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DOI: 10.1177/0020872808102067

2009 52: 327International Social Work Martin Javier Zurita Paucar

Rodas, Juan Manuel Raunelli Sander, Juan Gabriel Adanaque Zapata and Nancy Claiborne, Junqing Liu, Henry Vandenburgh, Jan Hagen, Armando Mera

interorganizational relationships Northern Peruvian non-governmental organizations : Patterns of

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International Social Work 52(3): 327–341 i s w

Sage Publications: Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC DOI: 10.1177/0020872808102067

Key words interorganizational relationships non-governmental organizations organizational environment Peru

Northern Peruvian non-governmental organizations Patterns of interorganizational relationships

Nancy Claiborne, Junqing Liu, Henry Vandenburgh, Jan Hagen, Armando Mera Rodas, Juan Manuel Raunelli Sander, Juan Gabriel Adanaque Zapata and Martin Javier Zurita Paucar

The purpose of this exploratory study is to understand relationship patterns among selected northern Peruvian non-governmental organi- zations (NGOs), other regional NGOs, the national government and international NGOs. The findings of this pilot study are expected to locate Peruvian NGOs within patterns laid down by globalization; cri- tique ways in which NGOs are utilized to promote false stability, and enhance NGO functioning and capacity building; identify areas for NGO staff development and training; directly contribute to social work organizational practice development and further collaborative research initiatives.

Collaboration and partnership among NGOs

Over the past 60 years, many NGOs have learned to use collabora- tion for capacity building, that is, improving an organization’s ability to promote better services and increase service access to consumers, which can be achieved through a process of enhancing staff skills with access to knowledge and training, developing organizational structures

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and systems, including enhancing management systems, development, improving process and procedures and managing interorganizational relationships (Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006; Tallberg, 2002). An NGO’s success in building greater capacity improves its ability to obtain resources, manage environmental and internal influences for resource allocation and deliver services (Barrett et al., 2005; Kenny, 2005; Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006).

DeGraaf (1986) notes that effective NGOs tend to use collaboration as opposed to using outside experts. Campfens (1996) also emphasizes partnerships as key to local capacity building. Uvin et al. (2000) stress the need for NGOs to expand their capacity by, among other things, influencing other organizations through collaboration and partnerships. Larence (2001) identifies an NGO’s assets as partly consisting of its networks, or linkages, with other organizations, its potential collabora- tion partners.

A key set of relationships is that between more macro (e.g. interna- tional NGO headquarters, national government, national NGOs) and more micro organizations. While these relationships have the potential to be asymmetrical, workable macro–micro relationships exist between local NGOs, their international counterparts, their host nations and local governments (Brinkerhoff, 1999; Snavely and Tracy, 2002) and other, larger-scale NGOs (Brown and Moore, 2001). However, an exces- sive amount of interorganizational linkage and dependency is likely to reduce autonomy (Silberberg, 1998), also essential for organizational effectiveness.

Methods

We examined six NGOs in the northern coastal region of Peru, prima- rily a rural region, that have primary missions of sustainable develop- ment and commitment to providing social welfare services to local communities (Midgley, 1996) in order to explore the following research questions:

What are the linkages and relationship patterns among NGOs operating in the same local geographic region? What are the linkages and relationship patterns among NGOs operating in Peru? What are the linkages and relationship patterns between NGOs and their international stakeholders? What are the linkages and relationship patterns between NGOs and both the local and national government agencies?

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In what ways do NGOs’ internal governance structures affect their interorganizational relationships with other NGOs, with interna- tional stakeholders and with government agencies?

The study was conducted during the period of June and July 2006. Three NGOs were located in the city of Chiclayo, a major metropolitan area, and three located in Piura, a more rural location. The major foci of the participating NGOs were economic development of home crafts, water rights coordination, health services provision, sustainable farm- ing and marketing, micro enterprise, and providing consultation and educational programs to communities and public schools.

A multiple-case study, mixed-methods approach was used. Data were collected from key administrative informants (N = 9), using semi- structured interviews (Yin, 2003). The interview guide was based on the Marguerite Casey Foundation Capacity Assessment Tool Web Version, a derivative product of the Capacity Assessment Grid cre- ated by McKinsey and Company for Venture Philanthropy Partners ( Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006). The interview guide was orga- nized by the following categories:

NGO operational and financial structure (internal governance, scope of services, employees and consumers, annual budget, sources and revenue streams); relationships with other NGOs (local, regional, national, interna- tional) focusing on type of contact, shared operations, coopera- tive activities, resource relationship, perception of and impact of collaboration; and organizational capacity including questions of leadership, adapt- ability (internal and external communication and monitoring), management and staff (composition, goals/objectives, skills and relationships), financial operations (planning, budgeting, monitor- ing and development) and technology (electronic communication systems).

Case study narratives for each NGO were analyzed through induc- tive and iterative processes. Although this approach offers an in-depth look at six NGOs in northern, coastal Peru, the findings are limited to those NGOs and are not highly generalizable. Additional study limi- tations include possible response bias based on the small number of NGOs studied in this convenience sample, possible social desirability bias, where respondents try to present the best face possible and the

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possibility of emergent issues now or in the future, such as changes in funding, which may make results not generalizable over time.

Each interview with an NGO executive director and key staff was conducted by two of the US investigators and one of the Peruvian investigators. Interviews were captured by handwritten notes and tape recordings that were transcribed and translated into English by an expe- rienced bilingual translator. The notes and transcriptions were then analyzed utilizing the NVIVO qualitative analysis software. Two inves- tigation team members analyzed individual case study narratives and identified themes and patterns that were compared across cases, pro- ducing a cross-case synthesis. Findings were reviewed by all members of the team to ensure agreement as well as cultural accuracy.

Findings

Context of the NGOs Environment All six of the NGOs studied have offices located in their respective cities. However, half the NGOs served people in the city and half served people living in the surrounding rural areas. Those serv- ing rural populations agree that developing a trusting relationship with local communities was difficult due to past histories of exploitation from ‘outsiders’. Respondents describe a trust-building process taking between about six months and one year before actual economic devel- opment activities can proceed.

Organizational structure All of the NGOs have a similar organiza- tional structure, consisting of a board of directors, an executive direc- tor, a few project managers, a small number of full-time line staff, and contracted staff who provide programming. The board of directors averages five members, each of whom brings specific expertise to the organization. They provide direction by developing strategic and opera- tional plans, identifying revenue sources and directly controlling bud- getary decisions. Another four roles for boards of directors identified by scholars as best practices were not suggested by our interviewees in this study: policy formation, program monitoring, board development and dispute resolution (Miller-Millesen, 2003).

According to resource dependency theory, when an NGO’s resources are mainly developed from outside, a board of directors is more likely to engage in boundary spanning functions (representing and linking the NGO to powerful external constituents) than daily operational internal monitoring (Miller-Millesen, 2003). This was true in our cases, in that

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the executive director usually provides management oversight and budget allocation.

Agency theory suggests that one way to solve conflicts of interest between managers and stakeholders is to keep the control of decision- making apart from the implementation of decisions, that is, to set up an independent board (Miller-Millesen, 2003). From our interviews, the executive director’s management tasks typically include program planning, outcome identification and measurement, staff supervision, fiscal systems implementation, and written and verbal communications to stakeholders. Some NGOs were an exception, however, in that the executive director is also an equal decision-maker with the board.

The majority of the NGOs use a few project coordinators, account- able directly to the executive director and supervising frontline staff. These project coordinators are responsible for ensuring projects are progressing, problem-solving with staff and assessing resources neces- sary for intervention tasks. Line staff are responsible for successfully implementing services and interventions.

One NGO’s organizational structure deviated from this model, in that it is part of the local university and direct oversight is structured through a university vice-president and an executive board. The presi- dent of the executive board is also the NGO’s executive director. With the exception of the executive director, staff here are unpaid. Service delivery is provided by volunteer professors and students.

There is no common approach for responding to grant announcements. One organization describes a matrix system in which different individ- uals come together to write a given grant, based on staff knowledge, skills and grant particulars. Another organization describes a planning committee responsible for submitting grants. The executive director is responsible for writing grants in the remaining NGOs surveyed.

Volunteers are a key component of many NGOs. Because the unem- ployment rate is high in Peru, many fresh graduates undertake volun- teering to improve future career potential by garnering experience and contacts for future employment (Handy and Srinivasan, 2005). Where they help compose the NGOs’ workforces, the volunteers tend to be very vocal. The NGOs thus employ volunteers not only to save costs but also to establish legitimacy with the community, because these vol- unteers both serve as a conduit to the community and can also represent the community’s voice to the executive director and board of directors. Establishing a common agenda between the community and the NGO is a process that needs to be actively cultivated, according to respon- dents (Silberberg, 1998).

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Leadership The executive directors are well educated, holding master’s-level degrees, usually in engineering, agriculture or business administration. All have held management positions previously and have had four or more years’ experience as top administrators. Most describe their organizational structure and leadership style as being hierarchical.

All identify management by goals and objectives as a core approach, a part of normal strategic planning (Herman and Renz, 1999). A major cause for the adoption of this style is identified as having occurred a few years previously when international NGOs demanded program evaluation, especially measurable outcome information. However, all directors described staff as providing input for decision-making, with the executive director making final decisions. Both the executive direc- tor and the staff are highly involved in decision-making on program- ming issues. This is a limited shared leadership model (Saidel and Harlan, 1998).

Supervising staff is described as frequent, usually daily, with written reports required weekly. Some administrators describe a hands-on approach involved in traveling to new site projects monthly to assess progress and problem-solve barriers to success. A few interview con- sumers to assess staff’s job performance and the quality of services delivered. These appraisal processes may lead to the improvement of program performance (Herman and Renz, 1999).

Finance The main financial supports for the local NGOs come from international NGOs. These typically use a grant mechanism to award these funds. The Peruvian national government also uses a grant mecha- nism for passing through some funding from international sources (e.g. USAID) to NGOs. Funding sources are multiple; often between five and 10 international sources can be identified for each NGO.

A major concern is that these NGOs face decreases in funding due to the changing commitments of the international NGOs and other interna- tional entities. For example, USAID is shifting its priorities for funding to incentives for growing alternative crops (actually for discouraging cocaine production). Relying on the international sector for funding makes these NGOs financially vulnerable to the precipitous withdrawal of funding if an international NGO’s policies change. However, this risk may be lessened by a strategy of utilizing multiple international funding sources (Miller-Millesen, 2003).

A few NGOs provide direct services to consumers who pay a fee. Some NGOs share a percentage of the profits from sales of products developed in partnerships with organizations they coach on economic

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development. Reimbursement generated from consumers who buy products appears to be only a small percentage of these NGOs’ operat- ing revenues, however. The amount of this earned revenue is positively associated with the age of the NGO, the number of staff employed and its budget size (Massarsky and Beinhacker, 2002). (On average, the Peruvian NGOs in this study have existed for less than 15 years; by contrast, the tenure of conventional employers is less than 10 years. The average NGO budget was less than $1m per year.)

A few NGOs are supported by subsidies from local government or the university. The majority of these organizations receive some grant awards from local government agencies and national NGOs.

Surprisingly, individual donor or gifts programs were not identi- fied by any NGOs as a source of revenue. NGOs in Peru do not enjoy exemption from taxes for operations or sales; clearly, this increases their financial burden and decreases incentives for establishing a suc- cessful gifts program. Donors are likewise not given incentives because they do not receive tax deductions.

All of the studied NGOs have internal financial accountability sys- tems established and external professional companies perform annual audits.

NGO relationships Linkage to government These Peruvian NGOs’ relationships with government are positive but distant. According to Young’s (2000) clas- sification of the types of NGO relationship with governments, Peruvian NGOs’ relationships with their government are more supplemen- tary and complementary than adversarial. Supplementary relationship means that NGOs finance and deliver public services left unsatisfied and unfinanced by the government; in a complementary relationship, NGOs deliver public goods left unsatisfied but financed by the govern- ment. NGOs advocacy of public policy or governmental responsibility is an example of adversarial operations. Peruvian NGOs are licensed by the Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional (APCI – Peru Agency of International Cooperation) and must follow rules prescribed for them. They are taxed and audited by this government agency annu- ally. NGOs are relied on to provide services that the government does not provide, or that can better be coordinated locally through NGOs, examples of supplementarity.

Since the government plays a more minimalist role than it would in a more economically developed country, these factors make NGOs desirable, especially if they do not promise to energize political move- ments, which would be an example of adversarial relations. Normally,

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they do not, because the typically top–down administrative structures of the NGOs make it likely that control over activities remains central- ized, rational and conventional in nature, even when the local popular voice on day-to-day operations is encouraged, either from volunteers or clients.

In the case of local coordination, government contract awards are issued to support services that NGOs provide, an example of comple- mentarity. (NGOs were the mechanism for privatizing some services during the 1990s.) For the most part, then, the government provides little support and exerts weak direct control over the NGOs’ activities. Respondents cited Peru’s poor economic conditions as having a large impact on NGOs, with government policies having little impact.

Linkage to regional and national NGOs Four of the NGOs studied have close ties to regional or national NGOs, which also have strong linkages to international NGOs. The relationship between the national and local NGOs are usually alliances based on membership and an iden- tified mission. The national organization usually provides legitimacy and networking opportunities for all member NGOs, service delivery model information, general funding information and research. Linkages among local NGOs appear to be closer, but informal for the most part, having network purposes only (Claiborne and Lawson, 2005). In some areas, the local NGOs meet monthly to discuss local development. Many administrators indicated that they frequently communicate with each other between meetings.

Collaborative activities such as partnered service delivery, joint grant writing and coalition building for advocacy and influencing govern- ment policy decisions were not identified as activities pursued by either the local network groups or the national NGOs

Linkage to international NGOs There is a great deal of interaction with international NGOs. These relationships have allowed the NGOs to expand their services, obtain training, receive consultations that enhance technical expertise and management capability, and strengthen funding acquisition activities. The main portion of revenue for the majority of the local NGOs studied derives from international funding sources. In addition, international NGOs provide expertise and training in micro enterprise, and economic and community development. One impact of international relationships is help in rationalizing manage- ment, that is, making it more like modern international management techniques. International NGOs provide consultation for measuring out- comes and, as stakeholders, demand demonstrable results in achieving

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promised outcomes. These potential impetuses for collaboration produce legitimacy, stability and efficiency in Peruvian NGOs. How- ever, there is concern that financial support from international NGOs may be decreasing or being directed to other programs, having a nega- tive impact on the NGOs’ financial stability and the equal partnership in decision-making (Ashman, 2001).

Collaboration Collaboration is the ability of NGOs to create mutually beneficial relationships that share resources for greater efficiency and expanded service delivery among other local and national entities and NGOs. Historically, as one administrator stated, competition for scarce resources is a barrier to collaboration, but some progress has occurred during the past five years. Currently, collaboration among NGOs takes the form of sharing information and occasionally partnering on a proj- ect. According to Claiborne and Lawson’s typology of the phases of collaboration, these forms are beginning stages of such collaboration (Claiborne and Lawson, 2005). On the one hand, collaborating with other NGOs is perceived as an advantage in that it can increase the like- lihood of realizing individual NGO goals, as well as provide economies of scale. On the other hand, collaboration activity at local or national level is typically weak.

The low level of collaboration among local or national NGOs can be understood in terms of the lack of contingencies of collaboration. Oliver identified six contingencies of collaboration formation: neces- sity, asymmetry (control over organizations), reciprocity, efficiency, legitimacy and stability (Oliver, 1990). Four factors denoting a low level of collaboration were found from our interviews, that is, weak- nesses in efficiency, reciprocity, legitimacy and stability contingencies. Oliver defines efficiency contingency as the organizations’ efforts to improve their input and output ratios. These NGOs do not consider such efficiency in providing services because there is little competition in garnering service consumers. In Peru, the need for services surpasses the amount of services NGOs can provide (Living in Peru, 2006). NGOs are more focused on independently extending their services over large geographic areas or within densely populated areas. Typical examples are agricultural development across a province, economic development in a metropolitan area or providing health services in a city center.

The great demand for these services thus provides NGOs with little incentive to form relationships with other NGOs for developing reci- procity as well as servicing delivery efficiency. Oliver defines reciproc- ity as organizations entering into a resource exchange that is to their mutual benefit and one that overcomes competition in an environment

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of scarcity. Competition among local or national NGOs for scarce resources outweighs the reciprocity of collaboration. Most of the NGOs studied frequently seek to access the same funding sources. The competition over funding makes NGOs less likely to see the need for reciprocity and collaboration. Faced with the constraints on funding munificence, NGOs strategically maintain small full-time work forces because Peru labor laws make it difficult to lay workers off. Therefore, NGOs rely on contracted labor to perform program implementation and servicing.

Legitimacy contingency is evident in that NGOs are challenged to provide funders and government with documentation that is divergent, not easily obtained under time constraints and imposes operational bur- dens. Oliver defines legitimacy as institutional environments imposing justifications of activities. But collaboration has also created adminis- trative burdens and issues of distribution of power. Most often cited is the idea of multiple levels of control requiring individualized reports. The reports discussed are details of funds received and invested made to the APCI licensing government agency or to the university’s auditors (annually); program outcomes and financial accountability reports to government, national and international funding entities (due per grant/ contract award specifications); and the individual NGO program and financial reports generated for their board of directors (weekly and/or monthly).

Some NGOs are not able to produce evidence of success for their funders during the initial community relationship building period, which can last for an extended period of time. The accountability requirement posed by donors conflicts with the principles of collaboration, includ- ing equal partnership, bringing in local NGOs’ agenda and resources of local development and viewing them as leaders in developing their own country (Ashman, 2001).

These administrators live in an environment of somewhat volatile daily operations and find it difficult to engage in strategic planning efforts that could result in formal coalitions and collaboration entities. Stability is the ability of an organization to deal with uncertainty and achieve reliable patterns for resource exchange. Instability in Peru is a factor that makes collaboration difficult. One area of instability is the heavy reliance on one revenue stream, mainly international NGOs. Thus, these NGOs would find it difficult to survive if the international NGOs were to change their priorities for funding. Another area is the different sectors of Peruvian people who remain culturally segre- gated, with intergroup dynamics making collaboration difficult. Stable

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relationships are therefore difficult to achieve between local or national NGOs (Oliver, 1990).

Conclusion

Survival is a major issue for Peruvian NGOs and globalization has brought Peruvian communities into the world’s competition for obtaining international NGOs’ support and resources. Although approximately 22 percent of Peruvian nonprofit income comes from international NGOs and donors (Management Systems International, 2000: 1–87), the organizations studied mainly rely on financial sup- port from international sources, including international NGOs. This support can be quixotic, depending upon the varying agendas of dis- tant funding organizations. All of the organizations have close com- munication ties to regional or international NGOs, but the amount of concrete support varies between organizations and over time. The subsequent impact of local NGOs on communities is strongly linked to the fluctuation in global priorities of international NGOs, which call the shots for their local subsidiaries. Additional revenue is from membership fees and services (usually realized as a percentage of product sales or fees for services). Such additional revenue streams are inconsiderable in that over half of Peru’s population in 2004 was reported as poor and about 20 percent being extremely poor, with rural areas having significantly higher poverty levels (World Bank, 2006: 146–736). Although the cities have drawn much of the rural population away from the rural areas (as agriculture has become rationalized and gone to larger, factory-like farmsteads as opposed to small-holdings), much of the polity is still rural. Peruvian rural civil society, in so far as it depends on NGOs, is thus characterized by resource instability and fragmentation.

The decline of central government and lack of intermediary associ- ations have generally left Peruvian civil society without an effective voice in national policy and with only weak capabilities to hold the government accountable. A consequence of the minimalist state has thus been the lack of infrastructure and political access. At the same time, mechanisms are not in place to support improvement in these areas. Requests for support fall on deaf ears. Frequently, politics in Peru operates as a short-term populist pork-barrel, with some immedi- ate payouts for popular votes but few long-term infrastructural improve- ments. Political access is limited because the mechanisms for long-term interest articulation for the great bulk of people and popular interests do not exist. People currently settle instead for short-term benefits as part

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of the programs of typically populist presidents who seem to have no intention of allowing long-term access to power (Kay, 1982).

Much of the state activity in Peru is currently controlled by the cen- tral government, including the activity of regional and local entities. This is partly due to the fact that the central government provides the bulk of revenues through which local governments operate, but also due to a recent tradition of central control and inflexibility in the politi- cal culture of Peru. The current period reflects the consequences of the post-Fujimori period, where the state is smaller, more centralized and more subject to direct executive control. This type of political structure tends to favor a minimal state in which the military is emphasized, and Peru is no exception. It has a standing military of around 100,000, pro- portionally more than that of the USA currently. It is common to see federal police officers, for example, on patrol inside the city and town limits, a function that in many other countries is usually allocated to local jurisdictions. The state has far fewer functions supporting its puta- tive social mission outside the provision of general education, some (not universal) healthcare, the military and police, and the basic regu- latory structure for business. Due to the fact that the state (in its most basic form) survives from the period of exporting natural and agricul- tural products to a world market, an economic reality that still persists, it exemplifies a polity that has returned to neo-liberal compradorism,1 in other words, a system whose primary role is to facilitate the export of natural resources and agricultural products. This focused centralization juxtaposed with a weakened civil society has resulted in a government that only marginally supports social democratic-type services, abdicat- ing this undertaking to NGOs.

Primary concern for these NGOs’ ability to advance their organi- zational mission and enhance service delivery is their reliance on a single revenue sector (international NGOs), low administrative costs (fewer opportunities to reduce expenditures without having an impact on the service provision), low operating margins (net income percent- age of revenues) and inadequate equity balances (assets minus liabili- ties). Organizations that lack flexibility in these key operational areas are assumed to be more vulnerable than organizations with flexibil- ity. Such financial vulnerability makes it unlikely that these NGOs can withstand financial upsets. A critical examination of each NGO’s financial condition would evaluate the long-term fiscal stability and assess if the organization can withstand financial changes, especially in funding sources. Selecting financial solutions should be performed in tandem with identifying mission-oriented objectives and programs,

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thus ensuring the financial resources are in accordance with the organization’s mission.

Communication liaison with other local NGOs is evident, especially at the level of frontline workers, but little has occurred in terms of joint projects or programs between organizations. Such underdeveloped collaboration may seriously limit the ability of these NGOs to realize greater efficiency and the expanded service delivery that occurs from sharing resources among other local and national entities and NGOs. Collaboration among NGOs becomes especially important in this envi- ronment where resources are scarce and the government is marginally engaged. Planning for program expansion and a complementary full- time, stable workforce should be integrated into the strategy for devel- oping revenue diversification.

However, these NGOs will need to be mindful that such capacity building places pressures on leadership and management systems and styles. Four of the NGOs’ boards of directors may need to change their role from direct operational involvement to a focus on revenue stream enhancement. To address the country barriers, the NGOs’ top leadership will need to engage in organizational advocacy with membership organizations and all levels of government. Executive directors may find their leadership style challenged by increased numbers of stakeholders (including workers) demanding greater input in programming, and organizational policies and procedures decisions. Ultimately, the environmental issues facing these NGOs cannot be resolved by the individualized, informal networking of the present. Traditional avenues of coalition building among NGOs and communities may not be acceptable in Peru due to significant ethnic, social and political barriers. One avenue that may be feasible is col- laboration building among similar NGOs within and across regions. Currently programming and training collaboration occurs on a small scale. The next step of collaboration building among NGOs could be around grant writing, programming, and negotiations with local and regional governments.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank Blanca Ramos, PhD, for forging the partnership between Universidad Católica Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, Chiclayo, Peru; Universidad Nacional de Peru, Pirua, Peru; and the School of Social Welfare, University at Albany, State University of New York.

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Note

A comprador bourgeoisie denotes a class that exists in developing countries that acts in its own economic interests, often sacrificing national interests and the interests of its country’s average citizens. Compradores essentially facilitate the transfer of wealth offshore to neo-colonialist nations.

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Nancy Claiborne, to whom correspondence should be addressed, is Associate Professor at the School of Social Welfare, University of Albany, State University of New York, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA. [email: [email protected]]

Junqing Liu is a doctoral candidate at the School of Social Welfare, University of Albany, at the same address.

Henry Vandenburgh is Associate Professor of Sociology at Bridgewater State College, 131 Summer St, Bridgewater MA 02325, USA.

Jan Hagen is Professor at the School of Social Welfare, University of Albany, at the same address as the first author.

Armando Mera Rodas is Associate Professor of Community Services at the Uni- versidad Católica Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, Av Panamericana Norte 855,

Chiclayo, Peru.

Juan Manuel Raunelli Sander is Associate Professor of Economics at the Universidad Católica Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, at the same address.

Juan Gabriel Adanaque Zapata is Dean of the School of Agronomy at the Universidad Nacional de Peru Campus Universitario, Urb. Miraflores s/n, Castilla-

Piura Apartado Postal 295, Piura, Peru.

Martin Javier Zurita Paucar is Instructor of Education, also at the Universidad Nacional de Peru, Piura, at the same address.

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