and, interestingly, with regard to the

last level we can think of the work of the Americans

Trevino and Weaver (2003). Still, as we see it, the

work of Ulrich must cope with the criticism that it is

either too radical (and thus rejects the free market

system as such) or too optimistically naı̈ve. With

regard to the meso-level an adequate and unified

theory of institutional design is still missing.

Broadening the issues

The search for a grander, more unified theory with

an important institutional dimension is one concern

for the future of business ethics. A second concern

which we would like to point out is a relative lack of

new research programmes and new research ques-

tions in business ethics. Business ethics arose in the

wake of particular moral issues. If one skims through

a standard business ethics handbook, one quickly

gets an impression of these core issues: discrimina-

tion, sexual harassment, bribery, equal treatment of

employees, advertisement, occupational health and

safety, unjust dismissal, financial issues and pollution.

These issues were important and crucial in the last

20 years and they will undoubtedly stay important.

However, if business ethics wants to prove its rele-

vance in the next 20 years in Europe, new themes

need to be addressed. Consider for instance issues

related to the treatment of animals, technological

development or medical concerns. To be sure, the

moral dimension of all these important themes is not

completely unexplored in today’s applied ethics.

There is animal ethics, technological ethics, medical

ethics and bioethics. But it often looks as if the fields

of applied ethics are drifting apart without too much

overlap or synergy. This is not very helpful. We

need only point out that free markets play an

essential part in all these problems. There are specific

commercial aspects to medical or animal rights issues,

aspects that are often not well articulated. It is for

instance not unimportant that most animals are

domesticated in a commercial setting. Medical or-

ganisations such as hospitals are also commercial

organisations and if not outright so financial con-

cerns are increasingly relevant to them. New tech-

nologies such as genetically modified crops or

genetically modified medicines are developed by

commercial companies. Business ethicists must gain

expertise in these fields and bring their expertise on

free market morality to these research areas, thus

contributing and joining new research fields that will

undoubtedly be very important in the future. Thus,

paraphrasing Chris MacDonalds (2004) there is not

only a need for a ‘‘business ethics 101’’ in many

fields; there is also a need for many ‘‘101 courses’’ for

business ethicists.

Business ethics needs to explore new themes if it

wants to show its relevance in the next 20 years and

it needs to explore them in new ways. With regard

to many contemporary moral issues it is rather

uninteresting to analyse them only as choice situa-

tions of particular individuals who are confronted

with a hard choice. In our technology-driven world

the real moral choices are made in the process in

which a particular technology was shaped. If agri-

cultural technology forces farmers to house their pigs

so crammed that they pre-emptively have to cut of

their tails, then it is hardly an interesting question

whether it is morally permissible to do so. The

crucial morally relevant question then becomes: ‘‘do

I want to be a farmer?’’ Since, if you choose to be

farmer, you have to play along. 4

The point is that the

moral issues have to be dealt with in a very early

stage. Any technology embodies moral choice.

Complex modern technology hardly leaves less and

less discretion to its user (Swierstra, 2006). Conse-

quently, the moral issues interwoven with specific

technologies must be dealt with while these tech-

nologies are being developed. Business ethics will

need to pick up specific insights from technological

ethics, animal ethics, bioethics, etc. At the same time

these sister research areas in applied ethics should

open up much more to the economic dimension of

their research field leaving the possibility for business

ethicists to contribute to their field in an important

278 Luc van Liedekerke and Wim Dubbink

way. This would create real synergy and make

business ethics relevant for many different domains.

Conclusion

This special issue connected to the twentieth anni-

versary of EBEN and focusing on the European

dimension in business ethics seemed like an ideal

opportunity for a short reflection on the past and

future of business ethics in Europe. The past 20 years

have witnessed a tremendous growth in the field of

business ethics in Europe, yet the mainstream

philosophical approach that reached Europe through

the US has in many respects been marginalised. Its

topics (e.g. diversity, bribery, marketing) were taken

over by social scholars and consultants alike. Trivi-

alisation of the normative stance that stood at the

centre of mainstream business ethics was the un-

happy result of this evolution. Mainstream business

ethics was also challenged by the rise of the CSR

movement where the classical business ethics

method focusing on the individual in a moral choice

situation seemed to lose its relevance. If the next

20 years want to be as fruitful as the previous,

business ethics will need to come up with an answer.

Two developments seem crucial in this respect. The

first is the ‘‘institutional transformation’’ of business

ethics. Grand theory, gladly left behind by American

business ethics, should stand another chance. It needs

to come up with an integrated theory that provides

us with a normative theory of the free market that

gives an adequate explanation from the institutional

side for the importance of business ethics. Combine

this with a meso-theory of the organisation which

shows us what a moral organisation needs to look

like and integrate in this the role of an autonomous

individual that can make a moral choice. The second

development in business ethics that so far has failed

to materialise is a broadening of the issues involved

and knitting in with other fields in applied ethics.

Environmental ethics, bioethics, technological eth-

ics, food ethics all raise issues with a strong economic

dimension. Business ethics should take up the chal-

lenge and get acquainted with these fields while at

the same time bringing in the proper business ethics

view. This could jumpstart a completely new branch

of business ethics. If we take these challenges serious

we might be up for another interesting 20 years of

business ethics in Europe.

Notes

1 With seminal contributions by Bowen (1953), Eels

and Walton (1961) and MacGuire (1963) one could ar-

gue that the history of CSR reaches even further back

then the history of business ethics. 2

The real breakthrough for Europe situates itself only

at the end of the 90s and for the rest of the world a

breakthrough is still far away. 3

One should probably also add the domain of corpo-

rate governance. But this is a tricky issue almost as tricky

as the CSR question itself precisely because of the many

existing interpretations of corporate governance. 4

Of course: this is not to say that farmers are just vic-

tims. There are many ways ‘‘to play along’’. One can

play and ignore the animal welfare issues involved. One

can even play along and actively fight any attempt to

change things, even at a collective level. But one can

also play along and be open and involved about the

consequences of the ‘‘objectification’’ of non-human

life in contemporary society.

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Luc van Liedekerke

KULeuven, Center for Economics and Ethics,

Naamse straat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium

E-mail: [email protected]

Wim Dubbink

Tilburg University,

Dante Building, Room D-248, P.O. Box 90153,

5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

E-mail: [email protected]

280 Luc van Liedekerke and Wim Dubbink

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa:

What Ethical Orientation? The Case

of East and Central Africa Christine Wanjiru Gichure

ABSTRACT. This paper starts off from what seems to be

a difficulty of ethics in African Business today. For several

years now Transparency International has placed some

African countries high on its list of most corrupt countries

of the world. The conclusion one draws from this

assessment is that either African culture has no regard or

concern for ethics, or that there has been a gradual loss of

the concept of the ethical and the moral in contemporary

African society. Equally problematic is the teaching and

promotion of Business ethics in organizations. Western

philosophical theories and systems alone have not suc-

ceeded in providing access to ethical life of people in

modern Africa. This paper is an attempt to inject an

orientation that takes into account African manners and

customs, their religious convictions and their under-

standing of the world as a whole, in the teaching of

Business Ethics. East and Central Africa have been se-

lected due to their common lingua franca, Kiswahili, and

the fact that the author has more teaching experience

within that region.

KEY WORDS: Ethics, East Africa, cultural transition,

morality, use of proverbs in teaching ethics.

Traditional African business and ethical

values

This paper starts off from what seems to be a diffi-

culty of ethics in African Business today. For several

years now Transparency International has placed

some African countries high on its list of most cor-

rupt countries of the world. The conclusion one

draws from this assessment is that either African

culture has no regard or concern for ethics, or that

there has been a gradual loss of the concept of the

ethical and the moral in contemporary African

society. This latter has been the most accepted the-

ory which, further more, suggests that this loss of the

ethical is particularly noticeable within the family

and in the exercise of public office (Dalfovo, 1992).

African scholars view this decline as underlying

most of the contemporary problems of the conti-

nent. Efforts to explain the root cause of this decline

in moral consciousness, especially with relation to

economic matters, have been abundant. Some the-

orists point to the process of social transformation

that occurred in Africa through the contact of

African cultures with external cultures, principally

the European and Asia over the last 150 years

(Kigongo, 1992). The result of that transformation,

they argue, automatically relegated the African

people to a state of poverty because there was no

Christine Wanjiru Gichure, born in Limuru, Kenya did her

undergraduate studies at the University of Nairobi before

moving on to the University of Navarre for her MA degree.

After several years teaching history and social ethics at sec-

ondary school Gichure embarked on her doctoral degree work

obtaining her PhD in 1993 at the University of Naverre.

Thereafter she moved on to tertiary education. She taught

philosophy briefly at the University of Nairobi before moving

on to the Kenyatta University where she now teaches philo-

sophy and Business Ethics. She is the author of two ethics

books: Basic Concept in Ethics by Focus Publications,

Nairobi, (1997) and Ética de la profesión docente. Es-

tudio Introductoria a la deontologı́a de la educatión, by

EUNSA-EIUNSA, Spain (1995 & 1999). She has sev-

eral published articles on business ethics, philosophy of action,

and philosophy of education in local and international jour-

nals. Between 2003 and 2004 she was a Senior Fulbright

Scholar at the Jepson school of Leadership studies of the

University of Richmond, Virginia, U.S.A. Gichure is ac-

tively involved in the promotion of business ethics and lea-

dership studies. In early 2005 business ethics was included as

a core unit in an MBA program in Kenya for the first time.

Journal of Business Ethics (2006) 63: 39–52 � Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s10551-005-1129-9

match between the new types of goods and lifestyles,

which the new cultures introduced and exhibited

and which most African people could not afford to

buy, and the simple goods which African people

traditionally possessed and used. Added to this

imbalance were the effects of colonialism on the

African people in some countries, such as the loss of

their ancestral lands – most of it prime farming land –

thereby losing their traditional means of economic

self-support, their simple but acceptable standard of

living, and with it their traditional social status.

With colonialism, Africa on one hand, emerged

from her traditional past and its subsistence economy

and entered suddenly, into a modern era, a new

social and economic organisation, and new eco-

nomic values to go with it. On the other hand,

colonialism was loath to provide the education and

skills needed to sustain this new economic organi-

sation to the bulk of the African people. During the

colonial period African people were used as the

farmhands or manual labourers in the new estab-

lishments, including homes, earning just a pittance

with which to pay the compulsory poll tax. Hardly

was an African ever part of any corporate manage-

ment. Thus, it has been argued that many post

independence problems in Africa, derive from the

time when she was rapidly incorporated into a world

‘‘economic system that obliged it to produce goods

it did not consume and to consume goods it did not

produce’’ (Baker, 1997, p. 69). After independence,

the economic consequences of those factors started

to reverberate. Africa was trapped by its own history;

a history largely shaped by external forces: without

sufficient knowledge or the capital with which to

manage and develop her new economic and political

set up, she remained a dependent continent, long

after the various countries gained their independence

from Europe, often in the form of donor aid.

Genesis of the ethical problems

The evolution of the ethical problems in modern

Africa can be explained within a paradigm on hun-

ger. If a person from any cultural background is

starved for a very long time, and then all of a sudden,

a lot of food is placed before him, that person can

adopt one of two kinds of reactions: either to simply

eat what food is placed before him as his share and, if

necessary, share it with other equally hungry persons;

or he may instead decide not just to take what is his

but to grab and hoard as much of that food as he can

so that she or he may never need to experience

starvation again, at least not for a long time. The

first reaction is in line with ‘‘the golden rule of

morality’’. The latter is in keeping with Hobbes

theory of self-interest, of the ‘‘man in the state of

nature’’ (Leviathan) and the modern theory of

Ethical Egoism.

Hunger here represents African peoples’ difficult

past. Her many problems which are well docu-

mented, range from climate and endemic diseases

such as malaria, to a history of displacement of

peoples especially through the 19th Century slave

trading. The gross effects of colonial rule in various

parts of the continent such as the Congo and Kenya

are still surfacing. Carol Elkin’s recent book on

Kenya is a wonderful eye opener on the matter. If

one applies the paradigm of hunger to Africa’s sit-

uation it should not be difficult to understand why

there has been a growing tendency for people who

assume public office, or find themselves in positions

which expose them to a lot of public money, to fall

into the temptation of corruption, without much

concern for the ethical significance of their actions

with regard to the whole society.

Ethical judgements in any community derive from

the ethical framework from which that community

and the individuals work. For that reason the question

of ‘‘moral value’’ has been central in all debates on

ethical issues touching on any aspect of life; private or

public. Within those debates the question of any

intrinsic and objective ethical value of actions in dif-

ferent situations remains largely unresolved. It is the

case then that when, for instance, someone says that a

person has acted well: honourably or morally, such a

judgment is made from within a framework of valuing

actions. Similarly, when someone makes an appraisal

of an action he or she does so from the conviction that,

that kind of action is praiseworthy, morally satisfactory

and an honourable thing to do. Consequently, for

somebody in similar circumstances not to act that way

would be considered to be inadequate, dishonourable,

and even scandalous conduct. When we apply this

reasoning to the African context and its history, and

then look at the framework from which praiseworthy

actions were traditionally made, it becomes easier to

understand the confusion which the cultural trans-

40 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

formation has brought to the ethical arena of African

affairs.

Like in the Greek epic stories, the model or gal-

lant in African stories was the warrior. In public life

the warrior was a candidate for fame because to excel

in that status required courage and a readiness to

hazard his own tranquillity, his life even, for the

community. He did that mostly for the sake of

honour. Honour was the mark of a real man, a mark

too, of valour, such that men who could not take

such risks were held in contempt as being ‘‘wom-

anish’’. Working from this mental framework, ‘‘va-

lue’’ is related to valour, to prowess in battle, and to

physical and mental strength. Readings of what

happened in ancient cultures of other societies seem

to suggest that in this aspect traditional Africa cannot

have been alone. Hence, it is understandable why

the term ‘‘virtue’’ from ‘‘virtus’’ in Latin also means

strength. In the African ‘‘age-set’’, and warrior cul-

ture, the most coveted achievement was to become a

gallant; a highly esteemed and influential person. A

gallant acquired many friends who lavished him with

gifts, and that made him wealthy and powerful. He

reciprocated by granting their wishes. People who

needed the great man’s help in any way went to

express those wishes with gifts. The more important

the favour desired, the more valuable was the gift

offered. This was simply protocol.

Besides having been a famous warrior, the gallant

of African epic stories was also expected to have the

ability to get whatever would lead to greater glory of

his own ‘‘age-set’’. Stories of the lives of African

great men are replete with such achievements. These

stories, often told in the evenings by the fireside,

served to communicate valour values to children as

they grew up. Sometimes they would be told in an

indirect way where the message would be passed

through the analysis of the characteristics of some

animals. The story told would centre on what hap-

pened to those animals. Thus, the hyena’s short rear

feet and queer laughter has something to do with his

treacherous character. The crow’s white spot just

below the neck is because he was burnt trying to

swallow all the hot soup in one gulp; the tortoise’s

segmented shell has to do with a tremendous fall he

experienced once when, having climbed too high

too fast, a simple slip brought him down into pieces.

He never managed to become the animal he was

before even with all the efforts to stick the different

parts of his shell together again. And, just as

Machiavelli uses the fox and the lion, to portray

leadership types, African stories use the hare, the fox,

the lion and other admired animals to depict agility

of mind, intelligence, shrewdness, and wisdom. In

the chameleon too there is something one can learn:

its two eyes see simultaneously in two different

directions so that when one eye is looking forward,

the other sees what is happening behind. These are

qualities a leader should have in order to achieve his

goal. According to the moral of those stories a great

leader went as far as to imitate the cunning habits of

the more canny animals particularly the hare, which

was known for its ability to deceive the other ani-

mals and there by always ended with the booty.

With the advent of the new social polity, or the

nation-state, and Western consumerism but without

the advantage of any strong, economic control

mechanism to match it in traditional African busi-

ness, African values gradually started to get eroded.

The presence of vastly different types of material

goods, modern technology and all the comforts and

pleasures that money can buy simply overwhelmed

the original social and economic values. Nonethe-

less, since tradition is not something that just goes

away – nor do we want it to go away completely –

the profile of the gallant of the past is still admired

and many are the individuals who would want to see

themselves ‘‘gallants’’ of today. The quests of warrior

honours and the wealth are still rife. However, in the

new social set up the place for those achievements

has shifted from war to economics. Ironically, gal-

lantly, currently understood as the ability to lay

hands on modern goods as fast as possible, when

translated into the modern business setting produces

not heroes but fraudsters, bribers and cheats of all

kinds, far removed from the gallants of old (Gichure,

2000, p. 242).

Seen from this perspective, and given the histor-

ical background of the continent, it may make it

easier to understand why corruption is deeply en-

trenched in Africa. That does not, however, make it

right or excusable; and this for two reasons: first,

because today everyone in Africa knows quite well

that we no longer function entirely within the

warrior hero framework. Secondly, today many

more people have had the opportunity for education

than 40–45 years ago when African countries started

attaining independence from European rule.

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa 41

By 2005 ethics in business remains problematic.

Equally problematic is the teaching and promotion

of Business ethics in organizations. To begin with

the invocation of Western ethical theories such as

egoism, utilitarianism or even duty based ethics has

often been futile. These theories and their methods

are easily discarded as being only workable within

the affluent Western society which is seen to be

individualistic in nature. In Africa, where nine out of

ten people live on less that $10 a day (purchasing

power-terms) while more than two thirds of its

population survives on less than $1 a day (World

Bank, UNDP Report 2002), talking ethics is held in

contempt. Many people who know quite well that

certain actions are unethical will, nevertheless, argue

that, at the end of the day it is money, and not ethics,

that will put some Ugali 1

on the table.

Traditional African business

At this stage of this paper it may help to ask: how did

traditional Africa transact business? Historical ac-

counts of traditional African activities show that

Africa was not used to a cash economy. Hence, it did

not need banks or any monetary investments. It

hardly ever made large exports. The author of the

Periplus of the Erythreian Sea 2

gives an account of

business transactions of the area around the Red Sea,

the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian

Ocean, from the western shores of India to the east

coast of Africa during the 1st Century A.D. (Reader,

1998, p. 202), in which he shows African trade with

the outside world to have been minimal. Where it

existed it offered items such as ivory, rhinoceros

horn, tortoise shell, and a little nautilus shell.

However accounts of a later period show that large

animals and even a giraffe were exported to as far

away as China (Reader, 1998, p. 204).

By the 19th Century, during what went by the

name ‘‘legitimate trade’’, to imply a replacement of

the transatlantic slave trade which had gone on for

close to 300 years, was, in a way, a new form of

human exploitation. African traders would be enticed

to take their gold, ivory, gum Arabic, timber and

foodstuffs to the coast and, by way of exchange re-

ceived liquor, cheap calico cotton, cheap metal,

beads, loads of guns and gunpowder. Historians have

shown that in a covert way the slave trade rather

increased than decreased during that period (David-

son, 1968; Reader, 1998; Were and Wilson, 1996).

During later centuries, exports from the East

African coast, now mostly in the hands of Omani

Arabs, were ivory, slaves and gold. In the interior

individuals and groups exchanged produce and ser-

vices directly among themselves, item for item: a

week’s labour for a share of the harvest; a goat for a

hoe, among others. Barter was still the principal

means of exchange. This barter trade was mostly

between local communities, and it dealt mainly in

essentials. However, some goods travelled across

Africa, from village to village. Local trade was part

and parcel of the social and food production systems

that evolved among communities. Farmers, herders,

fishermen, and smiths pursued their specialized

activity. Whether to do so at the exclusion of all

others depended absolutely upon the agreements of

exchange among the groups, and upon climatic

conditions such as the rains or drought. Among the

farmers, for example, there were those whose strat-

egy was to plant sufficient crops to enable them to

survive during the poorer years. If and when less

adept farmers failed to generate all they required

even during the rainy years, local barter systems

helped to balance the inequalities by making surplus

food available to those who had a deficit, either by

an exchange of goods or services, or in charitable

distributions, at harvest festivals or during ritual

ceremonies (Reader, 1998, pp. 263–264).

Needless to say, in traditional Africa, as in any

other ancient communities, the ideal society did not

exist. Avarice and greed, both common human de-

fects, existed. But on the whole studies show that

those imperfections and abuses were contained.

Factors such as the unpredictability of production,

and the continual need to barter for essential com-

modities, limited the chances of individuals or

groups accumulating wealth in a form and quantity

that would enable them to control the lives of

others. In addition, the collective authority of the

age-set or – age-group – reduced the possibility of

overreaching ambition. Local trade had the capacity

to reinforce both the integrity and interdependence

of groups. Goods and services were paid for

according to local custom and circulated within the

system. So long as there was no external drain on the

resources the communal and political order of

participating communities was secure.

42 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

In his study of African past, John Reader (1998,

pp. 267–269) has been able to establish that generally

local trade transactions took place within distances

which could be covered in one day by foot or by

donkey while allowing time to exchange goods and

return home. Beyond this radius it was necessary to

make special arrangements for the ‘‘safari’’, reallocate

work in the household, and sometimes hire people to

help with the load. For items that were not available

locally, it was necessary to make arrangements for

travel to get them, or for their delivery through a

relay network trade. Such items could be glass beads

and shells from distant shores which were invaluable

for the manufacture of trinkets. Other very valued

items were iron, copper and salt. Of salt, he says:

‘‘was such a precious commodity that its demands

were the first to break the barriers of self-sufficiency

in any community. It travelled long distances be-

tween source and consumer apparently exciting the

entrepreneurial ambitious individuals along the way.

Where there was wealth it was necessarily of a

kind and nature that could be seen by all. Such

possessions generally consisted of livestock, lands,

drums, certain trinkets, wives and children. An

individual’s prosperity was, therefore, a good for the

whole community. Consequently, there were few

chances, if any, for such practices as fraud and

embezzlements or conflicts of interest. Bribery may

have existed, but it is difficulty to prove it since gift

exchanges were, as we have seen, an essential part of

the social mores. The social pattern alone constituted

checks and balances for the amount of wealth a

family possessed.

Two factors which greatly shaped the social or-

der of most communities of Eastern and Central

Africa: the principle of precedence, or the fact of

having occupied a certain territory first, and the

age-set system. The principle of precedence re-

quired that communities which arrived at a certain

virgin territory first had primacy of authority over

other immigrant groups. The age-set system di-

vided all males into groups, each of which included

all individuals within a particular range of ages,

such as five, seven or fifteen years. Each age-grade

was allocated a standard set of social and political

duties. As individuals advanced in years they

changed duties until those surviving had progressed

through the complete set (Reader, 1998, pp. 264–

267).

The rites of passage through which individuals

were conveyed from one age-set to the next were

timed to occur simultaneously among groups over a

wide area, each group giving the event its own

distinctive character. Individuals with qualities of

leadership and astute judgement emerged in each

age-set. Occasionally, and at the behest of the age-

set, their talents were converted to power and

authority to be exercised with prior approval of the

age-set. Those individuals, who acted very effec-

tively on behalf of the community as they progressed

through the senior age-sets, achieved the status of

wise men whose judgements were universally

recognised and respected. These were the gallants

whose fame would be told and retold. There existed

great respect for the wisdom and judgements of the

oldest members in a set. Consequently, the age-

group system established gerontology as the domi-

nant form of political organization. Respect for the

elders and their way of doing things was the essence

of the principle. This principle automatically out-

lawed the vertical authority of family lines, and

sometimes transcended the divisive nature of ethnic

boundaries (Reader, 1998, p. 265).

Business, ethics, and social transformation

Many African languages do not have a word that can

be translated directly as ‘‘ethics’’. However, in nearly

all traditional activities there were those which, in

general, formed part of the non-material culture of

society, operating as the systemic grid for ensuring

that social life and practices were conducted along

socially acceptable patterns. Although unwritten,

those practices were understood and well respected

as the bedrock of social interaction including trade

transactions. For example, it was understood that

adherence to ethical behaviour in full view of the

wider public would elicit respect and honour

whereas failure to follow the society’s accepted

behaviour would render one to contempt and ridi-

cule or to some form of sanction, reprimand or

punishment, depending on the magnitude of the

offence. African communities therefore, were gov-

erned by well established codes of ethical behaviour

(Prah, 1993, pp. 58–72).

The contact of traditional Africa with external

cultures, and the process of social transformation that

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa 43

ensued thereafter, led to two crucial effects: first, the

emergence of a diversity in the manner of under-

standing what constitutes ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘evil’’,

‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’; secondly, the formation of the

nation-state brought in a new socio-polity foreign to

the African mindset. The nation-state is still an alien

concept in the practical lives of many African

people.

By contrast to traditional trade practices, con-

temporary economic activity in Africa is one laden

with multicultural values. On one hand, everyone

wants to have the possibility to have and enjoy

modern lifestyles. It would be more correct to say

that modern Africans lay a claim to two world views

and their proper ethos: from the West, Africa has

adopted some tenets of thinking based on the indi-

vidualistic principle of ‘‘self-interest’’. At the same

time most Africans would hate to disassociate

themselves completely from their roots and tradi-

tions; a culture which believes and teaches that the

real human values are found in the family, the clan,

and among ‘‘my people’’. So, in practice at least, the

world out there, the nation-state, national develop-

ment, and in fact anything ‘‘national’’ are simply

foreign, and unreal. The city is the place where one

goes to work in order to bring a better life for people

at ‘‘home’’. This is the mental framework from

which most business and its ethos are conceived.

So far, there does not exist a typically African

business model, and so long as it does not exist,

business will continue to be conducted within this

mixture of Western and African values. At the social

and ethical levels the African businessman finds

himself torn between these two worlds. He may be

doing business with, say an American person whose

culture is rooted in individualism and self- interest,

and who, nonetheless is meticulous regarding certain

ethical issues such as giving and receiving of gifts.

The African businessman on the other hand cares

more on how to cater, not only for his ever

expanding consumer needs, but also for the equally

ever insatiable expectations of the family and the

clan, and in some cases the entire village during

some big feasts. This is partly why corruption has

persisted.

Beyond the various instances given to show that

contemporary Africa has witnessed a gradual ethical

decline, scholars point to two related issues: the

weakening of the communal spirit and its ethos, and

with it an increasing tendency to individualism and

selfishness, product of human greed, and weakened

social control of such activities. ‘‘Traditional African

culture valued the communal dimension of life and

ethics as its strong and healthiest asset’’ says Dalfovo

(1992, p. 1.). Nevertheless, today one has to reckon

with a challenging and relentless influence of indi-

vidualism brought about by contemporary social

change emerging from different quarters: Western

education, greater human mobility and urbanization,

job competition, economic management and the

on- going process of acculturation. All these factors

are made even more intense by the present global-

ization which exposes the entire world to the indi-

vidualism that characterizes Western society and its

culture where it is widely believed that morality and

ethics can be viewed as two related but different

social concerns.

Added to this modern experience are certain

contradictions regarding morality and ethics. For

example, in the social and business context, African

people point out the fact that while the West accuses

Africa of ‘‘corruption’’ their own notion of ethics

and the ethical is lost on us as we observe some

Western practices. Often cited, by way of example,

are practices that violated the stability of the family

such as divorce, the disregard for the life of the most

vulnerable such as abortion, and euthanasia, and fi-

nally the ever increasing dissemination of porno-

graphic materials, and the like. The African mind has

yet to come to grips with the reason why it should

be a serious ethical problem to, for instance, flout a

copyright to intellectual property in the Cyberspace

by downloading and sharing books, articles, music,

or other publications when little or no importance is

given to the corrosive and sometimes pornographic

‘‘content’’ of those publications, music, or videos.

(See lecture by Donaldson, 2001). As a result con-

fusion arises as to what is more serious: matters

economic or matters that refer to human life and its

integrity?

Similar clashes of values have been pointed out

in other areas of human interaction. The experi-

ence of wars during the last two decades in parts of

Africa such as the Sudan, has led to similar hard-

ened approach regarding the intrinsic value of

some of the Western theories of ethics. It is asked:

where is ethics in selling arms to a faction of

people in a developing country, such as Sudan, to

44 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

fight people of the southern part of the same

country, and at the same time promote a World

Food Program for war victims of the ensuing civil

war? Of course, this is a difficult question, but the

case is that it is relevant.

What ethical orientation in teaching business

ethics?

Some African theorists have categorically affirmed

that ‘‘Western philosophical theories and systems

alone cannot provide us access to the ethical life of

people in Africa; we also need to study in detail their

manners and customs, their religious convictions,

and their understanding of the world as a whole.

Only after such an intensive study can one employ

Western categories such as truth/lie, freedom, con-

science (...) in judgements that do justice to the

African reality’’ (Bujo, 2001, p. 73). These include,

the understanding of the person and his reciprocal

relatedness and community to all others, including

the ancestors and God. Other scholars suggest that

‘‘an intelligible African business ethics should arise

from the African anthropological presuppositions

and the implicated core ethical values (Lotriet,

2003). Consequently some of us who teach business

ethics propose that an African focused business ethics

should include a component of African traditional

worldview and teaching model which takes into

account African humanism. Such a contribution, it is

hoped, can serve to initiate some form of ethical

mindset which, given the current world economic

trends, is necessary if Africa is not to be excluded

from the pool of world business ethics (Gichure,

2005).

African societies have always believed that a hu-

man being has and will always be a neighbour, a

person from whom you ‘‘can borrow salt’’. 3

For that

reason the norms, values and choices with which

freedom deals were believed to be inter-subjective.

In administering one’s freedom, the orientation of

the community was always taken into consideration

and consulted. It was always also the case that, that

administration and that administrative wisdom were

not something that a person attained all by himself.

Just as Aristotle taught that the principles of practical

reasonableness can only be usefully discussed with

experienced and mature people – because age is a

necessary, though not sufficient condition, for the

required wisdom and maturity – (Aristotle, N.E.

I1094b28-a122001a), traditional African wisdom

held that the young must be taught in order to

transmit to them the values and administrative wis-

dom of the ancestors. Traditional Education was the

vehicle used to perpetuate these traditions. It was the

tool by which young people got to discover their

potential as well as their internal and external limi-

tations. There were various methods used for this

orientation during a person’s life. Of these, the most

important were the communal educational exercises

carried out within one’s own age-set, particularly

during the different rites of passage: namely, the

initiation to adulthood or circumcision, the prepa-

ration for marriage and the begetting of children,

and the passage to senior elder status.

The disruption of this social and educational

pattern and the lack of its substitution with any non-

relativistic ethical model in the Western educational

system adopted during colonialism and retained

afterwards, left a moral vacuum which today creates

a difficult on how to inject ethics in the society. At

the academic teaching level a consequence of this

trend has been that graduates and young profes-

sionals leave the university, or Business School,

perhaps with the knowledge of many ethical theories

and cases studies which can be resolved using any of

those ethical theories, but without having formed a

clear picture of the kind of life which they, as

individual persons want to live. To many people,

ethics understood in the Western model, is seen to

be more a matter of culture and personal taste in life

where one can choose any ethical theory of action,

provided that the theory chosen can sufficiently

justify ones actions within one’s own culture.

What ethical orientation? The possible use of ‘‘orature’’

We have already established that contemporary

Africa is an amalgam of two worldviews that live side

by side. Hence, teachers of ethics, particularly in

Eastern and Central Africa, would benefit greatly

from the use of a model that combines the best

contributions to ethics from the classic traditions of

the two worldviews. The model envisioned here is

one which, while taking into account the African

traditional socio-ethos should still be able to transmit

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa 45

the Western tradition of Virtue. Such a model

should seek to synthesize the fundamental principles

of both worldviews and to identify the ultimate link

between their moral teachings.

Virtue ethic has been chosen because of it ability

to respond to the true nature of man as man in

whatever cultural environment one may happen to

have been born. In this attempt the model also

suggests making a parallelism of business ethics

programs, workshops, training sessions, together

with ethics retreats and seminars to modern business’

rites of passage, thus establishing a continuous plan of

induction courses geared toward the improvement

of ethical sensitiveness and practice in organizations.

There are many reasons to justify this option:

• First, Gyekye has (1996), already clearly shown that while many African persons today

easily adopt Western consumer behaviour

and lifestyles, these same people ideologically

feel a strong attachment to African cultural

values and thereby urge for their relevance

for the continuity of an African identity.

• Secondly, there are sufficient reasons to show that today Africa is entailed to modernity and

to the global village. Consequently, many

alien values have inevitably become relevant

to Africa because they address life as we now

live it. Thus, it is argued, reference to an

age-set system for the transmission of values

has become not only irrelevant but com-

pletely obsolete. This ‘thinking outside the

box’ is further supported by the consideration

of the reverence which we daily witness

regarding Western goods, Western forms of

business, Western education, Western fash-

ions, housing, transportation, all of which are

synonymous with Western civilization.

As regards the choice of virtue ethics several reasons

also come up to justify it above all other ethical

models.

• In the first place, virtue ethics has been tak- ing a strong hold in applied ethics since the

publication of After Virtue by Alasdair Mac-

Intyre (1984).

• Secondly, by focusing more on the individ- ual’s inner disposition rather than on the

group it is more likely to get people to

understand themselves as individuals who

are, for that reason, un-substitutable and un-

representable in their own decisions and

behaviour, rather than in losing themselves

in a communal ethos. If the responsibility of

each individual person is understood as part

of the person’s integral development, the

resultant social and corporate culture will be

defined in terms of the sum-total of personal

ethical integrity, accountability, trustworthi-

ness, transparency, and honesty, of all the

individuals who make up the society. This

translates to awareness of the common good.

The outcomes of this model should therefore

be greater corporate and individual moral

responsibility.

• Finally, virtue ethics has been preferred to others because its humanistic character is not

only attractive but also easy to accept.

Although virtue is elaborated on the basis of

the individual, this individual is never alone.

External goods such as friendship, divine

benevolence, and one’s disposition towards

others have an important role to play in the

definition of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’, and of

virtue. Hence, the African proverb ‘‘a person

becomes virtuous through the virtue of oth-

ers’’. It is virtue, not malice, that pleases the

ancestors, and God, not vice or greed.

The interiorization of ethical norms within an

African context can greatly benefit from using what

people, have always known to be ‘‘human good’’.

This knowledge is locked in many African Proverbs,

tales and adages. ‘‘The use of proverbs in combina-

tion with palaver and narratives belong properly to

the traditional African educational system. Palaver is

a form of discourse for discovering and justifying

norms’’ (Bujo, 2001, p. 45).

There exist various genres of palaver covering

diverse areas of life, without the need for uniformity

among their modes of procedure. There is a form of

palaver suitable for family affairs. Another form is

appropriate for administrative purposes, and yet an-

other kind for healing. If palaver is to be used in the

teaching of business ethics, it will be necessary to

find out in subsequent publications what would be

the most appropriate mode to suit the group and the

46 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

issues at hand. But palaver may work in Africa to

instil virtue ethics in business, politics and the pro-

fessions.

The proverb

The word ‘‘proverb is often used in the more

inclusive sense to cover specific proverbs as well as

maxims, adages, aphorisms... (Healey and Sybertz,

1995, p. 35). Mwanahewa (1992) renders all these

under the term ‘‘orature’’ or African oral literature.

Proverbs and riddles are two closely related forms

of didactic literature in statement and questioning

form. ‘‘In African traditional education they played

an important role in the process by which the young

people were initiated to life or enculturated, that is

to say, educated to a cultural tradition. They taught

the young people to observe and to compare. They

reflected the participatory character of life and

encouraged the young people to explore a given

experience in the light of another related experi-

ence’’ (Aylward Shorter, 1987, p. 50). As the youths

graduated into full manhood or womanhood in their

age-sets, knowledge of proverbs was part of their

education. The young, and even not so young, de-

rived from the proverb the necessary wisdom to

enable them to answer the question: how ought we

to live? How ought we to behave in various social

circumstances and activities? This is a fundamental

question of ethics. This fundamental question of

ethics can be interpreted in two ways. In one way,

‘‘we’’ can be interpreted to mean each person

individually, or it can be interpreted to mean all of us

collectively. In the first sense we refer to the indi-

vidual. In this sense it is a question of how I should

live my life, how I should act, what I should do, and

what kind of person I ought to be.

An important part of any ethics and morality has

to do with examining principles and rules that might

help us one to decide how to act. On the other

hand, a crucial part of morals involves the exami-

nation of those character traits, or virtues that would

constitute an ideal life: the ‘‘life worth living’’.

Hence, in the collective sense, how ‘‘we ought’’ to

live translates to how ought I to live within the

bigger community? This is what makes the link

between the ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘thou’’ relationship. The

question, therefore, of ‘‘how ought we to live’’

should be interpreted both as how I as an individual

ought to live, as well as how we as a society ought to

live together.

Commenting on the role of proverbs in African

education Patrick Kalilombe sees them as ‘‘a mirror

in which a community can look at itself and a stage

on which it exposes itself to others. They describe its

values, aspirations, preoccupations and the particular

angles from which it sees and appreciates realities and

behaviour. What we call mentality or way of life is

best pictured in them’’ (Kalilombe, 1969, p. 3).

Likewise, in her research on African proverbs,

Caroline Parker describes a proverb as ‘‘a message

coded by tradition and transmitted in order to

evaluate and/or affect human behaviour’’ (Parker,

1974, p. 79).

On his part, Sango Mwanahewa in his essay on

African Logical Heritage and contemporary Life, (1992),

says of proverbs that they may not necessarily follow

a sophisticated or scientific logical sequence, but

their magic consists in the artistic arrangement of

words which enables their user to attain the set

objective. That objective is to communicate some

important teaching convincingly. To do so, the

proverb must be brief, logical, authentic and ra-

tional. It must be exposed tactfully, and contain

much wisdom within very few words. ‘‘The force of

the proverb, says Mwanahewa, resides not in the pen

but in the tongue’’ (1992, p. 2). As the sole instru-

ment traditionally available to the illiterate people,

proverbs were designed carefully using all the time

necessary to think them out, polish, fine tune and

embellish their musicality. It was also necessary to

compare each proverb with its possible negation

(antithesis), and think out a counter proverb that

would answer the first proverb (synthesis) and still

match its wisdom.

Studies have shown that there exist over 1000

written collections of African proverbs, – books,

booklets, pamphlets, articles, privately duplicated

lists – including many unpublished sources. From

their research Healey and Sybertz (1995) declare

that, ‘‘the sum total is over one million African

proverbs. When one considers current scholarly

estimates that 1200 to 1300 languages are spoken in

Africa, (the number climbs to 5000 if dialects are

included), the uncounted number of spoken Africa

proverbs yet to be collected is truly staggering’’

(1995, p. 35).

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa 47

Gerald Wanjohi, in The Wisdom and Philosophy of

the Gikuyu Proverbs (1997) divides proverbs into

various categories. Among them are some which he

considers to be symbolic and wisdom proverbs.

Under the category of wisdom proverbs he places

those which, either literally or symbolically state a

universal truth or give practical counsel or advice

(Wanjohi, 1997, pp. 41–58).

Wisdom proverbs served as a test for the capacity

to relate ideas and practice. The Gikuyu of Kenya

for example, extolled rationality, intelligence, and

knowledge so much so that they went to the ex-

treme of associating them with what is good and

honourable. A person who did not capture the

meaning of a proverb was held to be either a fool or

not yet sufficiently educated or mature, and, for that

reason, not qualified to be entrusted with affairs of

the community.

Wanjohi, translates the English word ‘‘reason’’ to

Gitumi or Kihooto. In the Gikuyu-English Dictionary

kihooto is defined as ‘‘that which convinces, an

unanswerable argument, powerful plea, proof, right,

reason, justice, equity, or fairness’’. Among the

speakers of that vernacular, ‘‘Kihooto’’ proverbs are

much respected for they confer honour to the per-

son who is able to understand and use them effec-

tively. One could say that among their users they

were held with the kind of admiration which, in

other cultures, is paid to people who can quote aptly

from the works of Shakespeare, Cervantes, or

Manzoni in literature, or Plato, Aristotle, Descartes

or Kant in philosophy. Thus for a Gikuyu speaker:

Ciira wa kirimu utindaga kiharo, meaning ‘‘A fool’s

lawsuit keeps the court sitting all day’’ makes the point

that one ought to listen to reason. Or again, Mu-

ingatwo na muingatani gutiri utahumaga; literally, both

the chased and the chaser get tired, means that when

someone accuses another he should adduce good

reasons to substantiate his case.

Another two examples are Ateithagio witeithitie to

point out that before calling out for help one is

expected to have exhausted the normal means

available to everybody to get themselves out of his

trouble. Likewise, Ciira utari gitumi nducirikaga,

meaning that, a case which has no cause can not be

argued out. Note, however, that one would miss

the real meaning of a proverb if he were to remain

fixed on the literal meaning and failed to realise

that the symbols (words) of the proverb are

pointing to other meanings or realities (Wanjohi,

1997, p. 42).

For many African people proverbs and sayings are

a way of life. They ‘‘touch on every aspect of the life

of the people who create them. There are proverbs

on political, social, educational, religious and eco-

nomic issues. There are those which have been

passed down from one person to the other, for

generations, Then there are new ones which have

been created about modern and current lifestyles and

experiences of our time’’ (Odaga, 1984, p. 68).

Within some African communities three types of

proverbs for the teaching of right and wrong can be

identified: meta-ethical proverbs, those on individual

ethics, and those on social ethics. To grasp the ethical

in the proverbs was a prerogative of the adults, the

mature in mind. Hence, among the Gikuyu for in-

stance, to aspire to become an elder is to reach the

point of being a person who combines certain qual-

ities of character: honesty, generosity, self-control,

humility and diligence (Wanjohi, 1997, p. 131).

There is an interesting parallelism in the purpose

of the proverb to the aim of Rhetoric in Aristotle. In

his Rhetoric 2001b Book 1., 1. he says that ‘‘of the

modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word

there are three kinds: the first kind depends on the

personal character of the speaker; the second on

putting the audience into a certain frame of mind;

the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided

by the words of the speech itself’’ (Rh 1356a). He

goes on to point out that among these, character is

the controlling element which persuades the listeners

because ‘‘we believe good men more fully and more

readily than others’’ (Rh 1356a-5). In the same vein

Aristotle recommends that for persuasion, the man

who is to be in command, that is the leader, (in our

case the teacher of ethics) must, ‘‘be able to reason

logically, understand human character and goodness

in their various forms, understand the emotions, be

able to name them and describe them’’ (Rh. 1356a-

20–25). Similarly, the African proverb can be taken

as an already made means available to the teacher

(leader) to persuade the learners to emulate certain

qualities of character. In so doing the teacher

accomplishes at least the first and third purposes

recommended in Aristotle’s list.

By their very definition proverbs are ‘‘supposed to

play a quadruple function: expose faults of language

so that people become aware of them and thereby

48 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

correct themselves; dissuade people from becoming

victims of those faults as they see them committed by

others, and hence not to commit those same faults

themselves; to provide moral lessons; and as a chal-

lenge to make people think carefully and evaluate

what they hear before taking action’’ (Mwanahewa,

1992, p. 3). The proverb, therefore, exhorts or dis-

suades from undesirable action through a delibera-

tive mode; it approves or condemns past action

through the judicial mode; it indicates what is

honourable or shameful in a person through the

demonstrative mode.

In this too we can find a close parallelism with

Aristotle’s Rhetoric. There he enumerates three

character traits or personal qualities that a speaker or an

aspiring leader/teacher should possess in order to give

a semblance of trustworthiness before his potential

followers. These are practical wisdom, virtue, and

good will. Thus, he says: ‘‘There are three things

which inspire confidence in the orator’s (read

teacher’s) own character that induce us to believe a

thing apart from any proof of it: namely; good sense,

good moral character, and goodwill’’ (Rh 1378).

Most African proverbs seek to provide cogent

reason for action (kihooto); they identify good char-

acter by praising virtue and ridiculing stupid or

selfish behaviour; and they prepare the emotional

disposition of the learners in order to understand the

teaching through palaver. For example, the Ban-

yarwanda of Rwanda, the Barundi of Burundi, and

the Bashi of the Congo underline the ethic of the

‘‘heart’’ because, the ‘‘heart’’ is the human person’s

little king’ which means guide. Thus, a person who

incurs guilt it is because he has a dirty ‘‘heart’’. For a

Bahema (Central Africa) a person with ‘‘two hearts’’

is one who lacks generosity or who is basically

niggardly (Bujo, 2001, p. 120).

Ethnic communities of East and Central Africa see

truth as one of the qualities of the ‘‘heart’’, since the

‘‘heart’’ is linked to intelligence, memory and will. It

is the ‘‘heart’’ that either wills something or does not

will it. It is the ‘‘heart’’ that thinks or produces

something creatively. The ‘‘heart’’ speaks. The

teaching here is that the notion of the ‘‘heart’’ goes

beyond the realm of emotions or feelings alone to

embrace the intellectual dimension as well. Hence,

wisdom and prudence are not understood solely on

the basis of their rational character. They are also

considered within a broader picture: that of the

‘‘heart’’ as the centre of the person. ‘‘The ‘heart’,

occupies the primary position, not only linked to

love and hatred, but to virtually all virtues or their

absence (sin), because these are brought into relation

to it. Self-control – temperance – , justice, courage

and bravery, truthfulness or honesty and all the

opposite thoughts and actions proceed from the

‘heart’’’ (Bujo, 2001, p. 121). Not surprising then

one finds many proverbs in which truth and ‘‘heart’’

are linked. Thus, ma ndithaamaga mukaro wayo,

translated to ‘‘truth does not leave its path’’, means

that truth does not change or that truth is not rela-

tive. Or, again ma ndikuaga, which literary means

that ‘‘truth does not die’’ or that truth persists. An-

other one says: ma iri ruo, that is, to tell someone the

truth may sometimes hurt but it is better that it hurts

than that it is hidden.

It should not, however, be thought that by

‘‘heart’’ these people mean simply the material organ

of the body to be the source of the ethical vital force.

This can be seen from the way the Bahema and the

Walendu of Central and Eastern Africa use the same

term. They are convinced that the ‘‘heart’’ is the

central and most significant force for all human

conduct by calling one who acts selfishly to be

‘‘heart-less’’ (Bujo, 2001, p. 122).

Although these proverbs express kihooto which is

their object, the ‘‘heart’’, as the driving force of

willing and wanting, necessarily plays a big role in

action. For that reason one shouldn’t have two

‘‘hearts’’ for to have two ‘‘heart’’s can also mean that

someone lacks openness, is untruthful or at least

suffers from some dimension of it.

Kihooto proverbs identify desirable or praisewor-

thy traits of character such as honesty, which enable

someone to be sensitive to truth and falsity, gener-

osity – which promotes goodwill – ; reciprocity of

friendships, kindness, and self-control or modera-

tion, which restrain personal greed and sensual

appetites such as the use of food, sexual drive and

property. There are proverbs to teach self-restraint.

For example, ‘‘one who does not possess a goat does not

yearn for meat’’, meaning that if some one does not

posses a goat (property) he ought not to covet it or

try to obtain meat (goods) illegally or immorally

through theft or deceit.

But, alas, from the ‘‘heart’’, also proceed evil

desires. So how does one distinguish the good from

evil advice of the ‘‘heart’’? This too is catered for in

Teaching Business Ethics in Africa 49

the proverbs. For example: ‘‘Practice self-control, do not

let yourself be led astray by the desires of your ‘heart’’’.

Thus, regarding human conduct, the ethical ideal or

excellence is a personality which displays self-control

both internally and externally, where the latter

dimension is dependent on the former. To say so we

learn that: ‘‘There is no difference between a thief and the

one who desires’’, meaning that theft is not simply the

material action of taking something: it includes

the actions of those who collude with the evil doer,

such as a thief or fraudster.

Virtue ethics: making the link

Current discussions on ethics and corporate business

culture are looking precisely for the ethical values of

trust, honesty, accountability, and transparency.

Corporations also want consumer loyalty that at-

tends such trust. Trust, based on truthfulness has

become for business the commercial equity for

fairness, justice, quality, honesty and consistency.

These, precisely, are the ethical qualities that most

proverbs seek to communicate.

All these moral values fall within the constellation

of virtues which, in the classic ethical tradition that

can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, and later to

Judeo-Christian culture, were held to be the driving

force of harmony between people in society. There

the acquisition of virtue, as an internal disposition for

action, forms the inner wealth of a person. That

wealth depends mostly on people’s free choices. But

in that choice good and evil are not equal partners. It

is rather a choice between doing the right thing and

reaping the fruits of a good life, or doing the wrong

thing and facing the negative responsibility of one’s

actions.

Between the theory and the practice of virtue,

however, certain other elements must be taken into

consideration. These include the best adjustment of

the individual to the world around him, the

interests for the welfare of the people around him

(altruism) and, in the case of many people of the

world, the recognition of God. It would be correct,

therefore, to say that where there is virtue there is

happiness not only for the acting individual, but

also for the persons who come into contact with

him. So, in virtue ethics the individual is never

alone because external goods such as friendship,

divine benevolence, and one’s own disposition to-

wards others have an important role to play in the

definition of integrity and happiness. Virtue is

unitary, not something arbitrary; it does not depend

solely on one’s good intention (subjective) but is

open to be guided by the knowledge of the

objective good and of the whole human good or

Common Good.

All these virtues fall under a constellation of four

major principles of action called cardinal virtues.

These are: Justice or rectitude in judging; Practical

wisdom, Prudence or insight; Courage, Fortitude or

firmness; and moderation, self-control or Temper-

ance. The wonderful thing about this classical view

is that the habitual practice of these principles

produces a permanent disposition or good character

in the individual. But, for that disposition to be-

come a permanent feature of someone’s personality,

a constant, and determined effort or striving is re-

quired. That effort is what draws out the desirable

personality which reflects personal integrity or

uprightness. Correspondingly, any relaxation from

making the effort to adhere to or to acquire that

uprightness leads easily to ethical insensitivity, and

ultimately to vice.

These four then are the hinges (cardos) on which

all other virtues hang, and they are shaped and re-

fined in a person by rubbing against real problems.

The integrity of a person stands out through the

constant practice of what one knows to be the

correct moral principles. A thorough investigation of

African proverbs, narrative, and song are bound to

yield good supporting fabric for virtues ethics in the

teaching of business ethics.

It has been wondered whether African proverbs

may not be just a mere relic of the past, quaint

expressions that will gradually die out with new

generations of people. To resolve that doubt, Healey

and Sybertz (1995) carried out a survey in several

African countries to find what was the general

feeling of modern Africans regarding the use of

‘‘orature’’. The results showed that many Africans

still maintain that African proverbs will have a lasting

influence; others said that proverbs are old-fashioned

and will therefore, slowly pass out of use. Among the

youth and in people living in urban situations, the

survey indicated that proverbs had less popularity.

Consequently, it is possible that African proverbs,

unless injected with new meaning and new life, will

50 Christine Wanjiru Gichure

gradually fall out of use and be forgotten (Healey and

Sybertz, 1995, pp. 35–38).

The good news, however, is that the same survey

found instances where proverbs have been used

successfully within a contemporary context. For

example, a Swahili proverb which says that: When

elephants fight the grass gets hurt has had an interna-

tional didactic usage.

During the Cold War period, this proverb was

used by Julius Nyerere, then president of Tanza-

nia, in a speech at the United Nations in New

York. It was used again by the Zairean Ambas-

sador to Great Britain in a world forum held in

London for white missionaries working in Africa.

In both cases the message was that, in the Cold

War between the two superpowers: the Unites

States and Russia, it was the poor Third World

countries such as those in Africa who suffer and

are victimized. The same proverb was used in

Somalia, 1992–1994 to say that when the local

warlords fight for power, it is the local Somalian

people who suffer and go without food. There are

versions of this proverb in nearly all Bantu lan-

guages. For example: When two bulls fight the grass

gets hurt is popularly known among the Kikuyu

and Kuria of Kenya as well as to the Ngoreme of

Tanzania.

In the fight against AIDS an old Swahili proverb:

Heri pazia kuliko bendera, meaning Better a curtain

hanging motionless than a flag blowing in the

wind, has been used to caution young people to

stay with one partner (the curtain in the house)

rather than play around with many partners (flag

blowing to and fro (Healey and Sybertz , 1995,

p. 37).

Notes

1 Ugali is a meal made from maize meal and water,

the simplest possible dish that can be served. It is eaten

in most families of East and Central Africa. 2

This work of an unnamed Egyptian author, written

in Greek, is estimated to have been written somewhere

between AD 40 and 70. 3

Means a person you can approach in a moment of

need.

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Christine Wanjiru Gichure

Department of Philosophy,

Kenyatta University,

43844 Nairobi,

Kenya

E-mails: [email protected]; [email protected]

52 Christine Wanjiru Gichure