The West in the Contemporary Era:

New Encounters and Transformations

• Economic Stagnation and Political Change: The 1970s and 1980s a R e v o l u t i o n i n the East H I n the Wske of R e v o l u t i o n H R e t h i n k i n g the West

O N THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 9 , 1 9 8 9 , EAST GERMAN BORDER g u a r d s at t h e Berlin W a l l w a t c h e d n e r v o u s l y as t h o u s a n d s of East Berliners c r o w d e d i n f r o n t of t h e m a n d d e m a n d e d t o b e a l l o w e d i n t o W e s t B e r l i n . T h i s d e m a n d w a s e x t r a o r d i n a r y : In t h e 2 8 years t h a t t h e Berlin W a l l h a d s t o o d , s o m e 2 0 0 p e o p l e h a d b e e n s h o t t r y i n g t o cross f r o m east t o w e s t . B u t t h e a u t u m n of 1 9 8 9 w a s n o o r d i n a r y t i m e . A r e f o r m i s t r e g i m e h a d e m e r g e d i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d p r o - c l a i m e d t h a t e a s t e r n E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s c o u l d n o l o n g e r rely o n t h e Red A r m y t o c r u s h d o m e s t i c d i s s e n t . P o l a n d a n d H u n g a r y w e r e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f r e p l a c i n g c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t s w i t h p l u r a l i s t p a r l i a m e n t a r y s y s t e m s . A n d i n East G e r m a n y , o v e r o n e m i l l i o n d i s a f f e c t e d c i t i z e n s h a d j o i n e d i l l e g a l p r o t e s t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .

In r e s p o n s e t o t h i s o v e r w h e l m i n g p u b l i c p r e s - s u r e , t h e East G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d d e c i d e d t o relax t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r o b t a i n i n g a n e x i t visa t o v i s i t W e s t G e r m a n y . B u t a t a press c o n f e r e n c e o n t h e m o r n i n g o f N o v e m b e r 9 , t h e East B e r l i n C o m - m u n i s t Party b o s s G u n t e r S c h a b o w s k i s t a t e d ,

w r o n g l y , t h a t a n y o n e w h o w a n t e d t o h e a d t o t h e W e s t c o u l d o b t a i n a n a u t o m a t i c e x i t visa at t h e b o r - der. As h u g e c r o w d s g a t h e r e d a t t h e c h e c k p o i n t s t h a t d o t t e d t h e B e r l i n W a l l , t h e b o r d e r g u a r d s h a d n o i d e a w h a t t o d o . P a n i c k e d , t h e y o p e n e d t h e g a t e s . W h i l e t e l e v i s i o n c a m e r a s b r o a d c a s t t h e scene t o a n a s t o n i s h e d w o r l d , t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s o f East B e r l i n e r s w a l k e d , r a n , a n d d a n c e d across t h e b o r d e r t h a t h a d f o r so l o n g l i t e r a l l y a n d s y m b o l i c a l l y d i v i d e d W e s t f r o m East. E l a t e d w i t h t h e i r n e w f r e e - d o m a n d e n e r g i z e d w i t h a sense o f p o w e r a n d p o s - s i b i l i t y , t h e y j u m p e d u p o n t h e W a l l . A n i n s t r u m e n t o f c o e r c i o n a n d d i v i s i o n b e c a m e a p l a t f o r m f o r p a r - t y i n g . W i t h i n a f e w d a y s , a n d a g a i n w i t h o u t a n y o f f i c i a l a p p r o v a l , o r d i n a r y G e r m a n s , e q u i p p e d w i t h h a m m e r s a n d chisels, b e g a n t o d i s m a n t l e t h e W a l l e r e c t e d a l m o s t t h r e e d e c a d e s earlier.

T h e f a l l o f t h e Berlin W a l l has c o m e t o s y m b o l i z e t h e d r a m a t i c e v e n t s t h a t c l o s e d t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n - t u r y : t h e c o l l a p s e of c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s t h r o u g h o u t e a s t e r n E u r o p e , t h e e n d of t h e C o l d War, t h e d i s i n t e - g r a t i o n of t h e Soviet U n i o n , a n d t h e o n s e t o f civil w a r

9 2 8

le West

) h e a d t o t h e sa a t t h e b o r - ; c h e c k p o i n t s T g u a r d s h a d

o p e n e d t h e ast t h e s c e n e i a n d s o f East ss t h e b o r d e r s y m b o l i c a l l y

eir n e w f r e e - z e r a n d pos- 1 i n s t r u m e n t ' o r m f o r par- w i t h o u t a n y u i p p e d w i t h i t l e t h e W a l l

t o s y m b o l i z e e n t i e t h cen- t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i s i n t e -

t o f civil w a r

A N D T H E WALL C A M E T U M B L I N G D O W N Events in H u n g a r y h e l p e d t o p p l e t h e Berlin Wall in East Germany. In t h e s u m m e r of 1 9 8 9 , t h e H u n g a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t , already well a l o n g t h e road f r o m c o m m u n i s m t o democracy, assisted t h e a n t i - c o m m u n i s t m o v e - m e n t in East G e r m a n y by o p e n i n g Hungary's borders w i t h Austria. The repressive East G e r m a n c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e d i d n o t p e r m i t its citizens to travel t o t h e West; it d i d , however, a l l o w t h e m t o vacation in Hungary. The n e w H u n g a r i a n b o r d e r policy m e a n t t h a t East Germans seeking t o escape c o m m u n i s m h a d o n l y t o b o o k a holiday in H u n g a r y and t h e n walk, drive, or take a train across t h e H u n g a r i a n b o r d e r i n t o Austria, a n d i n t o f r e e d o m . In just three days in September, 1 3,000 East Germans d i d exactly t h a t . This mass exodus f o r c e d t h e East G e r m a n c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n - m e n t t o promise r e f o r m s — t o o little, t o o late.

i n Y u g o s l a v i a a n d i n m a n y f o r m e r l y S o v i e t r e g i o n s . In t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e s , g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o r d i - n a r y p e o p l e — n o t o n l y i n E u r o p e b u t across t h e g l o b e — s t r u g g l e d t o b u i l d n e w s t r u c t u r e s t o s u i t t h e t r a n s f o r m e d g e o p o l i t i c a l l a n d s c a p e . W h a t , t h e n , w e r e t h e causes a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f these d e v e l - o p m e n t s ? A n d w h a t w e r e t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r W e s t e r n i d e n t i t y — a n d f o r t h e f u t u r e o f W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n ?

E C O N O M I C STAGNATION A N D POLITICAL C H A N G E : T H E 1970s A N D 1980s n H o w d i d economic and p o l i t i c a l

developments i n the 1970s and 1980s destabilize p o s t - W o r l d War I I n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l structures?

9 2 9

9 3 0 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: Hew Encounters and Transformations

The 1970s and 1980s saw the post-World War I I political settlement, in national and international terms, begin to collapse. The stark clarity—the " T h e m versus \Js"—oi the C o l d War grew more opaque at the same time that economic crisis widened divisions w i t h i n Western societies and eroded the social democratic political consensus.

The 1970s: A More Uncertain Era I n the early 1970s, the West entered a new era. Detente, the effort to stabilize superpower rela- tions through negotiations and arms control, shifted the Cold War status quo while the easy affluence of the postwar period abruptly ended.

T H E ERA OF DIITENTE West German diplomacy caused the first shift in Cold War relations. I n 1969 the West Berlin mayor and Social Democra- tic Party (SPD) leader W i l l y Brandt (1913-1992) became chancellor. For the first time in its history. West Germany had a government not led by a Christian Democrat. Brandt proceeded to imple- ment a new Ostpolitik or "Eastern policy"—the opening of diplomatic and economic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Ostpolitik reached its climax when East and West Germany recognized the legit- imacy of each other's existence in 1972 and both Germanys entered the United Nations in 1973.

Economic pressures led the leaders of the superpowers to embrace a much wider version of Ostpolitik: detente. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet and the American economies were stag- nating. W i t h both states spending colossal sums on nuclear weapons, their leaders looked for a new approach to the Cold War. Thus, in Novem- ber 1969 Soviet and American negotiators began the Strategic Arms L i m i t a t i o n Talks (SALT). Signed i n 1972, the agreement froze the existing weapons balance. SALT left the superpowers w i t h sufficient nuclear weaponry to destroy the globe several times over, but it helped slow the armaments spiral and ease Cold War tensions.

Detente also extended to U.S. relations w i t h the other great corrununist power: China. I n 1971 President Richard N i x o n (1913-1994) announced

the lifting of travel and trade restrictions w i t h China and then visited China himself. "East versus West" had formed a basic building block of inter- national relations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. I n the era of detente, however, the shape o: international politics became more f l u i d .

E C O N O M I C Oms m T H E W E S T The economic outlook also blurred in this era as the 1970s brought an unprecedented combination of high inflation and high unemployment rates. Com- mentators labeled this new reality stagflation— escalating prices combined w i t h the joblessness of a stagnant economy. Between 1974 and 1976 the average annual g r o w t h rate w i t h i n western European nations dropped to zero.

War and o i l helped create this economic c r i - sis. I n October 1973, the Y o m K i p p u r War began when Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked Israel. I n retaliation for American assistance to Israel, the oil-producing Arab states in OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- tries) imposed an embargo on sales to the United States and quintupled the price of a barrel of o i l . I n 1979 political revolution in Iran doubled the price again. These t w o " o i l crises" vastly acceler- ated the inflationary spiral.

Two other factors also contributed the eco- nomic crisis. First, in 1973 President N i x o n acted to defend the weakening dollar by letting i t " f l o a t . " M a r k e t forces rather than fixed exchange rates now determined the dollar's value against other currencies. This decision gutted the Bretton Woods Agreement, which had governed international economic affairs since W o r l d War I I (see Chapter 28), and introduced a less regu- lated, more volatile economic era. In the t w o decades after the collapse of Bretton Woods, 69 countries experienced serious banking crises as currency speculators destabilized national economies and the annual economic g r o w t h rates of the developing nations fell by one-third.

A second factor in the economic crisis of the 1970s was international competition as Asian, South American, and Latin American economies industriaUzed. Because Western societies possessed a politicized workforce that demanded relatively

Economic Stagnation and Political Change; The 1970s and 1980s 9 3 1

restrictions w i t h self. "East versus •Lg block of inter- the 1950s and ever, the shape of :e f l u i d .

The economic i-a as the 1970s bination of high ent rates. Com- lity stagflation— a the joblessness 1 1974 and 1976 ; w i t h i n western :ro. his economic cri- I p p u r War began armies attacked can assistance to states in OPEC

Exporting Coun- ales to the United of a barrel of o i l . Iran doubled the ;s" vastly acceler-

itributed the eco- President N i x o n dollar by letting i t her than fixed the dollar's value

ecisiou gutted the ich had governed since W o r l d War iuced a less regu-

era. In the t w o Bretton Woods,

lus banking crises abilized national ;conomic g r o w t h fell by one-third, lomic crisis of the petition as Asian, iierican economies societies possessed ;manded relatively

high wages and extensive social services, manufac- turing firms began to move south and east to take advantage of the lack of labor regulation and pro- tection in the developing w o r l d .

CowsEQUEf'JCES OF THE CRISIS As the economic pie appeared smaller, competition for slices increased. The 1970s saw a resurgence of indus- trial unrest. Conflict w i t h unions brought d o w n three successive British governments in a decade. Throughout the West images of picketing w o r k - ers, often fighting w i t h police, dominated tele- vised news broadcasts.

Racial conflict also escalated, w i t h the nine m i l l i o n immigrants residing in northern and western Europe making easy targets for those individuals and groups w h o sought someone to blame for their economic hardships. By 1975 West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland had all banned further immigration, but ironically, this legislation actually increased the size of i m m i - grant communities. Foreign workers scrambled to get into western Europe before the doors shut, and those already established hastened to bring i n family members. By 1991, 25 percent of the inhabitants of France were either immigrants or the children or grandchildren of immigrants.

The resulting encounters among peoples of dif- ferent religious and ethnic traditions transformed European cultures and raised questions about national identiries. In Britain, for example, Afro- Caribbean styles of dress and music reshaped white working-class youth culture. A t the same time, however, journalists often described an individual born in Britain to British citizenship as a " t h i r d - generation immigrant," a label that revealed the "whiteness" of popular notions of British identity. A t least in Britain, as well as in France, immigrants could become or already were legal citizens, h i contrast, in West Germany, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, immigrants remained " f o r - eign," w i t h no chance of obtaining citizenship. Thus, their children grew up in a society in which they had no pohtical rights. These "foreigners" experienced widespread discrimination i n educa- tion, housing, and employment.

E x p l i c i t l y racist p o l i t i c a l parties capitalized on a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n sentiment. The most i m p o r t a n t such p a r t y emerged i n France i n 1974 when Jean-Marie Le Pen (b. 1928) cre- ated the Front National. I n Le Pen's view, " E v e r y t h i n g comes f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n . Every- t h i n g goes back to i m m i g r a t i o n . " Unemploy- ment, rising crime rates, an increase i n illegitimate births, crowded schools, AIDS—Le Pen blamed i t all on n o n w h i t e immigrants. Appealing particularly to young, male w o r k i n g - class voters, Le Pen's party remained a p o l i t i - cal presence i n France for the next three decades.

The 1980s: The End of Political Consensus in the West The economic crisis cracked the postwar p o h t i - cal consensus. T w o offshoots of the protests of the 1960s—new feminism and environmental- ism—demanded a reorientation of social demo- cratic politics, while New Conservatives rejected social democratic fundamentals.

N E W CHALLKWCES A N D N E W iDENXiTiEs; N E W FEMiNisry: N e w feminism (also called "Second Wave feminism") emerged directly out of the stu- dent protest movement of the 1960s, when female activists grew frustrated w i t h their limited role—"We cook while the men talk of revolu- t i o n . " ^ Their efforts to hberate women f r o m political and cultural Umits gave b i r t h to an international feminist movement.

Although new feminists worked for the elec- tion of female candidates and other such pohtical goals, they refused to confine their efforts to par- liamentary politics. Asserting that "the personal is p o l i t i c a l , " new feminists attacked beauty pag- eants, critiqued the fashion industry, and demanded equal access for girls to sporting funds and facilities. They also sought to outlaw spousal rape and to legalize abortion. Abortions became legal first i n northern Europe: i n Britain in 1967, in Denmark in 1970. Catholic Europe followed: I n Italy abortions became legally available in 1978, in France in 1979.

9 3 2 C H A P T E R 29 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

N e w feminism extended its critique of gen- der inequalities to the economic and educational spheres. Feminists demanded equal pay for equal w o r k and greater access for women to profes- sional opportunities. They pressed for more gen- erous parental leave policies, family allowances, and child care provisions. W i t h women account- ing for approximately half of the universiry stu- dents i n many Western countries, feminists also began to alter the content of the curriculum. Challenging the biases that had regarded women's contributions as irrelevant and women's lives as insignificant, feminists brought to light the "hidden h i s t o r y " of women.

N E W CHALLENGES mo M E W IDENTITIES: Ew^moN- MENTALISM Environmentalists added their voice to the political cacophony of the 1970s and 1980s. A t the heart of environmentalism was the idea of natural limits, often conceptualized as "Spaceship E a r t h , " the vision of the planet as a "single spaceship, w i t h o u t unlimited reservoirs of a n y t h i n g . " - This vision led environmentalists to question the fundamental structures of indus- trial economies (capitalist and communist), par- ticularly their inherent emphasis on "more, bigger, faster, n o w . " The movement argued that quantitative measures of economic g r o w t h (such as the GNP) failed to factor in environmental destruction and social dislocation and that in many contexts, "small is beautiful."

The environmentahst movement's concern w i t h ecological susta inability helped create " G r e e n " pohtical parties. Green politics drew on two other sources: new feminism and the N e w Left. The Greens contended that the degradation of the natural environment stemmed from the same root as discrimination against women—an obsession w i t h physical power and an unwilling- ness to tear d o w n hierarchical structures. Green pohtics also championed the key N e w Leftist goal of participatory democracy (see Chapter 28) and so articulated a basic challenge to the p o l i t i - cal status quo: "We are neither left nor right; we are in f r o n t . " By the late 1980s Green Parties had sprouted in 15 western European countries. The Greens were the most successful i n West

Germany, where they sat in the legislature f r o m 1983 and formed an important voting bloc.

T H E N ^ W CONSERVATIVES Discontented by the economic crisis and social unrest of the 1970s, voters throughout the West looked for new answers. In Spain, Portugal, and Greece, they turned to socialist parties. Throughout most of western Europe and in the United States, how- ever, N e w Conservatism dominated pohtical society. Three leaders epitomized the N e w Con- servatism: the Republican Ronald Reagan i n the United States (1911-2004), the Christian Demo- crat H e l m u t K o h l in West Germany (b. 1930), and the Conservative Margaret Thatcher in Britain (b. 1925). New Conservatives rejected the postwar emphasis on social improvement in favor of individual achievement. They argued that rising social expenditures, funded by rising taxes, bore the blame for surging inflation and declining economic g r o w t h rates. As K o h l demanded during his 1983 campaign, "Less state, more market; fewer collective burdens, more personal performance; fewer encrusted structures, more mobility, self-initiative, and competition."

The N e w Conservative agenda included l i f t - ing regulations on business, privatizing national- ized or state-owned industries, and reining in the welfare state. M o s t dramatically. N e w Conserva- tives abandoned the central feature of the post- war social democratic consensus: the conviction that the state has the responsibility to ensure f u l l employment. By imposing high interest rates on their economies, N e w Conservative leaders such as Thatcher lowered damaging double-digit i n f l a t i o n rates. But high interest rates hurt domestic manufacturing and led to rising unem- ployment numbers. I n Britain, 13 percent of the workforce was unemployed by 1984. I n West Germany, too, Kohl's policies of holding down taxes and government expenditures accompa- nied unemployment rates over 9 percent in the mid-1980s.

T H E E H D OF Dtrimt Like the emergence of N e w Conservatism, rising superpower tensions

NEW C British P press aft

powers e fives of 3 States, an Accords, ders, agrt military e dental nu human r i j

The F detente—; European human r i

Economic Stagnation and Poiitical Change: The 1970s and 1980s 9 3 3

lire from iloc.

i by the le 1970s, for new ece, they t most of tes, how-

political Jew Con- ;an in the i n Demo- b. 1930), atcher in s rejected vement in ;y argued . by rising ation and As K o h l

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encrusted itive, and

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lergence of fer tensions

NEW CONSERVATIVES AT W O R K British Prime Minister M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r a n d G e r m a n Chancellor H e l m u t Kohl address t h e press after a m e e t i n g in L o n d o n in 1 9 8 8 .

accelerated the breakdown of the post-World War I I political consensus w i t h i n Western soci- eties. Those tensions had appeared to be receding i n the early 1970s as the leaders of the super- powers embraced detente. In 1975 representa- tives of 32 European states, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords, which ratified existing European bor- ders, agreed to the joint notification of major military exercises (to reduce the chances of acci- dental nuclear w a r ) , and promised to safeguard human rights.

The Helsinki Accords came about because of detente—yet they helped destroy it. Eastern European and Soviet dissidents used the Helsinki human rights clauses to publicize the abuses committed by their governments and to demand justice. Dissident activities expanded throughout the Soviet bloc, as did efforts at repression. When U.S. president Jimmy Carter took office in

1976, he placed human rights at the center of his foreign policy. Carrer's approach infuriated Soviet leaders. Detente finally died in December 1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. Calling the invasion "the most serious threat to peace since the Second W o r l d War," Carter warned that if the Soviets moved toward the M i d d l e East, he w o u l d use nuclear weapons.

The election of New Conservatives such as Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 intensified the rejection of detente and the renewal of the Cold War. Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the " E v i l Empire"—a reference to the popular Star Wars f i l m series released in the 1970s—and revived the anticommunist attitudes and rhetoric of the 1950s. Thatcher strongly supported Rea- gan's decision to accelerate the arms buildup begun by Carter. Her hard-line anticommunism w o n her the nickname " I r o n L a d y " f r o m Soviet policymakers.

9 3 4 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

T H E G R E E N H A M C O M M O N PROTESTS In t h e s p r i n g of 1 9 8 3 , protesters f o r m e d a 14-mile h u m a n chain across G r e e n h a m C o m m o n in England to p r o t e s t against NATO's d e p l o y m e n t of cruise missiles. The protest was p a r t of a m u c h w i d e r m o v e m e n t in w e s t e r n Europe a n d t h e U n i t e d States against t h e intensification of t h e C o l d War after t h e collapse of d e t e n t e . The G r e e n h a m C o m m o n p r o t e s t also played a p i v o t a l role in British f e m i n i s m , as f e m a l e activists established a w o m e n - o n l y c a m p at t h e G r e e n h a m C o m m o n m i l i t a r y base.

R E V O L U T I O N M T H E EAST • W h a t factors explain n o t o n l y the

outbreak b u t also the success of the revolutions of 1989-1991 ?

Between 1989 and 1991, revolution engulfed eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and set in m o t i o n a series of breathtaking changes: Soviet control over eastern Europe ended, the Cold War came to an abrupt halt, the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist. M i k h a i l Gorbachev (1985-1991), appointed Soviet Communist Party secretary in 1985, played a pivotal role in

these events. But Gorbachev did not control the story. Ordinary people developed their o w n plot lines. What the Czech dissident (and future pres- ident) Vaclav Havel called "the power of the powerless" proved powerful indeed.

The Crisis of Legitimacy in the East While Western cotmtries in the 1970s struggled w i t h stagflation, the Soviet U n i o n posted record- breaking production figures. But Soviet statistics ignored the quality of goods produced, the actual demand for a product, or the cost of producing i t . A n d while Soviet leaders boasted that they

Revolution in the East 9 3 5

had completed the heavy industrial expansion planned by Khrushchev i n the early 1960s, microchips now counted for more than i r o n ore, and fiber optics, not steel, buttressed the new modernity. The r i g i d Soviet command economy could not keep up. By the 1980s, its only g r o w t h sectors were oil and vodka—and then the bot- t o m dropped out of the oil market. After peaking i n 1981, oil prices began a steady decade-long fall—and so, too, did the Soviet economy.

The Soviet Union's satellite states i n eastern Europe also lurched f r o m apparent prosperity into economic crisis durmg this period. D u r i n g the 1970s, t w o factors cushioned eastern Europe f r o m the economic crisis in the West. First, east- ern governments could purchase Soviet oil at prices below market value. (In return these states had to sell their o w n products to the Sovi- ets at similar discounts.) Second, loans f r o m Western banks helped mask fundamental prob- lems such as over-centralization and under- productivity. But i n the 1980s, the Soviet U n i o n , strugghng w i t h its o w n faltering economy, began charging higher oil prices at the same time that debt loads overwhelmed eastern European economies.

T H E EjEGi!'Ji''>iiNC. OF THE E N D : SOUDARITV Events i n Poland indicated the fragility of the communist system and initiated the process that led to the sys- tem's collapse. Faced w i t h negative economic growth rates, the Pohsh government announced in July 1980 a rise i n prices for meat and other essentials. Workplace strikes protesting the price rises spread throughout Poland. Then, workers at the Lenin Shipyard i n Gdansk, led by a charis- matic electrician named Lech Walfsa (b. 1943), demanded the right to f o r m a trade union inde- pendent of communist control. One month later, they did so—Solidarity was born. M o r e than a trade union, Sohdarity demanded the liberation of pohtical prisoners, an end to censorship, and a rollback of governmental power. W i t h i n just a few months, more than eleven miUion Poles joined Solidarity.

H o w could Solidarity become such a power- f u l political and social presence so quickly? The

answer rests in the concept of civil society: pub- he organizations and activities separate f r o m the state, commerce, or the family. Ranging f r o m church and charitable groups to sports and hobby clubs, f r o m theater companies to rock bands to radio stations, these organizations and activities help create community life—and i n such communities, an individual creates his or her o w n sense of independent identity. In Soviet- style communism, where the state aimed to con- t r o l not only public life but even private consciousness, such a self-identity, forged out- side state c o n t r o l , threatened the entire political system. (See Encounters and Transformations in this chapter.)

I n Poland, however, communist control had never entirely destroyed civil society, i n part because of the key role of the Roman Catholic Church. Participation i n the Church had long been a way for Poles to express not only their religious faith but also their Pohshness—an iden- tity not controlled by the communist govern- ment. The power of this Catholic identity became clear i n 1979, when Pope John Paul I I (r. 1978-2005) visited Poland. This visit marked the first time any pope traveled to a communist c o u n t r y - b u t John Paul I I was not just any pope. Born Karol Wojtyla, he was the first non-Italian pope since 1523 and the first Pohsh pope ever. Twelve m i l l i o n people—one-third of the Polish population—greeted the pope during his visit. M a n y Solidarity members testified to the impor- tance of this visit i n empowering them to chal- lenge the communist order.

Solidarity's growing popularity soon threat- ened communist control of Poland. I n December 1981 Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law and arrested more than 10,000 Solidarity members (including Wal^a). Like the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, Solidarity seemed to be one more noble but defeated protest i n eastern Europe.

But Solidarity refused to be defeated. I t remained a pohtical presence and a moral force in Polish society throughout the 1980s. Solidar- ity members met i n small groups, published

9 3 6 Ci-iAPTER 29 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

[i THE M O M E N T OF SOLIDARITY Pope John Paul II greets Lech Wa-tqsa. The Polish pope's visit t o his h o m e l a n d in 1 9 7 9 helped energize t h e a n t i c o m m u n i s t protests t h a t coalesced i n t o Solidarity the f o l l o w i n g year.

n e w s p a p e r s , a n d o r g a n i z e d e l e c t i o n b o y c o t t s . A t t h e same t i m e , activists t h r o u g h o u t H u n g a r y , C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , East G e r m a n y , a n d the Soviet U n i o n itself d r e w o n S o l i d a r i t y f o r i n s p i r a t i o n a n d p r a c t i c a l lessons i n resistance.

B e f o r e 1 9 8 9 n o o t h e r eastern E u r o p e a n state e x p e r i e n c e d a p r o t e s t m o v e m e n t as d r a m a t i c as S o l i d a r i t y , yet t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the r e g i o n t w o i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s m a r k e d the l a t e r 1970s a n d the 1 9 8 0 s . F i r s t , e c o n o m i c h a r d s h i p fed w i d e s p r e a d p o l i t i c a l a l i e n a t i o n a n d a deepen- i n g l o n g i n g f o r r a d i c a l change. A n d second, activists a n d o r d i n a r y p e o p l e w o r k e d t o create the s t r u c t u r e s o f c i v i l society.

Ef\<V!RONMENT.£..L pROTE;vr F o r m a n y eastern E u r o p e a n s , e n v i r o n m e n t a l a c t i v i s m h e l p e d create at least the b e g i n n i n g s o f c i v i l society. F o r decades, the c o n q u e s t o f n a t u r e h a d been a k e y

p a r t o f c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y : " W e c a n n o t w a i t f o r f a v o r s f r o m n a t u r e ; o u r task is t o t a k e f r o m her."-" G o v e r n m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t the Soviet b l o c i g n o r e d the m o s t basic e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r e c a u - t i o n s , d u m p i n g u n t r e a t e d sewage a n d n u c l e a r w a s t e i n t o lakes a n d r i v e r s a n d p u m p i n g poisons i n t o the air. B u t because c o m m u n i s t o f f i c i a l s r e g a r d e d the n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t as i n s i g n i f i - c a n t , t h e y t e n d e d t o v i e w e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t p r o t e s t as u n i m p o r t a n t , a " s a f e " o u t l e t f o r p o p u - l a r f r u s r r a t i o n . T h u s , by the later 1970s, m a n y Soviet a n d eastern E u r o p e a n citizens h a d j o i n e d e n v i r o n m e n t a h s t g r o u p s . E n v i r o n m e n t a l a c t i v i s m w o r k e d h k e a t e r m i t e i n f e s t a t i o n , n i b b l i n g a w a y at c o m m u n i s t s t r u c t u r e s . I n H u n g a r y , p u b l i c o u t - rage over a C z e c h - H u n g a r i a n c o l l a b o r a t i o n t o d a m the D a n u b e R i v e r resulted i n the f o r m a t i o n o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t e n c o u r - aged H u n g a r i a n s t o q u e s t i o n n o t o n l y the

Revolution in the East 9 3 7

Danube project, but also the priorities and poh- cies of the entire communist system.

Environmentalism also fueled nationalist protest among the non-Russian peoples w i t h i n the Soviet U n i o n . The various national and eth- nic groups of the Soviet empire watched their forests disappear, their lakes dry up, and their ancient cities bulldozed as a result of decisions made in faraway Moscow by men they regarded as foreigners—as Russians rather than comrades or fellow Soviets. By the 1980s, for example, w i t h schools i n Latvia forced to issue gas masks as a routine safety precaution because of the dan- gers of chemical spills, many Latvians concluded that they w o u l d be better off in an independent Latvia.

Gorbachev and Radical Reform As these discontents simmered among the peo- ples of the Soviet bloc, a series of deaths ushered i n an era of dramatic change. I n 1982, the decrepit Leonid Brezhnev died—and so, i n rapid succession, d i d his successors, Y u r i Andropov (1914-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1911-1985). The time had come for a genera- tional shift. When M i k h a i l Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, he was 54 years o l d . Compared w i t h his elderly colleagues on the Politburo, he looked like a teenager.

Gorbachev's biography encompassed the drama of Soviet history. Born in 1931 Gor- bachev experienced Stalinism at its worst. One- t h i r d of the inhabitants of his native village i n Stavropol were executed, imprisoned, or died f r o m famine or disease i n the upheavals of collec- tivization. Both of his grandfathers were arrested during the Great Purge. His father served i n the Red A r m y during W o r l d War I I and was wounded twice. Yet Gorbachev's family contin- ued to beheve in the communist dream. I n 1948 Gorbachev and his father together w o n the Order of Red Banner of Labor for harvesting almost S I X times the average crop. This achieve- ment, and his clear ability, w o n Gorbachev a uni- versity education. After earning degrees i n economics and law, Gorbachev rose through the

ranks of the provincial and then the national Communist Party.

A l t h o u g h an ardent communist, Gorbachev became convinced that the Soviet system was ail- ing, and that the only way to restore i t to health was through radical surgery. What he did not anticipate was that such surgery w o u l d , i n fact, k i l l the patient. Gorbachev's surgical tools were glasnost and perestroika, t w o Russian terms w i t h o u t direct English equivalents.

G L A S N O S T AI-JD PERESTROIKA Glasnost, some- times translated as "openness," " p u b l i c i t y , " or "transparency," meant abandoning the decep- t i o n and censorship that had always character- ized the Soviet system for a policy based o n open admission of failures and problems. According to Gorbachev, " B r o a d , timely, and frank i n f o r m a t i o n is testimony of faith in peo- ple , . . and for their capacity to w o r k things out themselves."''

Soviet citizens remained wary of Gor- bachev's talk of glasnost—until A p r i l 1986 and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. Operator error at the Ukrainian power plant led to the most serious nuclear accident i n his- tory. I n the days f o l l o w i n g the accident, 35 plant workers died. Over the next five years the cleanup effort claimed at least 7,000 lives. The accident placed more than four m i l l i o n inhabi- tants of Ukraine and Belarus at risk f r o m excess r a d i a t i o n and spread a radioactive cloud that extended all the way to Scotland. W h e n news of the accident first reached Moscow, party o f f i - cials acted as they had always done: They denied i t . But after monitors i n Western coun- tries recorded the radiation spewing into the atmosphere, Gorbachev dared to release accu- rate i n f o r m a t i o n to the public. I n 1986, 93 per- cent of the Soviet p o p u l a t i o n had access to a television set and what they saw on their screens convinced them that glasnost was real. A p o w e r f u l change had occurred in Soviet p o l i t - ical culture.

T h r o u g h glasnost Gorbachev aimed to overcome public alienation and apathy and so convince Soviet citizens to participate i n

Revolution in the East 9 3 9

R O C K I N G T H E B L O C In 1 9 7 7 , t h e Plastic People of t h e Universe play an illegal c o n c e r t in Vaclav Havel's f a r m h o u s e .

PPU h a d s p l i t u p t w o years b e f o r e a n d so d i d n o t s i n g in t h e n e w era, b u t f i t t i n g l y , o n e o f t h e f i r s t i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t President Vaclav Havel i n v i t e d t o t h e n e w free Czechoslovakia w a s a n a g i n g psyche- delic r o c k e r n a m e d Frank Z a p p a .

For Discussion I m a g i n e t h a t t h e post-1968 C o m m u n i s t g o v e r n - m e n t i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a s i m p l y i g n o r e d t h e PPU. W o u l d e v e n t s h a v e u n f o l d e d a n y d i f f e r e n t l y ? W h y o r w h y n o t ?

reforming p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e — o r perestroika, often translated as " r e s t r u c t u r i n g " or " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " Gorbachev believed he could reverse Soviet economic decline by restructuring the economy t h r o u g h moderniza- t i o n , decentralization, and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a l i m i t e d market. Gorbachev knew, however, that even limited economic reforms threatened the vested interests of communist bureaucrats and that these bureaucrats w o u l d block his reforms i f they could. Thus, economic perestroika w o u l d not succeed w i t h o u t political pere- srroika—restructuring the political system, opening i t up to limited competition to allow new leaders and new ideas to t r i u m p h . So i n 1990 Gorbachev ended the Communist Parry's m o n o p o l y on parliamentary power, and the

Soviet Union entered the brave new w o r l d of m u l t i p a r t y politics.

E N D I N G T H E C O L D W A R Restructuring Soviet economics and politics led almost inevitably to restructuring i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations—and to ending the C o l d War. By the 1980s, the arms race absorbed at least 18 percent of the Soviet GNP, as the Soviets scrambled to keep pace w i t h the Reagan m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p . Gorbachev concluded that the Soviet U n i o n could not a f f o r d the C o l d War. To signal to the West his desire for a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, Gor- bachev reduced Soviet m i l i t a r y commitments abroad and asked to resume arms c o n t r o l negotiations. I n December 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the I N F (Intermediate

940 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

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Nuclear Forces) Treaty, agreeing to eliminate all land-based intermediate-range nuclear mis- siles. I n 1 9 9 1 , the Soviets and Americans signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I ) , in w h i c h they pledged to reduce intercontinental ballistic missiles. The nuclear arms race was over.

Gorbachev also moved to restructure Soviet policies i n eastern Europe. He realized, f i r s t , that western leaders w o u l d not end the C o l d War as long as the Soviet U n i o n sought to dictate eastern European affairs, and second, that the Soviet U n i o n could no longer a f f o r d to c o n t r o l its satellite states. I n his first i n f o r m a l meetings w i t h eastern European communist leaders i n 1985, Gorbachev t o l d these aging communist stalwarts that the Red A r m y w o u l d no longer enforce their w i l l o n rebellious pop- ulations. By the time Gorbachev addressed the U N General Assembly at the end of 1988 and declared that the nations of eastern Europe

were free to choose their o w n paths, dramatic changes were underway.

Revohition in Easicero Europe Hungary and Poland were the first states to jetti- son communist rule. Even before Gorbachev took power, economic crisis and public discon- tent had driven the Polish and Hungarian gov- ernments to embrace reform. I n the early 1980s Hungary moved toward a Western-oriented, market-driven economy by joining the W o r l d Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and establishing a stock market. I n 1985, independent candidates for the first time appeared on Hungarian ballots—and many w o n . I n Poland, Jaruzelski's government also experi- mented w i t h restoring some measures of a mar- ket economy and w i t h limited political reform. Once martial law ended in 1983, censorship loosened. Newspapers published criticisms of

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Revolution in the East 9 4 1

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governmental policy that w o u l d never have been permitted before 1980.

Once Gorbachev came to power, the pace of reform i n these t w o states accelerated. I n January 1989, H u n g a r y legalized noncommu- nist p o l i t i c a l parties and trade unions. I n Feb- ruary, Solidarity and Polish communist officials began " r o u n d t a b l e t a l k s " aimed at restructur- ing Poland's p o l i t i c a l system. I n June, Poland held the first free elections in the Soviet bloc. Solidarity swept the contest and formed the first noncommunist government in eastern Europe since 1948.

These remarkable events sparked revolutions throughout the Soviet bloc. I n the f a l l of 1989, mass protests toppled communist governments in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. I n November, as the introduction to this chapter detailed. East Berliners succeeded in tearing d o w n the Berlin

Wall. One m o n t h later the w o r l d watched in wonder as the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel became Czechoslovakia's president.

Q u i c k l y the revolutionary fire spread to Bulgaria and Romania. There, however, com- munism was reformed rather than o v e r t h r o w n . I n Bulgaria, reform-minded Communist Party members ousted the government of Todor Z h i v k o v , w h o had been i n power for 35 years. The Romanian r e v o l u t i o n was similar i n outcome—but much bloodier. I n December 1989, Romania's dictator N i k o l a e Ceau§escu ordered his army to fire on a peaceful protest and hundreds died. I n a matter of days, h o w - ever, the soldiers turned against Ceau§escu. H e and his wife went into h i d i n g , but on Christ- mas Day they were caught and executed by a f i r i n g squad. A new government formed under Ion Iliescu (b. 1930), a communist reformer

942 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

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Mafiar Demokrata Forum " C O M R A D E S , I T ' S O V E R ! " This H u n g a r i a n political poster sums u p t h e revolutions of 1 9 8 9 .

w h o had attended M o s c o w University w i t h Gorbachev.

The final chapter of the eastern European revolutions featured a redrawing of political borders—and a corresponding shift of political identities. In October of 1990, the line dividing West and East Germany disappeared; Germany was once again a single nation-state. But three years later, the nation-state of Czechoslovakia cracked apart, as President Havel was unable to satisfy the demands of Slovakian nationahsts. O u t of Czechoslovakia came t w o new states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union Western p o l i t i c a l leaders and ordinary people praised Gorbachev for ending the Cold War and removing the Soviet hold on eastern Europe. Gorbachev, however, regarded these changes as the international means to a domes- tic end—freeing the Soviet economy for pros- perity and thereby saving the communist system. But prosperity eluded his grasp, and the system Gorbachev sought to save disinte- grated. Economic perestroika proved a failure. By 1990, f o o d and other essential goods were scarce, prices had risen by 20 percent since the year before, and p r o d u c t i v i t y figures and incomes were f a l l i n g . Dramatic increases i n the number of prostitutes, abandoned babies, and the homeless p o p u l a t i o n all signaled the eco- nomic and social breakdown of the Soviet U n i o n .

As these problems escalated, Gorbachev faced g r o w i n g opposition f r o m hard-line com- munists and f r o m reformers w h o wanted a thoroughly capitalist economy. These r e f o r m - ers f o u n d a spokesman i n Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007), a charismatic, boisterous p o h t i - cian w h o became the president of Russia (as distinct f r o m the Soviet Union) in 1 9 9 1 . When the hard-liners attempted to o v e r t h r o w Gor- bachev in August 1 9 9 1 , Yeltsin led the popular resistance that blocked the coup. From that p o i n t o n , Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, dominated Soviet politics.

Yet nationalism rather than the hard-liners or Yeltsin's pro-capitalist movement toppled Gorbachev—and destroyed the Soviet U n i o n . The success of eastern European nations i n freeing themselves f r o m Soviet d o m i n a t i o n encouraged separatist nationalist movements w i t h i n the Soviet U n i o n . A l t h o u g h Gorbachev deployed troops to quell nationalist r i o t i n g i n Azerbaijan and Georgia and to counter inde- pendence movements i n the Baltic states, the Soviet U n i o n broke apart anyway. O n Decem- ber 25, 1991 Gorbachev resigned his office as president of a state that no longer existed (see M a p 29.1).

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M A P 2 9 . 1 The Former Soviet Union In D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , t h e Soviet e m p i r e d i s i n t e g r a t e d . In its place s t o o d 14 i n d e p e n d e n t republics, r a n g i n g f r o m t i n y a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d M o l d o v a to relatively a f f l u e n t a n d Europeanized Latvia to Russia itself, still t h e d o m i n a n t p o w e r in t h e r e g i o n .

IN T H E WAKE OF R E V O L U T I O N • W h a t were the consequences o f the

Revolutions of 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 f o r the societies of eastern Europe?

The collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet U n i o n meant exhilarating yet exhausting change. Democracy-building proved to be a colossal task in societies burdened w i t h the communist lega- cies of social division, political skepticism, and economic stagnation.

Russia After the Revolutiosi I n contrast to states such as Poland, where the dismantling of communism came as the result of popular protests, i n the Soviet U n i o n change had been initiated f r o m above. Moreover, unlike i n eastern Europe, Russians could p o i n t w i t h pride to at least some achievements of communism: They had created an industrial society, w o n W o r l d War I I , and become a Superpower. I n the 1990s, then, Russians struggled to come to terms w i t h their unexpected—and for some, unwanted—revolution.

944 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: New Encounters and Transformations

ICUSSiA'S EcONOSViSC AND S O C i A l CniSiS As the first president of post-Soviet Russia, Boris Yeltsin promised to accelerate his nation's transforma- t i o n into a prosperous capitalist democracy. But he proved unable to do so. Three interlocking developments—continuing economic crisis, widening corruption and criminality, and grow- ing socioeconomic inequality—characterized the Yeltsin era.

In January 1992, Yeltsin applied "shock therapy" to the aihng Russian economy. He lifted price controls, abohshed subsidies, and p r i - vatized state industries. But the economy did not prosper. Prices climbed dramatically, and the clo- sure of unproductive businesses worsened unem- ployment, at the same time that cuts in government spending severed welfare lifelines. By 1995, 80 percent of Russians were no longer earning a living wage. Food consumption fell to the same level as the early 1950s. The economic situation worsened in 1998 when Russia effec- tively went bankrupt. The value of the ruble col- lapsed, and the state defaulted on its loans. Even Russians w i t h jobs found it d i f f i c u l t to make ends meet. M a n y resorted to barter and the black market to survive.

This economic crisis worsened as a result of widespread corruption and crime. I n the 1990s Russians suddenly had the right to own private property, but they could not count on the state to protect that properry. Russia's policing and j u d i - cial systems could not keep up w i t h the new demands placed upon them. As a result, a new force appeared i n Russian life—the "Russian M a f i a , " crime syndicates that offered "protec- t i o n " at a high price and used extortion and intimidation to seize control of large sectors of the economy.

Economic crisis, combined w i t h criminality and c o r r u p t i o n , meant growing inequality. By 1997, seven individuals controlled an estimated 50 percent of the Russian economy.^ Clearly a m i n o r i t y of p o w e r f u l and influential Russians experienced the 1990s as years of extraordinary o p p o r t u n i t y and wealth accumulation. For many other Russians, however, the ending of the Soviet regime meant freedom of the worst

kind—freedom to be hungry, homeless, and afraid. I n 1999, almost 40 percent of Russians fell beneath the official poverty line.

The end of the 1990s coincided w i t h the end of the Yeltsin era. I n December of 1999 the for- mer K G B ofhcer V l a d i m i r Putm (b. 1952) became president of Russia. Well-manicured and austere, Putin provided stable and competent government—a welcome change to the roller- coaster ride of the Yeltsin years. The economy became stronger. Stabilization, however, came at a political price: the return to authoritarianism. Putin centralized political power and economic decision-making under his o w n control and ran roughshod over such key democratic touch- stones as freedom of the press and the right to a fair t r i a l . I n 2008 Putin gave up the Russian pres- idency, but not executive power—he became prime minister instead.

N A T I O N A O S T CHALIEWCES I N THE FoRtvitR SOVIET U N I O N The breakup of the Soviet U n i o n did not bring an end to nationalist violence in the region. Popular nationalist movements vaulted states such as Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics to independence, but many new gov- ernments then found themselves facing their o w n nationalist chaUenges. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan all experienced civil war in the 1990s as regions w i t h i n these new states sought to break away and f o r m their o w n independent states.

Russia, too, faced contmuing violent efforts to redraw its boundaries. Russia remained an enormous multinational federation—and not all of its national minorities wanted to remain part of Russia. The sharpest challenge came f r o m Chechnya, one of 21 autonomous republics w i t h i n the larger Russian Federation. When the Soviet U n i o n broke up, Chechens saw no reason that Chechnya should not f o l l o w the path of Georgia or Azerbaijan toward independent nation-statehood. In 1991 Chechnya declared independence, but Russia refused to acknowl- edge this declaration. The dispute simmered u n t i l 1994 when Yeltsin sent in the Russian army to force Chechnya back w i t h i n Russia's embrace. In

In the Wake of Revolution 9 4 5

the ensuing 20-month conflict, 80,000 died and 240,000 were wounded—80 percent of these Chechen civilians. Yeltsin negotiated a truce in the summer of 1996, but four years later Putin renewed the war. As of 2010, Russia retains con- t r o l over Chechnya by m i l i t a r y force, but Chechen nationalists continue to resist this con- t r o l through terrorism.

Central and Eastern Europe: Toward Democracy? Like the former Soviet U n i o n , the states of east- ern Europe found the path from communist rule to democracy strewn w i t h obstacles. By the end of the 1990s, much of the region—but not all of i t — h a d successfully negotiated that path and achieved pohtical and economic stability.

STRUGGLES W I T H I N THE REU^^!TED G E R M A N Y Almost half the population of East Germany crossed the border into West Germany i n the first week after the fall of the Berhn Wall. They returned home dazzled by the consumer delights they saw in store windows and eager for a chance to grab a piece of the capitalist pie. The West German chancellor, Helmut K o h l , recognized the power of these desires and skillfully forced the pace of reunifica- t i o n . When the two Germanys united at the end of 1990, K o h l became the first chancellor of the new- German state.

K o h l trusted that West Germany's economy was strong enough to pull its bankrupt new part- ner into prosperity, but he proved overly o p t i - mistic. The residents of the former East Germany soon found their factories closing and their liveli- hoods gone. These economic troubles leached over into the western regions of Germany. By 1 9 9 7 , German xinemployn:\ent stood at 12.8 per- cent—the highest since W o r l d NJVar I I . E c o n o m i c difficulties were most concentrated i n the former East Germany, where over 20 percent of the pop- ulation was out of w o r k in the later 1990s.

T h e divide between "Wessies" (West Ger- mans) and "Ossies" (East Germans) sometimes seemed unbridgeable. Women of the former East

Germany, for example, often found i t d i f f i c u l t to adjust to a culture in which more conventional gender roles and conceptions of sexual morahty dominated. I n communist East Germany, women had expected to w o r k f u l l time and to have access to state-provided day care, contraceptives, and abortion. I n contrast, i n West Germany the concept of the male breadwinner/head of house- hold was enshrined i n the legal code until the end of the 1970s and prominent i n West German cul- ture for a long time after.

I n 2005, however, the election of Angela M e r k e l (b. 1954) as chancellor marked an important symbolic moment for united Ger- many. The first w o m a n to head the German Christian Democrats (and a Protestant i n a heav- ily Catholic party), M e r k e l was also the first East German to hold such a prominent political office i n the new Germany. Under M e r k e l , the divide between East and West i n Germany began to wane.

W I N N E R S Ai--iB LOSERS AFTER 1 9 S 9 East Germany, of course, was unique among the former Soviet bloc states because of its rapid unification w i t h West Germany, but peoples throughout the region experienced hard times immediately after 1989. Western advisers and the International Monetary Eund ( I M F ) , which controlled access to much-needed loans, insisted that the new gov- ernments f o l l o w programs of "austerity" aimed at cutting government spending and curbing i n f l a t i o n . The result was economic hardship far beyond what any Western electorate w o u l d have endured.

I n the second half of the 1990s, however, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic countries saw their economies stabilize and their overall standard of living rise rapidly. In. 2 0 0 2 , the average Pole's purckasing power w a s 40 percent higher than i n 1 9 8 9 . But in c o u n - tries such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, the economies continued to flounder. I n Albania, conditions were so dire that some

40 ptmi of AMnms ol woiJiiiig â c i r c i abroad for jobs between 1994 and 1998. A n important divide opened up in eastern Europe