Biological Roots of Moral Development Assignment

OVERVIEW

You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson plan in the context of higher education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading for comprehension is one thing, and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be given opportunities to read for the purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while thinking about and devising plans for how to deliver of the content of the readings.

INSTRUCTIONS

Details:

Read

Chapter 19-22

1. While completing the assigned readings for the Module: Week, think about which topic to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic and come up 3-4 objectives. The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and Objectives.” When listing objectives, start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…”

2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture Content.” Citing the assigned readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be delivered in class. Your summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced. Do not go over 3 pages. The goal is not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to summarize the lecture content noting the most important concepts in a coherent manner (showing their connections to the overall topic and objectives).

3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-long lecture on the chosen topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the lecture followed by concrete in-class activity/discussion ideas.

Further instructions:

1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so think concretely about your teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as useful for you as possible.

2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and headings as well as a reference page, but do not include the title and abstract.

Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the Summary and Lesson Plan Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to consider as your write your objectives.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

Ch .19 The Neurobiological Bases of Empathic Concern for Others

There has been a remarkable increase in theory and research on the neurobiological foundations of empathy, sympathy, compassion, prosocial behavior, and altruism in recent years. In this chapter, we examine how empathic concern for others is connected to genetic, neurophysiological, hormonal, and autonomic physiological functioning. Neurobiological researchers take various positions on the extent to which empathy and related constructs are reflective of morality, precursors to morality, or fundamental building blocks of morality. Our position conforms to the latter view: Empathy is a primary motivational force for caring behaviors toward others in need (de Waal, 2008). As a basic, essential element of compassion, empathy forms the basis for the capacity to think and act with positive, care-oriented morality. We begin with a brief consideration of definitional and theoretical issues before turning to the exciting new insights arising from empirical research.

Empathy is defined here as the recognition and sharing of another’s emotional state. Recognition entails cognitive empathy, or the capacity to comprehend another’s emotional state and understand another’s perspective. Shared emotional states reflect affective empathy, or vicarious affective arousal that might be similar to the other’s emotion. This is distinct from emotional contagion, a close matching of the other’s emotion, or personal distress, a self-focused aversive reaction to another’s distress or pain, in that affective empathy is a resonant emotion that is felt on behalf of the other person (Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Closely related to empathy are sympathy and compassion, which reflect an orientation toward another’s distress or pain, feelings of sadness or concern on behalf of that person, and a desire to promote that person’s well-being. Prosocial behavior constitutes actions taken to benefit another’s well-being, including actions to alleviate their distress. Thus, the broad behavioral category of prosocial behavior can encompass altruism,

which promotes another’s needs at some cost to oneself. These related affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions all reflect, to some degree, expressions of empathic concern for the well-being of others (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Usher, & Bridges, 2000).

Numerous theories have attempted to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of feeling and acting toward the well-being of others with the drive for individual survival and reproductive success emphasized by traditional evolutionary perspectives. According to kin selection processes, a network of genetically related individuals within a population will cooperate and engage in altruistic acts with one another and thereby increase the average genetic fitness of the network as a whole, even if such behavior reduces the individual fitness of certain members of the group (Wilson, 1978). With evolutionary pressure having selected for a propensity for cooperative or altruistic behaviors toward kin, one can expect that such behaviors would occasionally be directed toward unrelated others (West, El Mouden, & Gardner, 2011). Some sociobiologists have suggested that altruism evolved through reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). Under certain conditions, natural selection favors altruistic behaviors because these actions eventually benefit the altruistic individual at a later time, through quid pro quo returns of the favor, or by increasing the benevolent actor’s stature and status within the community (McAndrew, 2007). Others have argued that altruism among nongenetically related members of social species that live in group contexts (including humans) increases the odds of reproduction by the group and, thus, species survival (e.g., Rachlin, 2002; Sober & Wilson, 1998). A genetic propensity toward concern for others facilitates group cooperation, cohesion, and success against threats and challenges. Even if some altruistic individuals are personally disadvantaged by their own actions, as the group thrives and grows, the genetic basis for compassion and helping also is perpetuated.

Research on the Biological Bases of Empathy

These theoretical perspectives put the roots of human empathy in our biology. In the balance of this chapter, we review of the evidence for this proposal from studies of human neurobiology. Three central themes emerged repeatedly in our review: definition and measurement, levels of analysis, and development. Framed as questions, first, how do researchers’ definitions of empathy and related constructs contribute to their identification of neurobiological correlates, and how are the contexts or procedures for measuring empathic concern associated with the neurobiological features identified? Second, what can we glean about cohesive or synergistic functioning of multiple levels of neurobiological activity during empathic responses? And third, is there any evidence for age-related changes in the neurobiology of empathy?

Ch. 20 The Moral Baby

Most developmental research into morality so far has focused on children and adolescents, as can be seen in the contributions of this current volume. We think that the time is ripe to take a serious look at the moral lives of babies. One motivation for this comes from evolutionary theory. Biologists have long been interested in how a species like ours—in which large groups of nonkin work together on projects of mutual benefit—could come to exist. This was largely a mystery at the time of Darwin, but there are by now several candidate theories for how our complex social structures can arise. These include the accounts developed in the 1970s and 1980s based on kin selection and reciprocal altruism (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971, 1985), as well as theories based on group selection—a proposal once derided by biologists, but now returning as a serious contender (see Nowak & Highfield, 2011, for an accessible review). Such theories explain our complex social structures as grounded in certain propensities that we can view as moral, including altruism to nonkin, guilt at betraying another, and righteous anger toward cheaters. While the details are a matter of considerable debate, the notion of unlearned moral universals is consistent with what we now know about biological evolution. And one way to explore the nature of such universals is to look at babies. The second motivation comes from developmental psychology. Over the last 30 or so years, findings based on looking-time methods set off a revolution in how we think about the minds of babies. The original studies used such methods to focus on early knowledge of physical objects—a baby’s “naïve physics.” A vast body of research now suggests that— contrary to what was taught for decades to legions of psychology undergraduates—babies think of objects largely as adults do, as connected masses that move as units, that are solid and subject to gravity, and that move in continuous paths through space and time (e.g., Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1990; Wynn, 1992). Other studies have found rich social understanding. For instance, babies before their first birthday appreciate that individuals have goals (Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998) and soon afterward they appreciate the other individuals can have false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). These sorts of findings make it plausible that some rudimentary moral capacities will also be present in young babies.

One can distinguish moral understanding from moral sentiments. It is one thing to judge that certain acts are right or wrong—to appreciate, for instance, that if X hits Y for no reason, then X has done something wrong. It is another to have moral emotions, to feel sympathy for the pain of Y and anger toward X. While most of the research that we discuss below focuses on understanding, there is little doubt that such sentiments are critical to morality. As David Hume (1739/2000) pointed out, without moral passions, our moral reasoning would be useless—we might know right from wrong, but we would never be motivated to act upon this knowledge. There are several moral emotions, including guilt, shame, gratitude, and anger, but most

developmental research has focused on caring about other people—sometimes described as compassion. Is this an inherent part of our natures? Many scholars believe that it is, that it makes society and culture possible. In his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, Hume’s contemporary Adam Smith begins with:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith, 2002, p. 11)

Ch. 21 A Neurodevelopmental Perspective on Morality

In the past decade, a dramatic shift in the study of morality has occurred, moving away from incompatible notions of moral development and toward a more integrated theory. An explosion of interdisciplinary research in psychology, anthropology, biology, economics, and neuroscience has resulted in an attempt to more clearly define and investigate the concept of morality across domains. Work amongst these fields of study now suggests that human social sensibility emerges from a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms, which are shaped through cultural exposure, and can therefore be seen as a product of our biological, evolutionary, and cultural history, representing an important adaptive element for social cohesion and cooperation. New research involving neuroscientific methods lends support to the notion of morality as an integrated process, heavily dependent on emotional sensibilities. Despite the enthusiasm and grandiose claims in the media about the discovery of a moral compass associated with a single region of the brain, the reality is much more complex. Functional neuroimaging studies with healthy participants have shown that, while moral reasoning is underpinned by specific neural circuitry, these circuits are not unique to morality. Rather, they involve communication between regions and systems underlying various affective states, cognitions, and motivational processes. This phenomenon is not exclusive to the study of morality. Indeed, there is no evidence for a direct one-to-one mapping of any psychological construct to a simple underlying neural substrate. It is critical, therefore that moral cognition be decomposed into the multiple processes and representations involved in its neuro-computational implementation, including (but not limited to) the specific capacities for the perception of causation, valuation, agency, cognitive control, emotional inhibition, and theory of mind (Young & Dungan, 2012). Complimentary to the neuroscience approach is the contribution of developmental psychology as a means of integrating theory and research on the subcomponents of more complex social behaviors. A focus on neurodevelopmental systems is particularly useful,

as it allows one to investigate human social tendencies when only some components of, or precursors to, more mature moral behaviors are observable. Developmental studies can provide unique opportunities to investigate how the components of the developing system interact in ways not possible to view in adults, where all the components are fully mature (De Haan & Gunnar, 2009). The current chapter integrates developmental research with burgeoning work on the neurological underpinnings of morality. We begin with a comprehensive review of the neurological underpinnings of moral cognition in adults, as evidenced through psychopathology, and neuroimaging studies with typically developing populations and individuals with socioemotional dysfunctions. Next, the neurodevelopment of morality is examined with reference to early signs of sensitivity, fairness, and concern for others, all of which are thought to be precursors to a more mature morality. Neuroimaging studies focusing on the developmental changes to the perception of others’ distress is then presented, supporting the role of affective arousal in moral reasoning. Finally, we discuss new neurodevelopmental data, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), eye tracking, and moral evaluation, indicating that the affective, cognitive, and regulatory aspects of empathy involve interacting neural circuits with distinct developmental trajectories. Together these data are consistent with the view that morality is instantiated by functionally integrating several distributed areas/networks involved in affect, mentalizing, decision making, and reward.

In the past decade, research in affective and cognitive neuroscience has turned to functional neuroimaging techniques as a way to identify a network of brain regions involved in moral cognition.

One seminal functional MRI study investigated the neural correlates of moral emotion in participants who were asked to passively view pictures of emotionally charged scenes (e.g., physical assaults, poor children abandoned in the streets, war scenes) with and without moral content (e.g., body lesions, dangerous animals, body products). Results showed that both basic and moral emotions elicited from the scenes with moral content are associated with activation in the amygdala, thalamus, and upper midbrain (Moll et al., 2002a). The orbital (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) were also recruited when viewing scenes evocative of moral emotions, indicating that these regions play a central role in moral appraisals. Similarly, when participants were engaged in a simple visual sentence verification task, a network comprising the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the temporal pole, and pSTS was specifically activated by moral judgments (Moll et al., 2002b). In contrast, judgment of emotionally evocative, but nonmoral statements activated the amygdala, lingual, and vmPFC. Another fMRI study examined brain regions that were activated during simple ethical decision making about unambiguous written scenarios not containing direct bodily harm or violence (Heekeren et al., 2003). Simple moral decisions (i.e., judging whether the sentence described was morally appropriate or inappropriate), compared to semantic decisions, resulted in activation of pSTS, temporal poles, lateral prefrontal cortex,

and vmPFC. To investigate the neural underpinnings of everyday moral decision making, Sommer and colleagues (2010) contrasted stories describing conflicts with either moral or neutral content. In this study, a choice was required between hedonistic, but not illegal, behavior or the fulfillment of a moral obligation toward another person (e.g., after a long working day, you run to the bus stop to catch your transportation. At the bus stop, you see an elderly person who has stumbled and needs help. Helping that person will result in missing your bus. What would you decide?). Regions that significantly increased their activity during the imagination of moral conflicts versus neutral conflicts included the mPFC, right pSTS, and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).

Ch. 22 Searching for the Evolutionary Roots of Human Morality

Foundations: The Role of Comparative Evidence

Humans, like all other organisms, have an evolutionary history, and many important events in our history have been documented by paleontologists who study the fossil record, and by molecular geneticists who sequence our genes. The challenge faced by researchers studying the evolutionary origins of morality is that behavior and cognition do not leave traces in the fossil record and cannot be extracted from DNA. However, we can gain some understanding of the evolutionary roots of morality by comparing ourselves to other closely related organisms. Evolutionary biologists generally reason that if two closely related species share a particular trait, then it is likely that they inherited the trait from their most recent common ancestor. Thus, if humans share a characteristic with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), such as the absence of a tail, then it is likely that the same trait characterized our most recent common ancestor, which lived about 5–7 million years ago. On the other hand, if humans possess a trait, such as bipedalism, which chimpanzees and other great apes do not display, we can be reasonably confident that this trait evolved after the human and chimpanzee lineages diverged. Based on this logic, our goal is to consider whether humans share any of the features of morality with other members of the primate order, particularly the great apes. We do not expect to find codes of conduct prescribed by society, but it is possible that some components of morality, such as a concern for the welfare of others, might be found in other species (Flack & de Waal, 2000). The presence of these traits among other great apes would imply that these capacities were also present in the most recent common ancestor of humans and the great apes. The absence of these traits in other great apes would suggest that these capacities arose after the lineages diverged. We focus on the extant species most closely related to humans to help us understand when and how the foundations of human morality evolved. The foundations, notably moral sentiments

(Smith, 1759), may also have arisen through convergent evolution in more distantly related species, but we are concerned here with the phylogenetic roots of modern human behavior.

Cooperation has long been recognized as a problem for the theory of evolution by natural selection: Individuals who pay a cost to the benefit of others will go extinct, since they will be at a disadvantage to individuals who reap the benefits without the costs (Darwin, 1871). In the evolutionary literature, as well as in economics at the proximate level, punishment is an effective means of maintaining cooperation (or any behavior, for that matter: Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). In the absence of punishment, free riders and cheaters exploit cooperators, causing cooperation to decline dramatically (for an example from economics, see Fehr & Gächter, 2002). There are a number of accounts of animals harming others for immediate personal gain (coercion), but little compelling evidence for punishment that produces delayed benefits, at least in nonhuman primates ( Jensen, 2010; Jensen & Tomasello, 2010; Raihani, et al., 2012). There is only one study in which researchers attempted to determine whether the failure to reciprocate grooming or support led to elevated levels of aggression, and no evidence was found to suggest that chimpanzees systematically targeted nonreciprocators (Koyama, Caws, & Aureli, 2006). In an experimental study, chimpanzees punished individuals who pulled a food tray away from them and thereby caused the thief to lose food ( Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007a). But in contrast to human studies in which punishment (paying a cost so that targets experience a greater loss) increases levels of cooperative behavior across trials (e.g., in the public goods game: Fehr & Gächter, 2002), in chimpanzees,