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Svrnposium: Biological Warji,rr

UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control

Stephen Black United Nations Special Commission 1

V erification of biological weapons (BW) arms control agreements is one of the most difficult tasks in disar­ mament. While biological arms were outlawed 25

years ago by the multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWe), there is still no accepted verification mechanism for biological weapons disarmament. The dis­ covery of an enormous, diverse biological weapons program in Iraq sparked new interest in development of a verification regime for the BWe. The investigation of Iraq's BW pro­ gram also provides the first case history of an international BW arms control verification effort. The inquiry undertaken by the United Nations Special Corrunission (UNSCOM) demonstrates both the inherent difficulties of such an investi­ gation and the possibilities of success.

The United Nation's actions in Iraq have made use of nearly all of the verification processes envisaged for the BWC, including information monitoring, remote sensing, inspections, on-site measures, and continuous monitoring. The UNSCOM case portrays examples ofthe real-world im­ plementation ofBW verification techniques, including their accomplishments and failures. Specifically, the commis­ sion's efforts in Iraq have shown the value of a process or systematic approach to BW verification, rather than a reli­ ance on discrete verification tools.

Using a multifaceted verification strategy, UNSCOM has also proven the possibility of detecting a covert, well-hidden biological weapons program. Following the detection of the Iraqi BW program, UNSCOM is attempting to determine the full scope of the program in order to eliminate it.

United Nations Special Commission

In the spring of 1991 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 (1991 c), which established the con­ ditions of the cease-fire following Iraq's expulsion from Ku­ wait that year. A major condition of the cease-fire was the elimination, under international supervision, of Iraq's nu-

Stephen Black served as Historian to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1993 to 1999. He has also served as an inspector on J 5 UNSCOM chemical and biological weapons inspections. In September, 1999, he assumes a new posi­ tion as International Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA E-mail: [email protected]

clear, chemical, and biological weapons and then ballistic missile delivery systems.

Resolution 687 specifically requires Iraq to declare its holding of and "unconditionally accept the destruction, re­ moval, or rendering harmless, under international supervi· sion, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities" (United Nations Security Council, 1991c). Iraq IS further required to "unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified" (United Nations Security Council, 1991 c).

Resolution 687 also calls for the "fonning of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site in­ spection ofIraq' s biological, chemical and missile capabili­ ties, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself' (United Nations Security Council, 1991 c). This second cate­ gory of sites allows UNSCOM to conduct challenge or no-notice inspections. As a consequence, the commission has the ability to both verify specific Iraqi decbrations as well as conduct investigative missions for the purpose ofun· covering undeclared activities or items.

At the outset of implementation, the Special Commission was given sweeping rights to implement its mandate. These powers include:

• "unrestricted freedom of movement without advance no­ tice within Iraq,"

• the "right to unimpeded access to any site or faciltty for the purpose of the on-site inspection ... whether such sIte or facility be above or below ground,"

• "the right to request, receive, examine and copy any reo cord, data or information ... relevant to the" commiSSIOn's activities, and

• the "right to take and analyze samples ofany kind as we!1 as to remove and export samples for off-site analysis" (Perez de Cuellar, 1991).

Thc nature of the information that Iraq must supply to the Special Commission on its proscribed weapons of mass de· struction (WMD) programs was later refined to a "full, final, complete, disclosure ... of all aspects of its programs to de· velop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic mis­ siles ... and ofall holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations" (United Nations

Politics and the Life Sciences March /999

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Security Council, 1991d). The requirement for a full descrip­ tion ofWMD activities is intended to provide a basis for eval­ uation ofthe extent oflraqi compliance with the disarmament

, requirements. Both UNSCOM's mandate and Iraq's obligations are

clearly set forth in these binding Security Council resolu­ tions. First and foremost, Iraq is required to yield for elimi­ nation all of its weapons of mass destruction and certain ballistic missile systems. Iraq is further required to provide full, final, and complete disclosures of its WMD and missile

,tic programs. The Special Commission has two complementary tasks. First, UNSCOM must determine the accuracy of

its Iraq's declarations regarding the disposition of proscribed

rc­ items and disclosures on its prohibited activities. Second,

Vl­ the commission must undertake investigative actions (in­

all spections) to resolve concerns about the accuracy of Iraqi

nts declarations and disclosures, addressing the possible exis­

ng tence of undeclared proscribed weapons or missiles and un­

Jls disclosed information about the WMD programs.

se, At the outset of its work, the Special Commission was

,d" faced with two mutually exclusive views ofthe BW situation in Iraq. First, as demanded by Resolution 687, in April 1991

ial Iraq made an initial declaration on its biological weapons ac­

in­ tivities-it had none-"Iraq does not possess any biological

ili­ weapons or related items as mentioned" in Resolution 687

ny If'

(Government ofIraq, 1991). The second view consisted of a host of concerns about the

te­ Iraqi program held by the members of the Security Council.

or While additional information was available to supporting

on governments, very little of it was shared, at least at the outset

as of the investigation, with the Special Commission. 2

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The BW Investigation :In se

The Special Commission's seven-year biological weapons investigation has been carried out in three, only slightly over­

0- lapping, periods. Initially, UNSCOM sought to resolve con­ cerns about a possible Iraqi BW program, something that Iraq

or strenuously denied. The commission then moved to develop a system for monitoring Iraqi biological facilities and indus­te tries. Finally, since 1994 UNSCOM has returned to the issue

e- of Iraq's BW program and seen significant increases in its knowledge of that program but also more tightly focused 's concerns about what might still remain.

In order to assess the scope ofIraq's BW program, includ­1/ i" ing the types and number of proscribed biological weapons

In Iraq, the commission had to first verify Iraqi declarations and conduct limited searches for hidden weapons. From Au­ gust 1991 until 1993, UNSCOM attempted to understand the Ie extent of the Iraqi program. Given the flat Iraqi denial of any BW program, limited information on Iraqi BW efforts, and I, the technical complexities inherent to BW arms control, UNSCOM achieved little progress in this phase.

In August 1991, UNSCOM conducted its first BW in­ spection (BW -I) at the Salman Pak site. It was during this in­ spection that Iraq first admitted an offensive BW program:

Politics and the Life Sciences March /999

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Symposium: Biological Warfare

Iraqi scientists told the inspection team that from 1986 to August 1990 Iraq had engaged in military biological re­ search, with both offensive and defensive purposes. Iraq ac­ knowledged investigation of Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium peljringens, and Bacillus anthracis. However, the Iraqis maintained that their work had never moved be­ yond the research stage and that all BW activities had ended in August 1990. They also stated that all of the stocks of their BW agents had been destroyed at that time (United Nations Security Council, 1991 a).

Near the end of the first inspection, Iraq presented the team with seed stocks of BW-relevant agents, including Brucellus abortus, Brucella melitensis, Francisella tularensis, and a number of strains of Clostridium botuli­ num. Iraq also turned over seed stocks of three biological warfare agent simulant organisms: Bacillus subtilis, Bacil­ lus cereus, and Bacillus megaterium. Iraq's possession of these agents indicated a diverse and detailed BW research effort (United Nations Security Council, 199Ia).

In hindsight, it seems clear that Iraq's failure to declare these stocks initially was not the result of a misunderstand­ ing of the terms of Resolution 687, but rather the first overt steps in its efforts to conceal the true BW program. Iraqi au­ thorities knew, at the time, that the seed stocks were part of a full-scale BW program and were therefore proscribed by Resolution 687. Despite this new evidence, which contra­ dicted Iraq's initial declaration of no biological weapons or related items, UNSCOM could not yet prove a full-scale BW program. The official UNSCOM status report to the Security Council later in 1991 simply noted that "[n]o biological weapons or evidence ofweaponization was found" (United Nations Security Council, 1991 a).

Ifin fact an Iraqi BW program did exist, it would need an agent production and weaponization component. Two months after the rust visit to the BW research facility at Salman Pak, the second UNSCOM biological inspection team (BW -2) examined a range of possible BW research or production facilities. The ten sites included pharmaceutical plants, a blood bank, vaccine production facilities, research sites with fermentation capability, and facilities specially designed to work with hazardous organisms (United Nations Security Council, 1991a).

Following the inspection, UNSCOM could only report that BW-2 had found no "biological weapons or facilities for filling weapons" (United Nations Security Council, 1991a). However, several of these sites had significant "dual-capability." While it appeared that they had not been uniquely constructed to only conduct proscribed BW activi­ ties, some ofthe sites were capable of prohibited activities.

The dual-use nature of the BW-2 sites caused a dilemma that would plague the biological investigation: suspicion and capacity does not necessarily prove proscribed activity. Despite concerns based on data provided by supporting gov­ ernments and a clear Iraqi technical capacity, UNSCOM could not prove that Iraq had a biological weapons program that included the production ofBW weapons. In the face of consistent and strenuous Iraqi denials of anything beyond a

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Symposium: Biological Warfare

limited research program, the commission was frozen. Throughout 1992 and most of 1993, the UNSCOM BW

inspections progressed only as a component of the chemical weapons (CW) inquiry. In fact, for most of the early history of the commission, the BW and CW investigations were conducted by the same staff at the UNSCOM New York headquarters. Many on-site inspections were conducted in 1992 and 1993, looking for hidden chemical and biological weapons. While the missions covered a large number ofam­ munition storage bunkers and related facilities, inspectors found no concealed chemical or biological weapons. The commission continued to report that it was unable to locate any biological weapons or related weaponization facilities (United Nations Security Council, 1992).

Ongoing Monitoring and Verification

In 1991, Iraq had rejected the concept of long-term monitor­ ing as an affront to its national sovereignty. It was not until the fall of 1993 that Iraq reluctantly agreed to abide by the Se­ curity Council's decision to implement UNSCOM's plan for continuing compliance monitoring: Resolution 715 (1991 e). Following Iraq's acceptance oflong-term monitoring in No­ vember 1993, UNSCOM began to work towards develop­ ment of information and procedures for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMY).

The purpose of OMY is to ensure that a biological war­ fare capability is not reestablished in Iraq, or that efforts to reestablish are detected. Thus, the development of a system for future compliance monitoring, while clearly mandated by Security Council resolutions, was not a direct effort to un­ cover, and eliminate, an existing offensive BW capability. Of course, UNSCOM maintained its interest in a possible concealed Iraqi BW capability, but from 1993 to the fall of 1994 no progress was realized in the search for an offensive IraqiBW program (United Nations Security Council, 1994).

The implementation ofOMY required a significant real­ location of commission resources. Work on proscribed ac­ tivities nearly came to a standstill while all capabilities were directed toward the dual-use materials, equipment, and fa­ cilities in Iraq (United Nations Security Council, 1994). In order to prepare implementation of biological OMY, the commission reinforced the existing CBW staff with addi­ tional expert BW personnel. Concurrently, the biological in­ vestigation separated from the chemical group and became an independent effort within the organization.

Once complete, the UNSCOM regime for the long-term monitoring ofIraq's biological capabilities became a set of independent, interlocking, investigative capabilities and mechanisms. Using aerial surveillance, on-site inspections, materials and equipment tracking, real-time monitoring cameras, regular declarations of dual-use activities and ma­ terials by Iraq, and data from external sources, the Biological OMY Plan is intended to monitor Iraq sufficiently to detect future proscribed activities.

Because very few BW-related items are not dual-use,

there are only a few totally proscribed activities. Iraq is. 101 hI example, totally prohibited from conducting any type of mil· JI itary biological research, even defensive, without first sub· ot mitting to UNSCOM, and receiving approval for, a plan of w activities. This prohibition covers any research by military Cl personnel, in military facilities, administered by military or­ pc ganizations, or biological activities that are classified or se­ m cret (United Nations Security Council, 1991 b). Unlike the Cl chemical and nuclear monitoring regimes, there are no strictly prohibited objects, beyond the general phrase "bio­ sc logical weapons ... stocks of agents ... and all related Jr sub-systems" (United Nations Security Council, 1991 c). rli

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Renewed Interest in the Offensive Program 10 stl

Once OMY had been established in late 1994, the commis­ sp sion's attention returned to the issue ofIraq's offensive bio­ an logical weapons program. The commission focused its attention on the lingering suspicions about a larger BW pro­ AI gram than Iraq had admitted to in 1991.

In 1994, UNSCOM investigators began a concerted ef TI fort to marshal their evidence and arguments in an effort to rei prove what had long been suspected. By April 1995, com­ H, mission experts still had no smoking gun for the Iraqi BW (S program. They did, however, have three incontrovertible tia pieces of evidence that pointed to the production ofbiologi­ 19 cal weapons. tee

tie Complex Growth Media WI

13\ In 1993 and 1994, as part of the requirements of OMV, Iraq de: submitted declarations on its legitimate biological activities we and industries. These declarations covered a wide range of (U dual-capability facilities and activities, including breweries. vaccine production, and bio-pesticide production sites. The me disclosures listed the importation and consumption of bio­ fOl logical materials and equipment, including activities prior to sy: 1991. Of specific interest to investigators was information on CO! Iraq's import of 39 tons of complex growth media by the SIS Technical and Scientific Materials Importation Division Cc (TSMID) under the Military Industrialization ComnusslOn an (United Nations Security Council, 1995a). sol

Iraq declared that this growth material had been used in hospital laboratories for disease diagnosis. Hospitals use WI only small quantities of media, and the material is acquired in small packages to reduce waste due to spoilage. The In TSMID purchases, however, were in 25- I00 kg drums. Of U! further concern were the types of media that had been im­ Ir, ported: they were not well suited for health care purposes but ha were ideal for production of biological materials, including fil warfare agents (United Nations Security Council, 1995a). Sa

Iraq was also unable to explain the fate of 17 tons of qu TSMID media that could not be located. Iraq provided a bit number of stories to resolve this concern, but explanations to collapsed on investigation. For example, in one exchange be Iraq claimed that the missing media had been distributed to Cc

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Symposium: Biological Warfare

for hospitals in 1989, in its original packaging. This media, and 1il­ all related documentation, was subsequently destroyed by ri­ lb­ oters in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Curiously, media of were only distributed to those provinces in which riots oc­

lry curred. No efforts were made to replace the media or com­ or­ pensate the hospitals for the loss, even though additional se­ media were available elsewhere in Iraq (United Nations Se­ the curity Council, 1995a). no When confronted with these discrepancies, Iraq pre­ 10­ sented accounts of incompetent managers, loss, theft, fires, ted and a host of other reasons to explain away the missing mate­

rials. But all of the Iraqi claims were either totally unsup­ ported by evidence or did not hold up under scrutiny. UNSCOM's biological investigators spent a year establish­ ing that various Iraqi assertions on the possible use or de­ struction of the growth media were not credible. By the

llS­ spring of 1995, 17 tons of media remained unaccounted for '10­ ! and unexplained by Iraq. its

ro- AI Hakam

ef­ The commission was also concerned about the purpose of a : to remote biological materials production facility called Al m­ Hakam, which Iraq had declared to be a single cell protein tW (SCP) animal feed production facility. Al Hakam was ini­ ble tially visited by the second biological inspection team in g1­ 1991 and had troubled the commission ever since. While the

team had not found conclusive evidence of proscribed activi­ ties at the site, the inspection report reflects the team's un­ willingness to give the facility a clean bill of health. The BW -2 team, and later other experts, found that the site had

'aq design features that were superfluous for an SCP plant but ies would be highly advantageous in a BW production facility of (United Nations Security Council, 1995a).

es, The Hakam site was constructed in great secrecy, at a re­ 'he mote desert location, with extensive security and military 10­ fortifications. The site included sophisticated air filtration to systems (using HEPA filters) on some buildings, for both in­I

on coming and outgoing air. TIlese features all implied a use incon­ he I sistent with the facility declaration (United Nations Security on Council, 1995a). Yet these indicators were only circumstantial, on and Iraq maintained its assertions that the site was intended

solely for the production of single cell protein animal feed. III

.se Weaponization ed he In addition to the bacterial growth media and AI Hakam, Jf UNSCOM had learned of other equipment and materials in n­ Iraq highly relevant to biological weapons production. Iraq ut had purchased four filling machines, which could be used to Ilg fill BW munitions, for a "bio-pesticides" project at the

Salman Pak research site. However, until the commission in­ of quired about the machines, Iraq had never mentioned a bio-pesticides research at Salman Pak. Iraq was also unable

ns to provide any evidence for its claim that these machines had ge been destroyed during the war (United Nations Security to Council, 1995a).

Politics and the Life Sciences March 1999 j

UNSCOM also discovered that the Salman Pak site had acquired a spray dryer used to dry the bacterial slurry prod­ uct of fermenters. Iraq claimed that the spray dryer was ac­ quired for a "bio-pesticides" project, but experts found that the machine had a capability to produce dry particles in the 1-10 micro size. Particles of this size are optimal for biowarfare purposes, but ineffective for bio-pesticides de­ livery (United Nations Security Council, 1995a).

Finally, the commission discovered that Iraq attempted to procure particularly virulent strains of pathogenic microor­ ganisms, including specific non-vaccine strains of anthrax (United Nations Security Council, 1995a). The requested or­ ganisms were known to be particularly effective as BW agents. Despite confirmation from the potential supplier, Iraq pointedly refused to admit the procurement attempt.

In April 1995, the commission was able to fully express its suspicions and concerns. For the first time UNSCOM felt that the weight of circumstantial evidence, compounded by Iraq's inability and unwillingness to establish legitimate ac­ tivities, could prove the existence of a concealed offensive BW program in Iraq. In its six-monthly report to the Security Council, UNSCOM stated:

The Commission assesses that Iraq obtained or sought to obtain all the items and materials required to pro­ duce biological warfare agents in Iraq. With Iraq's fail­ ure to account for all these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been pur­ chased and in part used for proscribed purposes-the production of agents for biological weapons. (United Nations Security Council, 1995a)

July 1, 1995

Since 1991, Baghdad had maintained that its BW program was limited to civilian-run, defensive research, and em­ ployed the skills of only 10 Iraqi experts (United Nations Se­ curity Council, 1995b). Following four years of steadfast denials, in 1995 Iraq presented a significantly different por­ trayal of its biological weapons efforts.

While the full range of reasons for Iraq's change of posi­ tion in the BW investigation is unclear, it is likely that the threat of continuing investigation and a resulting prolonga­ tion of sanctions caused a fundamental change in Iraq's atti­ tude. On July I, 1995, Iraq presented a new report on its BW efforts to UNSCOM investigators. In a brief oral statement, Iraqi experts admitted that the program, offensive in nature, had run from April 1986 to September 1990. They further re­ vealed that Iraq had indeed produced large quantities of an­ thrax and botulinum toxin at the AI Hakam site. Despite these revelations, Iraq continued to firmly deny weaponization of these or any other biological warfare agents (United Nations Security Council, 1995b).

The July disclosure exposed many areas in which Iraq's statements were inconsistent with the commission's infor­

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Symposium: Biological Warfare

mation or in which information was absent or vague, notably in the area of weaponization. Commission experts believed that Iraq was attempting to conceal information that would either "provide evidence ofweaponization or reveal military connections with the biological weapons program" (United Nations Security Council, 199 5b). Iraq refused to admit any link between the production of bulk BW agent and military requirements or intentions. This appears to have been yet an­ other effort to limit UNSCOM's understanding of the full scope of the biological warfare program.

On August 7, 1995, General Hussein Kamel Hassan ai-Majid, a major player in the Iraqi WMD programs and son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, fled to Jordan. His departure threatened the release of significant new information about the biological weapons program and other areas of UNSCOM's work. This event prompted Iraq to release to UNSCOM a vast collection of previously hidden documen­ tation related to proscribed weapons activities and to signifi­ cantly revise its full, final, complete disclosures on past proscribed activities in all weapons areas. 3

Just ten days after Hussein Kamal's escape, Iraq pre­ sented UNSCOM with a vastly different account of Iraq's past biological warfare program. The new disclosure, the second "full" story in as many months, included weaponization, additional agents, more production activi­ ties, research, and weapons storage sites. The report pre­ sented to UNSCOM also contained a different and more detailed account of the history and activities ofthe Iraqi bio­ logical warfare program.

Iraqi Biological Weapons Program Revealed

The late August 1995 disclosures stated that in 1974 the gov­ ernment of Iraq had adopted a policy to acquire biological weapons. 4 While initial attempts to start a BW research pro­ gram in the late 1970s failed, by 1985 the Muthanna State Es­ tablishment, Iraq's primary facility for chemical weapons research and development, production, and weaponization, fostered the full-scale commencement of a biological weap­ ons program. Research at Muthanna allegedly concentrated on the characterization of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin) to establish patho­ genicity, growth and sporulation conditions, and storage pa­ rameters.

In 1987, the biological weapons program was transferred from Muthanna to the Salman Pak facility, inspected by BW-l. The work at Salman Pak included the acquisition of additional materials, equipment, and staff. The program also began to focus its attention on the use of various BW agents as weapons. The effects ofBW agents on large animals, like dogs, sheep, and donkeys, were tested in both laboratory in­ halation chambers and in the field; and production scale-up studies for anthrax and botulinum toxin were started. An­ thrax production allegedly began at Salman Pak around March 1989. Research on additional agents such Clostridium perjringens (gas gangrene), aflatoxin, and

trichothecene mycotoxins, including T-2 and DAS, was also anth conducted at Salman Pak. liter

As the result of a high-level decision to move ahead with fille a full program, in 1988 a new site for biological weapons production was selected at Al Hakam. The design concept of the facility was drawn from Iraq's main chemical weapons Co. site and included extensive perimeter security and widely dispersed buildings. At Al Hakam, production of botulinum Iraq toxin and anthrax for weapons purposes allegedly had begun vali, by 1989. In total, about 6,000 liters of concentrated botuli­ but num toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax were declared to have pert been produced at Al Hakam. dar

In 1989, aflatoxin production was moved to a facility at Fudaliyah. Iraq declared that the facility was used for afla­ the toxin production in flasks from April/May 1990 to Decem­ I ber 1990. A total of about 1,850 liters of toxin in solution was tion declared to have been produced at Fudaliyah. ties

The toxin ricin was investigated in 1988. Following ini­ dec tial toxicological tests in conjunction with the chemical fied weapons program at Muthanna, 10 liters of concentrated sun ricin were prepared. The ricin was placed in artillery shells Irae and a field trial was conducted. Iraq declared that the test was fou a failure, and the project was abandoned. on:

The Iraqi program expanded to include viral research in 199 1990. After initial activities at Salman Pak, the BW program I acquired a foot-and-mouth disease vaccine production facil­ not ity for additional BW efforts. Work on viruses for biological gan weapons purposes was said to include hemorrhagic conjunc­ rati tivitis, a rotavirus, and camel pox. Iraq stated that little prog­ ofi ress had been made and that no viral agents had been log produced in bulk. Th(

BW weaponization efforts were initially conducted in and concert with the existing, and well-established, chemical cas weapons program. From 1988 to 1990, weaponization ef­ anc forts allegedly included field trials of aerial bombs, artillery rounds, and unguided artillery rockets. Trials were declared me to have been conducted with both actual BW agents and par agent simulants like Bacillus subtilis (instead of anthrax). scr

At the end of 1990, Iraq allegedly initiated a BW tin:

spray-tank project. Iraq intended to mount the tank on either ble a piloted or remotely piloted aircraft and spray up to 2,000 li­ itie ters of anthrax over a target area. Field trials of this system Ira were purportedly conducted in January 1991 and considered a failure. However, a total of four tanks were modified and glr readied for use. Iraq claimed that all of the tanks were either gn destroyed during the war or destroyed unilaterally in 1991, Co in its effort to conceal the BW program. cal

Iraq stated that BW agents had been loaded into both op­ vo erational R-400 aerial bombs and Al Hussein ballistic mis­ te~ sile warheads. These weapons were then deployed in on January 1991 and were considered ready for use. Iraq claims fOJ

that, in the summer of 1991, it unilaterally destroyed all of these filled munitions. All remaining bulk agent was alleg­ IS~ edly destroyed at Al Hakam in the summer of 1991. cil

By October 1995, Iraq had declared the production of at tic least 19,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin, using al­ ga most 10,000 liters in munitions; 8,500 liters of concentrated m

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anthrax, with about 6,500 liters loaded munitions; and 2,200 liters of concentrated aflatoxin (allegedly 1,580 liters were fI\led into munitions).

Continuing Concerns, Continuing Investigation

Iraq's July 1995 disclosures about its BW program not only validated the suspicions held by the commission since 1991, but also opened wide a new field of inquiry. UNSCOM ex­ perts shifted to a verification of the scope of Iraq's newly de­ clared offensive BW program. The commission faced the "new" problem of conducting a quantitative investigation of the mass balance of produced BW weapons and agents.

From 1995 to 1997, dozens of BW verification inspec­ nons were conducted, most of which resulted in uncertain­ ties or clear inaccuracies in various parts of previous Iraqi declarations. When enough of these errors had been identi­ fied, Iraq would produce a new "full, final, complete disclo­ sure" (FFCD), and the process would start again. In total, Iraq presented three "final" versions of its BW FFCD and four "drafts." The most recent FFCD was presented by Iraq on September 11, 1997 (United Nations Security Council, 1997).

In response to continuing UNSCOM findings that it had not fully disclosed its biological weapons program, Iraq be­ gan calling for an independent assessment of the BW decla­ ration. In 1997 and 1998, UNSCOM convened three panels of international experts in biology, biotechnology, and bio­ logical weapons to examine Iraq's September 1997 FFCD. The panels included a small number of UNSCOM experts and a far larger number of outside personnel. In all three cases, the panels found the FFCD to be lacking in substance and accuracy (United Nations Security Council, 1998b).

The third of these panels, termed a technical evaluation meeting (TEM), was held in March 1998 in Vienna. The panel concluded that a host of issues were incompletely de­ scribed, inaccurate in their presentation, or were missing en­ tlrely (United Nations Security Council, I 998b). The assem­ bled experts determined that a wide range ofIraqi BW activ­ ities required still further disclosure and clarification before Iraq's description of its program would be acceptable.

The TEM found that documented information on the ori­ gins, purpose, and current status of the offensive BW pro­ gram was absent from the FFCD (United Nations Security Council, 1998b). Iraq failed to provide the rationale, justifi­ cation, and requirements for organizations and sites in­ volved in the BW program, including those for weapons lests, research and development, production, storage, weap­ ons production and filling, deployment, and destruction sites for weapons, documents, and agents.

Some of the most startling problems involved the central Issue of materials balances (United Nations Security Coun­ cil, 1998b). The FFCD does not sufficiently explain acquisi­ tion of supplies, materials, munitions, and equipment. This gap includes the omlssion of substantial quantities of microbial growth media which remain undeclared. The

..Politics and the Life Sciences March J999

numerical accounting for growth media consumption is flawed and is based in large part on Iraqi estimates, many of which are themselves based on still other estimates. None of the estimated values are supported by documentary evi­ dence. In summary, the TEM found that the declared quanti­ ties of BW agents produced are not credibly established (United Nations Security Council, I 998b).

The results of Iraq's BW research efforts were also un­ clear to the TEM (United Nations Security Council, 1998b). The experts did not understand Iraq's rationale for work on genetic engineering, ricin, mycotoxins, and virus research. The panel was equally uncertain about the extent ofprogress made in these research efforts. The toxicological justifica­ tion for development of aflatoxin as a biological weapon is inadequate and not credible.

Weaponization, weapons production, and unilateral de­ struction issues raised still more concerns (United Nations Security Council, 1998b). Iraq has not provided a complete disclosure on the numbers, types, and detailed accounting of individual BW weapons systems. Declarations by Iraq on the alleged unilateral destruction of Al Hussein missile war­ heads filled with BW agents do not match the physical evi­ dence available. Iraq's description of its aircraft spray-tank project is deficient in all areas, including planning, procure­ ment, testing, and production. Because oflimited data in the FFCD, no confident assessment can be made of the scale of production ofBW-filled aerial bombs or their fate. The tech­ nical sophistication ofIraq's aerobiology research is also not adequately explained.

The TEM expressed further apprehension over the con­ cealment and discontinuation of the BW program. Despite the fact that the BW program was hidden from the commis­ sion until 1995, there is no description in the FFCD ofthe ra­ tionale for this concealment, the actions taken to conceal the program, or the organizations involved. Iraq states that the BW program was "obliterated" in 1991, yet facilities, growth media, equipment, and core groups of experts at AI Hakam were retained.

Iraq maintains that it has provided a full and complete ac­ count of its BW program; however, UNSCOM'smostrecent assessment, supported by three panels of independent out­ side experts, is quite different. In April 1998, the commis­ sion reported to the Security Council that the disclosure provided by Iraq in September 1997 "still does not cover the entirety of the BW program. Iraq's FFCD isjudged to be in­ complete and inadequate and to contain major mistakes, in­ consistencies and gaps in information. The FFCD does not provide a clear understanding of the current status ofthe BW program nor whether, nor when, it was terminated" (United Nations Security Council, 1998b).

The Road Ahead?

On August 5, 1998, the Revolutionary Command Council, Iraq's highest decision-making body, announced that it would no longer cooperate with the Special Commission on

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S:vmposium: Biological Warfare

issues of disarmament. Iraq would no longer work, it said, with inspection teams and would provide no further data or disclosures on its proscribed activities (United Nations Secu­ rity Council, 1998a). This decision by Iraq prevents any fur­ ther progress in uncovering the full scope and depth of its BW program.

In order to restart the investigation, with the intention of meeting the objectives of Security Council Resolution 687 in the shortest possible time, three actions are required of Iraq. First, it must provide a new, truly full, final, and com­ plete disclosure of its biological weapons activities. This document is the cornerstone of Iraq's obligations under Se­ curity Council resolutions: no real progress can be made without it. Second, Iraq must support the FFCD with data and evidence. This complementary information could be in the form of interview testimony, documents, or physical fo­ rensic data. Whatever the form, the supporting data must be internally consistent and match other data already available to the commission from previous on-site inspections, suppli­ ers, and other data sources. Finally, Iraq must facilitate the verification of the FFCD by providing full access to any site, at any time. This requirement includes access to personnel for the purpose of interviews and documents for the purpose of review.

Conclusions

At the close of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council created a new organization, the United Nations Spe­ cial Commission. UNSCOM was charged with the investiga­ tion and elimination of Iraq's WMD capabilities; and Iraq was required to produce a full declaration of its WMD hold­ ings and programs and provide full assistance to the UNSCOM investigators.

As a direct result ofIraq's military defeat and the imposed cease-fire settlement, the Security Council granted UNSCOM sweeping rights of access and investigation. Be­ cause of the unique nature of these circumstances, this ar­ rangement is unlikely to be repeated in the future of cooperative arms control. Therefore, the specifics of the UNSCOM work in Iraq are not directly applicable to the BWC, or to any other cooperative arms control or nonproliferation regime.

Some have suggested that the goal of designing a BW verification mechanism, which can detect noncompliance, is unattainable. The Special Commission has proven that it is not impossible to detect a concealed BW program, even when it is carefully hidden. While it took several years and significant effort, UNSCOM was able to build a case that could have only one outcome-Iraq 's admission of an offen­ sive BW program. UNSCOM has also shown that such veri­ fication may require a highly intrusive, prolonged investigation, backed by threats of sanctions and military force.

To uncover the Iraqi program, UNSCOM used small pieces of circumstantial evidence that individually did not

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seem significant but together created a damning picture of Iraq's activities. This picture was then used to highlight ele­ ments of investigative data that did not fit Iraq's declara­

Uni tions, anomalies that further developed and confirmed UNSCOM's theories. Uni

UNSCOM showed the value of a system approach to bio­ Un

logical arms verification, rather than looking for single ele­ ments and discrete actions. The all-pervasive problem of dual-capability in BW arms control was addressed by look­ ing not at single pieces of equipment or specific materials, but at the whole ofthe capability. It was the combination and obvious direction of Iraq's dual-use capabilities that con­ vinced the world of Iraq's deceit.

Finally, the world's experience with Iraq's biological weapons program should demonstrate that if a country has a compelling reason to retain or develop a strategic WMD ca­ pability, it will pursue that goal despite any international consequence. Iraq's actions of August 5, 1998 make this case in stark terms. The international community, specifi­ cally arms controllers, should not underestimate the capabil­ ities of nation-states with such overriding national interests.

Notes

1. The views and opinions expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the Special Commission. Rel­ evant United Nations Security Council resolutions and docu­ ments, and UNSCOM photographs, are available at http://www.un.org/depts/unscom.

2. See, for example, the Gulf Link collection of U.S. Government documents on the Iraqi BW program, declassified in 1997-98 (http://www.gulflink.osd.mil).

3. Documentation related to the biological weapons program was limited to a handful of research reports and photographs, a sparse amount compared to the releases of chemical weapons and ballistic missile program documentation.

4. The data in this section are drawn from United Nations Security Council, 1995b. This portrayal of the Iraqi BW program is proba­ bly accurate only in broad terms. This description of the program is illustrative, but not verified in specifics or scope

References

Government of Iraq (1991). Letter addressed to the Secretary, Gen­ eral of the United Nations (initial disarmament declaration), dated April 18, unpublished.

Perez de Cuellar, J. [Secretary-General of the United Nations] (1991). Letter to His Excellency Ahmed Hussein, Minister for For­ eign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, May 6, unpublished.

United Nations Security Council (1991 a). "Note by the Secre­ tary-General." S/23165, October 25.

United Nations Security Council (1991 b). "Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)." S/22871 , October 2.

United Nations Security Council (1991 c). Resolution 687. United Nations Security Council (1991 d). Resolution 707. United Nations Security Council (1991e) Resolution 715. United Nations Security Council (1992). "Note by the Secre­

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