University of Pennsylvania Press

Chapter Title: The Coevolution of the Internet, (Un)Civil Society, and Authoritarianism in China Chapter Author(s): Min Jiang

Book Title: The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China Book Editor(s): Jacques deLisle, Avery Goldstein, Guobin Yang Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press. (2016) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b3t8nr.4

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide

range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and

facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

http://about.jstor.org/terms

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

C H A P T E R 1

The Coevolution of the Internet, (Un)Civil

Society, and Authoritarianism in China

Min Jiang

Th is chapter extends Guobin Yang’s 2003 seminal article on the coevolution of the Internet and civil society in China.1 It argues the Internet has facili- tated, on the one hand, the coevolution of Chinese civic spaces and authori- tarian control, and, on the other, the coevolution of civic activities and uncivil interactions. Th e Internet has not only helped amplify civic discourses and group formations; it has also augmented the infl uence of uncivil exchanges online, leading to a greater degree of fragmentation and cynicism of public opinion. Although social media platforms such as the Twitter- like Sina Weibo can serve as a critical space for expressing and channeling public opinion, they are unlikely to be the ultimate game changer.

In charting the new terrain of China’s online civic spaces, the chapter focuses on four aspects: (1) real- time activism; (2) online po liti cal jamming; (3) weibo celebrities; and (4) the rise of an “uncivil society” online. I explore conditions and instances of “real- time” activism; the use of cultural jamming and “serious parody” for po liti cal activism; the role of weibo celebrities in fos- tering plurality and fragmentation; and the uncivil ideological discourse exchanges that have led to public brawls in the street and pop u lar rejection of “public intellectuals.” In contrast, to curb the po liti cal consequences of new forms of mediated activism, the control regime has implemented a variety of new mea sures besides fi ltering and employment of pro- government com- mentators to forestall or pacify collective actions, including real name regis- tration policy and anti- rumor campaigns.

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 29

Th e chapter argues positive development of online public spaces in China relies as much on institutional politics to eff ectively channel public opinion as it does on identity politics and progressive changes in subjectivity through everyday life interactions. While the Internet mediates such negotiations and is increasingly indispensable to the parties involved, it does not determine their outcomes. Th e contextualized use of the Internet and new media, shaped by the social, cultural, and po liti cal protocols surrounding such technologies, ultimately does.

Context

Th e massive diff usion of the Internet and the rise of China as a world power are two prominent stories of our time. In 1994, China connected to the World Wide Web. By mid-1998, Chinese Internet users reached 1 million. Today, China is the second largest economy in the world and home to 632 million Internet users, 275 million microbloggers, 527 million Internet mobile phone users, and such Internet giants as Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, and Sina.2 Th e rapid development of the Chinese Internet is grounded in the transformation of China itself from a third- world country to a manufacturing and industrial power house aft er the Chinese Communist Party traded Mao for markets and gradually opened its closed doors to the outside world in the late 1970s.

Th e Chinese government’s embracing of the Internet presents a paradox and has attracted heated public debate over the po liti cal consequences of the widespread adoption of the Internet in an authoritarian society. President Reagan famously remarked: “Th e Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.”3 Yet defying such prevailing techno- utopian predictions that the Internet sides with freedom and undermines au- tocratic rulers, Beijing has so far managed to weave and guard an expanding fi ltered web. Besides employing various means of censorship,4 more impor- tant, the regime has built and promoted state legitimacy through economy, nationalism, ideology, culture, and governance to ensure the compliance, if not allegiance, of its population.5

Th is is not to say that Chinese authorities do not fear the diff usion of the Internet in China or its po liti cal implications. In fact, Party mouthpiece and People’s Daily Online’s editor in chief once remarked: “What would it look like if everybody went into politics? . . . China has more than 100 million In- ternet users. If they were all free to speak their minds, we would have a very

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

30 Min Jiang

serious situation.” 6 With more than 600 million of the Chinese population online now, control of po liti cal discourse is by no means a cakewalk. As Guo- bin Yang demonstrated in his nuanced account of digital activism in China, the Chinese state’s regulation of the Internet has consistently run against an impressive degree of grassroots challenges fueled by public discontent dur- ing China’s tumultuous economic, social, and cultural transformations.7

Th e evolution of the Internet in China in the last two de cades has wit- nessed the simultaneous growth of authoritarianism and grassroots activ- ism fueled by contention and participation. Dubbed oft en by pop u lar press as a “cat- and- mouse” game, the coevolution of digital activism and authori- tarianism does not pronounce immediate winners or losers. However, it has become increasingly clear that the Internet is not necessarily an insur- mountable threat to capable illiberal regimes. So far the Chinese govern- ment has managed to promote the Internet as a means for socioeconomic development while successfully minimizing its po liti cal impact. Overall, despite limited po liti cal freedoms, people’s freedoms in other realms have expanded with improved living standards and opportunities. China’s on- line activism is thus embedded in a much larger media ecol ogy and social pro cess, where the po liti cal impact of the Internet is mediated through a complex mix of social, economic, po liti cal, and institutional circumstances.8

Unlike the dictators toppled during the Arab Spring— Ben Ali failed to control the communication networks in Tunisia, where protestors used the Internet effectively to or ga nize civil disobedience; Mubarak unplugged the Internet in Egypt and drove protestors to the street— Chinese authorities have walked a fi ne line balancing Internet growth and its attendant po liti cal consequences. Its “networked authoritarianism” or “authoritarian deliberation” resorts less to brute force but allows for a considerable degree of give- and- take between the state and emergent civil forces.9 Moreover, China’s expanding economy, the state’s anticorruption promises, its emphasis on governance, and its appeal to Chinese nationalism and civilization have fostered an im- plicit state- society pact, a grand bargain of sorts, that the po liti cal status quo— a one- party system monopolized by a small group of elites with the assurance of reasonable per for mance, social stability, and continued economic growth— shall remain unchallenged. In the realm of new media, such an arrange- ment has translated into a form of “informational authoritarianism” that combines capitalism, authoritarianism, and Confucianism to institute state regulation, as well as widespread self- censorship among Internet ser vice/ content providers and users.10

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 31

While much of the previous literature tends to focus on grassroots empowerment,11 or disempowerment,12 this chapter argues for a dialectic coevolution of the state and an emerging Chinese civil society mediated via the Internet. Th e grassroots empowerment narrative focuses on the Inter- net’s decentralized structure, low cost, greater access to information/ideas, communication speed, user interactivity, connectivity across space, online dissent, or ga ni za tion, and mobilization. On the other hand, the disempow- erment thesis emphasizes state control of Internet infrastructure, prohibi- tion of po liti cally sensitive content, regulation of ICP/ISP, state surveillance of netizens, and rampant self- censorship, as well as commercialization, entertainment, slacktivism, and distraction away from critical social issues and real changes.

Does the widespread adoption of social media in China alter the balance of power between the state and the emerging civil society? In what ways does it contribute to citizen empowerment? How have authorities adjusted to contain public opinion? Taking the perspective of a coevolution of the Internet, (un)civil society, and authoritarianism in China, in what follows, I discuss the most recent development of the Chinese Internet and new media, particularly the rise and fall of Sina Weibo (China’s Twitter) since August 2009.

Online Activism and (Un)Civil Society

As many Chinese are now connected via mobile social networks, digital ac- tivism has acquired new characteristics. I highlight in the following: (1) real- time activism, (2) online po liti cal jamming, (3) weibo celebrities, and (4) the rise of an uncivil society online.

Real- Time Activism

Th e arrival of mobile microblogging and photo sharing makes possible the instantaneous broadcast of an unfolding event over the Internet and social networks. With deeper integration of the mobile web into people’s everyday life, a new genre of media activism— real- time activism— has emerged as Chi- nese netizens start to document and amplify anything they fi nd provocative, scandalous, and intriguing in real time. Some accidentally become national

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

32 Min Jiang

or international news and even lead to policy change as they tap into wide- spread public sentiment and deep- seated social problems.

Speaking at a public lecture at Peking University in June 2010, propaganda offi cial Li Baozhu proudly announced: “With a wave of my hand, tens of mil- lions of posts about the Deng Yujiao incident were all deleted.”13 Th e comment, accompanied by live pictures, was quickly circulated on Chinese microblog- ging before being taken down by commercial portals soon aft erward.

One of the most prominent cases of real- time activism concerns the Wenzhou train collision. On July  23, 2011, two high- speed trains crashed into each other at 8:34 p.m. near Wenzhou, a coastal city in southeast China, causing four cars to fall out of a sixty- foot- tall viaduct and resulting in forty deaths. Four minutes aft er the accident, a Sina Weibo user posted the fi rst tweet about the accident. Nine minutes later, a desperate plea for help was posted on Sina Weibo, retweeted more than one hundred thousand times (later censored): “A cry for help! Train D301 has been derailed not far from Wenzhou station. Children are crying up and down the carriage. No staff member has come out! Hurry up and save us!” Two hours aft erward, the fi rst tweet about rescue relief was sent from the scene and government appeal for blood donations was put on Sina Weibo. Later, a user’s tweets from the blood donation clinic were reposted more than one hundred thousand times.14

At a time of crisis when offi cial media are absent or barred from report- ing, social media users become de facto reporters on the scene, giving ac- counts in real time. Weibo is oft en chosen in China to break such news not only because of its speed or con ve nience but also because of its connected- ness and publicness. Deeply embedded in users’ social relationships and everyday life and used by many professional reporters, weibo was highly conducive to the spread of critical news and information before stricter reg- ulations were imposed by authorities later to rein in public opinion and spread “positive energy.”15 A week aft er the accident, more than 10 million comments about the crash had been posted on Sina Weibo, nearly all of them angry, questioning authorities’ rescue eff orts, the hasty burial of evidence, and the truth behind the accident.16

Few social media users are activists, yet oft en by accident their fi rsthand accounts, when widely circulated, form the basis of truth and public dis- course. Within twenty- four hours aft er the accident, video clips of authori- ties burying a train carriage spread like wildfi re online.17 People believed they were “burying the truth.” Aft er offi cial media announced the end of rescue eff orts merely eight hours aft er the crash, the survival of “miracle girl,” two-

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 33

year- old Yiyi, whose parents died in the crash, further fueled online fury.18 In response to reporters’ charge that the Ministry of Railways was trying to thwart investigation, the ministry spokesman haplessly commented: “Whether or not you believe it, I believe it,” which immediately took fl ight as an Internet meme. Even offi cial media turned up the heat on the ministry. State tele vi sion CCTV anchor Qiu Qiming veered from his script and asked on air: “Can we drink a glass of milk that is safe? Can we stay in an apartment that will not fall apart? Can we travel roads in our cities that will not collapse?”19

Th e hastily constructed railways under Minister “Great Leap Liu,” as an offi cial report later revealed, were plagued with safety hazards due to infe- rior engineering, poor management, and systemic corruption. Th e minister was sacked for embezzling millions of dollars from public projects. Conse- quently, the world’s largest and fastest railway, Harmony Express, one of China’s proudest modern achievements, has come to represent recklessness and fraud.20 In this case, real- time activism, in the form of civic journalism and public criticism, played a crucial role in helping uncover the truth by keeping the pressure on the government. Media of all kinds— old and new, grassroots and offi cial— participated in exposing the iconic failure of govern- ment per for mance that in large mea sure violated the grand bargain of mod- ern Chinese politics that allows the Party to “reign unchallenged as long as it is reasonably competent.”21 However, weibo’s connectedness and public- ness, as the chapter will later explain, have come under increasing state scru- tiny as the government propaganda apparatus begins to pressure commercial operators to fi lter around the clock and silence infl uential users online.

Online Po liti cal Jamming

Not only can activism in the social media age occur in real time; its style has also taken a more playful turn to evade censors and reach larger publics. On- line po liti cal jamming— the use of digital media and pop u lar culture to dis- seminate dissenting images and viewpoints, disrupt stultifying mainstream po liti cal discourses, and expose social injustices— borrows from “cultural jamming” practices that target and subvert mainstream corporate culture and ideologies.22 Like cultural jams, online po liti cal jamming challenges dominant po liti cal discourses by producing and distributing counter- hegemonic messages via new media: logos are reconfi gured, images Photo- shopped, pop u lar fi lms clips remixed, and pop culture references appropriated

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

34 Min Jiang

and distributed via digital networks.23 Not only are such practices rooted in parody as a powerful tool of po liti cal re sis tance worldwide throughout hu- man history, to which China is not an exception; they have acquired new genres, features, and potency in Chinese cyberspace, creating an alternative carnivalesque world of freedom and laughter where the rich and powerful are ridiculed and subverted.24

Similar to its Western counterparts, online po liti cal jamming in China has spread acerbic critique of contemporary Chinese politics cloaked in frisky artistic forms and helped energize acts of social and po liti cal activ- ism. For instance, Chen Guangcheng, a famous Chinese human rights activist and self- taught blind lawyer, is internationally recognized for or ga- niz ing a landmark class- action lawsuit against authorities’ abuses in family- planning practices in Linyi, Shandong. Aft er serving four years in prison, he was released in 2010 and was under house arrest until his remarkable escape to the  U.S. embassy in Beijing in April 2012. To protest against the brutal treatment of Chen, his supporters made stickers, the size of a booklet cover, featuring a stylized graphic of Chen’s face with his signature sunglasses (see fi gure 1.1), modeled aft er the logo of KFC, a well- known U.S. fast- food chain in China. “Pearl Her,” a Chen supporter, reportedly had four thousand of these stickers produced and asked fellow supporters to put them on their cars. A Google Maps page was also set up for a “FREE CGC Car Sticker Club” where supporters who had put the sticker on their cars could register their approximate locations. She remarked: “dissidents have traditionally been quite confrontational with the government. . . . But we should learn how to express ourselves and protest in an orderly way, to use art and enter- tainment more freely. It is like Occupy Wall Street.”25

Another FREE CGC’s participatory act is the Dark Glasses Portrait campaign (see fi gure 1.2). To support Chen, an anonymous Chinese artist, “Crazy Cab,” began to solicit and curate digital photos of netizens wearing the blind activist’s signature sunglasses in 2012. Viewed in isolation, each photo did not trip censors. When aggregated, however, these photos evolved into a powerful and continuous picture wall, reminding people of the hoodie- wearing campaign for Trayvon Martin in the United States and the hijab “Be a Man” photo drive showing solidarity for the Ira nian Green Movement.26 As an act of guerrilla activism, the campaign was designed to avoid censor- ship, as authorities cannot possibly round up everyone wearing sunglasses.27

Such acts of “serious parody” are examples of Chinese activists’ appro- priation of cultural jam techniques for digital po liti cal activism.28 Cultural

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 35

or po liti cal jamming, Cammerts explains, draws inspirations from art move- ments of Dadaism, Surrealism, Fluxus, and Situationism.29 It borrows from Dadaism the idea of assigning diff erent meanings to objects, exemplifi ed in the art work of Marcel Duchamp, who famously dubbed a urinal art and named it Fountain. Likewise, the “FREE CGC” sticker recoded the ready- made KFC logo with disruptive meanings. In addition, cultural jamming adopts the optical illusion practice of Surrealism, cleverly designed to confuse the viewer. Th e “FREE CGC” sticker clearly baffl ed the Chinese police, who did not notice them. “And if they ask what Free CGC means, we say it is free KFC,” says an activist.30 Moreover, po liti cal jamming follows Fluxus’s principle of integrating social action in the fl ux of everyday life, blending art and social

Figure 1.1. Source (original source unknown): http:// newnation . sg / tag / obama - fried - chicken/ (New Nation, a Singapore- based online publication, has granted the author permis- sion to reuse the image for this chapter).

Figure 1.2. Source (screenshot): http:// ichenguangcheng . blogspot . com / . Site creator has chosen to remain anonymous.

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

36 Min Jiang

critique into a form of counter- artistic movement. In the “FREE CGC” case, not only did activists produce and distribute stickers online; more important, participants integrated activism into both material (for example, a car) and immaterial (for example, performing) aspects of their daily life. Lastly, po liti cal jamming is détournement, or rerouting, in the Situationist sense. By hijacking the original artwork, détournement, like the “FREE CGC” sticker, situates new po liti cal messages in existing consumerist culture and public spaces, both online and offl ine.

Th is new type of “art as po liti cal act” in the Chinese activism scene owes a debt to famed Chinese artist- activist Ai Weiwei. A student of Duchamp, Ai views art not as something detached from society or transcending so- called ordinary people but part of everyday life and experiences. “If artists betray the social conscience and the basic principles of being human, where does art stand then?” Ai asks.31 A provocateur who dares to pose nude to con- demn the Party and give the middle fi nger to iconic buildings around the world, including the Tiananmen and the White House, Ai also led notable eff orts that combined art and digital activism. Between 2008 and 2009, he investigated student casualties due to the collapse of “tofu- dreg” (shoddy) school buildings in the aft ermath of the Sichuan earthquake. A list of 5,385 names was collected, for which he was severely beaten. To mourn the dead and shame authorities who refused to release students’ names, the list was printed on white paper, each name read aloud and recorded by strangers who volunteered to participate in digital art making.32 In both cases, social me- dia facilitated the diff usion of po liti cal jamming to larger publics and helped coordinate large- scale per for mances in a participatory manner. However, the impact of po liti cal jamming is not impossible to control if the state resorts to more forceful means to suppress activists and diff use poorly coordinated actions.

Weibo Celebrities

Besides real- time activism and po liti cal jamming, the role of weibo celebri- ties in China’s emerging civil society is worth noting. By introducing distinct identities, information, and worldviews, weibo celebrities tend to foster plural- ity and fragmentation simultaneously. Here, weibo celebrities refers to users on Chinese microblogging platforms with large numbers of followers. Known as “Big Vs,” their accounts are usually verifi ed, designated with a V.

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 37

In January 2015, all top ten Sina Weibo celebrities had more than 40 million fans. Among them, “Weibo King,” actor Chen Kun, had more than 73 million. “Weibo Queen,” Yao Chen, had 72 million. While many of these celebrities are entertainers, others, such as Kai-fu Lee, ex- CEO of Google China, also have more than 50 million followers.33 Copying its celebrity- driven business approach from blogging to microblogging, Sina Corporation has actively cultivated its “stars” and a celebrity culture from sports, entertainment, and media to real estate, science, and technology to drive online discussion, traf- fi c, and ultimately profi t. Although Sina Weibo’s user base has witnessed a signifi cant loss to Tencent’s WeChat, a group- chat social media platform, Weibo remains as China’s “public forum,” central to the publicness of Chinese social media.

Weibo celebrities, a new breed of opinion leaders in the social media age, hold considerable sway in China’s public opinion space. Compared with the 80- million- member Chinese Communist Party, weibo celebrities’ fans are for- midable both in numbers and loyalty. As many offi cial media are not held in high esteem in China, weibo celebrities with their expertise, charisma, and authority are an important source of alternative news, information, and opin- ions to millions. Although opinion leaders and public opinion formation are certainly not new in China,34 or elsewhere,35 weibo has arguably altered in no small mea sure Chinese microbloggers’ access to news and information, their relation to one another and social elites, public opinion formation, and even online activism mechanisms.

Th e public campaign against child traffi cking “Take a Photo, Save a Child” is one such example. It was started in 2011 on Sina Weibo by Profes- sor Yu Jianrong, a weibo celebrity known for his support for social justice issues. Soon, a microblog site was launched for people to post photos of child beggars in the hope to re unite parents with their kidnapped children. More than 175,000 people joined the eff ort and posted more than twenty- fi ve hundred photographs. Supported by ultra- weibo celebrities like Yao Chen and Kai-fu Lee and sanctioned by the state, the campaign garnered a great deal of attention. It also made weibo celebrities out of grassroots advocates such as Deng Fei, a journalist from Phoenix Weekly, and Charles Xue, a Chinese American angel investor. Although only a few children were successfully identifi ed and re united with their families as a result of this campaign, the charitable eff ort raised widespread social awareness and solicited long- term commitment from Jet Li’s One Foundation and legislative support.36

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

38 Min Jiang

Weibo celebrities’ contribution to such charity causes and similar episodes of civic activism have benefi ted from weibo’s functionalities and sociality and weibo celebrities’ infl uence. Although these celebrities’ po- liti cal impact is under the constant surveillance of commercial operators and authorities, their posts oft en blur the boundaries between self- media and public media, private lives and public issues. In his exuberantly optimistic book, Weibo Changes Everything, Kai-fu Lee compares weibo users with ten thousand fans with magazine own ers, those with one hundred thousand fans to regional newspaper publishers, and those with 1 million or even 10 million followers to having the infl uence of national papers and national TV stations. Celebrity posts are no longer self- talk but public talk.37

Oft en critical of social ills, top weibo celebrities, such as real estate ty- coons Ren Zhiqiang and Pan Shiyi, IT elite CEO Kai-fu Lee, and economists Mao Yushi and Lang Xianping, exert considerable infl uence. Th ese public fi gures use weibo not only as a PR tool to cultivate their personal image but also as a means to express their views and infl uence the public. Moreover, the separation between private lives and public issues has become increas- ingly artifi cial and fl uid for weibo celebrities. For instance, research fi nds that between October and November 2011, one- fi ft h of “Weibo Queen” Yao Chen’s posts concerned public issues rather than topics about entertainment or herself.38 Her revelation of her distant relatives’ experience of forced de- mo li tion put the social issue at the front and center of her followers’ minds. Another weibo celebrity’s, Luo Yonghao’s, public smashing of Siemens’s faulty refrigerators and CCTV anchor Zhang Quanling’s post about erro- neous ads on Baidu also put these companies in the public spotlight, chan- neling personal frustrations and driving public discourse.39

The Uncivil Society Online

However, like previous web technological changes, weibo’s impact on Chi- na’s emergent civil society and activism is highly mixed. Not all weibo ce- lebrities are civil in their discourse or online behavior. Besides individuals and groups conducive to the expansion of open discussion and growth of an emergent civil society, more radical and extreme personalities and groups have thrived as well. Th e coexistence of groups of diametrically opposed ideologies has led to considerable slanging matches, online verbal abuse, and even public brawls in the street. In addition, “50 cents,” or paid pro-

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 39

government online commentators reportedly reaching 2 million,40 have fl ooded weibo and other pop u lar online spaces, breeding substantial confu- sion and discursive frictions.41 As a result, public discourses and opinions formed in such online spaces are not necessarily coherent or always pro- ductive, and they have grown more fragmentary, polarized, theatrical, and cynical over time, culminating in the phenomenal pop u lar rejection of “public intellectuals.”

For instance, Kong Qingdong, a professor of Chinese at Peking Univer- sity and a descendant of Confucius, is a highly controversial weibo celebrity. On January 24, 2012, during an interview on Chinese news site v1.cn, he openly cursed Hong Kong residents as dogs of the British Empire: “As far as I know, many Hong Kong people don’t regard themselves as Chinese. Th ose kinds of people are used to being the dogs of British colonialists— they are dogs, not humans.” 42 Refusing to apologize for it, he defended his remarks as “free speech.” 43 On the Chinese Internet, Kong, Zhang Hongliang, Sima Nan, and Wu Fatian are popularly referred to as the “New Four Arch Evils” in China.44 Appealing to pop u lism, nationalism, Maoism, and even the Cultural Revolution, these Far Left fi gures known for their ultra- nationalistic, anti- West, anticapitalist stance amassed a considerable following online for their defense of “the people” against “the elite.” 45

Social media not only amplifi ed the voices of such extremists and fueled fragmentation and polarization but, perhaps more important, helped disman- tle the “public intellectual” in China. In a most theatrical fashion in 2012, the high- profi le weibo debate between Han Han and Fang Zhouzi and the physical brawl started on weibo between Wu Fatian and Zhou Yan enveloped Chinese netizens in deep cynicism. “Public intellectual,” defi ned in contem- porary China by infl uential metropolitan paper Southern Daily’s supplement Southern People Weekly as “knowledgeable, progressive and critical individ- uals who actively engage in public aff airs,” has become a label to be shunned like a plague by online celebrities.46

Before the arrival of weibo, Han Han was already a literary star and pub- lic fi gure. His blogs were read by tens of millions and in Time magazine’s 2010 “Time 100” poll, Han Han, at twenty- seven, came in second.47 For many, es- pecially Chinese youth, Han Han is the ultimate nonconformist: a high school literary competition winner and dropout, a pop u lar blogger, a best- selling author, a singer, and most recently a professional racecar driver. An out- spoken critic against China’s establishment with snarky wit, Han Han is the unoffi cial rebel voice of his generation.48 Fang Zhouzi’s fl ame war with Han

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

40 Min Jiang

Han started in mid- January 2012. Following Han Han’s three controversial po liti cal posts on revolution, democracy, and freedom, blogger Mai Tian accused Han Han of being the front man of a team of ghostwriters and promoters. Aft er Mai Tian withdrew his accusation as a result of counter- evidence, Fang picked up the crusade and engaged Han Han in a war of words over the authenticity of Han’s work.49 Fang Zhouzi is known in China as a fraud buster, having brought down most prominently Tang Jun, former pres- ident of MSN China, for lying about his PhD degree. Th eir wrangle, broad- cast live from Sina Weibo, polarized not only China’s literary, media, and intellectual circles, who split into a “Han camp” and a “Fang camp”; it most tragically alienated millions of weibo users disappointed by the malicious lan- guage and behavior of the so- called public intellectuals online. Both camps used the same derogatory labels— “50 Cents” and “residual toxin of the Cultural Revolution”—to condemn each other. Although their debate fi zzled because of lack of evidence off ered by either side, the spectacle they cre- ated in China’s public life cast deep skepticism on both public fi gures and Chinese intellectuals in general.50

However, the most dramatic uncivil dispute is the physical fi ght between Wu Fatian and Zhou Yan, started and arranged over weibo and known as “Weibo Brawl.” Wu Danhong, or “Wu Fatian” online, was an assistant pro- fessor at Beijing University of Po liti cal Science and Law whose staunch de- fense of the Party had earned him the “Advanced 50 Cents” badge.51 On July 3, 2012, Wu posted a tweet on Sina Weibo supporting the construction of a questionable metal refi nery plant in Shifang, Sichuan Province, that had sparked local protests and been halted. His remarks infuriated Zhou Yan, a Sichuan TV reporter empathetic to the protest. An exchange of insults quickly escalated to a fi ght appointment at Beijing Chaoyang Park on July 6, 2012, that drew onlookers online and offl ine. Videos of the encounter circulated widely aft erward, including footage of Ai Weiwei trying to attack Wu, a trans- gression some said they were willing to forgive because it was Wu Fatian.52 Yet the public was not so forgiving of the ways “public intellectuals,” espe- cially the well- educated democracy- loving liberals, behaved at the scene. Th e transition from verbal abuse to physical attack on Wu Fatian shocked and disappointed many sympathetic to liberal views in China, prompting some to remark that the brawl smeared the image of liberals and in eff ect made more room for those opposing liberal and demo cratic views in China.53

Following these high- profi le incidents, “public intellectual” has turned into a widely accepted pejorative in China. Not only is the hooliganization

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 41

of public intellectuals a tragic turn of China’s emerging civil society, it also casts serious doubt on the conducive role that the Internet is thought to have played in the development of China’s emergent civil society. Instead, through social media, paid commentators, and self- seeking personalities, abrasive exchanges between ideological factions have propelled the Chinese online space to be more fragmentary, polarized, theatrical, and cynical over time.

Control Regime in Action

To respond to new forms of digital activism and curb the po liti cal con- sequences of social media, China’s control regime has implemented various new mea sures besides fi ltering and hiring pro- state commentators to fore- stall collective actions. Two are highlighted here: (1) real name registration policy and (2) anti- rumor campaigns.

Real Name Registration Policy

Th e rapid growth of the weibo user base from nil to 278 million in three years worried authorities.54 During its ascendance, Chinese weibo has witnessed many explosive exposures of corrupt offi cials, government unaccountability, and social injustices, thriving as the cyber epicenter of China’s sociopo liti cal lives. Weibo’s aff ordances and deep integration into China’s public life are regulatory nightmares. To curtail public rage on weibo, Beijing Municipal Provisions for Microblog Development and Management (Microblog Provi- sions hereaft er) was promulgated on December 16, 2011, targeting more than a dozen microblog ser vice providers headquartered in Beijing, especially Sina Weibo.55 Such provisions required weibo operators to implement real name registration by March 16, 2012.

Ostensibly promoted by the state to tame online rumors and safeguard a healthy online environment, the policy is seen as an offi cial tactic to curb public discourse, targeting each microblogger.56 Specifi cally, users are ex- pected to register their IDs with weibo as mandated by the state. Following the principle “front stage voluntary, backstage real name,” microbloggers can use pseudo user names, but they are asked to register their real identi- ties backstage with weibo operators, linked to their national ID cards, mobile phone numbers, or other identifi cations. Weibo businesses maintain their

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

42 Min Jiang

servers do not retain user ID information, but users’ national ID card in- formation will be compared against public security’s database to verify user identity. Unregistered users can view microblogs but cannot post or pass along any.57 By March  2012, Sina reportedly had verifi ed 60  percent of its users.58 In December 2012, the policy was passed as law in the National Peo- ple’s Congress.59 Th e State Council expected major portal websites to verify user identity by June 2014, although, to date it is not clear how many users have registered with their real identities.60

Specifi cally, Article 8 of the Microblog Provisions requires microblog- ging ser vice providers (MSPs) to “build a comprehensive system of con- tent evaluation and monitor the production, reproduction, publication, and distribution of microblog information.” 61 Article 9 stipulates: “Any or ga ni za tion or individual . . . must register with real name. Th e use of fake or stolen ID cards, business registration information, or or ga ni za tion code is forbidden. Websites that off er microblog ser vice should ensure the truth- fulness of user registration information.” Additionally, Article 5 eff ectively legalizes censorship by commercial intermediaries. In December 2012, the real name registration policy was endorsed by the National People’s Con- gress Decision on Strengthening Internet Information Protection, which requires all ISPs to collect users’ real names when providing Internet con- nection, analog phones, mobile phones, or information publishing.62

Th ese top- down mandates triggered a heated debate among weibo operators and users. Tencent CEO, Ma Huateng, publicly opposed the policy, arguing that it poses a great threat to user privacy and security and places an unreasonable burden on ISPs. Ma’s sentiments were echoed by Chen Tong, Sina’s editor in chief, who argued back in 2005 that the indiscriminate adoption of real name policy was unlikely to deter slander or other illegal activities.63 However, unable to resist state pressures, Sina, for instance, reportedly hired more than a thousand people to manually monitor and delete weibo posts around the clock besides using computational fi ltering and encouraging weibo users to fl ag abusive users.64

Regulators brushed aside public concerns for privacy and rights to expres- sion, stressing instead reducing “pornography, rumors, slander, fake identi- ties that threaten network security and social stability.” 65 Downplaying the policy’s chilling eff ects, China Central Tele vi sion (CCTV) deleted its own news on the bankruptcy of South Korea’s real name registration policy.66 State media also actively promoted stories that gave citizens the false impression

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 43

that such a policy was prevalent elsewhere in the world. Li Yizhong, the for- mer minister of industry and information, publicly stated: “Internet real name registration, according to our research, is adopted by most countries.” 67 While “real name” sites like Facebook are pop u lar around the world, they are not mandated by the state or connected to users’ national IDs. Li’s comments were fl atly rejected by some. One user remarked: “Th ere are many such ‘mosts.’ Most countries have competitive elections. Most countries’ offi cials publish their property rec ords. Most countries’ highways are free. Most coun- tries don’t limit the mobility of their residents through Hukou system. Most countries have press freedom.” 68 Authorities’ impulse to control information fl ow and public opinion through the real name registration policy is not new, but the speed and extent to which the policy has been pushed through with- out strong public opposition is alarming.

Anti- Rumor Campaigns

Th e rollout of real name registration policy may be considered part of Chinese authorities’ much larger campaign to regulate speech online. Besides encouraging weibo users to self- censor through legislation, the latest anti- rumor campaign also employs judicial decisions and extralegal tactics to achieve the state’s regulatory goals, targeting in par tic u lar weibo celebrities, or “Big Vs.”

In September 2013, China’s highest court handed down a judicial deci- sion, announcing stiff penalties for posting rumors that get shared fi ve hun- dred times or seen fi ve thousand times.69 A convicted off ense could carry a three- year jail sentence, a ruling deemed by many as setting a dangerous pre- ce dent for free speech despite reported cases of fabricated rumors for money and infl uence. Th e fi rst person to run afoul of the law was an outspoken sixteen- year- old, Yang Hui, who questioned the local police investigation of a suicide case in Gansu Province. Th e police’s evidence, he argued, was highly inadequate. His accusation quickly went viral. But it turns out Yang’s “rumor” was right. Th e police’s case eventually collapsed, and the local police chief was suspended. Yang was released. China Daily, however, calls the incident “an accident.”70 In a fundamentally fl awed legal system, “rumor” is oft en used as a means of social protest and proves to have an unusual degree of truth and accuracy in China.71 Instead of increasing government transparency

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

44 Min Jiang

and responsiveness, the state’s demonization of “rumor” produces a chill- ing eff ect on the public’s ability to know, to question, and to act.

Th e most prominent cases of state rumor campaigns were orchestrated via offi cial Chinese media. One targeted a vocal Chinese American weibo celebrity and investor Charles Xue and another New Express reporter Chen Yongzhou. Known as “Xue Manzi” on the Chinese Internet, Xue became fa- mous for championing several charity causes, including the 2011 campaign against child traffi cking and his initiative to ask netizens to pitch projects over weibo for which he provided angel investment. By the time he was arrested for prostitution solicitation on August 23, 2013, he had more than 12 million weibo followers. It was widely speculated that Xue’s criticism of social and police issues prompted the detention. In early August, Xue was among a group of “Big Vs” invited to meet with the head of the State Internet Infor- mation Offi ce (SIIO), who urged the group to be more constructive in their online postings. It seems offi cials did not deem his per for mance adequate. Paraded on state tele vi sion CCTV, Xue appeared rueful in jail clothes and confessed his wrongdoing. Even Hu Xijin, editor in chief of Party paper Global Times, commented on Sina Weibo (later removed): “Using sexual scandal, tax evasion and so on to take down po liti cal foes is a hidden rule common among governments worldwide.”72 By making an example of Xue, the state shamed a few “Big Vs” and intimidated others.

Equally gripping is the Chen Yongzhou incident. Chen was detained in Guangzhou by Changsha police on October 18, 2013, for allegedly defaming Changsha- based, state- owned Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science & Technol- ogy, China’s second- largest heavy equipment maker. On October 23 and 24, New Express printed extra- large- font headlines calling for Chen’s release, a move seen as an unpre ce dented call for press freedom. On October 26, Chen appeared in a nine- minute national TV broadcast confessing to fi ling stories in exchange for payment from an outside company. Th e story exploded on Chinese social media with many expressing sympathy for Chen and dis- approving of police and CCTV’s abuse of power. Although journalism fraud and bribing is a real issue, people noted the following: Changsha police ar- rived in Guangzhou in Zoomlion’s car; the state- owned company is well connected with local and national authorities; Chen is known for diligent fact- checking and journalist ethics; the CCTV story did not name the third party bribing Chen but obtained and aired Chen’s confessions prior to court trial.73 Th e truth may never be known, but the “killing the monkey to scare

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 45

the chicken” tactic is unlikely to be eff ective in eradicating rumors or people’s challenges to authorities in China in the long run.

Refl ections on the (Un)Civil Society

Th e chapter argues that in the social media era, the coevolution of the Inter- net, civil society, and authoritarianism has produced a mixed impact on China’s sociopo liti cal lives. A few new trends of China’s Internet and online activism are surveyed in the chapter, including real- time activism, online po liti cal jamming, weibo celebrities, and the rise of an uncivil online society. Th e state’s containment of public opinion on Chinese social media via legal and extralegal means, such as the real name registration policy and anti- rumor campaigns, are also discussed. In addition, the amplifi cation of both civil and uncivil tendencies on the Chinese Internet has engendered a greater degree of fragmentation, polarization, and cynicism among Chinese netizens for which previous literature on Chinese online civic spaces has not ade- quately accounted.

“Uncivil society” is highlighted here to draw attention to the diffi culty of creating and sustaining civil society, particularly in the Chinese context. Previously, three schools of thought dominated the understanding of civil society: civil society as associational life; civil society as the good society re- sulting from free association; and civil society as the public sphere where citizens engage in discussions over public issues and arrive at consensus.74 Th ese three related views of civil society point to the necessity to build voluntary associations based on tolerance and cooperation, eff ective insti- tutions that produce good government, and the capacity to deliberate demo- cratically. Implicit in these dominant views of civil society are positive assumptions about human nature, consensus formation, and institution building, views that have been critiqued by many for being incapable of recognizing the “agonistic pluralism” world in which we live.75 By remov- ing power considerations and basing deliberation purely on rationality and morality, Habermas’s construction of the public sphere and civil society, though desirable, is seen as far too idealistic, detached from reality.76

Applying the concept of civil society to China encounters additional challenges. While Mouff e’s departure from “public sphere” and introduction of “agonistic pluralism” recognize social confl icts with productive potentials,

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

46 Min Jiang

this agonism still rests on an “adhesion to the ethico- political principles of democracy” that is feeble if not absent in China.77 With limited protection for individual rights and arbitrary practice of the rule of law, Chinese poli- tics is dominated by struggles between elite factions at the very top;78 con- fl icts between diff erent social, economic, and ideological strata; and multiple confrontations between the state and the citizenry.79 Ultimately, authori- tarian order and opaque operations of power pose fundamental threats to China’s emerging civil society.80

“Uncivil society online” is used here to capture the extreme incivility of online exchanges between individuals and groups over public issues, which not only fail to produce solutions to problems but also accentuate group identities and widen the ideological chasms between them. Th is notion underscores the following: (1) the plentitude of disrespect between inter- locutors, (2) schisms between groups in ideology and values, and (3) inad- equate mechanisms to channel online exchanges to build eff ective civic institutions. One may reasonably argue that “uncivil society” is not a China- specifi c phenomenon. Th e crisis in democracy experienced in many West- ern societies today— systemic corruption, widespread po liti cal apathy, and failed governance—is also accompanied by an “uncivil” turn in civic life; however, China’s “uncivil society” is embedded in its own unique historical, economic, and sociopo liti cal contexts.81

Further, a conceptualization of civil society as purely oppositional to the state is limiting. On the one hand, it tends to equate “civil society” with “po liti cal society,” and, on the other, it downplays the heterogeneous groups inhabiting the “civil society” space and becomes increasingly inadequate to capture the complex dynamics on the ground.82 As a much larger and diverse Chinese population, rather than a small group of liberal elites, has come to adopt the Internet, the implicit assumption of a liberal subject demanding social justice, media freedom, and po liti cal reforms online may be limited. A rising cacophony nowadays stems not only from contentions between the state and grassroots oppositions but also between various factions of “civil society” groups, including po liti cally conservative, chauvinist, nationalistic, and apathetic subjects and businesses.83

While civil society is commonly associated with the third space, distinct from the private sphere, government, and business as a groundswell for ac- tivism against authorities, in reality the variety of individuals and groups making up “civil society” and the interactions between them are oft en far too complex to be reduced to a linear formula of “civil society = public

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Coevolution of the Internet 47

sphere = NGOs = empowerment.”84 On the darker side, civil society can include the Mafi a and terrorists.85 In less extreme forms, members of civil so- ciety can include po liti cal opportunists, nationalist ideologues, and reaction- aries. Moreover, civil society’s conceptual in de pen dence from the state and commercial interest oft en fails to translate straightforwardly in practice. Far from it, civil society groups such as human rights organizations in authoritar- ian countries and anticapitalist associations are oft en the targets of state and corporate co- optation.86 Conversely, ideologue factions and trade as- sociations too can seek to infl uence po liti cal and fi nancial authorities.

Th e problematization of “civil society” thus invites a more critical and nuanced reading and analysis of China’s emergent civil society and its en- gagement with the Internet and social media. Previously, for instance, Le and Yang noted that the various strains of China’s online sociopo liti cal discourses can be grouped into fi ve major ideological orientations: Far Left , moderate left , neutral, moderate right, Far Right.87 Netizens’ attitudes toward a unifi ed Chinese nation, Chinese government’s policies, traditional Chinese culture, and Western po liti cal/economic systems oft en guide their choices of online groups, discourses, and interactions with others online. A 2013 mainland China national online survey conducted by Ma and Zhang reveals that among Chinese netizens, “rightists” (those who favor rule of law, protection of personal rights and freedoms, and market economy) constitute 38.7 percent; “left ists” (those who strongly support nationalism and oppose Western po liti cal and eco- nomic systems) make up only 6.2 percent; while the majority are centrists at 55.1 percent. Zhang’s national survey published in 2012, however, fi nds left ists constitute 38.1  percent of Chinese citizens, rightists 8  percent, and centrists 51.5 percent.88 Due to the surveys’ inherent research limitations (for example, the representativeness of survey participants), the opposing statistics they of- fered failed to produce conclusive evidence of the ideological makeup of Chi- nese citizens. However, it seems the identifi cation of such ideological groupings and their potential consensus could be a productive route to understanding the changing Chinese civic spaces besides various forms of social stratifi ca- tion along class, gender, race, generational, and rural- urban fault lines.

Conclusion

Although social media platforms such as Sina Weibo provide technological aff ordances for instantaneous communication and endless possibilities of

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

48 Min Jiang

group formation, their capacity for civic empowerment is mediated through many factors, including grassroots demands and or ga ni za tion, state inter- vention, and Internet ser vice providers’ policies and practices, as well as the civic groups’ interactions with one another. Social media can serve as a crit- ical space for expressing and channeling public opinion in China, but they are unlikely to be the ultimate game changer. Th e ability of the Internet to transform social and po liti cal realities increasingly needs to suffi ciently ac- count for the eff ect of divergent cyber subjectivities and a wider range of so- cial, economic, and po liti cal factors beyond merely considering the Internet’s technological impact on the state or the grass roots in general.

Such a transition would require a more sophisticated framework to dis- sect the heterogeneous components that make up China’s online civic spaces today without losing sight of the power the authoritarian state can assert over the society or the power of individuals to expand their spheres of infl uences. It also means to take into account both civil and uncivil elements of China’s emergent civil society and their appropriation of new media for identity for- mation and collective mobilization. Previous work has examined in- depth Internet use by diverse civic groups: dissidents, working class, nationalists, activists, environmentalists, urban youth, and young migrant women.89 Each of the subgroups carries distinct yet mixed attitudes toward and demands for the state, the market, and other social strata. Together, they oft en render the emergent Chinese civil society “praetorian,” swirling in extensive and sometimes very intensive po liti cal participation without being channeled eff ectively through formal institutions.90

Positive development of public spaces and power relations in China re- lies as much on institutional politics to eff ectively channel public opinion as it does on identity politics and progressive changes in subjectivity through everyday life interactions. While the Internet mediates such negotiations and is increasingly indispensable to the parties involved, it does not determine their outcomes. Th e contextualized use of the Internet and new media, shaped by the social, cultural, and po liti cal protocols surrounding such technologies, ultimately does.

This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:45:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

159

O

CONCLUSION

CHINA’S LONG REVOLUTION

nline activism appeared in China in the mid-1990s, at a time when the revolutionary spirit of the student movement in 1989 had been sapped. It has become increasingly frequent and influential since its appearance. I have examined more than seventy cases in this book, involving hundreds of civic groups, online communities, and Web sites, and numerous people. Some of

these cases were sustained struggles; others were episodic. Some involved large-scale, spontaneous protest activities; others were organized or took moderate or surreptitious forms. The issues ranged broadly, from the most horrific forms of human exploitation to controversies about single parenthood and sexual mores. All this adds up to an image of a restive society alive with conflict and contention. Together with the larger currents of popular contention in contemporary China, online activism marks the palpable revival of the revolutionary spirit.

At the macro level, Chinese online activism is a generalized response to the consequences of Chinese modernity. It is a countermovement rooted in material grievances and an identity movement born out of the identity crisis associated with dramatic change. In reality, most cases of activism involve overlapping concerns. Thus the antidiscrimination struggles by diabetes patients and hepatitis-B carriers discussed in

are rooted in concerns about individual dignity. Yet they also involve practicalchapter 1 matters of job placement or educational opportunities. In the same chapter, the cases of Sun Zhigang and Wei Wenhua represent protests against a form of political oppression that has become prevalent only in the past decade. This is the random and ruthless use of violence against citizens. In Sun Zhigang’s case, the perpetrators were the police. In Wei Wenhua’s case, they were city inspectors. Both groups of persecutors were law-enforcement personnel. These cases indicate the cancerous conditions of the law-enforcement authorities. If the conditions of rapid change and dislocation heighten1

identity concerns and intensify yearnings for recognition and belonging, the conditions of political oppression are the soil for rebellion.

At the meso and micro levels, online activism reflects Chinese citizens’ struggles in dynamic interaction with political, cultural, social, economic, and global conditions. Dynamic and multidimensional interaction reflects the condition of growing complexity in the age of globalization. Social activism in China responds to these complex conditions.

First, the issues and forms of online activism reflect the ways in which citizens creatively negotiate political power. That the Internet is under strict control is well known. Much less is known about the varieties of citizen activism online. In , I showed that issuechapter 2 resonance and issue-specific political opportunity are important factors in influencing which contentious issues enter the public sphere. I identified three ways in which citizens creatively respond to Internet control—rightful resistance, artful contention, and digital hidden transcripts. As the forms of domination change, so do the forms of resistance. The

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

160

simple truth is that domination is always met with resistance. But simple truths are often forgotten.

The second factor in the multi-interactionism model of online activism is culture. I have shown that the expression of contention in cyberspace depends on cultural tools and symbolic resources. It relies on language, symbols, imagery, sounds, and rhetorical conventions of expression. Even using the Internet to mobilize street demonstrations is a cultural activity. The culture of online activism is informed by history and tradition. Time-honored rituals and genres of contention have persisted in the Internet age. Like mental structures, they provide contemporary activism with cultural schemas. Both verbal2

and nonverbal rituals in Chinese contentious culture have been extended to cyberspace. The traditional practice of linking up as a form of petition journey is replicated online with the new kinds of linkages made possible by the Internet networks. Among the verbal rituals and genres I discussed are sloganeering, wall posters, and verse. These are perennial elements of popular protest in modern China. Yet they have taken on new forms and power in cyberspace because of the speed and scope of diffusion and the ease of publication. Political satire in the form of “slippery jingles,” for example, is among the most popular e-mail and text-messaging forwards; there is now a veritable electronic folklore exposing various social problems.

At the same time, online activism demonstrates enormous cultural creativity and innovation. Existing cultural forms are given new energy. New forms and practices have multiplied. Among the new practices I analyzed in are contention in BBS forums,chapter 3 text messaging, blogging, hacktivism, the hosting of campaign Web sites, and online signature petitions. Some newer forms, such as blogs, bear the imprints of the tradition of text-based communication. Others are multimedia, blending text with image, sound, and video files. Among the most innovative genres and practices used in online activism are Flash films, digital photographs, and digital videos. Like traditional texts, they are produced by individuals or groups, but they require a different kind of creativity—the facility to handle creative software and other digital technologies. Their power derives from both their direct visual and aural appeal and the ease and speed of dissemination.

Compared with earlier social movements, online activism manifests a different style. It is at once more playful and more prosaic, whereas earlier social movements often had an epic style suited to the expression of apocalyptic visions. Parodic forms are prevalent in online contention, facilitated by the ease and creative potential of new media technologies. The prosaic side of the new style is evident in the sometimes matter-of-fact approaches to claims making, such as the meticulous calculation of real-estate prices that the blogger in

provided in his call for a movement to boycott home buying. As I will note below,chapter 4 the new styles of online activism are symptomatic of other changes in Chinese society.

Third, online activism has a business dimension. As if to keep up with the marketization of Chinese society, activism has attained market value. Some activists adopt marketing strategies to push their causes. Consumer activist Wang Hai, among others, used his Web site to expose counterfeit products while charging customers for the legal-aid services he provides. More importantly, Internet businesses have an vested interest in online contention, because contentious activities increase Web traffic. Major Web sites therefore welcome and embrace controversial media events and encourage their users to participate. This was true in the early history of the Chinese Internet, but it has become all the more so in recent years. My analysis of the “South China tiger” case in illustrates one Webchapter 5 company’s business strategies when a contentious event occurs. Government regulations allow commercial Web sites to carry news only from official news agencies and forbid them to produce their own news. Yet the business firm bypassed this rule through a nominal partnership with a provincial official Web site. At the same time, the firm promoted user participation and discussion through its “response to news” feature. As I also indicated in C

op yr ig ht @ 2 01 1. C ol um bi a Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

161

, however, business interests in online contention may result in manipulativechapter 5 practices, thus damaging public debate. The business of contention must be viewed critically, but it does not negate the significance of this new phenomenon. Despite critiques of media commercialization, the market has a more ambivalent relationship to politics than is acknowledged. Under specific historical circumstances, it may provide the conditions for more open political participation.

The fourth factor is civil society, of which I examined two main components. Urban civic associations, the more formal of the two components, make active use of the Internet despite resource shortage. Clearly, a web of civic associations has emerged. Given the political constraints facing civil society in China, the Internet is a strategic opportunity and resource for achieving organizational development and social change. The less formal of the two components of civil society is the online communities. Here my findings go beyond current studies of online communities in China or elsewhere. Many studies have shown, correctly, the “reality” of virtual communities, arguing that they are just as real as offline communities. Such analysis emphasizes the practical aspects of online communities but neglects their meaning as spaces for identity and moral exploration. It also tends to focus on the internal dynamics of computer-mediated interaction, with little attention to their connections to the broader patterns of contemporary life.

My analysis in reveals a vibrant utopian impulse in Chinese onlinechapter 7 communities. This impulse is expressed in idealized images of online communities as spaces of freedom, solidarity, and social justice. In his famous study of elementary forms of religious life, Emile Durkheim wrote that “a society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal.” Creating an ideal is society’s way of3

creating and recreating itself. The ideal represents the sacred values of the community. Chinese online communities are thus both the products and the vehicles of social regeneration. Through them, people exert their work of the imagination. The values of freedom, solidarity, and justice both motivate online activism and are reaffirmed in the process. Such social regeneration is urgent, because the new conditions of Chinese modernity, such as new forms of inequalities, have greatly strained community and social justice. Contemporary Chinese modernity has created greater freedom in individual life. For large segments of the population, the choices of life have multiplied. But this freedom comes with new forms of anxiety and insecurity. The utopian impulse is rooted in these broader social transformations. As long as these conditions remain, people will continue to seek freedom, justice, and solidarity through online communities. But as my analysis also shows, they will not limit their ideas and action to cyberspace but will inevitably bring them to bear on the social spaces they inhabit. Nor, of course, do I intend to imply that all that happens in online communities is virtuous by civic standards.

The fifth factor in my multi-interactionism model of online activism is transnationalism. In , I examined three broad types of transnational activists—the Chinese diaspora,chapter 8

international NGOs, and domestic activists. A main finding is that the radicalization of online activism is in direct proportion to the degree of transnationalization. The more4

transnational, the more radical and confrontational. This finding is significant because it reveals the limits of political control in the age of globalization. Observers of Internet control in China often neglect the contentious character of Chinese Internet culture. One reason for this is that they fail to see other balancing conditions, such as activists’ creativity, business interests, civil-society initiatives, and the possibilities of engaging in long-distance, transnational activism. If transnationalization improves the chances of more radical forms of activism, it is because it increases connections between domestic and international activists and thus gives domestic activists a degree of leverage that would otherwise be unavailable. This finding does not negate the continuing importance of the state. It shows, rather, that both the state and its challengers are based in an increasingly complex andC

op yr ig ht @ 2 01 1. C ol um bi a Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

162

connected world. As challengers gain more leverage, so is the state subject to more sources of pressure.

A Cultural Revolution

The multidimensional interactions that drive Chinese online activism suggest that online activism is a central locus of tension and conflict in contemporary Chinese society. Analyzing online activism provides a unique angle for understanding broader social trends. The forms, dynamics, and consequences of online activism contain elements of the structures of feeling in Chinese society. I will propose that Chinese online activism is emblematic of a communication revolution in contemporary China. This communication revolution is a cultural revolution in the sense that it significantly expands the horizons of learning and communication for ordinary people. I will further propose that this communication revolution is a social revolution, because the ordinary people assume an unprecedented role as agents of change and because new social formations are among its most profound outcomes.

I will propose, finally, that this communication revolution is expanding citizens’ unofficial democracy. It is true that democracy as a political system, an important element in Raymond Williams’s long revolution, is missing from China’s long revolution. Yet as Williams argues, the progress of democracy is not limited to simple political change. It depends ultimately “on conceptions of an open society and of freely cooperating individuals which alone are capable of releasing the creative potentiality of the changes in working skills and communication.” The long revolution “is not for democracy as a political system alone” but derives its meaning from new conceptions and practices of self, society, and politics. Ultimately, these new conceptions and practices are the social and cultural5

foundations for a democratic political system. Let me begin with the cultural revolution. The culture of online activism is dynamic and

creative. It marks a significant change in the style of contention in recent Chinese history. Yet its significance goes beyond what it means as a form of contention. It signifies and contributes to more basic and profound trends of cultural change in Chinese society. Such change is profound even in comparison with periods as recent as the 1980s, which witnessed a period of extraordinary cultural effervescence. From the “misty poetry” in the early 1980s to the “culture fever” later in that decade, one cultural movement followed another. The fields of art and literature were full of creativity. A dazzling array of works was published. Literary journals sold millions of copies and were presumably read by millions more. Yet the main force of this cultural blossoming consisted of intellectuals, writers,6

artists, and professors. Its elitist bias was exposed most starkly during the climactic event of that age—the student movement in 1989. During that movement, despite belated efforts to unite with workers and peasants, students and intellectuals not only dominated the stage of political action but deliberately tried to distinguish themselves as the torchbearers—the “chosen few.”

To the extent that the Internet was first adopted in universities and research institutions in China, it had an elitist origin. Yet its rapid nationwide diffusion brought it quickly within the reach of the average urban consumer, despite the persistent digital divide. With this comes the expansion of culture, of which online activism is only the most radical expression. This cultural expansion is evident in three aspects—the sources of information and means of learning, the tools of cultural production and innovation, and the spaces of communication.

First, for the vast majority of Internet users, one of the most exciting things about the Internet is that it opens up new worlds of information and learning. The biannual Internet surveys produced by CNNIC since 1997 consistently show that the majority of people useCo

py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

163

the Internet for information seeking. The personal stories I collected about Internet use in the earlier years of China’s Internet history exuded excitement about the new possibilities the Internet offered. Today, as more and more people begin to take it for granted, the thrill people experienced when they first signed on to the Internet is already being forgotten. It shows how far the Chinese people have come in just over ten years, but the historical significance of the expansion of information sources can hardly be overstated.

To be sure, the existing digital divide means that many people still have no access to online information. Even here, however, there are interesting new experiments. In some7

remote areas, for example, county-level governments have launched projects to wire villages indirectly. One study finds that in the county of Jinta in Gansu Province, the county information center collects and compiles agricultural information from the Internet and posts the information online. Then teachers in village schools use the school computer facilities to print and photocopy the information and distribute it to farmers. In other rural areas,8

Internet bars and cellphones provide options in the absence of home Internet access. Indeed, as of December 2007, close to half of all Internet users in rural areas accessed the Internet in Internet bars; 23 percent use cellphones for access. Among migrant workers,9

the culture of mobile phones and Internet bars is just as dynamic and colorful as the broader Internet culture in China. Some Chinese scholars believe that these alternative10

methods of Internet access will prove to be effective means of narrowing the digital divide. In the long run, the real divide is not access but use and capability, which are shaped by11

the entire structure of social stratification and inequality in a society. The fundamental solution therefore depends on attacking social inequality.

Second is the expansion of tools of cultural production and innovation. Here again, online activism both reflects and leads larger trends of cultural creativity. Online activism involves quintessentially activities of cultural production and innovation. This is evident in every case I discussed in this book. Writing BBS posts, creating Flash and digital videos, setting up and maintaining campaign and petition Web sites, various forms of “artful contention” and digital “hidden transcripts”—these are all creative activities. That the Internet and other new information technologies offer tools for these creative activities is in itself significant. But the real significance lies in the democratization of these tools. There have always been tools of cultural production and creativity, but rarely have ordinary joes had such broad access to them. Certainly, because of the digital divide, not all people have access or the capability to use these new creative tools. Yet here again it is worth emphasizing that although the digital divide is a barrier to overcome, it does not shadow the real progress of the communication revolution. The broad trend in the past decade has been the rapid expansion of access. More than any other creative technology before, these new communication technologies equip the common people with the tools for creating their own cultural products.

Common people have become publishers, editors, writers, and artists, rather than just consumers, audience, and readers. Instead of just trying to receive and digest knowledge produced by dead authors or living authorities, they become knowledge producers. The12

enormous creative potential of the common people is released. This is crucial for correcting the asymmetry in knowledge production. In modern society, knowledge production is socially organized such that a minority of experts, authorities, and institutions control the processes of knowledge production and certification. The dominant ideas of society are the ideas of this minority. This in itself runs counter to the principles of a democratic culture. Thus when the ordinary people become knowledge producers, they infuse a new culture into society. They provide alternative perspectives, different standpoints, and more diverse life experiences. Their alternative experiences and perspectives can challenge cultural

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

164

stereotypes, correct misinformation, and resist symbolic violence (symbolic violence meaning violence inflicted on society by the ruling elites through labeling, categorization, and other discursive forms).

The cases of online activism I studied all in one way or another involved the common people as knowledge producers. The knowledge they created typically subverted received wisdom or prevailing views. Thus activists among hepatitis-B carriers challenged the received wisdom about the vectors of infection for this virus and pointed out how discriminatory government policies helped perpetuate popular misconceptions. Similarly, Flash videos about animal protection during the avian flu crisis in 2005, by taking the perspectives of birds and chickens, revealed the mindlessness, paranoia, and cruelty that human beings are capable of during times of perceived danger. And of course, a main part of consumer-rights defense is to expose counterfeit products.

The expansion of tools of cultural creativity and the release of the creative energies of the common people are directly related to the extension of existing cultural forms and the appearance of new ones. An important feature of online activism is its diverse genres and rituals. These cultural forms are the vehicles of citizen activism. They are also the vehicles of popular sentiments in general. Herein lies the significance of these cultural forms. For what they express, ultimately, are the concerns and aspirations of the common people. Slippery jingles are a popular cultural form, and so are Flash videos, youtube videos, blogs, and BBS postings. They communicate experiences, viewpoints, and values often at variance with those carried in official forms. That is why between popular and official forms there is always conflict. One seeks to dominate, the other resists. Resistance is more effective the more creative it is.

The third area of cultural expansion is the emergence of a citizens’ discourse space. A citizens’ discourse space is where people can voice concerns and express their feelings and opinions. To expand citizens’ discourse space is an important goal of the new citizen13

activism. A major achievement in this respect, not surprisingly, is the social construction of the Internet as such a space. Nowhere else do Chinese citizens participate more actively and directly in communication about public affairs. Nowhere else are so many social issues brought into public discussion on a daily basis.

A new concept is born out of a new reality while shaping that reality. “Discourse space,” or , is one of the new vocabulary terms linked to citizen activism in Chinahuayu kongjian today. Other examples include “discourse right” ( ), “rights protection” (huayu quan wei quan ), “disempowered groups” ( ), “right to know” ( ), “citizen rights” (ruoshi qunti zhiqing quan

), “public participation” ( ), “grassroots” ( ), “publicgongmin quan gongzhong canyu caogen sphere” ( ), and “civil society” ( ). Some of these concepts,gonggong lingyu gongmin shehui such as “right to know” and “public sphere,” are entirely new coinages or translations.14

Others use Chinese terms and expressions used in the past, but the old concepts are replaced with new ones emphasizing citizen participation. For example, in the earlier period, was the Chinese equivalent of the English word “grassroots.” Literallyjiceng meaning “foundation” or “infrastructure,” is a term with a revolutionary history. Thejiceng hallmark of Mao’s organizational approach, the so-called mass-line, was based on the15

assumption that the voice of the party should penetrate into the very basic fabric of Chinese life—the or foundation. The new vocabulary has abandoned the term andjiceng jiceng adopted a literal translation of the English word “grassroots” as .caogen

A citizens’ discourse space is thus also a space for fashioning a new language and a new identity. Perhaps the most important new identity fashioned in cyberspace is the rather mundane term “netizen” ( ). A netizen is an Internet user, but both in Chinese andwang min English, the term carries the meaning of a citizen, because it combines the two words ofCo

py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

165

“Internet” and “citizen” into one. But the mundane netizens in China today are synonymous with being fearless, informed, impassioned, and not easily deceived. Sometimes they are denigrated as Internet mobs ( ), but recall that, in history, whenever thewangluo baomin common people act up they are denounced as mobs. It is true that there is a great deal of radicalism in Chinese cyberspace, but as I have shown in these chapters, Internet radicals are often called into being by even more radical forms of social injustice. The popular

carried a story on January 13, 2008, titled “Don’t Even ThinkSouthern Metropolis News About Deceiving Netizens.” The story refers to many of the cases of Internet contention that happened in 2007 and that are discussed in this book. The story argues that these Internet events show convincingly that in the Internet age, netizens will not let themselves be deceived by anyone, because “suppression and deception will only strengthen netizens’ desire to express themselves.”16

A Social Revolution

China’s communication revolution is also a social revolution. It is social because its dynamics are social dynamics, because its primary agents of change are the ordinary people, and because its most profound influences appear in the form of new social formations. It is revolutionary not because it happens abruptly but because in the depth and scope of its influences, it is unparalleled in history. The Internet revolution marks, accompanies, and contributes to profound changes in all aspects of Chinese society.

The communication revolution is rooted in contemporary social conditions. As I argued in , online activism responds to two central consequences of Chinese modernity.chapter 1

One is the social polarization that has accompanied China’s rapid economic development. Economic developments do not automatically bring about social progress. Rather, grave social injustices and insidious forms of social inequality have become exacerbated over the course of economic developments. Many of the spontaneous forms of online protests happen as a countermovement against social injustice and inequality. The other consequence is social dislocation. Social injustices happen to the poor, the weak, and the disempowered. Social dislocation touches everyone in a rapidly changing society, the upwardly as well as the downwardly mobile. The consequences of social dislocation are identity anxieties and crises. Online activism is thus also an identity movement, expressed as yearnings and struggles for social recognition, personal dignity, and a sense of community.

Not surprisingly, the yearnings for justice, identity, and community are translated into acts of communication, for communication is about community and vice versa. A17

communication revolution is necessarily a social revolution. The rapid development of the Internet is as much about technological change as it is about social change. It often seems that a new development in communications technology triggers social change. But the opposite is just as true. New technological developments are just as much responses to social needs. A dynamic and participatory Internet culture would be hard to imagine without the intense social yearnings for communication. Not only is society a cause of the communication revolution, but the dynamics of the communication revolution are also social. Never before has social participation been as important an engine of technological development as in the case of the Internet today. The Internet would not be what it is without social participation. Participation on the Internet is a productive activity. No wonder that Internet firms are willing to invest their resources in maintaining free blogs and online forums, for these free spaces of communication are also spaces of social and economic production.

Just as the cultural revolution associated with the Internet creates new cultural forms, soC op yr ig ht @ 2 01 1. C ol um bi a Un iv er si ty P re ss .

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

166

its social consequences are manifest in the rise of new social forms and formations. Over a decade of online communication has created numerous online communities. New social types have proliferated, ranging from citizen journalists and bloggers to hackers, cybernationalists, BBS hosts, Flash animators, Internet gamers, and, of course, online activists. Civic associations maintain an active Web presence and use Web sites to achieve organizational visibility and promote causes of social change.

The significance of these new forms and formations is fourfold. First, they are significant because of the relative weakness of citizen organizing in the history of the PRC. Citizen organizing was not absent in the past, but it lacked a legitimate and institutionalized base. Today, it has attained a degree of institutionalization. Online communities are legitimate formations, and as I showed in , their activities extend offline. Civic associationschapter 7 such as NGOs have to negotiate restrictive state regulations in what they can or cannot do, but they enjoy de facto or de jure legitimacy and have room to maneuver. This is not to underestimate the political restrictions they face, but rather to recognize the importance of the institutionalization of new social forms.

Second, the size and scale of citizen organizing are significant. The largest online communities have millions of registered members, larger than any other form of social organization except for the Chinese Communist Party itself. There are also tens of thousands of small communities. The scale is equally remarkable, considering that the members in many communities are scattered not only in different cities but in different regions of the world. The social interactions take place at multiple levels. All this translates into an enormous synergy of social interaction. For any political ruler, it is a new social force to reckon with. Growing control of the Internet partly reflects the state’s awareness of this new social force.

Third, the new social formations are significant for the values they represent. My analysis of online communities in shows that members of online communities not onlychapter 7 express critiques of social reality and affirm moral values they see as damaged in contemporary society but are ready to act on their cherished values. They demonstrate a high degree of civic engagement, or, in the words of some Chinese scholars, “civicness.”18

At a time when Chinese society is plagued by a crisis of trust, it may appear ironic that trust should exist in online communities. As I showed in , members of onlinechapter 7 communities both demonstrate high degrees of trust and strive to reaffirm it. The irony is superficial. The reality is that if communication remains open, people will build trust. Trust is only as poor as communication.

Finally, the new forms and formations represent new developments in Chinese civil society. As I indicated in my introduction, civil society is a loaded concept, but it is only as loaded as history itself. Historical developments in China today have given it new meaning. When the concepts of “public sphere” and “civil society” were first introduced into Chinese intellectual discourse in the late 1980s, they were alien. They remain controversial in the Western scholarly literature. Yet in China today, they have become key concepts both in intellectual and popular, journalistic discourse. Some Chinese scholars have argued recently that with the thriving of civic associations China has stepped onto the threshold of a civil society. Thresholds aside, my analysis of online organizing and online communities19

supports the argument that a veritable associational revolution in China is happening.20

Online social formations are a crucial component of this associational revolution. It bears emphasis that online social formations are always projects under construction because of their openness and dynamism. Different viewpoints and social and political forces will necessarily come into contact. There will be tensions and conflicts. The future of these formations therefore remains open to negotiation or transformation.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

167

Toward an Unofficial Democracy

Both the cultural and social transformations associated with the communication revolution involve political dynamics and have political implications. But the communication revolution also has more direct political consequences. It has shaped state politics and contributed to the rise of a grassroots, citizen politics. Thus although democracy as a political system remains an ideal and not a reality, at the grassroots level, people are already practicing and experimenting with forms of citizen democracy. As Raymond Williams puts it, “if people cannot have official democracy, they will have unofficial democracy, in any of its possible forms, from the armed revolt or riot, through the ‘unofficial’ strike or restriction of labor, to the quietest but most alarming form—a general sullenness and withdrawal of interest.” As21

is clear from the above chapters, withdrawal is not a feature of Chinese people’s struggles for grassroots democracy. Engagement is. I will return to this point below. But since citizen politics comes about in direct relation to state power, it is necessary to first trace the evolution of state power in the Internet age.

The basic point here is that as technological change enables new forms and dynamics of citizen activism, so it provides occasions for state actors to adjust and refine the institutions, concepts, and methods of governance. The adjustments reflect both the grassroots pressure for democratic participation and elites’ attempts to strengthen political control. There is thus evidence of the slow and limited institutionalization of government transparency and citizen input. This is an ongoing process throughout the reform period, despite periodic policy contractions and relaxations and scholarly disagreements as to the sources of the process. The contribution of online activism to this process is the mounting22

social pressure for government transparency and public participation. Progress is limited but merits mention. One development is e-government. As I noted in ,chapter 5 e-government lags behind e-business or e–civil society. Still, major e-government initiatives have been under way for years, with campaigns to set up Web sites for government agencies at all levels and to use Web sites to publicize government policies and encourage direct citizen input. Kathleen Hartford’s study of two e-government projects at the municipal level, for example, shows the broad range of social issues that citizens brought to the attention of city governments through the mayor’s e-mail boxes. These mailboxes elicit citizen feedback and enhance government transparency.23

Besides e-government projects, there are efforts to promote information disclosure. The year 2007 has some significance in this respect. In April 2007, the State Council promulgated the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Government Information Disclosure.” This was the first of its kind at the level of the central government, with a mandate to “ensure that citizens, legal persons and other organizations obtain government information in accordance with the law” and “enhance transparency of the work of government.” Also in April 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration24

(SEPA) issued China’s first-ever “Regulations on Environmental Information Disclosure.” The regulations require both government and business enterprises to disclose environmental information in order to safeguard the rights of citizens to obtain information about the environment. The process of formulating this regulation reflects popular pressure. For years, SEPA officials had been working closely with environmental NGOs to promote public participation in decision making on environmental issues. For example, in April 2005, SEPA held the first public hearing on a controversial environmental project concerning the protection of the lake bed of the Yuanmingyuan Garden in western Beijing. The public25

hearing resulted in the cancellation of the project. The hearing was held because environmentalists had launched a media campaign to request such a hearing to oppose the project.

The institutionalization of government transparency and citizen participation, however,

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

168

lags far behind government efforts to strengthen and refine methods of control and governance. In this respect, Internet control is a field for the state topar excellence experiment with new ways of governing. As I argued in , in fewer than fifteenchapter 2 years, China’s Internet-control regime has undergone three stages of evolution. With each new stage, the methods of control became more refined and sophisticated. The general trend is a gradual move from repressive power to disciplinary power, from hard control to soft control. From 2003 to the present, the dominant mode of power has been disciplinary. On the one hand, the state is stepping up Internet control. This is evident in the new Internet-related regulations promulgated since 2003.

On the other hand, fully aware of the productive aspects of the Internet economy, the state is reluctant to sacrifice economic gains to blunt methods of control. Hoping to maintain both prosperity and control, state authorities have been refining the technologies of control into what a Foucaultian perspective might view as biopower. The essence of biopower is to harness human subjects in the service of the state’s agendas. It is a

power because it enables the production of particular kinds of knowledge,productive subjects, and needs. A central element in this new biopower regime is the so-called26

soft-control approach ( ). In contrast to hard control, soft control, a termrouxing guanli borrowed from business management, is more about self-discipline, indirect guidance, efficient management, positive cues, and rule by law. The new principles of governance laid out at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 2004, which I cited in , embody the idea of soft control. The promotionchapter 2 of self-discipline and the ethical use of the Internet, as well as a new system of asking citizens to voluntarily report on ( ) violations through an officially sponsored portal site,jian ju also embodies the idea of soft control. Technologies of power are most effective when they appear in the forms of technologies of the self, that is, when they induce individuals to willingly partake of their own transformation. From this perspective, the Internet may also be transformed into a technology of power.

The shift toward a more disciplinary mode of power is not limited to Internet control. As both a new object and a priority area of control, however, the Internet provides a strategic opportunity for state actors to adjust and refine the entire apparatus of governance and control. Thus the refined approaches to Internet control are visible in other areas, such as the control of the mass media, for here too, state control is becoming more sophisticated.

The constant evolution of power is a condition that will make China’s long revolution, a struggle for a more open and democratic society, an arduous process. Yet it is important to see the signs of progress. What are the political gains of China’s online activism? What are the signs of political progress in China’s long revolution?

The most important development here is citizens’ unofficial democracy. Online activism is a microcosm of China’s new citizen activism, and it is one of its most vibrant currents. In this sense, online activism marks the expansion of a grassroots, citizen democracy. It is an unofficial democracy because the initiatives, both in thinking and action, come from citizens. The expansion is evident both in consciousness and practice. In consciousness, the major developments are the rising awareness of citizenship rights among the Chinese people and the changing views of power and authority. Neither development is limited to online activism, yet both have expanded because of it. Chinese struggles for citizenship rights constitute perhaps the core of citizen activism since the 1990s. They have been extensively documented by the many scholars I have cited throughout this book. Online activism has been most instrumental in disseminating and deepening popular consciousness about citizens’ information rights. Freedom of speech was a main stake in earlier social movements, and it remains central. Information rights, such as citizens’ right to know, put additional demands on the government. Not only do citizens demand the rightCo

py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

169

to express their opinions, but now they also demand the right to be informed of issues of concern to their well-being.

Online activism promotes the awareness of information rights by eroding information control and propaganda. It makes it harder for state authorities and news agencies to control information. In 2001, a school explosion in rural Jiangxi province killed forty-two people. In 2002, a food-poisoning accident in the city of Nanjing killed over forty. In both cases, government authorities attempted to put a media gag on information but were eventually forced to reveal the truth because of exposure and controversies on the Internet. These cases led an influential Chinese media scholar to claim that the Internet has brought about the demise of propaganda based on centralized control of news and information.27

Whether this alleged demise has occurred or not is open to debate, but it is clear that centralized information control has become increasingly difficult.

Negative experiences also offer instructive lessons and help bring home the importance of information rights. Initial information control during the SARS crisis in 2003 and the Songhua River pollution crisis exacerbated the confusion and unrest. When people are poorly informed, rumors flourish. When rumors flourish, fear strikes deeply, and people lose the capacity for sound judgment and sensible action. When, under pressure, the Chinese government opened up the information channels, confidence and order were restored.

The growing rights consciousness parallels changing conceptions of power and authority. In contemporary China, power and authority are much revered and feared. To some extent, the onslaughts on official bureaucracies and bureaucratic power carried out by Mao and the Cultural Revolution have been reversed. The traditional, official-centered political culture (

) has returned to Chinese society with a vengeance. The culture ofguan ben wei wenhua official-centricity is everywhere today and being continuously propagated by China’s officially controlled mass media and culture industry. In popular culture, television dramas and films that glorify emperors, empresses, lords, and generals flood the market. They exalt power and wealth and inculcate values of blind loyalty to the superiors. Official newscasts of the style retain the same mode of presentation as they hadxinwen lianbo decades ago, with high proportions of airtime given to party leaders, who are presented in an aura of power and authority.

It is against this culture of official-centricity that the Internet culture of humor and play assumes special significance. Play has a spirit of irreverence. It always sits uncomfortably with power. The subversive power of the Wang Shuo–type “hooligan literature” in the recent history of Chinese culture comes from its spirit of play. Much online activism, and28

much Chinese Internet culture in general, is enlivened with this spirit. If Wang Shuo’s hooligan literature was shocking and heretical to its audience when it first appeared in the 1980s, it now appears timid and old-fashioned in comparison with the hilariously nonconformist Internet culture. In Chinese cyberspace, nothing is sacred. Pretensions to authority are favorite targets of attack. This culture of irreverence is not confined to the Internet but merges into the broader popular culture today. If religion is about the worship of an external source of power, one is tempted to argue that China has only now entered its secular age. The consequences of this secularization for political change will only gradually unfold.

The second area in the expansion of citizen democracy is practice. The growing rights consciousness is matched by the proliferation of forms of citizen participation in public affairs. Again, online activism is symptomatic of this expansion. Examples abound in other areas of contemporary life. The PX incident in the city of Xiamen, which I discussed in

in relation to the use of text messaging for mobilization, is exemplary, because itchapter 3 combines participation with opposition and joins online with offline action.

The PX case is about resistance. The online debate and the street demonstration expressed residents’ opposition to the construction of a chemical factory in their

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost

170

neighborhood. The project was supported by the municipal government. Therefore public opposition challenged both business and the local government. The PX case is also about citizen participation. For citizens to be able to participate in making decisions concerning their own well-being is a basic requirement of any democracy. Rapid economic development has not improved citizens’ chances of participating in democratic decision making. The growing sense of identity crisis and anxieties discussed in suggestschapter 1 that people increasingly feel that life is out of their control. It is as a reaction against this loss of control that citizens begin to be more actively engaged in civic affairs. Some residents in Xiamen learned about the PX project in online forums. Many learned about the planned demonstration through SMS, a simple cellphone text message that called on people to “take a leisure walk.” Several images of anti-PX graffiti painted on the walls near Xiamen University were circulated online. The information was there, but people did not have to participate. That they did, simply in response to an SMS message or a BBS post, reflected their desire to take control of their own affairs. They participated when they realized that they could no longer trust the government.29

The debate on the rule of law and democracy featured in a recent book issues from the premise that neither exists in China at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The Chinese30

government may have been building a legal system for decades, yet despite halting and limited progress, this system lacks transparency, accountability, and due process. Thus it is not surprising that Chinese citizens are increasingly resorting to contentious means in their struggles for a more just society. The Internet satisfies an immediate social need. It provides a new medium for citizens to speak up, link up, and act up against power, corruption, and social injustice. By using the Internet to speak up, link up, and act up, Chinese citizens participate in Chinese politics uninvited. They practice their own unofficial democracy.

Online activism represents Chinese people’s everyday struggles for freedom, justice, and community. It articulates people’s aspirations for basic citizenship rights—the right to voice their opinions on government policies, to be informed of issues that affect their lives, to freely organize themselves and defend their interests, to publicly challenge authorities and social injustices, and to be able to enjoy equal rights and human dignity. These everyday struggles have a mundane character. They do not necessarily articulate lofty visions for grand political designs. Yet beneath these mundane struggles run powerful undercurrents. The effervescence of online activism, as part of China’s new citizen activism, indicates the palpable revival of the revolutionary impulse in Chinese society. The power of the Internet lies in revealing this impulse and in signaling the probable coming of another revolution. As I have tried to suggest in these concluding pages, this would be a different kind of revolution. It may lack the usual revolutionary fanfare, but it will not be lacking in revolutionary power. As civic engagements in unofficial democracy expand, the distance to an officially institutionalized democracy shortens.

Co py ri gh t @ 20 11 . Co lu mb ia U ni ve rs it y Pr es s.

Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed u nd er U .S . or a pp li ca bl e co py ri gh t la w.

EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/23/2018 11:49 PM via UTICA COLLEGE AN: 944954 ; Yang, Guobin.; The Power of the Internet in China : Citizen Activism Online Account: s8331415.main.ehost