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The Extraordinary Science of Addictive Junk Food By MICHAEL MOSS FEB. 20, 2013
On the evening of April 8, 1999, a long line of Town Cars and taxis pulled
up to the Minneapolis headquarters of Pillsbury and discharged 11 men
who controlled America’s largest food companies. Nestlé was in
attendance, as were Kraft and Nabisco, General Mills and Procter &
Gamble, Coca-Cola and Mars. Rivals any other day, the C.E.O.’s and
company presidents had come together for a rare, private meeting. On
the agenda was one item: the emerging obesity epidemic and how to deal
with it. While the atmosphere was cordial, the men assembled were
hardly friends. Their stature was defined by their skill in fighting one
another for what they called “stomach share” — the amount of digestive
space that any one company’s brand can grab from the competition.
James Behnke, a 55-year-old executive at Pillsbury, greeted the men
as they arrived. He was anxious but also hopeful about the plan that he
and a few other food-company executives had devised to engage the
C.E.O.’s on America’s growing weight problem. “We were very
concerned, and rightfully so, that obesity was becoming a major issue,”
Behnke recalled. “People were starting to talk about sugar taxes, and
there was a lot of pressure on food companies.” Getting the company
chiefs in the same room to talk about anything, much less a sensitive
issue like this, was a tricky business, so Behnke and his fellow organizers
had scripted the meeting carefully, honing the message to its barest
essentials. “C.E.O.’s in the food industry are typically not technical guys,
and they’re uncomfortable going to meetings where technical people talk
in technical terms about technical things,” Behnke said. “They don’t
want to be embarrassed. They don’t want to make commitments. They
want to maintain their aloofness and autonomy.”
A chemist by training with a doctoral degree in food science, Behnke
became Pillsbury’s chief technical officer in 1979 and was instrumental in
creating a long line of hit products, including microwaveable popcorn.
He deeply admired Pillsbury but in recent years had grown troubled by
pictures of obese children suffering from diabetes and the earliest signs
of hypertension and heart disease. In the months leading up to the
C.E.O. meeting, he was engaged in conversation with a group of food-
science experts who were painting an increasingly grim picture of the
public’s ability to cope with the industry’s formulations — from the
body’s fragile controls on overeating to the hidden power of some
processed foods to make people feel hungrier still. It was time, he and a
handful of others felt, to warn the C.E.O.’s that their companies may
have gone too far in creating and marketing products that posed the
greatest health concerns.
The discussion took place in Pillsbury’s auditorium. The first
speaker was a vice president of Kraft named Michael Mudd. “I very much
appreciate this opportunity to talk to you about childhood obesity and
the growing challenge it presents for us all,” Mudd began. “Let me say
right at the start, this is not an easy subject. There are no easy answers —
for what the public health community must do to bring this problem
under control or for what the industry should do as others seek to hold it
accountable for what has happened. But this much is clear: For those of
us who’ve looked hard at this issue, whether they’re public health
professionals or staff specialists in your own companies, we feel sure that
the one thing we shouldn’t do is nothing.”
As he spoke, Mudd clicked through a deck of slides — 114 in all —
projected on a large screen behind him. The figures were staggering.
More than half of American adults were now considered overweight,
with nearly one-quarter of the adult population — 40 million people —
clinically defined as obese. Among children, the rates had more than
doubled since 1980, and the number of kids considered obese had shot
past 12 million. (This was still only 1999; the nation’s obesity rates would
climb much higher.) Food manufacturers were now being blamed for the
problem from all sides — academia, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the American Heart Association and the American Cancer
Society. The secretary of agriculture, over whom the industry had long
held sway, had recently called obesity a “national epidemic.”
Mudd then did the unthinkable. He drew a connection to the last
thing in the world the C.E.O.’s wanted linked to their products:
cigarettes. First came a quote from a Yale University professor of
psychology and public health, Kelly Brownell, who was an especially
vocal proponent of the view that the processed-food industry should be
seen as a public health menace: “As a culture, we’ve become upset by the
tobacco companies advertising to children, but we sit idly by while the
food companies do the very same thing. And we could make a claim that
the toll taken on the public health by a poor diet rivals that taken by
tobacco.”
“If anyone in the food industry ever doubted there was a slippery
slope out there,” Mudd said, “I imagine they are beginning to experience
a distinct sliding sensation right about now.”
Mudd then presented the plan he and others had devised to address
the obesity problem. Merely getting the executives to acknowledge some
culpability was an important first step, he knew, so his plan would start
off with a small but crucial move: the industry should use the expertise
of scientists — its own and others — to gain a deeper understanding of
what was driving Americans to overeat. Once this was achieved, the
effort could unfold on several fronts. To be sure, there would be no
getting around the role that packaged foods and drinks play in
overconsumption. They would have to pull back on their use of salt,
sugar and fat, perhaps by imposing industrywide limits. But it wasn’t just
a matter of these three ingredients; the schemes they used to advertise
and market their products were critical, too. Mudd proposed creating a
“code to guide the nutritional aspects of food marketing, especially to
children.”
“We are saying that the industry should make a sincere effort to be
part of the solution,” Mudd concluded. “And that by doing so, we can
help to defuse the criticism that’s building against us.”
What happened next was not written down. But according to three
participants, when Mudd stopped talking, the one C.E.O. whose recent
exploits in the grocery store had awed the rest of the industry stood up to
speak. His name was Stephen Sanger, and he was also the person — as
head of General Mills — who had the most to lose when it came to
dealing with obesity. Under his leadership, General Mills had overtaken
not just the cereal aisle but other sections of the grocery store. The
company’s Yoplait brand had transformed traditional unsweetened
breakfast yogurt into a veritable dessert. It now had twice as much sugar
per serving as General Mills’ marshmallow cereal Lucky Charms. And
yet, because of yogurt’s well-tended image as a wholesome snack, sales
of Yoplait were soaring, with annual revenue topping $500 million.
Emboldened by the success, the company’s development wing pushed
even harder, inventing a Yoplait variation that came in a squeezable tube
— perfect for kids. They called it Go-Gurt and rolled it out nationally in
the weeks before the C.E.O. meeting. (By year’s end, it would hit $100
million in sales.)
According to the sources I spoke with, Sanger began by reminding
the group that consumers were “fickle.” (Sanger declined to be
interviewed.) Sometimes they worried about sugar, other times fat.
General Mills, he said, acted responsibly to both the public and
shareholders by offering products to satisfy dieters and other concerned
shoppers, from low sugar to added whole grains. But most often, he said,
people bought what they liked, and they liked what tasted good. “Don’t
talk to me about nutrition,” he reportedly said, taking on the voice of the
typical consumer. “Talk to me about taste, and if this stuff tastes better,
don’t run around trying to sell stuff that doesn’t taste good.”
To react to the critics, Sanger said, would jeopardize the sanctity of
the recipes that had made his products so successful. General Mills
would not pull back. He would push his people onward, and he urged his
peers to do the same. Sanger’s response effectively ended the meeting.
“What can I say?” James Behnke told me years later. “It didn’t work.
These guys weren’t as receptive as we thought they would be.” Behnke
chose his words deliberately. He wanted to be fair. “Sanger was trying to
say, ‘Look, we’re not going to screw around with the company jewels
here and change the formulations because a bunch of guys in white coats
are worried about obesity.’ ”
The meeting was remarkable, first, for the insider admissions of
guilt. But I was also struck by how prescient the organizers of the sit-
down had been. Today, one in three adults is considered clinically obese,
along with one in five kids, and 24 million Americans are afflicted by type
2 diabetes, often caused by poor diet, with another 79 million people
having pre-diabetes. Even gout, a painful form of arthritis once known as
“the rich man’s disease” for its associations with gluttony, now afflicts
eight million Americans.
The public and the food companies have known for decades now —
or at the very least since this meeting — that sugary, salty, fatty foods are
not good for us in the quantities that we consume them. So why are the
diabetes and obesity and hypertension numbers still spiraling out of
control? It’s not just a matter of poor willpower on the part of the
consumer and a give-the-people-what-they-want attitude on the part of
the food manufacturers. What I found, over four years of research and
reporting, was a conscious effort — taking place in labs and marketing
meetings and grocery-store aisles — to get people hooked on foods that
are convenient and inexpensive. I talked to more than 300 people in or
formerly employed by the processed-food industry, from scientists to
marketers to C.E.O.’s. Some were willing whistle-blowers, while others
spoke reluctantly when presented with some of the thousands of pages
of secret memos that I obtained from inside the food industry’s
operations. What follows is a series of small case studies of a handful of
characters whose work then, and perspective now, sheds light on how
the foods are created and sold to people who, while not powerless, are
extremely vulnerable to the intensity of these companies’ industrial
formulations and selling campaigns.
I. ‘In This Field, I’m a Game Changer.’
John Lennon couldn’t find it in England, so he had cases of it
shipped from New York to fuel the “Imagine” sessions. The Beach Boys,
ZZ Top and Cher all stipulated in their contract riders that it be put in
their dressing rooms when they toured. Hillary Clinton asked for it when
she traveled as first lady, and ever after her hotel suites were dutifully
stocked.
What they all wanted was Dr Pepper, which until 2001 occupied a
comfortable third-place spot in the soda aisle behind Coca-Cola and
Pepsi. But then a flood of spinoffs from the two soda giants showed up
on the shelves — lemons and limes, vanillas and coffees, raspberries and
oranges, whites and blues and clears — what in food-industry lingo are
known as “line extensions,” and Dr Pepper started to lose its market
share.
Responding to this pressure, Cadbury Schweppes created its first
spin off, other than a diet version, in the soda’s 115-year history, a bright
red soda with a very un-Dr Pepper name: Red Fusion. “If we are to re-
establish Dr Pepper back to its historic growth rates, we have to add more
excitement,” the company’s president, Jack Kilduff, said. One
particularly promising market, Kilduff pointed out, was the “rapidly
growing Hispanic and African-American communities.”
But consumers hated Red Fusion. “Dr Pepper is my all-time favorite
drink, so I was curious about the Red Fusion,” a California mother of
three wrote on a blog to warn other Peppers away. “It’s disgusting.
Gagging. Never again.”
Stung by the rejection, Cadbury Schweppes in 2004 turned to a
food-industry legend named Howard Moskowitz. Moskowitz, who
studied mathematics and holds a Ph.D. in experimental psychology from
Harvard, runs a consulting firm in White Plains, where for more than
three decades he has “optimized” a variety of products for Campbell
Soup, General Foods, Kraft and PepsiCo. “I’ve optimized soups,”
Moskowitz told me. “I’ve optimized pizzas. I’ve optimized salad dressings
and pickles. In this field, I’m a game changer.”
In the process of product optimization, food engineers alter a litany
of variables with the sole intent of finding the most perfect version (or
versions) of a product. Ordinary consumers are paid to spend hours
sitting in rooms where they touch, feel, sip, smell, swirl and taste
whatever product is in question. Their opinions are dumped into a
computer, and the data are sifted and sorted through a statistical method
called conjoint analysis, which determines what features will be most
attractive to consumers. Moskowitz likes to imagine that his computer is
divided into silos, in which each of the attributes is stacked. But it’s not
simply a matter of comparing Color 23 with Color 24. In the most
complicated projects, Color 23 must be combined with Syrup 11 and
Packaging 6, and on and on, in seemingly infinite combinations. Even
for jobs in which the only concern is taste and the variables are limited to
the ingredients, endless charts and graphs will come spewing out of
Moskowitz’s computer. “The mathematical model maps out the
ingredients to the sensory perceptions these ingredients create,” he told
me, “so I can just dial a new product. This is the engineering approach.”
Moskowitz’s work on Prego spaghetti sauce was memorialized in a
2004 presentation by the author Malcolm Gladwell at the TED
conference in Monterey, Calif.: “After . . . months and months, he had a
mountain of data about how the American people feel about spaghetti
sauce. . . . And sure enough, if you sit down and you analyze all this data
on spaghetti sauce, you realize that all Americans fall into one of three
groups. There are people who like their spaghetti sauce plain. There are
people who like their spaghetti sauce spicy. And there are people who
like it extra-chunky. And of those three facts, the third one was the most
significant, because at the time, in the early 1980s, if you went to a
supermarket, you would not find extra-chunky spaghetti sauce. And
Prego turned to Howard, and they said, ‘Are you telling me that one-
third of Americans crave extra-chunky spaghetti sauce, and yet no one is
servicing their needs?’ And he said, ‘Yes.’ And Prego then went back and
completely reformulated their spaghetti sauce and came out with a line
of extra-chunky that immediately and completely took over the
spaghetti-sauce business in this country. . . . That is Howard’s gift to the
American people. . . . He fundamentally changed the way the food
industry thinks about making you happy.”
Well, yes and no. One thing Gladwell didn’t mention is that the food
industry already knew some things about making people happy — and it
started with sugar. Many of the Prego sauces — whether cheesy, chunky
or light — have one feature in common: The largest ingredient, after
tomatoes, is sugar. A mere half-cup of Prego Traditional, for instance,
has the equivalent of more than two teaspoons of sugar, as much as two-
plus Oreo cookies. It also delivers one-third of the sodium recommended
for a majority of American adults for an entire day. In making these
sauces, Campbell supplied the ingredients, including the salt, sugar and,
for some versions, fat, while Moskowitz supplied the optimization.
“More is not necessarily better,” Moskowitz wrote in his own account of
the Prego project. “As the sensory intensity (say, of sweetness) increases,
consumers first say that they like the product more, but eventually, with
a middle level of sweetness, consumers like the product the most (this is
their optimum, or ‘bliss,’ point).”
I first met Moskowitz on a crisp day in the spring of 2010 at the
Harvard Club in Midtown Manhattan. As we talked, he made clear that
while he has worked on numerous projects aimed at creating more
healthful foods and insists the industry could be doing far more to curb
obesity, he had no qualms about his own pioneering work on discovering
what industry insiders now regularly refer to as “the bliss point” or any of
the other systems that helped food companies create the greatest
amount of crave. “There’s no moral issue for me,” he said. “I did the best
science I could. I was struggling to survive and didn’t have the luxury of
being a moral creature. As a researcher, I was ahead of my time.”
Moskowitz’s path to mastering the bliss point began in earnest not
at Harvard but a few months after graduation, 16 miles from Cambridge,
in the town of Natick, where the U.S. Army hired him to work in its
research labs. The military has long been in a peculiar bind when it
comes to food: how to get soldiers to eat more rations when they are in
the field. They know that over time, soldiers would gradually find their
meals-ready-to-eat so boring that they would toss them away, half-
eaten, and not get all the calories they needed. But what was causing this
M.R.E.-fatigue was a mystery. “So I started asking soldiers how
frequently they would like to eat this or that, trying to figure out which
products they would find boring,” Moskowitz said. The answers he got
were inconsistent. “They liked flavorful foods like turkey tetrazzini, but
only at first; they quickly grew tired of them. On the other hand,
mundane foods like white bread would never get them too excited, but
they could eat lots and lots of it without feeling they’d had enough.”
This contradiction is known as “sensory-specific satiety.” In lay
terms, it is the tendency for big, distinct flavors to overwhelm the brain,
which responds by depressing your desire to have more. Sensory-specific
satiety also became a guiding principle for the processed-food industry.
The biggest hits — be they Coca-Cola or Doritos — owe their success to
complex formulas that pique the taste buds enough to be alluring but
don’t have a distinct, overriding single flavor that tells the brain to stop
eating.
Thirty-two years after he began experimenting with the bliss point,
Moskowitz got the call from Cadbury Schweppes asking him to create a
good line extension for Dr Pepper. I spent an afternoon in his White
Plains offices as he and his vice president for research, Michele Reisner,
walked me through the Dr Pepper campaign. Cadbury wanted its new
flavor to have cherry and vanilla on top of the basic Dr Pepper taste.
Thus, there were three main components to play with. A sweet cherry
flavoring, a sweet vanilla flavoring and a sweet syrup known as “Dr
Pepper flavoring.”
Finding the bliss point required the preparation of 61 subtly distinct
formulas — 31 for the regular version and 30 for diet. The formulas were
then subjected to 3,904 tastings organized in Los Angeles, Dallas,
Chicago and Philadelphia. The Dr Pepper tasters began working through
their samples, resting five minutes between each sip to restore their taste
buds. After each sample, they gave numerically ranked answers to a set
of questions: How much did they like it overall? How strong is the taste?
How do they feel about the taste? How would they describe the quality of
this product? How likely would they be to purchase this product?
Moskowitz’s data — compiled in a 135-page report for the soda
maker — is tremendously fine-grained, showing how different people
and groups of people feel about a strong vanilla taste versus weak,
various aspects of aroma and the powerful sensory force that food
scientists call “mouth feel.” This is the way a product interacts with the
mouth, as defined more specifically by a host of related sensations, from
dryness to gumminess to moisture release. These are terms more
familiar to sommeliers, but the mouth feel of soda and many other food
items, especially those high in fat, is second only to the bliss point in its
ability to predict how much craving a product will induce.
In addition to taste, the consumers were also tested on their
response to color, which proved to be highly sensitive. “When we
increased the level of the Dr Pepper flavoring, it gets darker and liking
goes off,” Reisner said. These preferences can also be cross-referenced
by age, sex and race.
On Page 83 of the report, a thin blue line represents the amount of
Dr Pepper flavoring needed to generate maximum appeal. The line is
shaped like an upside-down U, just like the bliss-point curve that
Moskowitz studied 30 years earlier in his Army lab. And at the top of the
arc, there is not a single sweet spot but instead a sweet range, within
which “bliss” was achievable. This meant that Cadbury could edge back
on its key ingredient, the sugary Dr Pepper syrup, without falling out of
the range and losing the bliss. Instead of using 2 milliliters of the
flavoring, for instance, they could use 1.69 milliliters and achieve the
same effect. The potential savings is merely a few percentage points, and
it won’t mean much to individual consumers who are counting calories
or grams of sugar. But for Dr Pepper, it adds up to colossal savings. “That
looks like nothing,” Reisner said. “But it’s a lot of money. A lot of money.
Millions.”
The soda that emerged from all of Moskowitz’s variations became
known as Cherry Vanilla Dr Pepper, and it proved successful beyond
anything Cadbury imagined. In 2008, Cadbury split off its soft-drinks
business, which included Snapple and 7-Up. The Dr Pepper Snapple
Group has since been valued in excess of $11 billion.
II. ‘Lunchtime Is All Yours’
Sometimes innovations within the food industry happen in the lab,
with scientists dialing in specific ingredients to achieve the greatest
allure. And sometimes, as in the case of Oscar Mayer’s bologna crisis, the
innovation involves putting old products in new packages.
The 1980s were tough times for Oscar Mayer. Red-meat
consumption fell more than 10 percent as fat became synonymous with
cholesterol, clogged arteries, heart attacks and strokes. Anxiety set in at
the company’s headquarters in Madison, Wis., where executives worried
about their future and the pressure they faced from their new bosses at
Philip Morris.
Bob Drane was the company’s vice president for new business
strategy and development when Oscar Mayer tapped him to try to find
some way to reposition bologna and other troubled meats that were
declining in popularity and sales. I met Drane at his home in Madison
and went through the records he had kept on the birth of what would
become much more than his solution to the company’s meat problem. In
1985, when Drane began working on the project, his orders were to
“figure out how to contemporize what we’ve got.”
Drane’s first move was to try to zero in not on what Americans felt
about processed meat but on what Americans felt about lunch. He
organized focus-group sessions with the people most responsible for
buying bologna — mothers — and as they talked, he realized the most
pressing issue for them was time. Working moms strove to provide
healthful food, of course, but they spoke with real passion and at length
about the morning crush, that nightmarish dash to get breakfast on the
table and lunch packed and kids out the door. He summed up their
remarks for me like this: “It’s awful. I am scrambling around. My kids are
asking me for stuff. I’m trying to get myself ready to go to the office. I go
to pack these lunches, and I don’t know what I’ve got.” What the moms
revealed to him, Drane said, was “a gold mine of disappointments and
problems.”
He assembled a team of about 15 people with varied skills, from
design to food science to advertising, to create something completely
new — a convenient prepackaged lunch that would have as its main
building block the company’s sliced bologna and ham. They wanted to
add bread, naturally, because who ate bologna without it? But this
presented a problem: There was no way bread could stay fresh for the
two months their product needed to sit in warehouses or in grocery
coolers. Crackers, however, could — so they added a handful of cracker
rounds to the package. Using cheese was the next obvious move, given
its increased presence in processed foods. But what kind of cheese would
work? Natural Cheddar, which they started off with, crumbled and didn’t
slice very well, so they moved on to processed varieties, which could
bend and be sliced and would last forever, or they could knock another
two cents off per unit by using an even lesser product called “cheese
food,” which had lower scores than processed cheese in taste tests. The
cost dilemma was solved when Oscar Mayer merged with Kraft in 1989
and the company didn’t have to shop for cheese anymore; it got all the
processed cheese it wanted from its new sister company, and at cost.
Drane’s team moved into a nearby hotel, where they set out to find
the right mix of components and container. They gathered around tables
where bagfuls of meat, cheese, crackers and all sorts of wrapping
material had been dumped, and they let their imaginations run. After
snipping and taping their way through a host of failures, the model they
fell back on was the American TV dinner — and after some brainstorming
about names (Lunch Kits? Go-Packs? Fun Mealz?), Lunchables were
born.
The trays flew off the grocery-store shelves. Sales hit a phenomenal
$218 million in the first 12 months, more than anyone was prepared for.
This only brought Drane his next crisis. The production costs were so
high that they were losing money with each tray they produced. So Drane
flew to New York, where he met with Philip Morris officials who
promised to give him the money he needed to keep it going. “The hard
thing is to figure out something that will sell,” he was told. “You’ll figure
out how to get the cost right.” Projected to lose $6 million in 1991, the
trays instead broke even; the next year, they earned $8 million.
With production costs trimmed and profits coming in, the next
question was how to expand the franchise, which they did by turning to
one of the cardinal rules in processed food: When in doubt, add sugar.
“Lunchables With Dessert is a logical extension,” an Oscar Mayer official
reported to Philip Morris executives in early 1991. The “target” remained
the same as it was for regular Lunchables — “busy mothers” and
“working women,” ages 25 to 49 — and the “enhanced taste” would
attract shoppers who had grown bored with the current trays. A year
later, the dessert Lunchable morphed into the Fun Pack, which would
come with a Snickers bar, a package of M&M’s or a Reese’s Peanut
Butter Cup, as well as a sugary drink. The Lunchables team started by
using Kool-Aid and cola and then Capri Sun after Philip Morris added
that drink to its stable of brands.
Eventually, a line of the trays, appropriately called Maxed Out, was
released that had as many as nine grams of saturated fat, or nearly an
entire day’s recommended maximum for kids, with up to two-thirds of
the max for sodium and 13 teaspoons of sugar.
When I asked Geoffrey Bible, former C.E.O. of Philip Morris, about
this shift toward more salt, sugar and fat in meals for kids, he smiled and
noted that even in its earliest incarnation, Lunchables was held up for
criticism. “One article said something like, ‘If you take Lunchables apart,
the most healthy item in it is the napkin.’ ”
Well, they did have a good bit of fat, I offered. “You bet,” he said.
“Plus cookies.”
The prevailing attitude among the company’s food managers —
through the 1990s, at least, before obesity became a more pressing
concern — was one of supply and demand. “People could point to these
things and say, ‘They’ve got too much sugar, they’ve got too much salt,’ ”
Bible said. “Well, that’s what the consumer wants, and we’re not putting
a gun to their head to eat it. That’s what they want. If we give them less,
they’ll buy less, and the competitor will get our market. So you’re sort of
trapped.” (Bible would later press Kraft to reconsider its reliance on salt,
sugar and fat.)
When it came to Lunchables, they did try to add more healthful
ingredients. Back at the start, Drane experimented with fresh carrots but
quickly gave up on that, since fresh components didn’t work within the
constraints of the processed-food system, which typically required weeks
or months of transport and storage before the food arrived at the grocery
store. Later, a low-fat version of the trays was developed, using meats
and cheese and crackers that were formulated with less fat, but it tasted
inferior, sold poorly and was quickly scrapped.
When I met with Kraft officials in 2011 to discuss their products and
policies on nutrition, they had dropped the Maxed Out line and were
trying to improve the nutritional profile of Lunchables through smaller,
incremental changes that were less noticeable to consumers. Across the
Lunchables line, they said they had reduced the salt, sugar and fat by
about 10 percent, and new versions, featuring mandarin-orange and
pineapple slices, were in development. These would be promoted as
more healthful versions, with “fresh fruit,” but their list of ingredients —
containing upward of 70 items, with sucrose, corn syrup, high-fructose
corn syrup and fruit concentrate all in the same tray — have been met
with intense criticism from outside the industry.
One of the company’s responses to criticism is that kids don’t eat the
Lunchables every day — on top of which, when it came to trying to feed
them more healthful foods, kids themselves were unreliable. When their
parents packed fresh carrots, apples and water, they couldn’t be trusted
to eat them. Once in school, they often trashed the healthful stuff in
their brown bags to get right to the sweets.
This idea — that kids are in control — would become a key concept in
the evolving marketing campaigns for the trays. In what would prove to
be their greatest achievement of all, the Lunchables team would delve
into adolescent psychology to discover that it wasn’t the food in the trays
that excited the kids; it was the feeling of power it brought to their lives.
As Bob Eckert, then the C.E.O. of Kraft, put it in 1999: “Lunchables
aren’t about lunch. It’s about kids being able to put together what they
want to eat, anytime, anywhere.”
Kraft’s early Lunchables campaign targeted mothers. They might be
too distracted by work to make a lunch, but they loved their kids enough
to offer them this prepackaged gift. But as the focus swung toward kids,
Saturday-morning cartoons started carrying an ad that offered a different
message: “All day, you gotta do what they say,” the ads said. “But
lunchtime is all yours.”
With this marketing strategy in place and pizza Lunchables — the
crust in one compartment, the cheese, pepperoni and sauce in others —
proving to be a runaway success, the entire world of fast food suddenly
opened up for Kraft to pursue. They came out with a Mexican-themed
Lunchables called Beef Taco Wraps; a Mini Burgers Lunchables; a Mini
Hot Dog Lunchable, which also happened to provide a way for Oscar
Mayer to sell its wieners. By 1999, pancakes — which included syrup,
icing, Lifesavers candy and Tang, for a whopping 76 grams of sugar —
and waffles were, for a time, part of the Lunchables franchise as well.
Annual sales kept climbing, past $500 million, past $800 million; at
last count, including sales in Britain, they were approaching the $1
billion mark. Lunchables was more than a hit; it was now its own
category. Eventually, more than 60 varieties of Lunchables and other
brands of trays would show up in the grocery stores. In 2007, Kraft even
tried a Lunchables Jr. for 3- to 5-year-olds.
In the trove of records that document the rise of the Lunchables and
the sweeping change it brought to lunchtime habits, I came across a
photograph of Bob Drane’s daughter, which he had slipped into the
Lunchables presentation he showed to food developers. The picture was
taken on Monica Drane’s wedding day in 1989, and she was standing
outside the family’s home in Madison, a beautiful bride in a white
wedding dress, holding one of the brand-new yellow trays.
During the course of reporting, I finally had a chance to ask her
about it. Was she really that much of a fan? “There must have been some
in the fridge,” she told me. “I probably just took one out before we went
to the church. My mom had joked that it was really like their fourth
child, my dad invested so much time and energy on it.”
Monica Drane had three of her own children by the time we spoke,
ages 10, 14 and 17. “I don’t think my kids have ever eaten a Lunchable,”
she told me. “They know they exist and that Grandpa Bob invented
them. But we eat very healthfully.”
Drane himself paused only briefly when I asked him if, looking back,
he was proud of creating the trays. “Lots of things are trade-offs,” he
said. “And I do believe it’s easy to rationalize anything. In the end, I wish
that the nutritional profile of the thing could have been better, but I
don’t view the entire project as anything but a positive contribution to
people’s lives.”
Today Bob Drane is still talking to kids about what they like to eat,
but his approach has changed. He volunteers with a nonprofit
organization that seeks to build better communications between school
kids and their parents, and right in the mix of their problems, alongside
the academic struggles, is childhood obesity. Drane has also prepared a
précis on the food industry that he used with medical students at the
University of Wisconsin. And while he does not name his Lunchables in
this document, and cites numerous causes for the obesity epidemic, he
holds the entire industry accountable. “What do University of Wisconsin
M.B.A.’s learn about how to succeed in marketing?” his presentation to
the med students asks. “Discover what consumers want to buy and give it
to them with both barrels. Sell more, keep your job! How do marketers
often translate these ‘rules’ into action on food? Our limbic brains love
sugar, fat, salt. . . . So formulate products to deliver these. Perhaps add
low-cost ingredients to boost profit margins. Then ‘supersize’ to sell
more. . . . And advertise/promote to lock in ‘heavy users.’ Plenty of guilt
to go around here!”
III. ‘It’s Called Vanishing Caloric Density.’
At a symposium for nutrition scientists in Los Angeles on Feb. 15,
1985, a professor of pharmacology from Helsinki named Heikki
Karppanen told the remarkable story of Finland’s effort to address its salt
habit. In the late 1970s, the Finns were consuming huge amounts of
sodium, eating on average more than two teaspoons of salt a day. As a
result, the country had developed significant issues with high blood
pressure, and men in the eastern part of Finland had the highest rate of
fatal cardiovascular disease in the world. Research showed that this
plague was not just a quirk of genetics or a result of a sedentary lifestyle
— it was also owing to processed foods. So when Finnish authorities
moved to address the problem, they went right after the manufacturers.
(The Finnish response worked. Every grocery item that was heavy in salt
would come to be marked prominently with the warning “High Salt
Content.” By 2007, Finland’s per capita consumption of salt had dropped
by a third, and this shift — along with improved medical care — was
accompanied by a 75 percent to 80 percent decline in the number of
deaths from strokes and heart disease.)
Karppanen’s presentation was met with applause, but one man in
the crowd seemed particularly intrigued by the presentation, and as
Karppanen left the stage, the man intercepted him and asked if they
could talk more over dinner. Their conversation later that night was not
at all what Karppanen was expecting. His host did indeed have an
interest in salt, but from quite a different vantage point: the man’s name
was Robert I-San Lin, and from 1974 to 1982, he worked as the chief
scientist for Frito-Lay, the nearly $3-billion-a-year manufacturer of
Lay’s, Doritos, Cheetos and Fritos.
Lin’s time at Frito-Lay coincided with the first attacks by nutrition
advocates on salty foods and the first calls for federal regulators to
reclassify salt as a “risky” food additive, which could have subjected it to
severe controls. No company took this threat more seriously — or more
personally — than Frito-Lay, Lin explained to Karppanen over their
dinner. Three years after he left Frito-Lay, he was still anguished over his
inability to effectively change the company’s recipes and practices.
By chance, I ran across a letter that Lin sent to Karppanen three
weeks after that dinner, buried in some files to which I had gained
access. Attached to the letter was a memo written when Lin was at Frito-
Lay, which detailed some of the company’s efforts in defending salt. I
tracked Lin down in Irvine, Calif., where we spent several days going
through the internal company memos, strategy papers and handwritten
notes he had kept. The documents were evidence of the concern that Lin
had for consumers and of the company’s intent on using science not to
address the health concerns but to thwart them. While at Frito-Lay, Lin
and other company scientists spoke openly about the country’s excessive
consumption of sodium and the fact that, as Lin said to me on more than
one occasion, “people get addicted to salt.”
Not much had changed by 1986, except Frito-Lay found itself on a
rare cold streak. The company had introduced a series of high-profile
products that failed miserably. Toppels, a cracker with cheese topping;
Stuffers, a shell with a variety of fillings; Rumbles, a bite-size granola
snack — they all came and went in a blink, and the company took a $52
million hit. Around that time, the marketing team was joined by Dwight
Riskey, an expert on cravings who had been a fellow at the Monell
Chemical Senses Center in Philadelphia, where he was part of a team of
scientists that found that people could beat their salt habits simply by
refraining from salty foods long enough for their taste buds to return to a
normal level of sensitivity. He had also done work on the bliss point,
showing how a product’s allure is contextual, shaped partly by the other
foods a person is eating, and that it changes as people age. This seemed
to help explain why Frito-Lay was having so much trouble selling new
snacks. The largest single block of customers, the baby boomers, had
begun hitting middle age. According to the research, this suggested that
their liking for salty snacks — both in the concentration of salt and how
much they ate — would be tapering off. Along with the rest of the snack-
food industry, Frito-Lay anticipated lower sales because of an aging
population, and marketing plans were adjusted to focus even more
intently on younger consumers.
Except that snack sales didn’t decline as everyone had projected,
Frito-Lay’s doomed product launches notwithstanding. Poring over data
one day in his home office, trying to understand just who was consuming
all the snack food, Riskey realized that he and his colleagues had been
misreading things all along. They had been measuring the snacking
habits of different age groups and were seeing what they expected to see,
that older consumers ate less than those in their 20s. But what they
weren’t measuring, Riskey realized, is how those snacking habits of the
boomers compared to themselves when they were in their 20s. When he
called up a new set of sales data and performed what’s called a cohort
study, following a single group over time, a far more encouraging picture
— for Frito-Lay, anyway — emerged. The baby boomers were not eating
fewer salty snacks as they aged. “In fact, as those people aged, their
consumption of all those segments — the cookies, the crackers, the
candy, the chips — was going up,” Riskey said. “They were not only
eating what they ate when they were younger, they were eating more of
it.” In fact, everyone in the country, on average, was eating more salty
snacks than they used to. The rate of consumption was edging up about
one-third of a pound every year, with the average intake of snacks like
chips and cheese crackers pushing past 12 pounds a year.
Riskey had a theory about what caused this surge: Eating real meals
had become a thing of the past. Baby boomers, especially, seemed to
have greatly cut down on regular meals. They were skipping breakfast
when they had early-morning meetings. They skipped lunch when they
then needed to catch up on work because of those meetings. They
skipped dinner when their kids stayed out late or grew up and moved out
of the house. And when they skipped these meals, they replaced them
with snacks. “We looked at this behavior, and said, ‘Oh, my gosh, people
were skipping meals right and left,’ ” Riskey told me. “It was amazing.”
This led to the next realization, that baby boomers did not represent “a
category that is mature, with no growth. This is a category that has huge
growth potential.”
The food technicians stopped worrying about inventing new
products and instead embraced the industry’s most reliable method for
getting consumers to buy more: the line extension. The classic Lay’s
potato chips were joined by Salt & Vinegar, Salt & Pepper and Cheddar &
Sour Cream. They put out Chili-Cheese-flavored Fritos, and Cheetos
were transformed into 21 varieties. Frito-Lay had a formidable research
complex near Dallas, where nearly 500 chemists, psychologists and
technicians conducted research that cost up to $30 million a year, and
the science corps focused intense amounts of resources on questions of
crunch, mouth feel and aroma for each of these items. Their tools
included a $40,000 device that simulated a chewing mouth to test and
perfect the chips, discovering things like the perfect break point: people
like a chip that snaps with about four pounds of pressure per square
inch.
To get a better feel for their work, I called on Steven Witherly, a food
scientist who wrote a fascinating guide for industry insiders titled, “Why
Humans Like Junk Food.” I brought him two shopping bags filled with a
variety of chips to taste. He zeroed right in on the Cheetos. “This,”
Witherly said, “is one of the most marvelously constructed foods on the
planet, in terms of pure pleasure.” He ticked off a dozen attributes of the
Cheetos that make the brain say more. But the one he focused on most
was the puff’s uncanny ability to melt in the mouth. “It’s called vanishing
caloric density,” Witherly said. “If something melts down quickly, your
brain thinks that there’s no calories in it . . . you can just keep eating it
forever.”
As for their marketing troubles, in a March 2010 meeting, Frito-Lay
executives hastened to tell their Wall Street investors that the 1.4 billion
boomers worldwide weren’t being neglected; they were redoubling their
efforts to understand exactly what it was that boomers most wanted in a
snack chip. Which was basically everything: great taste, maximum bliss
but minimal guilt about health and more maturity than puffs. “They
snack a lot,” Frito-Lay’s chief marketing officer, Ann Mukherjee, told the
investors. “But what they’re looking for is very different. They’re looking
for new experiences, real food experiences.” Frito-Lay acquired Stacy’s
Pita Chip Company, which was started by a Massachusetts couple who
made food-cart sandwiches and started serving pita chips to their
customers in the mid-1990s. In Frito-Lay’s hands, the pita chips
averaged 270 milligrams of sodium — nearly one-fifth a whole day’s
recommended maximum for most American adults — and were a huge
hit among boomers.
The Frito-Lay executives also spoke of the company’s ongoing
pursuit of a “designer sodium,” which they hoped, in the near future,
would take their sodium loads down by 40 percent. No need to worry
about lost sales there, the company’s C.E.O., Al Carey, assured their
investors. The boomers would see less salt as the green light to snack like
never before.
There’s a paradox at work here. On the one hand, reduction of
sodium in snack foods is commendable. On the other, these changes
may well result in consumers eating more. “The big thing that will
happen here is removing the barriers for boomers and giving them
permission to snack,” Carey said. The prospects for lower-salt snacks
were so amazing, he added, that the company had set its sights on using
the designer salt to conquer the toughest market of all for snacks:
schools. He cited, for example, the school-food initiative championed by
Bill Clinton and the American Heart Association, which is seeking to
improve the nutrition of school food by limiting its load of salt, sugar and
fat. “Imagine this,” Carey said. “A potato chip that tastes great and
qualifies for the Clinton-A.H.A. alliance for schools . . . . We think we
have ways to do all of this on a potato chip, and imagine getting that
product into schools, where children can have this product and grow up
with it and feel good about eating it.”
Carey’s quote reminded me of something I read in the early stages of
my reporting, a 24-page report prepared for Frito-Lay in 1957 by a
psychologist named Ernest Dichter. The company’s chips, he wrote, were
not selling as well as they could for one simple reason: “While people like
and enjoy potato chips, they feel guilty about liking them. . . .
Unconsciously, people expect to be punished for ‘letting themselves go’
and enjoying them.” Dichter listed seven “fears and resistances” to the
chips: “You can’t stop eating them; they’re fattening; they’re not good for
you; they’re greasy and messy to eat; they’re too expensive; it’s hard to
store the leftovers; and they’re bad for children.” He spent the rest of his
memo laying out his prescriptions, which in time would become widely
used not just by Frito-Lay but also by the entire industry. Dichter
suggested that Frito-Lay avoid using the word “fried” in referring to its
chips and adopt instead the more healthful-sounding term “toasted.” To
counteract the “fear of letting oneself go,” he suggested repacking the
chips into smaller bags. “The more-anxious consumers, the ones who
have the deepest fears about their capacity to control their appetite, will
tend to sense the function of the new pack and select it,” he said.
Dichter advised Frito-Lay to move its chips out of the realm of
between-meals snacking and turn them into an ever-present item in the
American diet. “The increased use of potato chips and other Lay’s
products as a part of the regular fare served by restaurants and sandwich
bars should be encouraged in a concentrated way,” Dichter said, citing a
string of examples: “potato chips with soup, with fruit or vegetable juice
appetizers; potato chips served as a vegetable on the main dish; potato
chips with salad; potato chips with egg dishes for breakfast; potato chips
with sandwich orders.”
In 2011, The New England Journal of Medicine published a study
that shed new light on America’s weight gain. The subjects — 120,877
women and men — were all professionals in the health field, and were
likely to be more conscious about nutrition, so the findings might well
understate the overall trend. Using data back to 1986, the researchers
monitored everything the participants ate, as well as their physical
activity and smoking. They found that every four years, the participants
exercised less, watched TV more and gained an average of 3.35 pounds.
The researchers parsed the data by the caloric content of the foods being
eaten, and found the top contributors to weight gain included red meat
and processed meats, sugar-sweetened beverages and potatoes,
including mashed and French fries. But the largest weight-inducing food
was the potato chip. The coating of salt, the fat content that rewards the
brain with instant feelings of pleasure, the sugar that exists not as an
additive but in the starch of the potato itself — all of this combines to
make it the perfect addictive food. “The starch is readily absorbed,” Eric
Rimm, an associate professor of epidemiology and nutrition at the
Harvard School of Public Health and one of the study’s authors, told me.
“More quickly even than a similar amount of sugar. The starch, in turn,
causes the glucose levels in the blood to spike” — which can result in a
craving for more.
If Americans snacked only occasionally, and in small amounts, this
would not present the enormous problem that it does. But because so
much money and effort has been invested over decades in engineering
and then relentlessly selling these products, the effects are seemingly
impossible to unwind. More than 30 years have passed since Robert Lin
first tangled with Frito-Lay on the imperative of the company to deal
with the formulation of its snacks, but as we sat at his dining-room table,
sifting through his records, the feelings of regret still played on his face.
In his view, three decades had been lost, time that he and a lot of other
smart scientists could have spent searching for ways to ease the
addiction to salt, sugar and fat. “I couldn’t do much about it,” he told me.
“I feel so sorry for the public.”
IV. ‘These People Need a Lot of Things, but They Don’t
Need a Coke.’
The growing attention Americans are paying to what they put into
their mouths has touched off a new scramble by the processed-food
companies to address health concerns. Pressed by the Obama
administration and consumers, Kraft, Nestlé, Pepsi, Campbell and
General Mills, among others, have begun to trim the loads of salt, sugar
and fat in many products. And with consumer advocates pushing for
more government intervention, Coca-Cola made headlines in January by
releasing ads that promoted its bottled water and low-calorie drinks as a
way to counter obesity. Predictably, the ads drew a new volley of scorn
from critics who pointed to the company’s continuing drive to sell sugary
Coke.
One of the other executives I spoke with at length was Jeffrey Dunn,
who, in 2001, at age 44, was directing more than half of Coca-Cola’s $20
billion in annual sales as president and chief operating officer in both
North and South America. In an effort to control as much market share
as possible, Coke extended its aggressive marketing to especially poor or
vulnerable areas of the U.S., like New Orleans — where people were
drinking twice as much Coke as the national average — or Rome, Ga.,
where the per capita intake was nearly three Cokes a day. In Coke’s
headquarters in Atlanta, the biggest consumers were referred to as
“heavy users.” “The other model we use was called ‘drinks and drinkers,’
” Dunn said. “How many drinkers do I have? And how many drinks do
they drink? If you lost one of those heavy users, if somebody just
decided to stop drinking Coke, how many drinkers would you have to
get, at low velocity, to make up for that heavy user? The answer is a lot.
It’s more efficient to get my existing users to drink more.”
One of Dunn’s lieutenants, Todd Putman, who worked at Coca-Cola
from 1997 to 2001, said the goal became much larger than merely
beating the rival brands; Coca-Cola strove to outsell every other thing
people drank, including milk and water. The marketing division’s efforts
boiled down to one question, Putman said: “How can we drive more
ounces into more bodies more often?” (In response to Putman’s
remarks, Coke said its goals have changed and that it now focuses on
providing consumers with more low- or no-calorie products.)
In his capacity, Dunn was making frequent trips to Brazil, where the
company had recently begun a push to increase consumption of Coke
among the many Brazilians living in favelas. The company’s strategy was
to repackage Coke into smaller, more affordable 6.7-ounce bottles, just
20 cents each. Coke was not alone in seeing Brazil as a potential boon;
Nestlé began deploying battalions of women to travel poor
neighborhoods, hawking American-style processed foods door to door.
But Coke was Dunn’s concern, and on one trip, as he walked through
one of the impoverished areas, he had an epiphany. “A voice in my head
says, ‘These people need a lot of things, but they don’t need a Coke.’ I
almost threw up.”
Dunn returned to Atlanta, determined to make some changes. He
didn’t want to abandon the soda business, but he did want to try to steer
the company into a more healthful mode, and one of the things he
pushed for was to stop marketing Coke in public schools. The
independent companies that bottled Coke viewed his plans as
reactionary. A director of one bottler wrote a letter to Coke’s chief
executive and board asking for Dunn’s head. “He said what I had done
was the worst thing he had seen in 50 years in the business,” Dunn said.
“Just to placate these crazy leftist school districts who were trying to keep
people from having their Coke. He said I was an embarrassment to the
company, and I should be fired.” In February 2004, he was.
Dunn told me that talking about Coke’s business today was by no
means easy and, because he continues to work in the food business, not
without risk. “You really don’t want them mad at you,” he said. “And I
don’t mean that, like, I’m going to end up at the bottom of the bay. But
they don’t have a sense of humor when it comes to this stuff. They’re a
very, very aggressive company.”
When I met with Dunn, he told me not just about his years at Coke
but also about his new marketing venture. In April 2010, he met with
three executives from Madison Dearborn Partners, a private-equity firm
based in Chicago with a wide-ranging portfolio of investments. They
recently hired Dunn to run one of their newest acquisitions — a food
producer in the San Joaquin Valley. As they sat in the hotel’s meeting
room, the men listened to Dunn’s marketing pitch. He talked about
giving the product a personality that was bold and irreverent, conveying
the idea that this was the ultimate snack food. He went into detail on
how he would target a special segment of the 146 million Americans who
are regular snackers — mothers, children, young professionals — people,
he said, who “keep their snacking ritual fresh by trying a new food
product when it catches their attention.”
He explained how he would deploy strategic storytelling in the ad
campaign for this snack, using a key phrase that had been developed
with much calculation: “Eat ’Em Like Junk Food.”
After 45 minutes, Dunn clicked off the last slide and thanked the
men for coming. Madison’s portfolio contained the largest Burger King
franchise in the world, the Ruth’s Chris Steak House chain and a
processed-food maker called AdvancePierre whose lineup includes the
Jamwich, a peanut-butter-and-jelly contrivance that comes frozen,
crustless and embedded with four kinds of sugars.
The snack that Dunn was proposing to sell: carrots. Plain, fresh
carrots. No added sugar. No creamy sauce or dips. No salt. Just baby
carrots, washed, bagged, then sold into the deadly dull produce aisle.
“We act like a snack, not a vegetable,” he told the investors. “We
exploit the rules of junk food to fuel the baby-carrot conversation. We
are pro-junk-food behavior but anti-junk-food establishment.”
The investors were thinking only about sales. They had already
bought one of the two biggest farm producers of baby carrots in the
country, and they’d hired Dunn to run the whole operation. Now, after
his pitch, they were relieved. Dunn had figured out that using the
industry’s own marketing ploys would work better than anything else.
He drew from the bag of tricks that he mastered in his 20 years at Coca-
Cola, where he learned one of the most critical rules in processed food:
The selling of food matters as much as the food itself.
Later, describing his new line of work, Dunn told me he was doing
penance for his Coca-Cola years. “I’m paying my karmic debt,” he said.
This article is adapted from “Salt Sugar Fat: How the Food Giants
Hooked Us,” which will be published by Random House this month.
Michael Moss is an investigative reporter for The Times. He won a
Pulitzer Prize in 2010 for his reporting on the meat industry.
Editor: Joel Lovell
A version of this article appears in print on February 24, 2013, on Page MM34 of the Sunday Magazine with the headline: (Salt + Fat 2 / Satisfying Crunch) x Pleasing Mouth Feel = A Food Designed to Addict.
© 2017 The New York Times Company
Chapter 3
Use of Logs and Other Homework
I ask the members to write a log after each group session to hand in to me. The log should contain the personal goal(s) and how the member worked on the goal(s) in the session, personal reactions to the session, questions that arose from the session and personal growth that occurred from the session. The person may include any other information or reactions pertaining to the session. I read these during the week and make comments on them and return them at the next group meeting. I find this to be an excellent way for me to communicate with each member of the group and to keep a pulse on how each member is responding. Coyne, Crowell & Newmeyer (2008, p. 160) stated that it also gives the leader a way to process independently between sessions. It is also a way for the members to process what they experienced. Gladding (2012, p. 154) noted that it enables participants to “spot inconsistencies in their reactions more quickly than if they simply talked about them.”
I also use other forms of homework. “Homework maximizes what is learned in the group and is a means of translating this learning to many different situations in daily life.” (Corey, Corey & Corey, 2010, p. 241). During group sessions as a member is working, if I perceive that it would be helpful for the individual to work on a particular skill during the week, I will suggest homework for the person to complete and report on in the next session. Gladding (2012, p. 128) stated that homework gives the member twice the benefit because the individual practices the skill outside the group and then interacts with the group about the experience. He also noted that it “helps group members achieve closure on unresolved issues” (p. 362).
The following gives examples of homework assignments:
If a person is working on self-confidence, I might suggest that she spend five minutes a day, standing in front of a mirror and looking herself in the eye and stating her strengths and abilities. We may have identified these in the previous group session or she may be able to list some on her own. In the next group session, she will report on the outcome of this exercise and together we’ll decide if she needs to continue with the assignment for the next week, tweak it in some way or terminate the exercise. I had a group member once, who had worked in the same job for five years and had never received a raise. She believed that she deserved a raise but did not have the self-confidence to go to her boss and ask for one. She discussed in the group her skills at work and how she was always on time and many times worked past her quitting time to complete a task. I assigned her the task of spending time each night sitting in front of an empty chair and
Chapter 3
Use of Logs and Other Homework
I ask the members to write a log after each group session to hand in to me. The log should contain the personal goal(s) and how the member worked on the goal(s) in the session, personal reactions to the session, questions that arose from the session and personal growth that occurred from the session. The person may include any other information or reactions pertaining to the session. I read these during the week and make comments on them and return them at the next group meeting. I find this to be an excellent way for me to communicate with each member of the group and to keep a pulse on how each member is responding. Coyne, Crowell & Newmeyer (2008, p. 160) stated that it also gives the leader a way to process independently between sessions. It is also a way for the members to process what they experienced. Gladding (2012, p. 154) noted that it enables participants to “spot inconsistencies in their reactions more quickly than if they simply talked about them.”
I also use other forms of homework. “Homework maximizes what is learned in the group and is a means of translating this learning to many different situations in daily life.” (Corey, Corey & Corey, 2010, p. 241). During group sessions as a member is working, if I perceive that it would be helpful for the individual to work on a particular skill during the week, I will suggest homework for the person to complete and report on in the next session. Gladding (2012, p. 128) stated that homework gives the member twice the benefit because the individual practices the skill outside the group and then interacts with the group about the experience. He also noted that it “helps group members achieve closure on unresolved issues” (p. 362).
The following gives examples of homework assignments:
If a person is working on self-confidence, I might suggest that she spend five minutes a day, standing in front of a mirror and looking herself in the eye and stating her strengths and abilities. We may have identified these in the previous group session or she may be able to list some on her own. In the next group session, she will report on the outcome of this exercise and together we’ll decide if she needs to continue with the assignment for the next week, tweak it in some way or terminate the exercise. I had a group member once, who had worked in the same job for five years and had never received a raise. She believed that she deserved a raise but did not have the self-confidence to go to her boss and ask for one. She discussed in the group her skills at work and how she was always on time and many times worked past her quitting time to complete a task. I assigned her the task of spending time each night sitting in front of an empty chair and
seeing her boss in the chair and reminding him of how valuable she was to his business. She also reminded him of how long she had been there and never received a raise. When she came to the group the next week, she reported that she felt ready to approach her boss. The group members stood around her and gave her support and encouragement. When she came to group the next week, she reported that she had successfully confronted her boss and she received a larger raise than she had expected.
If an individual has the need to confront a family member, friend or employee, I might suggest that she spend time writing out what she needs to say and then rehearsing it with an empty chair. She might say the same thing day after day or write a new script each day and say it; or I might suggest that she write a letter to the person with the idea of bringing the letter to the next group session and reading it to the group. Sue was taken advantage of by her parents and siblings. She was an adult, living in her own place but in the same community as her parents and sisters. They depended on her to do everything for them, even though they were perfectly capable of completing the tasks that they expected her to do. She resented all that she did for them but had never confronted them to say that she would no longer be their errand girl. This became her goal for group - to confront them and let them know that things were changing. She began by writing a letter to her sisters and reading it to the group the next week. The group praised her and encouraged her. She decided that for the next week, she would practice talking with them face to face. We role played this in the group so she could practice. She continued with the practice over the next week. When she came to the next group session, she felt prepared to confront them. We brain stormed all the possible scenarios that could occur and discussed how she would respond to each possibility. When she left group, she was confident that she could successfully confront them. In the next group session, she was beaming because she had successfully confronted them. They had not responded in a positive manner and were angry with her. She was okay with their anger because she knew that she had done what she needed to do.
If a person is grieving the death of a loved one, I might suggest that she decide on an activity she could do to honor the person and then to go through with the activity. Bill had lost a son eighteen years ago in a car wreck but was still grieving and could not move past this death. The group encouraged him to find a way to honor the memory of his son. He decided that he would host a barbecue and invite his son’s friends who still lived in the area. He set a date and the group helped him think through what his goal was and how he would achieve it with this occasion. Several weeks later, he hosted this event. The group was excited to hear the results at the next meeting. He reported that he and his son’s friends sat for hours, eating barbecue and telling stories about his son. He said that they laughed and cried. He reported that he was so pleased with the event and that he had felt better in the past few days than he had felt for the past eighteen years.
If a person is feeling guilt for something she did or did not do, I might suggest that she not only seek forgiveness from the wronged person, but that she finds a way of doing penance so that she can forgive herself. This might come in the form of volunteering at a non-profit organization, raising funds for a worthy cause or some other form of a good deed. The group might help her decide what she needs to do and give her encouragement to complete the commitment. Angie’s grandmother had died about a year ago and she felt guilty for not spending more time with her grandmother in the months leading up to the death. The group helped her decide that she would go to the extended-care unit of a local retirement center and find an elderly lady who had little or no local family members and become friends with this individual. Her assignment for the next week was to meet with the social worker at the unit and get suggestions of who might need her attention the most. She returned to the next meeting and reported that she had talked with the social worker and also had visited with three ladies in the unit and had decided on the lady to whom she would become a friend. Through the course of the next few weeks, Angie kept the group posted on her progress with her self-forgiveness and finally, reported that she no longer felt guilty and, instead, felt grateful that she had developed this relationship that had become so meaningful to her.
Hopefully, these examples show how powerful homework can be and how helpful it can be in assisting a group member to reach a goal. Goals can be achieved with the aid of homework that would never be achieved from the group sessions alone.
Questions to Ponder
1. As you consider writing a log each week as a way of communicating with the therapist outside the group, what are your thoughts? Does this excite you, frighten you or create some other emotion? How do you think this will be helpful to you?
2. I gave several examples of how homework positively affected group members. What are your reactions to these examples?
Big Case Paper Deadlines
DUE DATE
Item/Section to Be Uploaded to Blackboard (All Thursday by 5pm)
Additional Resources
1/26 by 5pm
Title Page Table of Contents Mission Statement (define mission statement), Executive Leadership (each on separate pages with headings and citations) References Page
Use the APA manual, organization’s website and their annual report and our textbook for the definition of mission statement
2/2 by 5pm
Introductory Paragraph Thesis Statement: What are the key strategic issues you will be examining?
Re-read the case and examine the company’s situation from the date of the article (2013). What were the issues and how would you approach them? This can be discipline specific, but must integrate concepts from other disciplines.
2/9 by 5pm
External Environment – Factors in the Remote Environment Factors in the Operating Environment
See Exhibit 4.1
2/16 by 5pm
External Environment (cont.) – Industry Analysis Porter’s 5 Forces
See Exhibit 4.9, Exhibit 4.18, Ch 4 Appendix
2/23 Nothing Due This Week – Study for the Exam and Continue Your Draft
3/2 by 5pm
Internal Analysis - SWOT Analysis Identification of Core Capabilities
Review Value Chain Exhibit 6.6, and RBV Exhibit 6.7 to help develop other SWOT items.
3/9 by 5pm
Internal Analysis – Comparison and Forecast of Past Performance and with competitors; BCG Matrix
Chapter 6 Appendix; Company’s annual report – stock price, current and historic financial data, etc.
3/16 Spring Break – Class Does Not Meet – Nothing Due – Continue Your Draft
3/23 by 5pm
Draft Due - Internal and External Analysis Due (NOTE: You must also still bring a printed copy to class the day it is due)
3/30 by 5pm
Long Term Objectives and Strategies – List your specific grand strategies List your long-term objectives (results) necessary to accomplish your strategies
4/6 Nothing Due This Week – Continue to work on your strategies and objectives.
4/13 by 5pm
Draft Due – Long Term Objectives and Strategies (NOTE: You must also still bring a printed copy to class the day it is due)
4/20 Nothing Due This Week – Visit The Writing Center for a review of your work to make improvements; Prepare Your Slide for the Presentation
4/27 by 5pm
Final Reports Due (NOTE: You must also still bring a printed copy to class the day it is due) Upload your presentation slide. (NOTE: You must also still bring in your slide on a FLASH DRIVE to class the day the final report is due).
Final Exam Week -- Final Presentations
Big Case Paper Deadlines
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
January 22 23 24 25 26 BY 5PM Title Page, Table of Contents, Mission Statement, Executive Leadership References Page
27 28
29 30 31 February 1 2 BY 5PM Introductory Paragraph Thesis Statement
3 4
5 6 7 8 9 BY 5PM External Environment - Remote & Operating
10 11
12 13 14 15 16 BY 5PM External Environment - Industry Analysis Porter’s 5 Forces
17 18
19 20 21 22 23
Nothing Due This Week on
Blackboard
24 25
26 27 28 March 1 2 BY 5PM Internal Analysis - SWOT Analysis and Identification of Core Capabilities
3 4
5 6 7 8 9 BY 5PM Internal Analysis – Comparison and Forecast; BCG Matrix
10 11
12 13 14 15 16
Nothing Due This Week on
Blackboard
17 18
Big Case Paper Deadlines
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
March 19 20 21 22 23 BY 5PM Draft Due - Internal and External Analysis Due
24 25
26 27 28 29 30 BY 5PM Long Term Objectives and Strategies
31 April 1
2 3 4 5 6 Nothing Due This
Week on Blackboard
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 BY 5PM Draft Due – Long Term Objectives and Strategies
14 15
16 17 18 19 20
Nothing Due This Week on
Blackboard
21 22
23 24 25 26 27 BY 5PM
Final Reports
Due
28 29
30 May 1 2 3 4
Nothing Due This Week on
Blackboard
5 6
7
FINAL
EXAM
WEEK –
Presentations
8
9 10 11 12 13

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