ical Assessment, International Academy for Intercultural Re- search, and the International Test Commission.
Selected Bibliography
Arends-Tóth, J., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2003). Multiculturalism and acculturation: Views of Dutch and Turkish-Dutch. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 249 –266. doi:10.1002/ejsp.143
Celenk, O., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2011). Assessment of acculturation: Issues and overview of measures. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 8(1). Retrieved from http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol8/ iss1/10
Cheung, F. M., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leong, F. T. L. (2011). Toward a new approach to the assessment of personality in culture. American Psychologist, 66, 593– 603. doi:10.1037/a0022389
Malda, M., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Temane, M. Q. (2010). Rugby versus soccer in South Africa: Content familiarity explains most cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores. Intelligence, 38, 582–595. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2010.07.004
Valchev, V. H., van de Vijver, F. J. R., Nel, J. A., Rothmann, S., & Meiring, D. (2013). The use of traits and contextual information in free personality descriptions of ethnocultural groups in South Africa. Journal of Person- ality and Social Psychology, 104, 1077–1091. doi:10.1037/a0032276
van de Vijver, F. J. R. (1997). Meta-analysis of cross-cultural comparisons of cognitive test performance. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28, 678 –709. doi:10.1177/0022022197286003
van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2002). Cross-cultural assessment: Value for money? Applied Psychology: An International Review, 51, 545–566. doi:10.1111/ 1464-0597.00107
van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2002). Inductive reasoning in Zambia, Turkey, and the Netherlands: Establishing cross-cultural equivalence. Intelligence, 30, 313–351. doi:10.1016/S0160-2896(02)00084-3
van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2003). Bias and equivalence: Cross-cultural per- spectives. In J. A. Harkness, F. J. R. van de Vijver, & P. Ph. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 143–155). New York, NY: Wiley.
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Hambleton, R. K. (1996). Translating tests: Some practical guidelines. European Psychologist, 1, 89 –99. doi:10.1027/ 1016-9040.1.2.89
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (1997). Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (2000). Methodological issues in psychological research on culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31, 33–51. doi:10.1177/0022022100031001004
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (2011). Equivalence and bias: A review of concepts, models, and data analytic procedures. In D. Matsumoto & F. J. R. van de Vijver (Eds.), Cross-cultural research methods in psy- chology (pp. 17– 45). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2002). Structural equivalence in multilevel research. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33, 141–156. doi:10.1177/0022022102033002002
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2005). Conceptual and meth- odological issues in adapting tests. In R. K. Hambleton, P. F. Merenda, & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), Adapting educational tests and psychological tests for cross-cultural assessment (pp. 39 – 64). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Tanzer, N. K. (2004). Bias and equivalence in cross-cultural assessment: An overview. European Review of Applied Psychology, 54, 119 –135. doi:10.1016/j.erap.2003.12.004
van de Vijver, F. J. R., Breugelmans, S. M., &Schalk-Soekar, S. R. G. (2008). Multiculturalism: Construct validity and stability. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32, 93–104. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2007 .11.001
van de Vijver, F. J. R., Chasiotis, A., & Breugelmans, S. M. (Eds.) (2011). Fundamental questions in cross-cultural psychology. Cambridge, Eng- land: Cambridge University Press.
van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Phalet, K. (2004). Assessment in multicultural groups: The role of acculturation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 53, 215–236. doi:10.1111/j.1464-0597.2004.00169.x
van de Vijver, F. J. R., Van Hemert, D. A., & Poortinga, Y. H. (Eds.). (2008). Multilevel analysis of individuals and cultures. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Contributions of Internationalization to Psychology: Toward a Global and
Inclusive Discipline
Fons J. R. van de Vijver Tilburg University, the Netherlands; North-West
University, South Africa; and University of Queensland, Australia
DOI: 10.1037/a0033762
In this article I define and describe the current state of interna- tionalization in psychology. Internationalization refers here to the approach in which existing or new psychological theo- ries, methods, procedures, or data across cultures are syn- thesized so as to create a more culture-informed, inclusive, and globally applicable science and profession. This ap- proach is essential to advance psychology beyond its Euro- American context of development and to achieve a more global applicability of its theories and professional proce- dures. Internationalization already has led to a better inte- gration of cultural aspects in various psychological theories, to more insight into how to deal with methodological aspects of intact group comparisons (such as bias and equivalence), and to the development of guidelines in areas such as test development, test adaptations, ethics codes, and Internet testing. I review systemic and scientific climate factors in psychology that thwart the progress of internationalization, and conclude by suggesting methods of enhancing interna- tionalization, which is essential for developing a truly uni- versal psychology.
Keywords: internationalization, cross-cultural, emic, etic
In the last 40 years, psychology has become more interna- tional. This development is a consequence of external dy- namics, notably, globalization (Arnett, 2002) and interna- tional migration (Rogler, 1994). This development is also due to the internal dynamics of psychology, such as the increase in the number of international conferences and the number of countries from which the conference attendees come (Adair, Coêlho, & Luna, 2002; Adair, Unik, & Huynh, 2010; Pawlik & d’Ydewalle, 1996) and the increased interest in cross- cultural comparisons. Both the number and proportion of cross-cultural studies have increased considerably (cf. van de Vijver, 2006). For example, since 1970, the number of pub- lications included in the PsycINFO database has increased sevenfold, but the number of cross-cultural studies included has increased fifteenfold.
In the context of this article, internationalization refers to a broad set of approaches in which existing or new psycho- logical theories, methods, procedures, or data are synthesized across cultures so as to create a more culture-informed,
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inclusive, and globally applicable psychology. This definition involves activities in branches of psychology in which inter- nationalization is a core activity, such as cross-cultural psy- chology, and specific professional associations, such as the International Association for Intercultural Research (www.intercultural-academy.net) and the International Asso- ciation for Cross-Cultural Psychology (www.iaccp.org). The definition also covers activities in other branches of psychol- ogy and organizations in which cross-ethnic or international issues are addressed.
My thesis is that internationalization is here to stay, is irreversible, and should be further developed to make psychology more inclusive and universally applicable. We need to move beyond the current state in which many psychological constructs are either taken to be completely invariant across cultures or are considered culture-specific and incomparable across cultures. Internationalization is important in order to overcome this dichotomy, to ade- quately deal with culture in our theories and models, and to better accommodate cross-cultural differences and sim- ilarities in our theories (F. M. Cheung, van de Vijver, & Leong, 2011).
The first section, in which I describe internationalization, is followed by a description of internationalization’s direct and indirect contributions to psychology. The third section deals with impediments to be faced in advancing internation- alization. Finally, I make suggestions about how internation- alization can be further developed.
The Three Imperatives of Internationalization In my view, the internationalization approach is impera- tive in psychology. I distinguish three imperatives: moral, intellectual, and professional. First, internationalization is a moral imperative. It makes psychology more inclusive. It is important to be inclusive in psychology, to not neglect 95% of the world’s population (Arnett, 2008), and to include the majority world (Kagitcibasi, 2002). If we want our models and findings to apply outside the Euro-Amer- ican context in which most psychological studies are con- ducted, Western psychology needs to reach out beyond its comfort zone.
Second, internationalization is an intellectual impera- tive if psychology is to be inclusive. Internationalization makes better science. In 1942, Merton formulated five norms that should guide scientific research and theories, which became known as the CUDOS norms (Merton, 1942/1973): communalism (results are a common good of the entire scientific community), universalism (everyone can contribute to science), disinterestedness (scientists should work for the sake of science, not their personal profits or fame), originality (new work should expand our knowledge or data), and organized skepticism (critical scrutiny is the hallmark of good science). It is probably
telling of the zeitgeist of the 1940s that universalism was not interpreted in an additional way: Our theories should be globally applicable. Psychological theories often tacitly assume global validity and applicability. Clearly, such an assumption requires testing.
The pursuit of globally applicable theories and practices does not imply a “one size fits all” approach. International- ization does not imply homogenization. Rather, global appli- cability means that cultural elements are factored into psy- chological theories and procedures so that these theories accommodate both cross-cultural similarities and differences. The approach is in line with Lewin’s (1936) famous equation according to which behavior is a function of the person and the environment. The development of a global psychology requires that we include the environment in our theorizing. Such a development should be based on existing approaches, notably Western models (with their often tacitly assumed, yet untested, global applicability) and indigenous models. Indig- enous psychologies have become the generic name for all efforts (invariably in non-Western cultures) to develop theo- ries with maximum validity and applicability in these cultures (e.g., Allwood & Berry, 2006; Diaz-Loving, 2005). Integrat- ing indigenous approaches (of which Western psychology is one example) in a truly universal psychology is an important intellectual challenge (Poortinga, 2005).
Finally, internationalization (or, probably better, inter- culturalization or multiculturalization) is a professional imperative, notably in polyethnic societies (Mays, Rubin, Sabourin, & Walker, 1996). Internationalization makes better practice. It is related to one of the values of the Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psycholo- gists (Gauthier, Pettifor, & Ferrero, 2010): maximizing benefits and minimizing potential harm to individuals, families, groups, and communities. Professional psychol- ogists working in polyethnic groups may experience a discrepancy between what is desirable and what is avail- able in their service delivery, tools, and therapies. Profes- sional requirements to optimize service delivery may im- ply that tools need to be adapted (van de Vijver & Phalet, 2004).
Editor’s note. Fons J. R. van de Vijver received the Award for Distin- guished Contributions to the International Advancement of Psychology. Award winners are invited to deliver an award address at the APA’s annual convention. This article is based on the award address presented at the 121st annual meeting, held July 31–August 4, 2013, in Honolulu, Hawai’i. Arti- cles based on award addresses are reviewed, but they differ from unsolicited articles in that they are expressions of the winners’ reflections on their work and their views of the field.
Author’s note. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Fons J. R. van de Vijver, Department of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]
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The Goals of Cross-Cultural Psychology as Stages in Internationalization The putative three stages in the development of cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002; F. M. Cheung, 2012) can be interpreted as the stages of interna- tionalization. The first stage aims to transport and test hy- potheses and findings obtained in Western cultures to other cultures. For example, can the Beck Depression Inventory be used to measure depression in Iran? If so, what can be concluded about depression levels among Iranian and West- ern clinical and nonclinical samples? Most cross-cultural studies were, are, and will probably continue to be of this nature (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). The second stage takes stock of these studies by documenting psychological differences and similarities to explore other cultures in order to discover psychological variation. For example, what can be concluded about the prevalence of depression if we com- pare scores on the Beck Depression Inventory from all the studies that have been reported (van Hemert, van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2002)? Are these country differences related to economic or social indicators? Such studies tend to employ meta-analyses (e.g., van Hemert et al.) or large-scale surveys (Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010). With the advent of multilevel models, there are interesting new opportunities to address both individual- and country-level variation in a single analysis (M. W. L. Cheung & Au, 2005; Fischer & Boer, 2011). In the third stage, the goal is to integrate findings in order to generate a more universal psychology. The findings of the first two stages are used to augment existing theories and models so as to accommodate the pat- terning of cross-cultural differences and similarities that have been found. For example, a theory of well-being that meets the requirements of the third stage would both specify cross- cultural similarities and differences and make predictions about individual- and country-level differences. A truly in- ternational psychology should develop theories of this kind. If this approach was fully implemented in psychology, there would be no reason for further internationalization. Branches of psychology that have internationalization at their core, such as cross-cultural psychology, could then cease to exist (Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998).
Contributions of Internationalization to Psychology Internationalization of psychology has made various contri- butions; I focus here on how internationalization has helped to achieve the third goal, which is the development of a truly international psychology. I describe three types of contribu- tions: theoretical advances, methodological advances, and guidelines for research and practice.
Theoretical Contributions
The internationalization approach is probably most associ- ated with a number of social-psychological studies that have reported differences in attitudes, norms, and values in large- scale international studies. The best-known examples are Hofstede’s (2001) study of work-related values, the concep- tually related GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), and Schwartz’s (1992) study of values. Notably, Hofstede’s work has received much attention. The country value dimensions he reported (individualism– collectivism, power distance, un- certainty avoidance, masculinity–femininity, and long-term orientation) have been widely applied. Individualism– collec- tivism, going back to Tönnies (1887/1963), has become the most frequently studied dimension in cross-cultural studies (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1994). Most studies of differences between East Asians and Americans, the most common comparison in cross-cultural psychology (Brouw- ers, van Hemert, Breugelmans, & van de Vijver, 2004), use these concepts as their theoretical background.
However, internationalization is much broader and richer than the study of norms, values, and attitudes. It has perme- ated all branches of psychology, although the level of ad- vancement with regard to internationalization differs across branches. Rather than trying to be exhaustive, I describe here examples of fields with a special standing regarding interna- tionalization. In developmental science, conceptual frame- works have been developed and tested that explain the inter- relationships between cultural and psychological phenomena. Examples include models of child– environment interactions (e.g., Bronfenbrenner’s, 1979, ecological model), parenting (LeVine, 1980), and parental ethnotheories (Super & Hark- ness, 1986). Work by Kagitcibasi (2007) and Keller (2007), which is based on theories of independence and interdepen- dence, shows that cross-cultural differences in parenting have a functional background. Parental socialization strategies match the relationship patterns that prevail in a society (in- terdependent or autonomous) to ensure that children are socialized to become adults who are well prepared to function in that society.
The field of personality shows a less advanced picture vis-à-vis internationalization. The dominant paradigm in the field, the five-factor personality model, has shown impressive cross-cultural invariance (e.g., McCrae et al., 2005). There is much evidence that when the Revised NEO Personality In- ventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) or a similar instrument is administered, the five factors that were origi- nally found in U.S. American samples are found in many other countries. The only factor that does not always replicate is Openness (De Raad, 1998). However, the reasons for not finding the fifth factor are elusive and do not seem to involve specific types of cultures. The evidence for the universality of the five-factor model makes it very unlikely that there are basic cross-cultural differences in personality structure.
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The cross-cultural studies that have compared factor struc- tures across countries have focused on confirming the West- ern structure and not on identifying culture-specific struc- tures. In other words, cross-cultural studies tested the applicability of the five factors, assuming that the Western theory and instrument provide an adequate rendering of per- sonality in all the countries studied. However, there are strong indications from non-Western studies that set out to combine etic and emic approaches that the five-factor model may not be comprehensive. Psycholexical studies, which start from an analysis of a language’s lexicon of personality- related terms or interviews with local informants to build up a database of such terms, do not always find the invariance of the five factors. Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscien- tiousness are consistently found, whereas Openness and Emotional Stability have not been found in all languages in which psycholexical studies have been conducted (De Raad & Peabody, 2005). In addition, there are psycholexical stud- ies in non-Western countries, such as China (F. M. Cheung et al., 2001), the Philippines (Church, 1987), and South Africa (Nel et al., 2012), that have tried to strike a balance between etic (universal) and emic (culture-specific) constructs (F. M. Cheung et al., 2011). These studies have found that the social domain of personality is insufficiently covered by the Agree- ableness factor of the five-factor model. For example, in a qualitative South African study it was found that relationship harmony (covered by facets such as approachability, conflict seeking, and interpersonal relatedness) and softheartedness (e.g., active support, amiability, and egoism) were the per- sonality terms that were most frequently mentioned by par- ticipants from the 11 official language groups of the country (Nel et al., 2012). Similarly, interpersonal relatedness, mea- suring various aspects of interdependence, was found in a psycholexical study in China (F. M. Cheung et al., 2011). These studies suggest that the five-factor model is universal yet incomplete in at least some non-Western cultures in its representation of social aspects of personality. There may be a functional reason for the more complex structure of social aspects in these cultures. Individuals living in (collectivistic) cultural contexts where personal relationships with ingroup members are more salient show a richer structure in these characteristics than do persons living in individualistic cul- tural contexts (where the five-factor model originated).
The field of intelligence shows a less advanced picture in terms of internationalization than does the field of personal- ity. The prevailing theory on the structure of intelligence nowadays is the CHC model, named after its originators, Cattell, Horn, and Carroll (Carroll, 1993). Like most models in intelligence, the CHC model has an assumed global appli- cability. The available, admittedly scant, cross-cultural evi- dence has supported this model (e.g., Malda, van de Vijver, Srinivasan, Transler, & Sukumar, 2010). Interestingly, there is another influential model in the cognitive domain, related to the field of social cognition, that adopts a more culture-
specific approach: Nisbett’s model of thought (e.g., Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). According to this model, East Asians think in a more holistic manner, attend more to the entire context, and use dialectical reasoning more. West- erners, on the other hand, are more analytic, attend more to detail, and employ more causal reasoning. There is no work on the link between these two seemingly conflicting tradi- tions. From the perspective of internationalization, the (etic) skill conceptions of the CHC model should be combined with the (emic) style conceptions of Nisbett’s model to develop a more integrated, culture-informed perspective on cognition.
A final domain mentioned here is clinical psychology (Helman, 2007), which has the same dualism between etic and emic approaches as the personality domain. On the one hand, the field has a strong etic orientation (focusing on the study of universals), notably in its nosology of disorders, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (published by the American Psychiatric Associa- tion) and the International Classification of Diseases (pub- lished by the World Health Organization). On the other hand, there is work with a strong emic orientation (focused on the study of culture-specific syndromes). The latter is best rep- resented in the study of culture-bound syndromes (Kleinman, Eisenberg, & Good, 1978). In addition, there is an emic orientation in the adjustment of therapies to specific ethnic groups (Cuéllar, 1998; L. A. Suzuki & Ponterotto, 2008). The current level of internationalization of the field, which is hampered by the relative independence of the emic and etic traditions, can be illustrated by the following example. Taijin Kyofusho is a type of social anxiety in Japan in which a patient avoids social contacts, not because of a self-perceived inadequacy in establishing contacts but in order to avoid harming others. Symptoms can be fear of blushing, eye contact, and emitting a foul body odor (Takahashi, 1989). It is no surprise to find claims that Taijin Kyofusho can also be found in other cultures (e.g., K. Suzuki, Takei, Kawai, Min- abe, & Mori, 2003). Social anxieties (and their culture- specific forms) are more likely to develop in societies with very strict norms regarding social contacts, such as in Japan. Social anxieties are probably universal, but cultures may well influence their expression. Clinical psychology will advance by integrating etic and emic perspectives on social anxiety.
It can be concluded from these examples that the devel- opment of internationalization is rather uneven across branches of psychology; it is fairly common to see that universal (etic) and more culture-specific (emic) topics are independently pursued without attempts to integrate both approaches. The global perspective, characteristic of interna- tionalization, can help to overcome the dichotomy.
Methodological Contributions
The methodological contributions undergirding internation- alization have been developed (and applied) in statistics, psychometrics, cross-cultural psychology, education, and
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cross-cultural survey research. The contributions comprise procedures that are based partly on new statistical develop- ments and partly on more experience with small and large cross-cultural studies. These procedures specify recommen- dations on how to conduct comparative studies. I first de- scribe a taxonomy of bias, followed by a taxonomy of equiv- alence.
The major methodological threat to valid inferences in comparative studies is bias (He & van de Vijver, 2012; van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Bias occurs when score differ- ences on indicators of a particular construct do not corre- spond to differences in the underlying trait or ability (van de Vijver & Tanzer, 2004). For example, a response in one culture represents a target construct (say, conscientiousness), whereas responses in another country may be due to other constructs (e.g., social desirability) or additional constructs (a combination of conscientiousness and social desirability). Bias can arise from three sources: the construct under study, methodological aspects of an instrument or sample, and spe- cific items.
Construct bias indicates that the construct measured is not identical across cultures. It can occur when there is only a partial overlap in definition of the construct across cultures or when not all relevant behaviors associated with the construct are present and properly sampled in each culture (van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1997). For example, it was found that Chinese depressed outpatients mentioned somatic symptoms as their major complaints, whereas their Australian counter- parts more often stressed depressed mood and cognitive anxiety symptoms (Parker, Cheah, & Roy, 2001; see also Marsella, 1980).
Method bias refers to all sources of systematic cross- cultural differences that are due to instrument or administra- tion features. Three sources of method-related factors can be distinguished: sample, instrument, and administration bias (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Sample bias results from incomparability of samples due to cross-cultural variation in sample characteristics. For example, cross-national compar- isons of intelligence test scores can be compromised by differences in the quality of education in the countries in- volved. Instrument bias involves problems deriving from instrument characteristics, such as stimulus familiarity (in cognitive and educational tests) and response styles (in per- sonality and attitude inventories) that differ across popula- tions. Teacher self-efficacy was studied among 73,100 teach- ers in 23 countries with the Teaching and Learning International Survey. Extremity scoring was measured as the proportion of responses in the two extreme response catego- ries (strongly disagree and strongly agree) on other scales of the survey. This response tendency was one of the best predictors of cross-national differences in teacher self-effi- cacy scores (Vieluf, Kuenther, & van de Vijver, 2013). The last type of method bias, administration bias, can come from administration conditions (e.g., data collection modes and
class size), ambiguous instructions, the interaction between the administrator and respondents (e.g., halo effects), and communication problems (e.g., language differences and ta- boo topics).
Finally, bias can be due to specific items. An item is biased when its psychological meaning differs across cul- tures. More precisely, an item of a scale (e.g., measuring anxiety) is said to be biased if persons with the same standing on the trait but coming from different cultures are not equally likely to endorse the item (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Item bias (or differential item functioning) can arise from various sources. Examples are poor translation, inapplicabil- ity of item contents in some cultures, or items that trigger additional traits or use words or expressions with ambiguous connotations. A good example is the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale item “I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.” The item presupposes own- ership of a car, which limits its applicability in cross-cultural research. Of all the bias types distinguished, differential item functioning has been the most extensively studied (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Zumbo, 2007).
Bias has implications for the equivalence (or comparabil- ity) of scores. Statistical and linguistic equivalence are of particular relevance here (the latter is dealt with in the next section). In the last 15 years, various taxonomies of statistical equivalence have been proposed. The currently most popular ones are based on structural equation modeling (e.g., Van- denberg & Lance, 2000). There are four basic types recurring in the numerous taxonomies that have been proposed. The first occurs when there is construct bias and there is no basis for comparing constructs across groups (“comparing apples and oranges”), which is the case when factor structures of constructs differ across groups. The second is called config- ural invariance, which means that the same indicators (items or subtests) load on the same factors in all groups studied. The third, called measurement weights or metric invariance, is found when the indicators show the same factor loadings in all groups. The fourth type, called score invariance or scalar invariance (or equivalence), is found when the regression of the latent factors on the observed indicators has the same intercept in each group.
Bias and equivalence are concepts that provide a frame- work for design and analysis aimed at enhancing research quality. The underlying questions are not unique for interna- tionalization and are also relevant for comparisons of ages, genders, or patient groups and for the comparison of work organizations and classes. Issues of comparability are rele- vant in all these groups. Employing current procedures to study equivalence and differential item functioning would enhance the research quality in such studies.
Guidelines for Research and Practice
In the last decade, various groups and associations have established guidelines that are relevant for promoting inter-
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nationally coordinated ways of dealing with common prob- lems in internationalization. Using the Internet as its principal means of dissemination, the International Test Commission has published guidelines on test use (International Test Com- mission, 2000), on computer-based and Internet testing (In- ternational Test Commission, 2005), and on adaptations across languages and cultures (International Test Commis- sion, 2010). Guidelines have also been developed in the domains of quality of life research (e.g., Guillemin, Bombar- dier, & Beaton, 1993) and cross-cultural survey research (Harkness, van de Vijver, & Mohler, 2003). Guidelines are sometimes formulated as recommendations and best prac- tices. For example, the Comparative Survey Design and Implementation (CSDI) Guidelines are aiming to “to develop and promote internationally recognized guidelines that high- light best practice for the conduct of comparative survey research across cultures and countries” (Survey Research Center, 2010, p. 1). These Guidelines describe the general goals of guidelines for survey questions as “to maximize the comparability of survey questions across cultures and lan- guages and reduce measurement error related to question design” (p. VI.-3). The statement of this principle is then followed by procedural steps, which provide detailed recom- mendations about how items can be formulated to increase their cross-cultural suitability. The International Test Com- mission’s (2010) guidelines on test adaptations follow a similar format. For example, the first test adaptation guideline defines the general context of multilingual studies: “Effects of cultural differences which are not relevant or important to the main purposes of the study should be minimized to the extent possible” (p. 2). These guidelines are couched in terms of recommendable practices rather than inflexible norms that should be obeyed. Such norms can be perceived as unneces- sary and counterproductive impositions as they cannot deal with all possible contingencies in field conditions.
These sets of guidelines accommodate both universal and culture-specific aspects of assessments. The above require- ment in the International Test Commission guideline to min- imize the impact of irrelevant cultural differences is meant to be a globally applicable principle. However, the operational- ization of this principle in a specific context requires a pro- found knowledge of the construct studied, of the psycholog- ical meaning of the construct in the target cultural context, and of the specific measurement operations that could be used to assess the construct. It should be noted that this current intellectual climate of developing instruments for use in multiple cultures is an improvement over the zeitgeist in which there was an almost exclusive emphasis on linguistic aspects and translation accuracy in international projects. It is in line with this change that the term translation seems to have gradually been replaced by the term adaptation. In PsycINFO, the term adaptation is now more common than the term translation in the context of cross-cultural studies.
The domain of ethics has also seen an important interna- tionalization movement. A 2010 special issue of Ethics & Behavior illustrates the combination of universal and coun- try-specific aspects, which is the common denominator of all internationalization efforts, in the domain of psychological ethics. Leach and Leong (2010) wrote in their introduction to the special issue that “the idea of an eventual common ethics code is probably not feasible or even appropriate given cul- tural nuances that comprise national ethics codes. However, as the discipline of psychology becomes more formalized in increasing numbers of countries, some common standards and principles are likely to follow” (p. 175). The work on international guidelines is useful for striking a balance be- tween the common and the unique (in line with the goals of internationalization). On the one hand, the work illustrates how we can escape from a simple Euro-American dominance in psychology and include the neglected 95% of the world’s population (Arnett, 2008). On the other hand, the work also illustrates that guidelines that are assumed to be globally applicable are typically not very dissimilar from Western recommended practices. However, they differ in an essential aspect from Western standards: They are based on experi- ences and insights obtained in various cultures and explicitly leave room for culturally unique aspects.
It can be concluded that there is a remarkable overlap in issues in the internationalization of psychology in theoretical advances, methodological developments, and the formulation of guidelines. Internationalization in each of these domains is based on broad universal features (constructs or procedures), complemented by culture-specific aspects. In each of the three, there are many more universal than culture-specific features; still, the accommodation of these specifics is essen- tial to make models, techniques, and recommendations glob- ally applicable.
Impediments to Progress There are two kinds of obstructions to further international- ization in psychology. The first kind is due to two systemic properties of psychology as a discipline. One of these is the dominant presence of Euro-American psychology. The dis- cipline was not set up to deal with great ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity in the profession or the participants we study. Not surprisingly, there are problems in dealing with this diversity. A good example is the dominance of English as the scientific lingua franca (Draguns, 2001). Technical tools for routine translation of scientific articles do not yet provide adequate quality. This language issue is particularly pressing in countries with a strong monolingual, non-English tradition, such as where the Romance languages are spoken. The lan- guage barriers have contributed to the development of sepa- rate language-wise organized disciplines with their own dy- namics, with much mutual ignorance and neglect, despite the overlap in topics studied. For example, acculturation studies in the Anglophone and Francophone worlds are remarkably
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different in theories and methods; cross-referencing is rare. Such mutual isolation impedes progress in both worlds. A second systemic problem is the absence in many countries of good tutoring systems to coach young scientists who want to submit manuscripts to international journals. I have met young colleagues from various countries who have to publish in these journals to be promoted, but because of a lack of relevant experience, their teachers and supervisors cannot be role models. It is not surprising that there is much copycatting of Western research in this young gen- eration.
The prevailing scientific climate in psychology lacks openness, which thwarts progress in internationalization. A first example involves the numerous tacit conventions in reporting psychological studies that are not mentioned in submission guidelines or in the American Psychological As- sociation’s (2009) Publication Manual (Bem, 2003). Journal editors and reviewers often have very detailed opinions and expectations about what should be mentioned where in a manuscript, which statistical analyses should be used, and which theories are popular or no longer popular. Authors who are not fully aware of these expectations may find that their manuscripts are rejected because they do not fit well in the scientific climate of that field. There is a striking analogy with how Wober (1969) once described the application of Western cognitive tests to non-Western participants: “How well can they do our tricks?” (p. 488). In the fierce compe- tition for journal space, unorthodox ways of presenting a study can be construed as incompetence.
The same lack of openness plagues the internationaliza- tion approach in other ways as well. Individualism– collec- tivism (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1994) and independence– interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) are very popular explanations of cross-cultural differences. Critical evaluations of these concepts (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Schwartz, 1994) have fallen on deaf ears. The concepts are overused. For example, Chiao and Blizinsky (2010) reported a significant correlation between 5-HTTLPR, a serotonin transporter gene that is related to negative affect, and individualism– collectivism at the coun- try level. The correlation was presented as evidence in favor of culture– gene coevolutionary theory. More specifically, it was argued that “cultural values and frequency of S allele carriers negatively predicted global prevalence of anxiety and mood disorder. Mediation analyses further indicate that in- creased frequency of S allele carriers predicted decreased anxiety and mood disorder prevalence due to increased col- lectivistic cultural values” (Chiao & Bebko, 2011, p. 23). A main problem with this reasoning is that individualism– collectivism is just one of the country-level variables that could be associated with 5-HTTLPR. I correlated 5-HTTLPR country scores with various other country-level scores and found stronger correlations for indicators of countries’ po- liteness, kindness, and humaneness (e.g., Chinese Culture
Connection, 1987). As a consequence, kindness may be a more powerful mediator (with an interpretation quite differ- ent from collectivism).
The third example of a lack of openness involves the strong tendency to focus on cross-cultural differences and to disregard cross-cultural similarities. Brouwers et al. (2004) conducted an overview of studies published in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology between 1970 and 2004. They found that more than 40% of the studies in which cross- cultural differences were expected did not find all the differ- ences expected, whereas there was almost no study in which expected similarities were not found. The cross-cultural field is difference driven. Such an orientation was helpful in the initial stages of the discipline when the field had to justify its existence. However, this orientation has quickly become counterproductive now that the initial stages are past.
It has often been argued that the closure that is associated with dominant paradigms in science is counterproductive and that individuals and groups with a vested interest in these paradigms can block progress (e.g., Willmott, 1993). The same problem threatens internationalization, which requires that we “break the paradigm mentality,” to use Willmott’s (1993, p. 681) words, and foster a basic openness to accom- modate diversity.
Conclusion and Implications Internationalization comprises different approaches in differ- ent fields. I have described approaches in theories, design and analysis, and guidelines on how to conduct studies in multi- cultural and multilingual settings. Even if approaches in these fields have been developed rather independently, they have much in common. These approaches share the need to over- come the dualism between etic and emic approaches. They also share the aim to accommodate both universal and cul- ture-specific aspects in constructs or measures. In sum, they are crucial for the further development of psychology as a science and a profession.
Internationalization has come a long way. It has led to the development of various new practices. Internationalization gave rise to the development of models and training proce- dures in intercultural communication, improved our under- standing of cultural factors in psychotherapy, has provided guidelines about how to design educational tests in polyeth- nic societies, and has informed policies on multiculturalism. Internationalization has expanded our theoretical knowledge in social psychology (e.g., cross-cultural similarities and dif- ferences in values) and developmental psychology (e.g., de- velopmental tasks as preparations for both universal and culture-specific ways of demonstrating adulthood). In addi- tion, our methodological tools to analyze quasi-experimental designs and to develop culture-informed instruments have been greatly expanded in the last decades. Also, topics in polyethnic societies have been investigated extensively, such as acculturation, which has been studied in psychology
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(Berry, 1997; Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001) and soci- ology (Portes & Zhou, 1993). However, internationalization of the discipline is still far from complete. Various branches of psychology have yet to overcome the emic– etic dichot- omy, such as personality and clinical psychology. In addition, there are aspects of internationalization that have hardly been touched on, such as the psychology of globalization (Gelfand, Lyons, & Lun, 2011).
There are in my view three promising ways to further advance internationalization in psychology. The first is the further development of international collaboration. The na- ture of such cooperation is a crucial factor in how much a study can contribute to the internationalization of psychol- ogy. Studies of international collaboration have shown that the power differential is often uneven; researchers from Western countries are often the dominant party, as they usually have an advantage in terms of language, experience, and resources (Adair et al., 2010). Obviously, the develop- ment of a truly international psychology requires the intel- lectual input of all parties.
As a second important way of advancing the internation- alization of the field, we should try to become less driven by implicit agendas (such as the overuse of individualism– col- lectivism) in the study of cross-cultural differences and ex- plore new perspectives on cross-cultural differences. A good example is the study by Schaller and Murray (2008) on the relation between disease prevalence and personality. There are few theoretical models of cross-cultural differences. It is, therefore, more productive in the long run to explore new models than to replicate or refine existing models, as is currently done in the area of individualism– collectivism. This plea involves the research agenda of the field of inter- nationalization but also editorial policies. It would help the field if journal editors and reviewers better appreciated that the few models of cross-cultural differences that are available are still fairly crude and in need of amendments and that we need a balanced view of similarities and differences.
Finally, internationalization has an important applied component involving, among other things, assessment in multicultural groups (L. A. Suzuki & Ponterotto, 2008), adjusting therapies for groups of immigrants (Gaw, 1993), and intercultural communication training (Deardorff, 2009). Numerous interesting approaches have been developed in each of these areas. However, these areas of inquiry lack integration and a systematic study of what is (not) effective. A stronger orientation toward the development of evidence- based practices in these areas would be helpful to advance the field as it will help to identify critical factors.
When the globalization movement gained momentum, it was not uncommon to hear that humankind was moving toward a homogeneous culture. In such a homogeneous world, the study of cross-cultural differences would become a nonissue. With the further development of globalization, it is becoming clear that if there is some homogenization of
humankind, it will be probably be restricted to a small elite with a strong international outlook and experience, such as sojourners working for multinational companies. It is much more likely that internationalization will further advance against a backdrop of prevailing cultural differences. Inter- esting challenges lie ahead of us if we want to advance the psychological basis of this development and want to reach a state in which we routinely incorporate culture in our theo- rizing.
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770 November 2013 ● American Psychologist
research design one uses (longitudinal, cross- sectional, experimental, quasi-experimental, etc). It does not depend on the sample (e.g., American or Nigerian). Science is charac- terized by testing and falsifying theories (Meehl, 1978).
In light of this philosophy, it is unclear why research on cultural context should be considered more scientifically progressive than research on basic processes. In fact, Ar- nett’s (2008) description of cultural research raises concerns that it could actually slow progress in psychology. His vision of cultural psychology does not invoke theory or the importance of having testable hypotheses. Rather, cultural psychology appears to be ex- ploratory and descriptive in nature. Will cul- tural psychology simply be an anecdotal record of cultural differences or a collection of replication studies? Will 100% of the world’s population have to be studied before psychology can be considered a “complete science?” Arnett failed to provide any infor- mation about how cultural psychology will progress as a science.
From a philosophy of science perspec- tive, Arnett’s (2008) distinction between cul- tural context and basic processes is a false dichotomy. The problem with human psy- chology is not its focus on basic processes rather than cultural context; it is the lack of strong falsifiable theories (Meehl, 1978). Cultural context cannot exist in a vacuum isolated from basic processes such as cogni- tion, perception, language, and so forth. If cultural research is to take hold in psychol- ogy, then it must be theory driven and inte- grated into work on basic processes. It is not enough to surmise that different cultures may lead to different outcomes. Researchers need to specify the conditions for when they would and would not expect culture to affect basic processes and behaviors.
Cultural context can serve an important purpose in psychological science: It will en- able us to test hypotheses about which fea- tures of human behavior are acquired through experience and which are basic (or innate). Basic processes are mechanisms via which humans—and other animals—are able to re- spond adaptively to typical environments; however, these processes can be distin- guished from another kind of adaptation, ac- quired associations or strategies (such as reading), which vary across situations and cultures. Within this framework, cultural ad- aptations can be thought to arise from the operation of basic processes, such as learn- ing.4 For example, at one time it was thought that language was acquired solely through imitation of and reinforcement by models within one’s sociocultural context (e.g., Skin- ner’s, 1957, Verbal Behavior), until Chom- sky’s synthesis of cross-cultural linguistic
variation revealed important similarities across cultures, suggesting that language ac- quisition also depends on a more basic struc- ture or process that all humans share. Simi- larly, conventional wisdom suggests that abstract mathematical concepts are learned through years of formal education and train- ing; however, studies of hunter-gatherer cul- tures (e.g., the Pirahã; Gordon, 2004) and even of nonhuman animals (e.g., monkeys, rats, pigeons; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000) have shown that we all share a common system for representing the abstract concept of number. In clinical psychology, many as- sume that eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa share a common genetic etiology. However, recent research suggests that the genetic diathesis for bulimia nervosa may exhibit greater pathoplasticity cross-culturally than the diathesis for an- orexia nervosa; this finding indicates distinct etiologies for these disorders (Keel & Klump, 2003). These examples highlight the impor- tance of using cultural context to test theories about basic and acquired human behavior.
Conclusion
Focusing on cultural context rather than basic processes is not going to advance American psychology, or psychology in general. Neither are having students travel abroad or take anthropology classes (as recommended by Arnett), in and of them- selves. Rather, science will advance by de- veloping and testing theories. We believe that psychological science can benefit most by using differences in culture and context to develop and test novel hypotheses about basic human processes.
4 Note that this formulation of the purpose of cross-cultural psychology differs markedly from Arnett’s (2008), which espouses cultural representativeness as a goal unto itself.
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Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. American Psychologist, 63, 602– 614.
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Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consult- ing and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806 – 834.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
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Stanovich, K. E. (2007). How to think straight about psychology (8th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon/Pearson Education.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Gerald J. Haeffel, De- partment of Psychology, 108 Haggar Hall, Uni- versity of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. E-mail: [email protected]
DOI: 10.1037/a0016723
The Neglected 95%, a Challenge to Psychology’s
Philosophy of Science
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett Clark University
My goal in writing “The Neglected 95%: Why American Psychology Needs to Be- come Less American” (Arnett, October 2008) was to fuel a conversation in psy- chology about whether American psycho- logical research should become more re- flective of how human beings in different cultures around the world experience their lives. I am pleased to see that many of my colleagues have taken up this conversation, as represented in the four comments Amer- ican Psychologist is publishing in this is- sue. The four comments were well chosen in that they represent quite different reac- tions to my article. Two of the comments were generally in support of my thesis that American psychology is too narrow cultur- ally, and sought to provide additional in- formation on the issues I raised. The other two comments were in opposition to my thesis and presented the grounds for their
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opposition. In this rejoinder I address the issues raised in each of the comments, first the two supporting comments and then the two opposing comments. Following this, I address the more general problem that cuts across the comments: American psychol- ogy’s dominant philosophy of science.
Strategies—and a Caveat—for Reaching the Neglected 95%
LoSchiavo and Shatz (2009, this issue) agreed that my analysis of articles pub- lished in APA journals shows that Ameri- can researchers in psychology have fo- cused too narrowly on Americans while neglecting the other 95% of the world’s population. However, they placed the ori- gin of the problem not mainly on a mis- guided philosophy of science, as I did (Arnett, 2008), but on practical issues, spe- cifically “a lack of viable options for con- ducting research with international sam- ples” (LoSchiavo & Shatz, 2009, p. 566). To remedy this problem they suggested the creation of a centralized network of multi- national field sites “so that researchers can partner with international colleagues and collect data from samples that better reflect the whole of humanity” (p. 566). They also recommended increased use of Web-based research methods, which could make it possible to involve colleagues and research participants around the world without the expense and logistical trouble of interna- tional travel.
I support these suggestions. However, I would only raise the caution that multi- national studies would have to be based on diverse culturally grounded theoretical per- spectives and methods in order to be suc- cessful in addressing the problems I de- scribed in my article. For example, it would be a mistake to believe that taking Ameri- can-based questionnaires and using them in 10 different countries would be an ade- quate way of representing the cultural con- texts of all 10 countries. Questionnaires are laden with cultural assumptions, in the items chosen and the response options offered, so the methods used would have to be adapted to the range of cultural contexts involved, even if doing so would make it more difficult to compare the samples. Similarly, it would be pointless to use the same experimental laboratory methods in 10 different countries. If experimental laboratory methods strip away cultural context in one country, they will do so in other countries as well. What needs to change is not just the cultural range of samples used in psychology but the dom- inant philosophy of science.
Is American Psychology Already Becoming More International?
Like LoSchiavo and Shatz (2009), Web- ster, Nichols, and Schember (2009, this issue) agreed with the thesis of my article. However, their appraisal of American psy- chology’s current international representa- tion was more favorable than mine. They conducted a journal analysis to supplement the one I presented and concluded that “substantial progress has been made over the last 30 years” (Webster et al., 2009, p. 566) in APA journals, toward representing a broader portion of humanity.
Their analysis included three journals that mine did not—Journal of Experimen- tal Psychology: General (JEP: General), Psychological Bulletin, and Psychological Review—and they excluded two journals that had been part of my analysis, Health Psychology and Family Psychology. My analysis was over 20 years in 5-year incre- ments; their analysis went back 30 years in 10-year increments. Furthermore, they an- alyzed national institutional affiliations of editors, associate editors, and consulting editors across five time points from 1980 to 2008. In contrast, my analysis of APA’s editorial representation was for only one year, 2007. This is an impressive analysis that Webster et al. (2009) have conducted, with admirable swiftness (presumably in the few months since my article was pub- lished in October 2008). Perhaps only they and I can truly appreciate the tolerance for tedium that such an analysis requires.
Although I now consider Webster et al. (2009) my comrades in tedium, I do not share their sanguine interpretation of their results. As I see it, there are three problems. First, although they stated hopefully that the “glass” is now “half full” (p. 568), in my reading of their results it appears that three glasses are actually 37% (authors), 18% (consulting editors), and 21% (edi- tors/associate editors) full, in terms of in- ternational representation in APA journals. Second, and more seriously, their analysis did not specify the proportion of non- American authors, editors, and consulting editors who were from English-speaking or European countries, as mine did. If, as in my analysis, nearly all non-American rep- resentation was from English-speaking or Western European countries, the cultural areas most similar to the United States, then the increased international representa- tion they reported for recent decades is not as comforting as it appears. Adding English-speaking and Western European countries to the United States may raise APA journal representation to about 12% of the world’s people (Population Refer- ence Bureau, 2006), up from less than 5%
for the United States alone, but a human science that neglects 88% of the species it purports to study remains a dubious one.
Third, and most serious of all, it is not enough for a growing proportion of authors and editors to be non-American if nearly all of them, American and non-American alike, share a narrow philosophy of science that focuses mainly on basic processes and ignores or strips away cultural context. In Webster et al.’s (2009) analysis, the journal with the highest international representa- tion was JEP: General, less than 50% of whose first authors in 2008 were American. However, JEP: General articles all use ex- perimental methods that cast little or no light on the cultural context of the persons or the phenomena being studied. Similarly, in my analysis, the highest proportion of non- American authors and samples was for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy (JPSP), but virtually all of the studies in that journal, no matter where they were con- ducted, involved samples of university stu- dents taking introductory psychology classes, and even non-American studies ignored the cultural context of the samples.
It is a dangerous illusion to assume that the mere presence of international au- thors, editors, or samples in APA journals would be enough to do justice to the cul- tural breadth and richness of the world’s peoples. International representation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a cultural perspective in American psychol- ogy. For this, a change in philosophy of science is necessary.
Psychological “Laws” and Theories
Stroebe and Nijstad (2009, this issue) be- gan their comment with a startling decla- ration: “It is a fundamental assumption of psychological science that, unless specified otherwise, our theories apply to all of hu- manity” (p. 569). This is a bold state- ment—and a remarkably ethnocentric one. Given human cultural diversity, how can it be justified to assume that a theory devel- oped on the basis of research on a tiny proportion of the world’s population can “apply to all of humanity”? As I noted (Arnett, 2008), this is certainly a strange way to conduct science.
Stroebe and Nijstad (2009) acknowl- edged that it is a scientific standard that the results of research can be generalized only to the population from which the partici- pants were drawn. Nevertheless, they as- serted that sampling from a diverse range of humanity is necessary only if the results of a study are expected to be moderated by other variables. “If no moderation is ex- pected, any subgroup of the population will do equally well, even the often maligned
572 September 2009 ● American Psychologist
undergraduate students” (Stroebe & Nij- stad, 2009, p. 569).
The problem with this position is that our theoretical expectations, and the vari- ables we consider as possible moderators, are shaped by our cultural assumptions, whether we realize it or not. For example, a long-standing finding on parent– child relations in American research is that from middle childhood to adolescence, conflict increases and closeness decreases (Laursen, Coy, & Collins, 1998). On the basis of these findings, an American psy- chologist proposed a theory that “distanc- ing” between parents and adolescents may have an evolutionary basis, in that it would be adaptive for young people to move away from closeness to their parents once they reach sexual maturity, so that they would mate and reproduce with persons outside the family (Steinberg, 1989). Yet among adolescents and parents in countries in- cluding India, Brazil, and Indonesia—all sharing the evolutionary history of homo sapiens— conflict does not increase and closeness does not decrease; adolescents enjoy being with their parents and feel closer to them than to their friends (French, Rianasari, Pidada, Nelwan, & Buhrmester, 2001; Larson, Verma, & Dworkin, 2003; Schlegel & Barry, 1991; Van Horn & Cunegatto Marques, 2000). Thus a re- searcher with knowledge of cultural varia- tions in parent–adolescent relations would develop much different theoretical expec- tations, and search for much different mod- erators, than an American researcher who focused on the American pattern and yet assumed that a theory developed from this singular case applied to all of humanity.
Similarly, Stroebe and Nijstad (2009) argued that “a major weakness of Arnett’s (2008) argumentation is that he failed to distinguish between research that tests gen- eral laws of behavior and research aimed at describing the impact of societal factors on behavior” (p. 569, emphasis in original). As an example, they named AIDS research, ar- guing that for gay American men as for het- erosexual African women, a theoretical model like the theory of planned behavior would apply equally well. The problem with this view is that often what psychologists proclaim as “general laws of behavior” are actually general “laws” of American behav- ior or, worse yet, general “laws” of American undergraduate introductory psychology stu- dent behavior (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).
Theories are essential to good psycho- logical research, but to be widely applica- ble—much less “laws”—they would have to be based on a broad knowledge of cul- tural practices, not just the ways of one culture. It would be a grave error to import
American-based theories and measures into cultures around the world and assume that they were based on “laws” that applied equally well to all peoples. To continue with the AIDS example Stroebe and Nij- stad (2009) invoked, research has shown that a key factor in the transmission of AIDS in Africa is that men often migrate to urban areas in search of work, where they have sex with HIV-infected prostitutes be- fore returning to their rural villages and unknowingly infecting their wives (Kali- peni, Craddock, Ghosh, & Oppong, 2008). Knowledge of this cultural pattern would be far more useful in developing interven- tions for HIV prevention in Africa than would applying an American theory like the theory of planned behavior advocated by Stroebe and Nijstad, which, in its Amer- ican way, focuses entirely on individual- level variables of knowledge, beliefs, atti- tudes, and perceived behavioral control without attending sufficiently to social or cultural context.
What Is Science? What Is Scientific Progress?
The most extensive of the four commentar- ies is the one offered by Haeffel, Thiessen, Campbell, Kaschak, and McNeil (2009, this issue), who took the position that “Theory, Not Cultural Context, Will Ad- vance American Psychology” (p. 570). Their main goal was to defend the value of research on basic processes (e.g., cogni- tion, perception, learning) and question the value of culturally diverse research.
Haeffel et al. (2009) are on shaky ground from the beginning. They showed the limits of their perceptions in asserting that “the problem of generalizability is often overstated” (p. 570), offering in support of this statement the assertion “Studies using one sample of humans (e.g., Americans) of- ten generalize to other samples of humans (e.g., Spaniards)” (p. 570). Even adding Spaniards to Americans (and throwing in Ca- nadians for good measure) still makes for less than 5% of the world’s population. Psychol- ogists are far too quick to jump from one study of Americans and one study of Span- iards to a declaration of a universal psycho- logical principle. It is not the problem of generalizability that is overstated but the re- search findings of psychologists based on a tiny and unusual segment of humanity.
There may be an effective case to be made for the value of psychological re- search on basic processes, but Haeffel and colleagues (2009) did not make it.1 They claimed that I suffer from a “fundamental misunderstanding about basic research” and that my position is “akin to asking why medical research continues to focus on
growing stem cells when there are more daunting problems such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease” (p. 570). If only the connection between psychological re- search on basic processes and real-world human problems were as clear as the rela- tion between stem cell research and dis- eases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s! The relation between stem cell research and treatments for Alzheimer’s and Parkin- son’s disease is evident even to the nonsci- entist. The relation between basic research in psychology and real human problems is far less clear even to a research psycholo- gist. There may be value in psychological research on basic processes, especially when the results are linked to cultural con- texts, as Haeffel et al. suggested. It is just that research on basic processes alone is not enough for a science of humanity. This approach to research leaves out too much about cultural beliefs, cultural practices, and social relations.
Haeffel et al. (2009) accurately iden- tified the heart of the difference between my perspective and theirs as a divergence in views of “how to define science . . . and how to evaluate scientific progress” (p. 570). They hold to a philosophy of science they attribute to Popper (1959) and Meehl (1978): “If a theory is falsifiable, it is by definition scientific” (Haeffel et al., 2009, p. 570). To some extent, I agree with this view. Certainly testing falsifiable hypothe- ses is one part of psychological science. However, restricting research to falsifiable theories alone is far too narrow a view of psychology as a human science. A focus on falsifiable theories narrows psychology’s
1 Haeffel et al. (2009) claimed, “Basic re- search in psychology has clear implications for real-world issues” (p. 570), but the examples they provided fall flat. Research on information processing and behavioral activation has not “led to the creation of highly effective treatments (e.g., cognitive behavior therapy) for disorders such as depression and anxiety” (p. 570). Cog- nitive behavior therapy was developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck, and its roots are in ancient Greek philos- ophy, not basic research on information process- ing and behavioral activation. To find an exam- ple of basic research related to any of the problems I suggested that psychology should address (e.g., religious fundamentalism, terror- ism, international ecological crises, war), the authors are forced to go back half a century to Milgram’s obedience studies and Zimbardo’s prison experiment. I agree about the value of the Milgram and Zimbardo studies, and I regard it as a great pity that psychological research today is rarely as creative in its methods as those studies were. As for research on “abnormal binocular experience such as esotropia” (p. 570), this seems more in the realm of optometry than psychology.
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intellectual and scientific scope mainly to the laboratory, where experimental situa- tions can be carefully controlled. The prob- lem with this focus is that laboratory stud- ies are often ecologically invalid and have little relation to how people actually live and how they experience their lives. There are many aspects of human development, behavior, and experience that are worth investigating even if they cannot be re- duced to falsifiable theories (Rogoff, 2003). Psychology needs to get over its “physics envy” and adapt its methods and theoretical approaches to its uniquely hu- man topic, in all its cultural complexity and diversity, rather than endlessly and fruit- lessly aping the natural sciences.
Toward a Broader Philosophy of Our Human Science
The four comments on my article (Arnett, 2008) are diverse, but together they suggest a need for a reexamination of psychology’s dominant philosophy of science. Even the two comments that were sympathetic to my thesis did not fully grasp the crux of the problem. Both assumed that a cultural un- derstanding of human psychology could be attained through cross-cultural research, not realizing how transporting American- based theories and methods to other cul- tures might result in missing the most dis- tinctive and essential features of those cultures. The two opposing comments rep- resented well the traditional approach to psychological research, with its confident assurance that progress in psychology is best served by following the model of the natural sciences, investigating basic pro- cesses in search of universal laws, with limited or no attention to that distracting variable, cultural context, that actually means the most to how people behave, how they function psychologically, and how they understand and interpret their lives.
I advocate a broader, more intellectu- ally vibrant and inclusive philosophy of science. The goal of the human sciences should not be simply the pursuit of univer- sal laws and the falsification of theo- ries—no matter how dull or trivial the the- ory, no matter how little relation the theory has to how people experience life outside the laboratory. The goal of the human sci- ences should be to use the tools of the scientific method to illuminate our under- standing of human behavior, human func- tioning, and human development. The tools of the scientific method in psychology should be construed broadly to include not just lab- oratory tasks but any systematic investigation of human phenomena. In this philosophy of science, the structured interview and the eth- nography are no less legitimate as tools of the
scientific method than are the laboratory or the questionnaire. Many diverse methods are welcome, and all contribute valuable pieces to the mosaic that makes up a full under- standing of humanity.
That mosaic is still missing many large and essential pieces, over a century after psychology was first established as a field. However, many research psycholo- gists are working daily to fill it in, using a wide range of theories and methods (Jensen, in press). What we need now in American psychology is not a narrowing of theories and methods to those that seem best to mimic the methods of the natural sciences, but a wider range of new, creative theories and methods, synthesizing cultural perspectives from all over the world, that will broaden our understanding of the end- lessly fascinating human experience.
REFERENCES
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. American Psychologist, 63, 602– 614.
French, D. C., Rianasari, J. M., Pidada, S., Nel- wan, P., & Buhrmester, D. (2001). Social sup- port of Indonesian and U.S. children and ad- olescents by family members and friends. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 47, 377–394.
Haeffel, G. J., Thiessen, E. D., Campbell, M. W., Kaschak, M. P., & McNeil, N. M. (2009). Theory, not cultural context, will advance American psychology. American Psycholo- gist, 64, 570 –571.
Jensen, L. (in press). Bridging developmental and cultural psychology: New syntheses in theory, research, and policy. New York: Ox- ford University Press.
Kalipeni, E., Craddock, S., Ghosh, J., & Op- pong, J. R. (2008). HIV and AIDS in Africa: Beyond epidemiology. New York: Wiley.
Larson, R., Verma, S., & Dworkin, J. (2003). Adolescence without disengagement: The daily family lives of Indian middle-class teen- agers. In T. S. Saraswathi (Ed.), Cross-cul- tural perspectives in human development: Theory, research and applications (pp. 258 – 286). New Delhi, India: Sage.
Laursen, B., Coy, K. C., & Collins, W. A. (1998). Reconsidering changes in parent– child conflict across adolescence: A meta- analysis. Child Development, 69, 817– 832.
LoSchiavo, F. M., & Shatz, M. A. (2009). Reaching the neglected 95%. American Psy- chologist, 64, 565–566.
Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabu- lar asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806 – 834.
Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psycho- logical universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 763– 784.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
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Schlegel, A., & Barry, H. (1991). Adolescence: An anthropological inquiry. New York: Free Press.
Steinberg, L. (1989). Pubertal maturation and parent–adolescent distance: An evolutionary perspective. In G. Adams, R. Montemayor, & T. Gullotta (Eds.), Advances in adolescent development (Vol. 1, pp. 71–97). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Stroebe, W., & Nijstad, B. (2009). Do our psy- chological laws apply only to Americans? American Psychologist, 64, 569.
Van Horn, K. R., & Cunegatto Marques, J. (2000). Interpersonal relationships in Brazil- ian adolescents. International Journal of Be- havioral Development, 24, 199 –203.
Webster, G. D., Nichols, A. L., & Schember, T. O. (2009). American psychology is becom- ing more international. American Psycholo- gist, 64, 566 –568.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Department of Psychology, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610. E-mail: [email protected]
DOI: 10.1037/a0016593
Teaching White Privilege to White Students Can Mean
Saying Good-bye to Positive Student Evaluations
Su L. Boatright-Horowitz and Sojattra Soeung
University of Rhode Island
As faculty and instructors working to re- duce racism in our students and ourselves, we certainly know about the phenomenon alluded to in the title of this comment. Many of us have discussed it with our colleagues and administrators, but we lacked empirical evidence to support our views. Teaching antiracism can have a negative impact on our careers when students eval- uate our teaching efforts and abilities (in fact, teaching antiracism has been called “the kiss of death,” Nast, 1999, p. 105). The published literature abounds with an- ecdotes about negative student reactions to antiracism teaching, particularly when it involves teaching White students about White privilege (McIntosh, 1988). Some scholars have reported that their classroom teaching experiences were negatively im- pacted, and their professional legitimacy questioned, because they discussed racism
574 September 2009 ● American Psychologist
The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
Oxford Handbooks Online
The Internationalization of Psychology: A History Ludy T. Benjamin and David B. Baker The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives Edited by David B. Baker
Print Publication Date: Jan 2012 Subject: Psychology, History and Systems in Psychology Online Publication Date: Sep 2012 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195366556.013.0001
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter discusses the origins and development of the international organizations and meetings that have sought to bring together psychologists from all over the world, principally the International Congresses of Psychology, which began in 1889 and are organized now by the International Union of Psychological Science, and the International Congresses of Applied Psychology, which began in 1920 and now are planned by the International Association of Applied Psychology. From its largely European origins, this chapter shows how psychology grew as an experimental and applied science to encompass psychological organizations in more than 100 countries today. The early congresses were a mix of experimental psychologists and parapsychologists, with the latter group forming their own group after 1905. The subsequent development of the international congresses is a story of science, applications, and world politics.
Keywords: International psychology, International Congress of Psychology, International Congress of Applied Psychology, parapsychology, International Union of Psychological Science, International Association of Applied Psychology, World War I, World War II
The International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) was established in 1951, to serve as an organizing body for psychological societies and psychologists around the globe. Today, it boasts 71 member nations from Albania to Zimbabwe and thus, by member affiliation, represents most of the world’s psychologists, whether they are engaged in research, teaching, practice, or public service (see Appendix A). Yet, efforts to bring the world’s psychologists together are much older than the formation of the IUPsyS. This chapter traces the history of international psychology organizations, beginning in the late 19th century with the first of the international congresses.
The beginnings of this history reside in the creation of a new scientific discipline, namely psychology, a field that left the house of philosophy and sought to join the house of natural science. This elopement had been delayed by a host of naysayers who argued over
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
centuries that a science of mind was not possible, that the study of mind could never achieve the level of objectivity needed to qualify as science. By the middle of the 1800s, that long-held view had been seriously challenged, for example, by John Stuart Mill (1843), who called for an empirical science of psychology, and by Wilhelm Wundt (1862, 1874), who called for and established an experimental science of psychology (Cattell, 1888). Wundt’s psychology laboratory was arguably the first on the scene but it was followed quickly by other laboratories in Germany, as well as labs in Denmark, Austria, England, and the United States.
As the new psychology laboratories emerged, some psychologists sought ways to bring their kindred researchers together. British psychologist Joseph Jacobs, recognizing the value of an international organization of psychologists called for (p. 2) the establishment of a “Society for Experimental Psychology.” Jacobs (1886) wrote:
This is the age of Societies. Agriculture and ballooning, cart-horses and dentistry, engineering and forestry, all subjects from A to Z, are represented by associations intended to promote the interests of each particular subject. Psychology alone has no society connecting together the workers in the wide field which the science of mind can claim for itself. (p. 49)
Although no international society existed in 1886 when Jacobs made his plea, there was at least one national society in France. La Société de Psychologie Physiologique was founded in Paris in 1885, by Jean-Martin Charcot and Charles Richet. The society was established to link the new experimental psychology with the work of Charcot at the Salpêtrière. The Société never achieved that end, however, and proved mostly to be a forum for papers on hypnosis. Shortly after Charcot’s death in 1893 it ceased to exist (Ellenberger, 1970). But in France in the late 1880s, plans for an international gathering of psychologists were taking form, and Charcot’s Société would host the meeting (see Françoise Parot, 2011, on France, Chapter 16, in this volume).
The First International Congress of Psychology In the second half of the 19th century, international congresses in a wide number of fields were commonplace. Statisticians held their first such congress in 1853, physicians their first in 1867, and anthropologists their first in 1885 (Montoro, Tortosa, & Carpintero, 1992). The impetus for an international meeting of psychologists began with an article published in 1881, in a French journal (Nicolas & Söderlund, 2005). The author was a young Polish philosopher and parapsychologist, Julian Ochorowicz, who had earned a doctorate from the University of Leipzig in 1874 with a dissertation on the nature of consciousness. Evidently Ochorowicz was a friend of Théodule Ribot, who edited the Revue Philosophique, where he published his detailed proposal for an international congress of psychology. According to Sabourin (2001), Ribot was sympathetic to the idea but doubtful of its achievement. Yet, eight years later, the first International Congress of
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Psychology would meet in Paris, France, on the centennial of the French Revolution, the 10th anniversary of the opening of Wundt’s laboratory at the University of Leipzig, and in the midst of the grand World’s Fair being hosted in Paris.
The meeting began on August 6, 1889. Charcot served as the honorary president of the congress but did not attend the four-day event. Instead, the audience was welcomed by Ribot, who gave an opening lecture on the status of contemporary psychology. According to William James (1889), who was in attendance as one of the few Americans present, Ribot showed “in simple but impressive words how [psychology] advances by combining physiological and pathological observation and experiment with the older introspective method, and [urged] the investigators of all countries to share in the work now become common” (p. 614).
Ochorowicz was in attendance and must have been pleased to see the extraordinary culmination of his plan laid out so meticulously 8 years earlier. Nearly 400 individuals attended one or more of the sessions. Ochorowicz himself was involved in the sessions on parapsychological topics. Given William James’s involvement with psychical research (see Coon, 1992), it is interesting to read James’s description of this part of the congress:
The most striking feature of the discussions was, perhaps, their tendency to slope off to some one or the other of those shady horizons with which the name of “psychic research” is now associated. Amongst those who took a more active part in the debate may be named MM. Marillier, Gley, Binet, Pierre Janet, Bertrand, Espinas, Bernheim, Liègois, Ochorowicz … Delboeuf, Forel, Galton, Sidgwick, F. W. H. Meyers. (James, 1889,1889 p. 615)
Certainly, the mix of individuals at this congress was considerable, from physiologists to philosophers and from physicians to parapsychologists. And, there were a few representatives of the new psychology, including Joseph Jastrow from the United States and Hugo Münsterberg from Germany. Although the meeting was billed as an international congress, the overwhelming majority of attendees were from France. By James’s account, only three came from the United States, four from England, and three from Germany. The breakdown of attendees by country suggests that more than 300 were from France. It seems likely that some of that audience consisted of lay individuals interested in psychology, no doubt most of those interested in hypnosis and paranormal phenomena. So, mixed with Galton, James, Binet, and Ribot, one may have (p. 3) found mediums, seers, palm readers, mental healers, and mesmerists. James (1889) described the social importance of the congress:
The open results were, however (as always happens at such gatherings), secondary in real importance to the latent ones—the friendships made, the intimacies deepened, and the encouragement and inspiration which came to everyone from seeing before them in flesh and blood so large a part of that little
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
army of fellow-students from whom and for whom all contemporary psychology exists. (p. 615)
For James, one of those social contacts was Hugo Münsterberg, whom James would invite 3 years later to become the director of the psychology laboratories at Harvard University. In bringing Münsterberg to Harvard, William James wrote to his novelist brother Henry that the university had acquired the “Rudyard Kipling of psychology” (Benjamin, 2006, p. 98).
The final event of this inaugural congress was a grand social affair. An elaborate banquet was held on the first platform of the Eiffel Tower, the recently completed architectural wonder that was the centerpiece of the Paris World’s Fair.
Perhaps prompted by this first international meeting of psychologists, discussions began about publishing international compilations of the new psychological literature. The German journal Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane began publishing an international bibliography as early as 1890. And, in 1895, similar bibliographies appeared in France in Année Psychologique and in the United States in a new publication entitled The Psychological Index (Benjamin & VandenBos, 2006).
Parapsychology and the Early International Congresses of Psychology When scientific psychology arrived on the scene in the late 1800s, it found itself in competition with an existing popular psychology in a variety of forms, what Leahey and Leahey (1983) have called psychology’s “occult doubles.” Phrenologists, physiognomists, spirtitualists, mesmerists, mental healers, and practitioners under other names as well offered a range of services to the public, including cures for melancholia, marital counseling, career advice, personnel selection, and parenting advice. For the public, these practitioners were the purveyors of psychology, a reality not lost on the new experimental psychologists who sought ways to distance their discipline from these popular psychologies and looked for opportunities to inform the public about the new science of psychology and why it was the one true psychology. In founding the first journal of the new psychology in 1881, Wilhelm Wundt had wanted to call it Psychologische Studien but that title was already in use as a parapsychological journal. So, Wundt selected Philosophische Studien instead. When G. Stanley Hall sought to found the first American journal of psychology in 1887, he was given the sum of $5,000 from a benefactor interested in establishing a parapsychology journal. Hall had no intention of establishing such a periodical and evidently never informed the donor of the nature of what would become the American Journal of Psychology. When the donor learned of the ruse, he asked that his money be returned (Ross, 1972).
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
Parapsychology had been a visible part of the program for the 1889 congress, and it promised to be on center stage at the second congress, planned for London, in 1892, and hosted by the British Society for Psychical Research. Indeed, the president of the London Congress was Henry Sidgwick, a philosopher and psychic researcher who was one of the founders and the first president of the British Society for Psychical Research (see Alan Collins, 2011, Chapter 14, in this volume). When the French were organizing the 1889 congress they had sought to identify psychological organizations in other countries for the purposes of distributing invitations. In the United States, their search led them only to the American Society for Psychical Research, and so they extended an invitation to that body. James and Jastrow became aware of this in attending the Paris Congress and likely brought that word back to American colleagues working in the new experimental psychology. It is possible that this situation proved to be an impetus for the founding of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1892 (Sokal, 1992).
Joseph Jastrow had been vehement in his insistence that experimental psychology was in no way connected to paranormal subjects. Many of his experimental colleagues shared similar views. But the program included multiple sessions on paranormal events and there were, no doubt, many in attendance for whom that was the only subject of interest. That this tension was recognized by the organizers of the London Congress is evident in this description of the program: “All branches of experimental psychology received a due share of consideration in the (p. 4) papers and discussion. Owing to the abundance of material, it was found advisable to place Neurology and Psychophysics in one section (A), and Hypnotism with kindred questions in another (B)” (Anonymous, 1892, p. 580). Those experimental psychologists who attended Section A heard presentations from an outstanding lineup including Alexander Bain, Francis Galton, Charles Richet, Pierre Janet, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Eduard Hitzig, Christine Ladd-Franklin, C. Lloyd Morgan, Edward B. Titchener, Gerardus Heymans, Henry H. Donaldson, Lightner Witmer, James Mark Baldwin, and James Sully. Although the attendance at the meeting was heavily British, it was evident that the percentage of international attendees was much greater than at the Paris Congress.
The Third International Congress of Psychology was held in Munich, Germany, hosted by a heavily spiritistic association, the Gesellschaft für Psychologische Forschung.
According to Gundlach (1997), “Carl Stumpf, who presided over the congress, tried his best to curb spiritism and hypnotism. But the academic societies for the less sensational areas of psychology continued to have difficulties in assembling enough members to ensure enduring organizations” (pp. 537–538). Thus, the better organized spiritualists, hypnotists, and psychical researchers were able to continue as a major force in these early congresses purporting to represent the new experimental psychology. Furthermore, the presentations at these congresses were of sufficient interest to the psychical community such that detailed reports appeared regularly in psychic journals such as the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (see, for example, Myers, 1889).
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
The Fourth International Congress returned to Paris in 1900, hosted by Ribot, Richet, and Pierre Janet. According to Robert Woodworth (1900), who reported on the meeting for the journal Science, “Psychical research was thoroughly ventilated at the Congress” (p. 606). Compared to past meetings, the number of papers on psychical topics declined (Warren, 1900). There were several papers on celebrated mediums, one of whom was present. One review of the psychical portion of the congress was especially critical of the quality of those presentations. In summarizing the presentations, Newbold (1902) concluded, “It is to be regretted that the tolerant spirit displayed by the organizers of the Congress in granting a hearing to the representatives of views with which few of them had any sympathy should have been in some cases so ill rewarded” (p. 103). Perhaps because they were being made to feel increasingly unwelcome, the psychical researchers decided to establish their own international congress, which would be known as the Institut Psychique. The paranormal group participated in one more congress, the fifth, held in Rome in 1905 (see Guido Cimino & Foschi, 2011, Chapter 19, this volume), but ties were officially severed there, and the spiritists, psychics, and mental healers found other venues in which they could share their common interests (Nicolas & Charvillat, 1998).
Politics, War, and the Congresses The Sixth International Congress of Psychology was held in Geneva in 1909, attended by 550 psychologists. The multiple languages of the congresses had always been a problem and were commented upon in most summary reviews. It was noted that discussion of papers was almost always in the language of the presenter and thus limited to a small number of attendees, especially for languages such as Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. Some steps were taken at this congress to deal with the language barriers. The major addresses and many of the minor papers were distributed in advance, often with abstracts in several languages. Further, Esperanto was recognized as an official language, and several brief reports were given in that form (Ogden, 1909). Some believed that it could be the international language of science, a hope that quickly disappeared. For Americans, the big news of the Geneva Congress was that the organizing committee accepted the invitation to hold the next meeting in the United States, in 1913.
The American proposal was one of two considered for the next meeting, the other from Hungarian psychologists for a meeting in Budapest. The American proposal was ill- prepared at best. It was presented by Morton Prince as a petition to host the meeting, but without any indication of a host institution; that is, no university nor the American Psychological Association had indicated support for the meeting. The petition listed James Mark Baldwin as president of the congress and William James as honorary president. Yet, Baldwin had expressed no interest in the congress and had not signed Prince’s petition. And James was named without his consent or knowledge. The informality and disorganization of the proposal foretold of difficulties ahead. What followed were several years of bickering among the leaders of American psychology, especially James McKeen
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
Cattell, James, Baldwin, and Titchener, that produced on-again, off-again plans for the congress that eventually went down to defeat in early 1912. (p. 5) By then, it was too late for any other country to put together plans for the meeting, and so it was cancelled. With the intervening years of World War I, the next congress would not be held until 1923, 5 years after the end of the war and 14 years after the Geneva Congress (Evans & Scott, 1978). The United States would have to wait 40 years from the first congress in Paris for its chance to serve as host country for the world’s psychologists.
When the congresses resumed in 1923, with the meeting held in Oxford, England, the pattern of attendance changed, as did the balance of power in the administration of the meetings. First, attendance was down considerably compared to the last two meetings before the war due to the economic recession affecting much of Europe. In fact, attendance was reduced by half, to approximately 240 attendees at both the Seventh Congress in Oxford and the Eighth Congress in Groningen, Holland, in 1926. Second, whereas the Germans and French seemed to have been the dominant forces before the war, the British and Americans assumed a larger role in the post-war congresses; the psychologies of those two countries would grow in international influence as well.
There was some concern about the reception of the German psychologists at the Oxford meeting in 1923, especially by the French participants. But all seemed to go well, as reported by Louis Thurstone (1923): “It was a source of satisfaction that the German and the French psychologists could meet each other as scientists and as men without allowing their political differences to affect seriously the activities of the Congress” (p. 560). The concerns about the German psychologists were merited, especially given the actions of Wilhelm Wundt, the acknowledged founder of the science of psychology. In 1914, 93 German professors and other intellectuals signed and published a document that was entitled “An Appeal to the Civilized World” (Lutz, 1932, vol. 1, pp. 74–78). Wundt was one of the signatories of that manifesto, which claimed that Germany’s invasion of Belgium was a matter of self-defense, and that Germany had the right to pursue whatever means necessary to ensure the future of German culture. Especially offensive to many academics was the German army’s destruction of the city of Louvain and its great university, which had been established in 1425. The signers of the manifesto argued that such destruction was justified and was, in fact, brought about as retaliation against actions of the citizens of Belgium. Some academics were so incensed by the message of the German manifesto that they considered it to be a war crime (Hale, 1980). Wundt’s ultra-patriotic stand angered many of his international students and caused some of them to revise their academic histories, minimizing the purported influence of Wundt and German psychology. Wundt died in 1920, just 2 years after the end of the war. But the ill will toward Germany lived on for some years. Sadly, it would recur all too soon.
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
The International Congress of Applied Psychology In 1920, a new international organization formed, emphasizing applied psychology or what was then called psychotechnics. It held its initial meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, under the title International Congress of Psychotechnics Applied to Vocational Guidance. The timing, location, and subject of this conference were not accidental, as described by Horst Gundlach (1998):
World War I left Europe for the most part shattered and wrecked, physically as well as morally. The devastation gave way to revolutions and civil wars, and despite armistices and peace treaties, nobody dared to hope for an enduring peace. Reconstruction and reconciliation seemed to be the only remedy to prevent a rekindling of hostility and further destruction in Europe. Innovative practical applications seemed what the science of psychology could offer to the reconstruction projects, and a neutral and affluent Switzerland seemed the most appropriate location for reconciling embittered adversaries. (p. 25)
The word Psychotechnik was coined in Germany in 1903, and subsequently translated for similar use in many other languages, mostly European. It was used to describe vocational guidance and personnel selection tests that used apparatus, instead of the paper-and pencil psychological tests that were popular in the United Kingdom and the United States. Interestingly, the work of Alfred Binet and Henri Simon on a psychological test for measuring intelligence was first presented at the 1905 Rome Congress. But their work would have far more impact in the United States and would not be the subject of much discussion in the early International Congresses of Psychology. Using an ever-developing collection of psychological instruments, those involved in psychotechniks measured such behaviors and cognitive processes as reaction time, hand-and-body steadiness, motor fatigue, color perception, and puzzle assembly (Drunen, 1997). Despite the German origins of the term, it was used by the new (p. 6) organization in the title of its congresses until it was replaced by the phrase applied psychology in 1955.
The first congress was organized by two faculty members at the University of Geneva: Édouard Claparède, professor of psychology, and Pierre Bovet, professor of education and philosophy. The focus of the congress was on vocational guidance, a growing activity in Europe following the influence of American lawyer Frank Parsons and the import of his ideas to Europe shortly before World War I. The approximately 50 participants at the Geneva congress came from Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and a few other European nations. There were no participants from the United Kingdom, United States, or Russia. And no Germans attended, presumably because of the high rate of inflation after the war. However, some German psychologists did attend the second congress in Barcelona, in 1921 (Gundlach, 1998).
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The significance of this initial congress was that it gave much-needed visibility and the beginnings of a voice to those psychologists worldwide who were interested chiefly in the application of their science. The early congresses focused on vocational guidance, but that subject proved too limiting, and it was dropped from the official congress title at the fourth congress in Paris, in 1927.
The Barcelona meeting in 1921 drew a much larger audience, as did the 1922 meeting in Milan. After three annual meetings, the congresses appeared on an irregular schedule. There were two more in the 1920s (1927 and 1928), three in the 1930s (1930, 1931, and 1934), and then a 15-year hiatus, largely because of World War II, until the 1949 meeting in Bern, Switzerland. Today, the congresses are held every 4 years on an agreed-upon schedule with the International Congress of Psychology, so that one of the congresses occurs every 2 years, an agreement reached with IUPsyS in 1976. The organization responsible for the International Congresses of Applied Psychology is the International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP), a name adopted in 1955 (Pickren & Fowler, 2003). Today, the IAAP has a membership of approximately 1,500 psychologists in 80 countries. The congresses that it organizes are important venues for the development of applied psychology, especially in the exchange of ideas that offer solutions to problems that are international in scope (see Appendix B).
“Finally, Finally in America” The Americans finally got their congress in 1929, the Ninth International Congress of Psychology, hosted by Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, where psychologist James Rowland Angell was university president. James McKeen Cattell served as president of the congress. As secretary of the congress, Switzerland’s Édouard Claparède excitedly proclaimed in one of the opening addresses, “Enfin! Enfin en Amérique!” (Claparède, 1930, p. 33). He added that, “For us of the Old World, America has danced before our eyes for 40 years as the promised land” (Langfeld, 1929, p. 366).
Indeed, it had been 40 years since the first congress met in Paris in 1889. William James, who had attended that Paris meeting, was now dead, as was G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Münsterberg, and E. B. Titchener. John Watson had been forced out of academic psychology in 1920 because of his scandalous divorce. That left Cattell as the dean of American psychologists. Thus, the individual who, it can be argued, was most responsible for the failure of the Americans to host the 1913 meeting was now the welcoming and very active head of the 1929 Congress.
The Americans were eager to make a great impression. Although scientific psychology’s roots were clearly European, Americans in the public euphoria of the Roaring Twenties were convinced of the preeminence of American psychology, and they intended to make that evident. Attracting international visitors was critical, and because of the expense of travel to the States, there was some concern about how to draw participants from abroad.
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A note in the 1928 Psychological Bulletin announced that “The Americans hope that the appointment of some foreigners for lecturers and lectureships can be arranged near the time of the congress, so that foreign attendance can be increased and international solidarity within psychology furthered still more” (Anonymous, 1928, p. 122).
By almost all measures, the Ninth Congress was a great success. The American Psychological Association cancelled its meeting, and more than 700 of its members attended the congress, where they heard Karl Lashley deliver his APA presidential address. International registrants numbered 104 from 21 countries. Total attendance, including spouses, was more than 1,000, a number that far exceeded the previous record of approximately 600 attendees for the 1909 congress in Geneva, was four times the attendance of the previous congress in Groningen, and would not be equaled until the Brussels Congress (the 15th) of 1957.
The distinguished invited addresses were given by Ivan Pavlov from Russia, Wolfgang Köhler from (p. 7) Germany, Albert Michotte from Belgium, Henri Piéron from France, Carl Spearman from England, and Edward L. Thorndike from the United States. Other international speakers included Kurt Lewin, Alexander Luria, Jean Piaget, William Stern, Robert Thouless, Karl and Charlotte Bühler, Mario Ponzo, Otto Klemm, and Wilhelm Wirth. The program was decidedly American, with 310 papers delivered by speakers from the United States compared to 73 presentations by international psychologists (not including papers read by title). It was the largest program to date, held over a period of 7 days. Not only were the Americans able to flood their guests with the substance of American psychology, but important liaisons were formed with many of the international psychologists by arranging lectures for them at a number of the East Coast universities (Boring, 1930; Langfeld, 1929; Poffenberger, 1929).
One of the gifts given to each of the international participants was a copy of The Psychological Register, edited by Carl Murchison and hot off the Clark University Press. This impressive undertaking was the first international directory of psychologists. It listed psychologists individually by country and included their educational history and a list of publications to date. The 570-page book included approximately 1,250 psychologists from 33 countries, with slightly over half of the book devoted to psychologists from the United States and Canada. Murchison (1929) confessed to the difficulty of the task, in some cases, to identify legitimately trained psychologists in various countries and to get complete information from them as requested. But the compilation was by far the most complete to date and no doubt served an important function in stimulating contacts across borders. Interestingly, the book given to the international guests was identified as Volume 2. Volume 1 was to have been a compilation of psychologists who had died before 1929, going back to the ancient Greeks. But that book was never published. A greatly expanded version appeared in 1932 as Volume 3. Because of contacts made with international psychologists at the New Haven meeting, Volume 3 included nearly double the number of psychologists—approximately 2,400—from 40 countries (Murchison, 1932).
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These volumes proved helpful in subsequent congresses, particularly in arranging symposia for researchers working in common fields.
Montoro, Tortosa, and Carpintero (1992) have argued that the Ninth International Congress was exploited by the Americans in advancing their psychology. Nowhere was that more evident than in the presidential address delivered by Cattell (1930) entitled “Psychology in America.” Cattell clearly acknowledged America’s debt to Europe in the sciences, arts, humanities, and certainly in psychology, naming Wundt and Francis Galton as the two greatest psychologists who ever lived and noting that he worked with both of them. Although he was gracious in his praise of Wundt, with several of his German students in the audience, Cattell’s letters to his parents from his graduate study in Leipzig suggest that he held a very negative view of Wundt’s worth as a psychologist (Sokal, 1981). Perhaps he had changed his mind after 45 years. Cattell touted the contributions in applied psychology that had come from America, arguing for superiority in all applied fields with the exception of industrial psychology. He labeled the American Psychological Association as the “world’s greatest organization of psychologists” (Cattell, 1930, p. 22). He closed his remarks with a biblical metaphor illustrating the importance of such international meetings in the context of recent and continued international conflicts:
International congresses are significant factors in the advancement of scientific research; they also promote international cooperation and good-will. The objects of the sciences are more ideal than the objects of the churches; their practices are more Christian. When in the fullness of time there is a family of the nations, when each will give according to its ability and receive according to its needs, when war among them will be as absurd as it would now be for members of this Congress to begin murdering one another, this will be due in no small measure to cooperation among scientific men of all nations in their common work. And it may be that psychology, the child among the sciences, and the United States, the child among the nations, shall lead them. (p. 31)
In spite of the bravado, the meeting was by most measures a very successful one that connected American psychologists and their international colleagues in important ways. Contacts made by some of the attendees from Germany and Austria would prove fortunate only a few years later, when the rise of the Nazi party forced them to look for jobs and security in America and other countries.
The Gathering Storm Following the meeting in the United States, the 1932 congress convened in Copenhagen. Attendance was (p. 8) less than half of the American meeting, approximately 450 registrants and guests. The 1936 meeting was to have been in Madrid, but the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War forced it to meet elsewhere. Initially, the Spanish organizers felt
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
that the meeting could be delayed until the summer of 1937, but when it became clear that the violence had escalated and showed no signs of ending in the near future, they were forced to cancel their hopes for the meeting (Carpintero & Lafuente, 2008). In an attempted move from the frying pan to the fire, the ideological watch office of the Nazi Party sought to bring the meeting to Germany (Geuter, 1984). But the organizing committee chose Paris instead, with the 11th Congress opening in July, 1937. Despite the last-minute relocation of the congress, the meeting was judged a successful one, with nearly 600 registrants from 36 countries. Two proposals were submitted at the Paris meeting for the 1940 congress, one from Otto Klemm to hold the meeting in Leipzig, Germany, the other from Karl Bühler to host the meeting in Vienna, Austria. Bühler told Klemm that if he supported the Austrian proposal for the 11th Congress, then Bühler would support a meeting in Germany for the 12th Congress. The Austrian proposal was accepted. When the Nazis invaded Austria in March, 1938, Bühler was arrested and put in prison for several months (Rosenzweig, Holtzman, Sabourin, & Bélanger, 2000). He and his wife Charlotte would eventually make their way to the United States, part of the diaspora of displaced European intellectuals (Mandler & Mandler, 1969). Klemm committed suicide in January 1939, likely related to the dismissal of Felix Kreuger, Wundt’s successor, from the Leipzig faculty. Kreuger was not anti-Semitic enough for the Nazi Party, which brought about his ouster in 1938. Klemm, who admired Kreuger, took over his position for the few months before his death. He was 54 years old (Wohlwill, 1987).
With the German occupation of Austria, pressures grew within the congress organizing committee to move the meeting. The American Psychological Association passed a resolution opposing the meeting in Vienna or in any country where the progress of psychology would be “hindered by a government hostile to the tradition of free and unimpeded scholarship” (Olson, 1939, p. 129). Plans were made to move the 1940 meeting to Edinburgh, Scotland, but as the war in Europe escalated, it became clear that no meeting would be possible. Instead, the 12th International Congress of Psychology was delayed until several years after the conclusion of World War II, meeting in Edinburgh in 1948, with an attendance of approximately 700, most of those from Great Britain. It was at this congress that the plans for the IUPsyS were formed.
The International Union of Psychological Science The idea for an international union had been discussed at the first international congress in 1889 and at subsequent meetings. But the growth of psychology internationally following World War II, especially the formation of many new national psychology organizations (see Appendix C), led to a renewed call for a formal organization that could promote international meetings and international cooperation among psychologists.
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Moreover, such international unions were being encouraged by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Union was formally established in 1951, as the International Union of Scientific Psychology at the time of the 13th International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm. The name was changed in 1965 to the International Union of Psychological Science, perhaps to avoid the assumption that there could be a psychology that was unscientific. The rules of the Union allowed for the membership of one psychological organization from each country. Eleven psychological associations joined as charter members, representing Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In addition to those 11 charter members, societies from nine other nations were also added in 1951. Today’s 74 member nations range from the membership of the United States at 114,000 to Malta at 46. Other nations with large memberships include the United Kingdom (39,000), Spain (30,700), Australia (16,500), Germany (15,000), the Netherlands (13,000), Sweden (8,600), Indonesia (8,100), and Japan (7,300). See Appendix A for a listing of all member nations of the IUPsyS.
The chief function of the Union is to facilitate the exchange of psychological knowledge among nations. Its goals were first stated formally in 1952 and modified in the years since. The aims of the Union were described in 2009 as follows:
As stated in Article 5 of its Statutes, the IUPsyS works to promote “the development, representation and advancement of psychology as a basic and applied science nationally, regionally, and (p. 9) internationally.” It represents psychology in its full breadth as a science and as a profession.
Article 6 of the Statutes states the aims of the Union as follows:
(a) To enhance and promote the development of the science and profession of psychology. (b) To exchange ideas and scientific information between psychologists of different countries. (c) To organize the International Congresses of Psychology and other meetings on subjects of general or special interest in psychology. (d) To contribute to psychological knowledge through publishing activities. (e) To foster the exchange of publications and other communications among different countries. (f) To foster excellence in standards for education, training, research and the applications of psychology. (g) To enable the development of psychological scientists and national associations through capacity building activities. (h) To foster international exchange, especially among students and young researchers.
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
(i) To collaborate with other international, regional, and national organizations in matters of mutual interest. (from the IUPsyS website, 2009).
Perhaps the most immediate impact of the Union was a more structured and formalized mechanism for soliciting bids for the international congresses and working with the local hosts in the planning and conduct of those meetings. See Appendix D for a listing of all the International Congresses of Psychology.
Consistent with the aims listed above, the Union began publication of a journal, the International Journal of Psychology, in 1966. Since 1992, it has published the proceedings of the International Congresses. It occasionally publishes other volumes, such as a history of the Union and all of the congresses from 1889 to 1996 (Rosenzweig, et al., 2000) and The International Handbook of Psychology (Pawlik & Rosenzweig, 2000). The Union participates with other international councils in matters of mutual interest, especially promoting the development of science worldwide. Further, it has organized and/or co sponsored a number of regional conferences on a variety of psychological topics. As noted earlier, the International Congresses of Psychology and the International Congresses of Applied Psychology each occur every 4 years but are staggered by mutual agreement, so that one of the congresses occurs every other year (see Appendix B).
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Conclusion Today, there are a great many specialized international congresses in psychology on such topics as sport psychology, personal construct psychology, psychology and law, cross- cultural psychology, analytical psychology, psychoanalysis, child psychology, psychology and religion, positive psychology, psychotherapy, psychology and spirituality, and even one on licensure, certification, and credentialing of psychologists. Some of these have been aided by the IUPsyS as part of its mission to enhance the development of the science and practice of psychology.
The work of the IUPsyS extends the reach of psychology beyond disciplinary boundaries. The Union is currently involved in a worldwide program to develop sustainable water use. In cooperation with the World Health Organization, the Union is working on a revision of the international classification of diseases. Allied with other international groups, the Union seeks to bring psychology’s resources to bear on creating conditions that will sustain world peace.
Opportunities abound to assist the development of psychology and psychologists in many countries where both the science and issues of mental health are not well developed. In recent years, the IUPsyS has discovered that its limited resources cannot begin to meet the needs that come to its door. It is hoped that this book, in describing the historical development of psychology in so many nations, will alert readers to the similarities and differences of problems faced by individuals in countries large and small, rural and urban, and that it may result in stimulating further advancement of the quality of psychological science and psychological services throughout an increasingly interconnected global society.
List of Abbreviations/Acronyms and Technical Terms APA: American Psychological Association, largest national psychology organization, founded in 1892 IAAP: International Association of Applied Psychology; responsible for the international congresses of applied psychology that began in Geneva in 1920 and meet now every 4 years
(p. 10)
ICP: International Congress of Psychology; held its first meeting inParis in 1889 and meets every 4 years
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
IUPsyS: International Union of Psychological Science, founded in 1951; contains 74 member nations today. It is responsible for planning the international congresses of psychology UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
Glossary Esperanto: A language developed in the 1870s that was intended to be an international language, but never received the support its developers had hoped psychotechnik: A word coined in Germany in 1903, initially used to describe psychological work in vocational guidance and personnel selection tests that used apparatus; it later became a synonym for applied psychology
Further Reading Brock, A. (Ed.). (2006). Internationalizing the history of psychology. New York: New York University Press.
David, H. P., & Buchanan, J. (2003). International psychology. In D. K. Freedheim (Ed.), Handbook of psychology. Volume 1: History of psychology (pp. 509–533). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Gundlach, H. U. K. (1998). The 1920 Geneva Congress. In H. Gundlach (Ed.), Applied psychology. Volume 1: The First Congress Geneva, 1920 (pp. 25–41). London: Routledge.
James, W. (1889). The Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris. Mind, 14, 614–616.
Montoro, L., Tortosa, F., & Carpintero, H. (1992). Brief history of international congresses of psychology. In M. Richelle & H. Carpintero (Eds.), Contributions to the history of the International Congresses of Psychology (pp. 75–89). Brussels: Leuven University Press.
Rosenzweig, M. R., Holtzman, W. H., Sabourin, M., & Belanger, D. (2000). History of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS). Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis.
Sexton, V. S., & Hogan, J. D. (Eds.). (1992). International psychology: Views from around the world. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Stevens, M. J., & Gielen, U. P. (Eds.). (2007). Toward a global psychology: Theory, research, intervention, and pedagogy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
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(p. 12) Appendix A
Albania Finland Mexico Slovakia
Argentina France Mongolia Slovenia
Australia Georgia Morocco South Africa
Austria Germany Namibia Spain
Bangladesh Greece Netherlands Sudan
Belgium Hong Kong New Zealand Sweden
Bulgaria Hungary Nicaragua Switzerland
Canada India Nigeria Turkey
Chile Indonesia Norway Uganda
China Iran Pakistan Ukraine
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The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
Colombia Ireland Panama United Kingdom
Croatia Israel Peru Uruguay
Cuba Italy Philippines United States
Czech Republic Japan Poland Venezuela
Denmark Jordan Portugal Vietnam
Dominican Republic Korea Romania Yemen
Egypt Lithuania Russia Zimbabwe
Estonia Malta Singapore
Member Nations of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS)
Number Year Location President
I 1920 Geneva, Switzerland Édouard Claparède
II 1921 Barcelona, Spain Édouard Claparède
III 1922 Milan, Italy Giulio Cesare Ferrari
IV 1927 Paris, France Édouard Toulouse
V 1928 Utrecht, The Netherlands Franciscus M. Roels
VI 1930 Barcelona, Spain Emilio Mira y López
VII 1931 Moscow, USSR Isaak Naftulevich Spielrein
VIII 1934 Prague, Czechoslovakia František Šeracky
IX 1949 Bern, Switzerland Henri Piéron
X 1951 Göteborg, Sweden John K. G. Elmgren
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XI 1953 Paris, France Raymond Bonnardel
XII 1955 London, United Kingdom Clifford B. Frisby
XIII 1958 Rome, Italy Leandro Canestrelli
XIV 1961 Copenhagen, Denmark R. Tranekjaer
XV 1964 Ljubljana, Yugoslavia Zoran Bujas
XVI 1968 Amsterdam, The Netherlands H. R. Wijngaarden
XVII 1971 Liège, Belgium Roger Piret
XVIII 1974 Montreal, Canada L. Dorais
XIX 1978 Munich, Germany R. Amthauer
XX 1982 Edinburgh, United Kingdom Gerry Randell
XXI 1986 Jerusalem, Israel Yehuda Amir
XXII 1990 Kyoto, Japan Jyuji Misumi
XXIII 1994 Madrid, Spain Jose Maria Prieto
XXIV 1998 San Francisco, United States Joseph D. Matarazzo
XXV 2002 Singapore Elizabeth Nair
XXVI 2006 Athens, Greece James Georgas & Marina Manthouli
XXVII 2010 Melbourne, Australia Paul Martin
XXVIII 2014 Paris, France
(p. 13) Appendix B
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Country Society Year Founded
Afghanistan Afghan Psychological Association 2001
Albania Association of Albanian Psychologists 1991
Argentina Argentine Psychological Society 1930
Armenia Union of Psychologists of Armenia
Australia Australian Psychological Society 1945
Austria Austrian Association of Professional Psychologists
1953
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Psychological Association 1997
Bahamas Bahamas Psychological Association
Bangladesh Bangladesh Psychological Association
Barbados Psychological Association of Barbados
Brazil Brazilian Association of Applied Psychology 1949
Bulgaria Bulgarian Psychological Society
Cambodia Cambodian Psychological Society
Canada Canadian Psychological Association 1938
Chile Association of Psychologists of Chile 1959
China Chinese Psychological Society 1921
Colombia Colombian Federation of Psychology 1955
Croatia Croatian Psychological Association 1953
Cuba Cuban Union of Psychology 1964
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Cypress Cypress Psychologists Association
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak Psychological Association 1958
Denmark Association of Danish Psychologists 1947
Dominican Republic
Dominican Psychologists’ Society 1979
Ecuador Ecuador Society of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies
1942
Egypt Egyptian Association for Psychological Studies 1948
El Salvador Salvadoran Society of Psychology 1964
Estonia Union of Estonian Psychologists 1988
Ethiopia Ethiopian Psychologists’ Association
Finland Finnish Psychological Society 1952
France French Psychological Society 1901
Georgia Georgian Psychological Association 1991
Germany German Society for Experimental Psychology 1904
Greece Association of Greek Psychologists 1963
Guam Guam Psychological Association
Guatemala Guatemalan Psychological Association 1996
Hong Kong Hong Kong Psychological Society 1968
Hungary Hungarian Psychological Association 1928
Iceland Association of Icelandic Psychologists 1954
India Indian Psychological Association 1925
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Indonesia Indonesian Psychology Association 1959
Iran Iranian Association of Psychology 1995
Iraq Iraqi Educational and Psychological Association
Ireland Psychological Society of Ireland 1970
Israel Israeli Psychological Association 1958
Italy Italian Psychological Society 1910
Jamaica Jamaica Psychological Society
Japan Japanese Psychological Association 1927
Jordan Jordan Psychological Association 1996
Kenya Kenya Psychological Association
Korea Korean Psychological Association 1946
Latvia Latvian Professional Psychologists Association
Lebanon Lebanese Psychological Association
Liechtenstein Association of Liechtenstein Psychologists
Lithuania Lithuanian Psychological Association 1958
Malaysia Malaysian Psychological Association
Malta Malta Union of Professional Psychologists
Mexico Mexican Psychological Society 1953
Mongolia Mongolian Psychologists Association
Morocco Moroccan Psychological Association
Namibia Psychological Association of Namibia 1990
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Nepal Nepalese Psychological Association 1982
Netherlands Netherlands Institute of Psychology 1938
New Zealand New Zealand Psychological Society 1967
Nicaragua Nicaraguan Psychological Association 1981
Nigeria Nigerian Psychological Association
Norway Norwegian Psychological Association 1934
Pakistan Pakistan Psychological Association
Panama Panamanian Psychologists Association 1965
Peru Peruvian Society of Psychology 1954
Philippines Psychological Association of the Philippines 1961
Poland Polish Psychological Association 1948
Portugal Portuguese Psychological Society 1965
Puerto Rico Association of Psychologists of Puerto Rico 1954
Romania Psychologists Association of Romania 1965
Russia Soviet Federal Socialist Republic Psychological Society
1957
San Marino Organization of Psychologists of San Marino
Saudi Arabia Saudi Educational and Psychological Association
Serbia Serbian Psychological Society 1953
Singapore Singapore Psychological Society 1979
Slovakia Slovak Psychological Association 1957
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Slovenia Slovene Psychological Association 1954
South Africa Psychological Association of South Africa 1982
Spain Spanish Psychological Society 1952
Sudan Sudanese Psychological Society 1987
Sweden Swedish Psychological Association 1955
Switzerland Swiss Psychological Society 1943
Thailand Thai Psychological Association
Tunisia Tunisian Society of Psychology 1961
Turkey Turkish Psychological Association 1956
Uganda Ugandan National Psychological Association 1992
Ukraine Ukrainian Psychological Society
United Arab Emirates
Emirates Psychological Association
United Kingdom British Psychological Society 1901
United States American Psychological Association 1892
Uruguay Psychological Society of Uruguay 1953
Venezuela Venezuelan Psychological Federation 1957
Vietnam Psycho-Pedagogical Association of Vietnam 1990
Yemen Yemen Psychological Association 1990
Yugoslavia Psychological Association of Yugoslavia 1950
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Psychological Association
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* Partially adapted from David & Buchanan (2003). Many countries have more than one psychological society. For the purposes of this listing we included only the first one to be established.
International Congresses of Applied Psychology
Appendix C*
Number Year Location President
I 1889 Paris, France Jean-Martin Charcot
II 1892 London, United Kingdom Henry Sidgwick
III 1896 Munich, Germany Carl Stumpf
IV 1900 Paris, France Théodule Ribot
V 1905 Rome, Italy Giuseppi Sergi
VI 1909 Geneva, Switzerland Théodore Flournoy
VII 1923 Oxford, United Kingdom Charles Myers
VIII 1926 Groningen, The Netherlands Gerardus Heymans
IX 1929 New Haven, United States James McK. Cattell
X 1932 Copenhagen, Denmark Edgar Rubin
XI 1937 Paris, France Henri Piéron
XII 1948 Edinburgh, United Kingdom James Drever, Sr.
XIII 1951 Stockholm, Sweden David Katz
XIV 1954 Montreal, Canada Edward Bott & Edward Tolman
(p. 14)
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XV 1957 Brussels, Belgium Albert Michotte
XVI 1960 Bonn, Germany Wolfgang Metzger
XVII 1963 Washington, DC, United States Otto Klineberg
XVIII 1966 Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Alexei Leontiev
XIX 1969 London, United Kingdom George Drew
XX 1972 Tokyo, Japan Moriji Sagara
XXI 1976 Paris, France Paul Fraisse
XXII 1980 Leipzig, Germany Friedhart Klix
XXIII 1984 Acapulco, Mexico Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero
XXIV 1988 Sydney, Australia Peter Sheehan
XXV 1992 Brussels, Belgium Géry d’Ydewalle &Paul Bertelson
XXVI 1996 Montreal, Canada David Bélanger
XXVII 2000 Stockholm, Sweden Lars-Göran Nilsson
XXVIII 2004 Beijing, China Qicheng Jing
XXIX 2008 Berlin, Germany Peter Frensch
XXX 2012 Cape Town, South Africa Saths Cooper
National Psychological Societies
(p. 17) Appendix D
(p. 15) (p. 16)
Page 29 of 30
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date: 06 August 2018
The Internationalization of Psychology: A History
International Congresses of Psychology
Ludy T. Benjamin
Ludy T. Benjamin Jr., Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University.
David B. Baker
David B. Baker, Ph.D., is the Margaret Clark Morgan Executive Director of the Center for the History of Psychology and professor of psychology at The University of Akron.
Page 30 of 30
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date: 06 August 2018
- Structure Bookmarks
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- IUPsyS: International Union of Psychological Science, founded in 1951; contains 74
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lieve that people of various cultures are more similar than different. As Helgeson (2012) articulates regarding the issue of gender differences, “most of us have two eyes, two arms, two legs; a heart, lungs, and vocal chords . . . The same logic applies to cognitive and social domains” (p. 103). Sim- ilarly, Myers (2005) draws from G. K. Ches- terton’s observations—“When someone has ‘discovered why men in Bond Street wear black hats he will at the same moment have discovered why men in Timbuctoo wear red feathers’” (Myers, 2005, p. 180)—to expli- cate the universality of fundamental psycho- logical processes. Although such nomothetic propositions are often drowned by loud pro- tests directed against the ethnocentrism of mainstream psychology, we must neverthe- less reiterate that the contributions of psy- chologists from all the different camps are essential in order to weave a truly coherent and meaningful fabric of human behavior.
REFERENCES
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Autism: Deficits in folk psychology exist alongside superiority in folk physics. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flus- berg, & D. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism and develop- mental cognitive neuroscience (2nd ed., pp. 73–82). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bhagat, C. (2014, July 17). Bestselling English author: I write about an India that the West is not interested in. The Huffington Post. Re- trieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ chetan-bhagat/bestselling-english-author_b_ 5575570.html?ir�India
Christopher, J. C., Wendt, D. C., Marecek, J., & Goodman, D. M. (2014). Critical cultural awareness: Contributions to a globalizing psy- chology. American Psychologist, 69, 645– 655. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036851
Helgeson, V. (2012). Psychology of gender (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Educa- tion.
Myers, D. G. (2005). Social psychology (8th ed.). New Delhi, India: Tata McGraw-Hill.
Rao, M. A., Berry, R., Gonsalves, A., Hastak, Y., Shah, M., & Roeser, R. W. (2013). Globalization and the identity remix among urban adolescents in India. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 23, 9–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jora.12002
Sartre, J. (1956). Being and nothingness (H. E. Barnes, Trans.). New York, NY: Washington Square Press.
Schwartz, S. H., & Sagie, G. (2000). Value con- sensus and importance: A cross-national study. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31, 465–497. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220 22100031004003
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Christine N. Winston, Depart- ment of Psychology, Women’s Christian Col- lege, College Road, Chennai – 600 006, India. E-mail: [email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038984
Revisiting Cultural Awareness and Cultural Relevancy
Naji Abi-Hashem Independent Practice, Seattle, Washington
and Beirut, Lebanon
I was delighted to see the article on “Critical Cultural Awareness” in the October issue of the American Psychologist by Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, and Goodman (2014).
The more insights and exploration of the meaning and influence of culture we receive, the better. There is no single treat- ment of any personal or collective cul- ture(s) that can be inherently complete or totally exhaustive. New hermeneutics and skills are always needed, appreciated, and refreshing.
A few thousand years ago, Socrates once said, “Know Thyself.” Culturally speaking, the practice of self-awareness re- mains a desired virtue. That was true in an- cient times, and is still true today, especially when modern societies and subcultures are changing more rapidly than ever and unfold- ing faster than we can mentally adapt, so- cially digest, or emotionally process.
The concept of culture does not ap- pear to be fixed or static but is always dynamic and is ever fluid. As a Lebanese American, I continue to observe, study, and interact with so many cultures and subcultures locally and globally, espe- cially comparing the differences and sim- ilarities between the East and the West (and anything in between). I find the no- tion of culture(s) in general to be intrigu- ing and truly fascinating!
Actually, there are many layers of cultures and many spheres of world- views, even within one geographical area, urban setting, or residential loca- tion. That is also true inside the faculties of the human personality, on individual level as well. It seems there are subcul- tures within each culture, mentalities within each mentality, and worldviews within each worldview.
Furthermore, I find that cultures can- not be adequately defined or fully under- stood. They are better felt than defined and better experienced than explained (Abi- Hashem, 1997, 2014a, 2014b; Cohen, 2009). I wish sometimes that our graduate schools in psychology would require more cultural studies and anthropological train- ing to equip students for dealing with the rich and yet complex phenomena of our global-social-local-personal culture(s).
I would like to add to the well-docu- mented treatment and discussion that
Christopher et al. (2014) provided, that it is also critical to emphasize that our cultural self-awareness must be quite frequent and up-to-date. It is not a one-time procedure, examination, or discovery. The present times we live in are changing fast, deep, and strong, affecting our existential iden- tity and sense of cultural and global self (if I may use the term—as I have been trying to develop this concept recently).
That is, who are we becoming cultur- ally at this globalized, polarized, and digi- talized age? Societies are drastically vary- ing and rapidly moving, and the world’s cultures are increasingly mixing and inter- acting, more than ever. With the invasion of the Internet and its cyberspace technol- ogy into all aspects of modern life, the traditional norms, geographical boundaries, basic structures, social values, established lifestyles, and national heritages are hold- ing no more.
Virtually, any field of knowledge, discipline, or helping profession has many concepts, principles, and constructs that are universal in nature, and could apply and be understood anywhere in the world.
However, each discipline, including psychology, has many specifics and partic- ulars that are not readily applicable else- where or well suited to be used outside their place of origin. These are solely local and provisional, relevant only to the imme- diate context where they are designed, for- mulated, and produced. They usually make sense inside (not outside) their cultural contours. But if they were to be introduced or applied elsewhere, nearby or faraway, they will need serious screening, trimming, and adaptation, as well as thoughtful revi- sions, modifications, and alterations. Oth- erwise, they will remain foreign and un- suitable to the population in mind, which could be a special target audience, a minor- ity group, a local community, or even an- other society or a different nation.
In addition, each discipline has some aspects, theories, tools, and assumptions that are counterculture in nature and will eventually cause confusion, if not harm, when they are applied blindly and without any discernment. These are totally irrele- vant and need to be omitted all together (cf. Abi-Hashem, 2014b).
How do we know the difference be- tween what is cultural-normal-natural and what is clinical-abnormal-unnatural, especially when we work cross-culturally or transnationally? The answer is by ex- perience and by allowing ourselves to be coached and trained by local educators and caregivers. They are the indigenous experts who know enough about their own settings and mentalities and some-
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660 October 2015 ● American Psychologist
thing about ours (and where we come from and how we operate). Otherwise, good intentions and self-confidence on the part of the visiting professionals are not enough.
I personally spend several months a year in Beirut, Lebanon, focusing on community service, teaching, counseling, training, crisis intervention, and trauma debriefing among various Middle East- erner populations and refugees living there, as well as interacting with profes- sionals and educators on various levels. I have experimented with many concepts, approaches, themes, and techniques widely practiced in North America, only to find that some of them were ineffective and questionable.
While the more generic principles and universal methods work nicely across the board and people relate and respond well to them, other notions, approaches, and interventions remain very awkward and foreign. They appear to be counterpro- ductive and unfortunately do complicate the relationships as well as the outcomes. Some actually have negative side-effects! Like suggesting a strict separation-individ- uation process, or a sharp drawing of per- sonal boundaries on the expense of alien- ating family and friends and other essential community bonding; or encouraging rigid privacy, impersonal autonomy, and total self-reliance, thus glorifying I-me-myself on the expense of we-us-together. This can destroy the fabric of communal harmony and intimate-collaborative beauty of many families, groups, communities, and societ- ies, because individuals have full meaning and clear identity only in relationship to significant others, in a fluid interdepen- dence and interconnectedness (rather than floating alone). Another example would be the open expression of anger and resent- ment. To encourage a quick verbalization of anger and hate is very foreign and shameful in many subcultures, e.g., “I hate my mother,” “I am angry at my father (or spouse),” or pushing the person to directly express and confront others publicly, as if to rub anger in their face. Indirect ways of describing and expressing negative emo- tions are more common in many traditions. Therefore, helping-professionals ought to be very careful and very patient with them- selves and with those they attempt to serve, either across the street, across the border, or across the ocean.
In the Arabic language, there is no single term or word to describe the Eng- lish parallel of “culture.” Rather, several terms are used, at times, to convey the meaning of culture and to capture its overall essence, like, Hadaarah (civiliza-
tion), Thihneyyah (mentality), Thakaafah (educational civility), and Turaath (liv- ing tradition).
Finally, as we strive toward a better contextualization and a healthy internation- alization of all social sciences, in general, and the psychological concepts, tools, methods, and therapeutic skills, in particu- lar, let us do these with full hermeneutic integrity, professional sensitivity, and cul- tural humility. Surely, the results will be more effective, the experiences more meaningful, and the newfound relation- ships more rewarding.
REFERENCES
Abi-Hashem, N. (1997). Reflections on “Inter- national perspectives in psychology.” Ameri- can Psychologist, 52, 569–570. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/0003-066X.52.5.569.b
Abi-Hashem, N. (2014a). Worldview. In D. A. Leeming (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology and religion (2nd ed., pp. 1938–1941). New York, NY: Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ 978-1-4614-6086-2_9357
Abi-Hashem, N. (2014b). Cross-cultural psy- chology and counseling: A Middle Eastern perspective. Journal of Psychology and Chris- tianity, 33, 156–163.
Christopher, J. C., Wendt, D. C., Marecek, J., & Goodman, D. M. (2014). Critical cultural awareness: Contributions to a globalizing psy- chology. American Psychologist, 69, 645– 655. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036851
Cohen, A. B. (2009). Many forms of culture. American Psychologist, 64, 194–204. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015308
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to Naji Abi-Hashem, 14054 Wallingford Avenue North, Seattle, WA 98133. E-mail: [email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038965
Cultural Humility: The Cornerstone of Positive
Contact With Culturally Different Individuals and
Groups?
Joshua N. Hook and C. Edward Watkins Jr. University of North Texas
Increased globalization has resulted in in- creased connections between different kinds of individuals and groups, in a sense “flattening” the world (Friedman, 2007). Psychologists have been influenced by this increased globalization and, with far greater frequency than ever before, now engage with individuals and groups from a host of different nations and cultures. But
increased contact alone does not necessar- ily undo the parochialism and ethnocen- trism of psychology in the United States. As noted by Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, and Goodman (2014), “U.S. psychology remains not only overwhelmingly U.S.- centric but also largely unaware of how its cultural roots shape theory and research” (Christopher et al., 2014, p. 645). Their case example about the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka loudly and clearly reflects that reality—demonstrating how failure to incorporate cultural consider- ations into helping strategies can result in wasted efforts and even bring harm to the very people that we are attempting to aid. It indeed appears that the way in which psy- chologists engage with culturally different individuals and groups can still be a serious problem in the delivery of competent psy- chological services.
But why? Why is it that many psy- chologists—despite such increasingly di- versifying opportunities for cultural con- tact, despite being trained and steeped in the values of multiculturalism, and despite being designated as leaders in promoting multiculturalism and positive cultural en- gagement—continue to seemingly struggle to positively engage with culturally differ- ent individuals and groups? And how is it that large failures, such as the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, could hap- pen but a decade ago and could perhaps still happen again now? From our perspec- tive, answers to those questions can be found in what may well be the very foun- dational cornerstone of any and all cultural contact: cultural humility. Although a more commonly used concept in family medi- cine (Falicov, 2014), cultural humility —an important component of multicultural com- petence and multicultural orientation—has recently begun to gain increasing traction as a vital explanatory construct and prac- tice-crucial variable in psychological ser- vice provision (e.g., Falicov, 2014; Hook, Davis, Owen, Worthington, & Utsey, 2013; Owen, 2013). Intrapersonally, cultural hu- mility involves a willingness and openness to reflect on one’s own self as an embedded cultural being, having an awareness of per- sonal limitations in understanding the cul- tural background and viewpoints of others; interpersonally, cultural humility involves an other-oriented stance (or openness to the other) with regard to aspects of an individ- ual’s or group’s cultural background and identity. Some of the core features of a culturally humble stance have been empir- ically identified as being respectful and considerate of the other; being genuinely interested in, open to exploring, and want- ing to understand the other’s perspective;
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661October 2015 ● American Psychologist
conceptions ofwhat is real and what isn't. By examining the rich diversity and complexity of human cultural expressions, you may also begin to grasp more fully the potential and possibilities for your own life.
What Is Culture?
When people hear the word culture, they often think about the material goods or artistic forms produced by distinct groups ofpeople-Chinese food, Middle Eastern music, Indian clothing, Greek architecture, African dances. Sometimes
people assume that culture means elite art forms such as those displayed in museums, operas, or ballets. But for anthropologists, culture is much more: It encompasses people's entire way of life.
Culture is a system of knowledge, beliefs, patterns of behavior, artifacts,
and institutions that are created, learned, shared, and contested by a group of people. Culture is our manual for understanding and interacting with the people and the world around us. It includes shared norms, values, symbols, mental maps of reality, and material objects as well as structures of power
including the media, education, religion, and politics-in which our under standing of the world is shaped, reinforced, and negotiated. A cultural group
may be large or small, and it may have within it significant diversity of region,
Al l humans must eat. But what we eat, how we eat, and who we eat with are shaped by local cultures. (Top left) a street market in Bangkok; Thailand; (right) an interfaith Passover Seder with Muslims and Jews in Guba, Azerbaijan; (bottom left) planning a business startup in London.
culture: A system of knowledge, beliefs, patterns of behavior, artifacts, and institutions that are created, learned, shared, and contested by a group of people.
WHAT IS CULT U RE? 35
-enculturation: The process of learning culture.
religion, race, gender, sexuality, class, generation, and ethnic identity. I t may not be accepted by everyone, even those living in a particular place or time. But ulti
mately, the culture that we learn has the potential to shape our ideas ofwhat is normal and natural, what we can say and do, and even what we can think.
Culture Is Learned and Taught
Humans do not genetically inherit culture. We learn culture throughout our
lives from the people and cultural institutions that surround us. Anthropolo gists call the process of learning culture enculturation. Some aspects of cul ture we learn through formal instruction: English classes in school, religious instruction, visits to the doctor, history lessons, dance classes. Other processes
of enculturation are informal and even unconscious as we absorb culture from
family, friends, and the media. All humans are equally capable of learning culture and of learning any culture they are exposed to.
The process of social learning, passing cultural information within popu
lations and across generations, is not unique to humans. Many animals learn social behavior from their immediate group: Wolves learn hunting strategies
from the wolf pack. Whales learn to produce and distinguish the unique calls
of their pod. Among monkeys and apes, our closest biological relatives, learned behaviors are even more common. Chimpanzees have been observed teaching
their young to create rudimentary tools, stripping bark from a twig that they then insert into an anthill to extract a tasty and nutritious treat. But the human
capacity to learn culture is unparalleled.
Culture is taught as well as learned. H umans establish cultural institutions as mechanisms for enculturating their members. Schools, medical and legal
systems, media, and religious institutions promote the ideas and concepts that
are considered central to the culture. Rules, regulations, laws, teachers, doctors,
religious leaders, police officers, and sometimes militaries promote and enforce what is considered appropriate behavior and thinking.
Culture Is Shared Yet Contested
No individual has his or her own culture. Culture is a shared experience devel
oped as a result ofliving as a member ofa group. Through enculturation, humans learn how to communicate and establish patterns ofbehavior that allow life in
community, often in close proximity and sometimes with limited resources. Cultures may be shared by groups, large and small. For example, anthropolo
gists may speak oflndian culture (1 billion people), ofU.S. culture (300 million
people) or of the culture of the Yanomami tribe (several thousand people) liv ing in the Amazonian rainforest. There may be smaller cultures within larger cultures. For instance, your college classroom h as a culture, one that you must
learn in order to succeed academically. A classroom culture includes shared
36 CHAPTER 2 CULTURE
- How is cutture learned and taught? Here, kindergartners learn
Mandarin Chinese at the New York Chinese School.
CULTURE IS SHARED YET CONTESTED
No individual has his or her own culrure. Culrure is a shared experience developed as
a result ofliving as a member ofa group. Through enculruration, humans learn how
to communicate and establish patterns of behavior that allow life in community,
often in close proximity and sometimes with limited resources. Culrures may be
shared by groups, large and small. For example, anthropologists may speak oflndian
culrure (1 billion people), of U.S. culrure (300 million people) or of the culrure of
the Yanomarni tribe (several thousand people) living in the Amazonian rainfor
est. There may be smaller culrures within larger culrures. For instance, your oollege classroom has a culrure, one that you must learn in order to succeed academically. A
classroom culrure includes shared understandings ofwhat to wear, how ro sit, when
to arrive or leave, how to communicate with classmates and the instructor, and how
to challenge authority, as well as formal and informal processes ofenculruration.
Although culrure is shared by members ofgroups, it is ab;o constantly con
tested, negotiated, and changing. Culrure is never static. Just ·as culrural instiru
tions serve as strucrures for promoting enculturation, they also serve as arenas for
challenging, debating, and changing core culrural beliefs and behaviors. Intense
debates erupt over school curriculums, medical practices, media content, religious
practices, and government policies as members ofa culrure engage in sometimes
dramatic confrontations about their collective purpose and direction.
CULTURE IS SYMBOLIC AND MATERIAL
Through enculruration, over time the members of a culrure develop a shared
body ofculrural knowledge and patterns ofbehavior. Though anthropologists no
longer think ofculrure as a completely separate, unique possession ofa specific
What Is Culture? 35
norms Ideas or rules about how people
should behave in particular situations or toward certain other people.
36
group ofpeople, most argue that a common cultural core exists, at least among
the dominant segments of the culture. Norms, values, symbols, and mental maps
of reality are four elements that an anthropologist may consider in attempting to
understand the complex workings ofa culture. These are not universal; they vary
from culture to culture. Even within a culture not everyone shares equally in that
cultural knowledge, nor does everyone agree completely on it. But the elements
ofa culture powerfully frame what its participants can say, what they can do, and
even what they think is possible and impossible, real or unreal.
Norms. Norms are ideas or rules about how people should behave in partic ular situations or toward certain other people--what is considered "normal" and
appropriate behavior. Norms may include what to wear on certain occasions such
as weddings, funerals, work, and school; what you can say in polite company; how
younger people should treat older people; and who you can date or, as the open
ing anecdote demonstrated, what you can eat when. Many norms are assumed,
not written down. We learn them over time--consciously and unconsciously
and incorporate them into our patterns ofdaily living. Other norms are formal
ized in writing and made publicly available, such as a country's laws, a system of
medical or business ethics, or the code of academic integrity in your college or
university. Norms may vary for segments of the population, imposing different
expectations on men and women, for instance, or children and adults. Cultural
norms may be widely accepted, but they may also be debated, challenged, and
changed, particularly when norms enforced by a dominant group disadvantage
or oppress a minority within the population.
Consider the question ofwhom you can marry. You may consider the deci
sion to be a matter ofpersonal choice, but in many cultures the decision is not
left to the whims ofyoung people. The results are too important. O ften it is two
families who arrange the marriage, not two individuals, although these patterns
are under pressure from the globalization ofWestern cultural practices.
Cultures have clear norms, based on ideas ofage, kinship, sexuality, race, reli
gion, class, and legal status, that specify what is normal and what is not. Let's
consider some extreme cases. In Nazi Germany, the Nuremburg Laws passed in 1935 banned marriage or sexual relations between German Jews and persons with German or related blood. From 1949 to 1985, South Africa's apartheid
government, dominated by white lawmakers, declared marriage and sex between
whites and "coloreds" (people ofmixed race), Asians, and blacks to be a crime under
the Prohibition ofMixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act. In the history of the United States, as many as forty states passed anti-miscegenation laws-that
is, laws barring interracial marriage and sex:. Such laws targeted marriages between
whites and nonwhites-primarily blacks, but also Asians and Native Americans. Only in 1967 did the U.S. Supreme Courtunanimously rule (inLovingv. Virginia)
Chapter 2: Culture
that these laws were unconstitutional, thereby striking down statutes still on the books in sixteen states (all the former slave states plus Oklahoma).
Cultural norms may discourage exogamy (marriage outside one's "group") and encourage endogamy (marriage within one's "group"). Think about your own
family. Who could you bring home to your parents? Could you cross boundar ies of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, or gender? Although U.S. culture
has very few formal rules about whom one can marry--with some exclusions around age, sexuality, and certain kinship relations-cultural norms still power fully inform and enforce our behavior.
Most people, though not all, accept and follow a culture's norms. Ifthey choose to challenge the norms, other members ofthe culture have means for enforcing its
standards, whether through shunning, institutionalized punishment such as fines or imprisonment, or, in more extreme cases, violence and threats ofviolence.
Values. Cultures promote and cultivate a core set of values- fundamental beliefs about what is important, what makes a good life, and what is true, right,
and beautiful. Values reflect shared ultimate standards that should guide people's behavior, as well as goals that people feel are important for themselves, their
families, and their community. What would you identify as the core values of U.S. culture? Individualism? Independence? Care for the most vulnerable?
Freedom of speech, press, and religion? Equal access to social mobility?
As with all elements of culture, cultural values are not fixed. They can be debated and contested. And they may have varying degrees of influence. For
example, if you pick up a newspaper in any country you will find a deep debate about cultural values. Perhaps the debate focuses on modesty versus public displays ofaffection in India, economic growth versus environmental pollution in China, or
land settlement versus peace in the Middle East. In the United States, while the value of privacy is held dear, so is the value ofsecurity. The proper balance of
the two is constantly being contested and debated. Under what conditions should the U.S. government be able to breach your privacy by eavesdropping on telephone
calls and emails, or unlocking your iPhone, in order to ensure your safety? Ultimately, values are not simply platitudes about people's ideals about the
good life.Values are powerful cultural tools for clarifying cultural goals and moti
vating people to action. When enshrined in law, values can become powerful political and economic tools. Values can be so potent that some people are willing
to kill or die for them.
Symbols. Cultures include complex systems ofsymbols and symbolic actions-in realms such as language, art, religion, politics, and economics-that convey meaning to other participants. In essence, a symbol is something that stands for something
else. For example, language enables humans to communicate abstract ideas through
What Is Culture?
values Fundamental beliefs about what
is important, what makes a good life, and what is true, right, and
beautiful.
symbol
Anything that represents something else.
37
- Money is symbolic1 and only 10 percent of the world's money
exists in tangible form. Here traders move money electronicalty
at Euronext stock exchange in Amstetdam, the Netherlands.
mental maps of reality
Cultural classifications of what
kinds of people and things exist, and the assignment of meaning to those classifications.
38
the symbols of written and spoken words, as well as unspoken sounds and gestures (see Chapter 4). People shake hands, wave, whistle, nod, smile, give rwo thumbs up,
give thumbs down, give someone the middle finger.These symbols are not univer sal, but within their particular cultural oontext they oonvey certain meanings.
Much symbolic oommunication is nonverbal, action-based, and unconscious. Religions include powerful systems of symbols that represent deeper meanings to their adherents. Consider mandalas, the Koran, the Torah, the Christian cross,
holy water, srarues ofthe Buddha-fill carry greater meanings and value than the physical material they are oonstructed 0£ National flags, which are mere pieces of colored cloth, are symbols that stir deep political emotions. Even money is simply a symbolic representation ofvalue guaranteed by the sponsoring govern
ment. It has no value, except in its symbolism. Estimates suggest that only about 10 percent of money today exists in physical form. The rest moves electroni cally through banks, stock markets, and credit accounts (Graeber 2011). Symbols
change in meaning over time and from culture to culture. Not understanding another culrure's oollective understandings-sets of symbolic actions-can lead
to embarrassing misunderstandings and cross-cultural miscues.
Mental Maps of Reality. Along with norms, values, and symbols, another key component of culture is mental maps of reality. These are "maps" that humans construct ofwhat kinds of people and what kinds of things exist.
Because the world presents overwhelming quantities of data to our senses, our brains create shortcuts- maps-to navigate our experience and organize all the data that come our way. A roadmap condenses a large world into a manageable
format (one that you can hold in your hands or view on your portable GPS sys tem) and helps us navigate the territory. Likewise, our mental maps organize the
world into categories that help us sort out our experiences and what they mean. We do not want all the details all the time. We oould not handle them anyway. From our general mental maps we can then dig deeper as required.
Chapter 2: Culture
Our mental maps are shaped through enculturation, but they are not fixed.
Like other elements ofculture, they can be challenged and redrawn. Today, glo
balization continues to put pressure on mental maps of reality as people on the
planet are drawn into closer contact with the world's diversity. We will examine
these transformations throughout this book, especially in chapters on language,
race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and kinship.
Mental maps have two important functions. Fint, mental maps cla.ssif; real
ity. Starting in the eighteenth century, European naturalists such as Carolus
Linnaeus (1707- 1778) began creating systems of classification for the natural
world. These systems included five kingdoms subdivided into phylum, class,
order, family, genus, and species. Through observation (this was before genetics),
these naturalists sought to organize a logical framework to divide the world into
kinds of things and kinds ofpeople. In a similar way, our cultures' mental maps seek to classify reality-though often a culture's mental maps are drawn from the
distinct vantage point of those in power.
A culture creates a concept such as time. Then we arbitrarily divide it into mil
lennia, centuries, decades,years, seasons, months, ·weeks, hours, morning, aftemoon, evening, minutes, seconds. Categoties of time are assumed to be scientific, universal,
and "natural." But mostly they are cultural constructs.The current Gregorian calen
dar, which is used in much of the world, was introduced in 1582 by the Catholic
Church, but its adoption occurred gradually; it was accepted in the United States
in 1756, replacing the earlier Julian calendar, and in China in 19'49. Until 1949 and still today, much ofChina relies on a lunar calendar in which months and days align
with the waxing and waning of the moon. New Yem's Day shifts each year. So do Chinese holidays and festivals. Even in the Gregorian calendar, the length of the
year is modified to fit into a neat mental map of reality. A year (how long it takes
Earth to orbit the sun) is approximately 365 .2425 days long, so every four years the
Gregorian calendar must add a day, creating a leap year of366 days rather than 365. Now check your watch. Even the question of what time it is depends on
accepting a global system of time zones centered at the Greenwich meridian in
England. But countries regularly modify the system according to their needs.
The mainland United States has four time zones. China, approximately the
same physical size, uses only one time zone. Russia has eleven. There is a time
change of three and a half hours when you cross the border between China and
Afghanistan. As these examples demonstrate, categories that seem completely
fixed and "natural" are in reality flexible and variable, showing the potential role
ofculture in defining our fundamental notions of reality.
Mental maps of reality become problematic when people treat cultural
notions ofdifference as being scientifically or biologically "natural." Race is a key
example. As we will see in Chapter 5, the notion of race is assumed in popular
culture and conversation to have a biological basis.There is, however, no scientific
What Is Culture? 39
- What does it mean to be a child laborer in your culture? (/eh) a
boy in Dhaka, Bangladesh, makes balloons for export; (right) a girl in
Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, works at a brick-making factory.
40
basis for this assumption. The particular racial categories in any given culture do
not correlate directly to any biological differences. Although most people in the
United States would name whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and perhaps Native
Americans as distinct races, no genetic line marks clear differences among these
categories. The classifications are created by our culture and are specific to our
culture. Other cultures draw different mental maps ofthe reality ofhuman phys
ical variation. The Japanese use different racial categories than the United States. Brazilians have more than 500 racial classifications.
Second, mental maps assign meaning to what has been classified. Not only do
people in a culture develop mental maps of things and people, they also place
values and meanings on those maps. For example, we divide the life span into
categories- infants, children, adolescents, teenagers, young adults, adults, and
seniors, for example- but then we give different values to different ages. Some
carry more respect, more protection, and more rights, privileges, and responsibil
ities.In the United States, these categories determine at what age you can marry, have sex, drink alcohol, drive, vote, go to war, stand trial, retire, or collect Social
Security and Medicare benefits. In considering the earlier discussion of time, we can see how these classifica
tions gain value and meaning. U.S. culture puts a premium on time, discourages
idle leisure, and encourages people to work hard and stay busy. "Time is money!"we
often hear, and so it should not be wasted. Assuming that our mental maps ofreality
are natural can cause us to disregard the cultural values ofothers. For instance, we
may see as lazy those whose cultures value a midday nap. This effect of our mental
maps is important for anthropologists to understand (Wolf-Meyer 2012).
To fully grasp the anthropological understanding ofculture, we will examine
the historical development of the culture concept before turning our attention to
more recent notions ofculture as a system ofmeaning and as a system of power.
Chapter 2: Culture
How Has the Culture Concept Developed in Anthropology? The concept of culture has been central to anthropology ever since the English
anthropologist Edward Bumett Tylor (1832- 1917) crafred his definition
in the opening paragraph of his book Primitive Culture in 1871: "Culture or
Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and
habits acquired by man as a member ofsociety."
Tylor understood culture to be a unified and complex system of ideas and
behavior learned over time, passed down from generation to generation, and
shared by members ofa particular group. Over the past century and a half, cul
ture has become more than a definition; it is now a key theoretical framework for
anthropologists attempting to understand humans and their interactions.
EARLY EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORKS
Edward Burnett Tylor and James Frazer (1854-1941) of England and Lewis
Henry Morgan (1818- 1881) of the United States were among the leading early
anthropologists who sought to professionalize a field long dominated by wealthy
collectors ofartifacts.They sought to organize the vast quantities ofdata about the
diversity ofcultures worldwide that were being accumulated through colonial and
missionary enterprises during the nineteenth century. These anthropologists were
influenced by Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution , which maintains
that the diversity of biological species resulted from gradual change over time in
response to environmental pressures. Thus, they suggested that the vast diversity
of cultures represented different stages in the evolution of human culture.
Early anthropologists suggested that all cultures would naturally evolve
through the same sequence ofstages, a concept known as unilineal cultural evo lution.They set about plotting the world's cultures along a con tinuum from most
simple to most complex, using the terms savage, barbarian, and civilized. Western
cultures were, perhaps too predictably, considered the most evolved or civilized. By arranging all of the world cultures along this continuum, the early anthropologists
believed that they could trace the path of human cultural evolution, understand
where some cultures had come from, and predict where other cultures were headed.
W hile Tylor and others developed the theory ofunilineal. cultural evolution
at least in part to combat the prevalent racist belief that many non-Europeans
were of a different species, the theory has itself been criticized as racist for rank
ing different cultural expressions in a hierarchy with European culture, consid
ered the ideal, at the apex (Stocking 1968). Franz Boas, the founder of American
anthropology, and Bronislaw Malinowski, a Polish anthropologist who spent
How Has the Culture Concept Develope d in Anthropology?
- B<i1ish anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor.
unilineal cultural evolution The theory proposed by nineteenth
century anthropologists that all cultures naturalty evolve through the same sequence of stages from
simple to complex.
41
historical particularism
The idea, attributed to Franz Boas, that cultures develop in
specific ways because of their unique histories.
- American anthropologist Ruth Benedict.
42
most ofhis life teaching in England, represent two main schools ofanthropology
that moved beyond the evolutionary framework for viewing cultural differences.
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PARTICULARISM Franz Boas (1858- 1942) conducted fieldwork among the Kwakiutl indigenous
people ofthe Pacific Northwest ofthe United States and Canada before becoming a professor ofanthropology at Columbia University in New York and a curator of the American Museum of Natural History. Boas rejected unilineal cultural evo
lution, its generalizations, and its comparative method. Instead he advocated for an approach called historical particularism. He claimed that cultures arise from
different causes, not uniform prooesses. According to Boas, anthropologists could not rely on an evolutionary formula to explain differences among cultures but must study the particular history ofeach culture to see how it developed. Evolutionist,;
such asTylor, Frazer, and Morgan argued that similarities among cultures emerged through independent invention as different cultures independently arrived at sim
ilar solutions to similar problems. Boas, in contrast, while not ruling out some independent invention, turned to the idea ofdijfoswn-the borrowing ofcultural
trait,; and patterns from other cultures-to explain apparent similarities. Boas's belief in the powerful role ofculture in shaping human life exhibited
itself in his early-twentieth-century studies ofimmigrantli. His research with the children of immigrant,; from Europe revealed the remarkable effects of culture
and environment on their physical forms, challenging the role ofbiology as a tool
for discrimination. As aJ ewish immigrant himself, Boas was particularly sensitive to the dangers of racial stereotyping, and his work throughout his career served to challenge white supremacy, the inferior ranking ofnon-European people, and
other expressions ofracism. Boas's srudents Ruth Benedict (1887- 1948) and Margaret Mead (1901- 1979)
continued his emphasis on the powerful role of culture in shaping human life and the need to explore the unique development ofeach culture. Benedict's popular srudies, Patterns ofCulture (1934) and The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), explored
the ways in which cultural trait,; and entire cultures are uniquely patterned and integrated. Mead conducted research in Samoa, Bali, and Papua New Guinea and
became perhaps the most famous anthropologist ofthe twentieth oentury, promoting her findings and the unique tools ofanthropology to the general American public.
Mead turned her attention p<lrticularly to enculturation and illi powerful
effects on cultural patterns and personality types. In her book Coming ofAge in Samoa (1928), she explored the seeming sexual freedom and experimentation
of Samoan young people and compared it with the repressed sexuality of young people in the United States, suggesting the important role of enculturation in
shaping behavior-even behavior that is imagined to have powerful biological origins. Mead's controversial research and findings over her career challenged
Chapte r 2: Culture
biological assumptions about gender, demonstrating cross-cultural variations in
expressions of what it meant to be male or female, and contributing to heated debates about the roles of women and men inU.S. culture in the twentieth century.
BRITISH STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM
Between the 1920s and 1960s, in a rejection ofunilineal cultural evolution, many British social anthropologists viewed anthropology more as a science and field
work more as a science experiment that could focus on the specific details ofa local society. These anthropologists viewed human societies a.s living organisms, and through fieldwork they sought to analyze each part of the "body." Each part
ofsociety-including the kinship, religious, political, and economic structures fit together and had its unique function within the larger structure. Like a living
organism, a society worked to maintain an internal balance, or equilibrium, that kept the system working. Under this conceptual framework, called structural functionalism, British social anthropologists employed a synchronic approach
to control their science experiments-analyzing contemporary societies at a fixed point in time without regard to historical context. By isolating as many variables
as possible, especially by excluding history and outside influences such as neigh boring groups or larger national or global dynamics, these anthropologists sought to focus narrowly on the culture at hand.
Early practitioners of this approach included Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), who used an early form offunctionalism in his ethnography of the
Trobriand lslands,Argonauh ofthe Wertern Pacific (1922), discussed in more detail in Chapter3; and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1902- 1973) in his classic ethnography ofthe Sudan, 7he Nuer (1940), which we will consider further in Chapters 3 and 9. Later,
British anthropologists, including Max Gluckman (1911- 1975) in his work on ritu
als ofrebellion, and Victor Turner (1920-1983) in his work on religious symbols and
rituals, ctitiqued earlier structural functionalists for ignoring the dynamics ofconflict, tension, and change within the societies they studied. Their intervention marked a
significant rum in the study ofsociety and culture by British anthropologists.
CULTURE AND MEANING
One predominant view within anthropology in recent decades sees culture pri
marily as a set of ideas or knowledge shared by a group ofpeople that provides a common body of information about how to behave, why to behave that way, and what that behavior means.The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926- 2006),
a key figure in this interpretivist approach, urged anthropologists to explore culture primarily as a symbolic system in which even simple, seemingly straight
forward actions can convey deep meanings. In a classic example, Geertz (1973c) examines the difference between a winkand
a twitch of the C)e· Both involve the same movement ofthe eye muscles,but the wink
How Has the Culture Concept Developed in Anthropology?
society The focus of early British
anthropological research whose structure and function could be isolated and studied scientifically.
structural functionalism A conceptual framework positing
that each element of society serves a particular function
to keep the entire system in equilibrium.
_, f . Papua "'· • ·~~ inea· wGu... -- '
I ....J ' -;,:-' I ·.._-_ briand
_..ands '
MAP2. I
Trobriand Islands
interpretivist approach A conceptual framework that sees culture primarily as a symbolic system of deep
meaning.
43
" MAP2.2
Bali
thick description A research strategy that combines detailed description of
cuttural activi1y with an analysis of the layers of deep cultural
meaning in which those activities are embedded.
- Preparations for a cockfight outside a Hindu temple in BaJi.
How do you ana]yze the deep
webs of meaning at play in any cultural event?
44
carries a meaning, which can change depending on the oontext in which it oocurs. A
wink can imply flirting, including a friend in a secret, or slyly signaling agreement.
Deciphering the meaning requires a complex, collective (shared) understanding of unspoken oommunication in a specific cultural context. Collective understandings of
symbols and symbolic actions enable people to interact with one another in subtle yet
complex ways without constantly stopping to explain themselves. Geertz's essay "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" (1973a)
describes in intricate detail a cockfight-a common activity even today in local communities across Bali, a small island in the South Pacific. Geertz describes
the elaborate breeding, raising, and training of the roosters; the scene of bedlam
at the fight; the careful selection of the birds; the rituals of the knife man, who
provides the razors for the birds' feet; the fight itself; the raucous betting before
and during the fight; and the aftermath, with the cutting up of the losing cock
and the dividing of its parts among participants in the fight.
Geertz argues that such careful description of cultural activity is an essential
partofunderstanding Balinese culture. But it is not enough. He claims that we must
engage in thick description, looking beneath the surface activities to see the layers
ofdeep cultural meaning in which those activities are embedded. The cockfight is
not simply a cockfight. It also represents generations of competition among the village families for prestige, power, and resources within the community. It sym bolizes the negotiation of those families' prestige status and standing within the
larger groups. For Geertz, all activities of the cockfight reflect these deeper webs of meaning, and their analysis requires extensive description that uncovers those
deeper meanings. Indeed, according to Geertz, every cultural action is more than
Chapte r 2 : Culture
the action itself; it is also a symbol ofdeeper meaning. (Even the seemingly simple
actofeating, as described in the chapter opener, carries a deeper cultural meaning.) Geertz's culture concept has provided a key theoretical framework for much
of the anthropological research in subsequent decades. But, as we will see in the
following section, it has also been criticized for not adequately considering the relations ofpower within a culture and the contested processes by which cultural
meanings- norms, values, symbols, mental maps of reality- aire established.
How Are Culture and Power Related? For many years, anthropologists focused primarily on culture as a system ofideas,
as represented in the section you have just read. But more recent scholarship has pushed anthropology to consider the deep interconnections between culture and
power in more sophisticated ways (Foucault 1977; Gramsci 1971; Wolf 1982), and the chapters of this book take this challenge seriously.
Power is often described as the ability or potential to bring about change
through action or influence, either one's own or that of a group or institution.
This may include the ability to influence through force or the threat of force.
Power is embedded in many kinds of social relations, from interpersonal rela tions, to institutions, to structural frameworks ofwhole societies. In effect, power
is everywhere and individuals participate in systems of power in complex ways.
Throughout this book we will work to unmask the dynamics ofpower embedded in culture, including systems of power such as race and racism, ethnicity and
nationalism, gender, human sexuality, economics, and family. The anthropologist Eric Wolf (1923- 1999) urged anthropologists to see power
as an aspect of all human relationships. Consider the relationships in your own life: teacher/student, parent/child, employer/employee, landlord/tenant, lender/ borrower, boyfriend/girlfriend. Wolf (1990, 1999) argued that all such human rela
tionships have a power dynamic. Though cultures are often assumed to be com posed ofgroups ofsimilar people who uniformly share norms and values, in reality
people in a given culture are usually diverse and their relationships are complicated. Power in a culture reflects stratification- uneven distribution of resources
and privileges-<lmong participants that often persists over generations. Some
people are drawn into the center of the culture. Others are ignored, marginal ized, or even annihilated. Power may be stratified along lines ofgender, racial or
ethnic group, class, age, family, religion, sexuality, or legal status. These structures of power organize relationships among people and create a framework through which access to cultural resources is distributed. As a result, some people are able
How Are Culture and Power Related?
power The ability or potential to bring
about change through action or influence.
stratification The uneven distribution of
resources and privileges among participants in a group or culture.
45
- A young Muslim woman with two French flags pulled over her head
covering marches in Paris against a French ban on religious symbols,
including head coverings, in public schools.
46
to participate more fully in the culture than others. This balance ofpower is not
fixed; it fluctuates over time. By eicamining the way access to the resources, priv
ileges, and opportunities ofa culture are shared unevenly and unequally, we can
begin to use culture as a conceptual guide to power and its workings.
POWER AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS
One key to understanding the relationship between culture and power is
to recognize that a culture is more than a set of ideas or patterns of behavior
shared among a collection of individuals. A culture also includes the powerful
institutions that these people create to promote and maintain their core val
ues. Ethnographic research must consider a wide range of institutions that play
central roles in the enculturation process. For example, schools teach a shared
history, language, patterns ofsocial interaction, notions of health, and scientific
ideas ofwhat exists in the world and how the world works. Religious institu
tions promote moral and ethical .codes ofbehavior. The various media convey
images ofwhat is considered nonnal, natural, and valued. Other prominent cul
tural institutions that reflect and shape core norms and values include the family,
medicine, government, courts, police, and the military.
These cultural institutions are also locations where people can debate and
contest cultural norms and values. In 2003, an intense debate erupted in France about Muslim girls wearing headscarves to public schools. Although few girls
actually wore headscarves, the con troversy took on particular intensity in the
aftermath of the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, the invasions ofAfghanistan and
Iraq, and terrorist incidents in Europe. For many non-M uslim people in France,
Chapter 2: Culture
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